1. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, "Of Personal Identity," Section Six, Part IV, Book I, pp. 251-263 in the Selby-Bigge edition (Clarendon Press).
2. Terence Penelhum, "Hume on Personal Identity," Philosophical Review, Vol. LXIV, 1955, pp. 571-589.
——— "Hume's Theory of the Self Revisited," Dialogue, Vol. XIV, 1975, pp. 389-409.
——— Hume, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1975. See Ch.
... [Show full abstract] Four.
3. Antony Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (Routledge & Kegan Paul: New York, 1961) p. 46.
4. It would be better to observe that no clear sense has been attached to the private/public distinction. Thus we sometimes keep a particular perception private, known only to one mind, as when I refuse to tell you my opinion of your spouse. This is not the intended sense of the word private, however, since my opinion here is in principle knowable by others. This perception can be shared.
In thinking about Hume's impressions and privacy, I found it helpful to consult "Hume's Impressions and the Problem of Objective Knowledge," an unpublished manuscript by Max Thomas.
5. For a discussion of this point, see John Cook, "Hume's Scepticism With Regard to the Senses," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1968, pp. 1-17. See Section V.