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Replies to discussions of 'Responsibility and Control, a Theory of Moral Responsibility'

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... SeeFrankfurt (1969).3 Fischer and Ravizza (2000) present their own paradigm Frankfurt case, 'Assassin', on pp. 29-30. ...
... 243-244) in order to give a clearer statement of the two counterfactual conditions that a mechanism must meet in order to be MRR. 7 SeeFischer and Ravizza (2000) for their replyMele (2000) for a response. ...
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According to Fischer and Ravizza, an agent has guidance control over some action A, whenever A is issued from one of their own moderately reasons-responsive mechanisms. This involves two elements: (i) the process P leading to their action being suitably responsive to reasons-(moderately reasons-responsive); and (ii) their taking an attitude towards processes of kind P such that they see themselves as the agents of the behaviour those processes issue (what they call ‘taking responsibility’ for a mechanism). For the purposes of this paper, I assume that guidance control amounts to actually guiding some action. I present, and defend, a counterexample in which an agent intentionally acts via a suitably reasons-responsive process which they have taken responsibility for and yet, intuitively, does not actually guide their action. On this basis, I argue that taking responsibility for a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism is not sufficient for having guidance control.
... With the most prominent one being that ofFisher and Ravizza (2000). But for a beautiful analysis of reason sensitivity see alsoNomy Arpaly (2004). ...
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In Utopophobia Estlund offers a prominent version of a conditional account of feasibility. I think the account is too permissive. I defend an alternative incentives account of feasibility (of action). The incentives account preserves the spirit of the conditional account but qualifies fewer actions as feasible. Simplified, the account holds that an action is feasible if there is an incentive such that, given the incentive, the agent is likely to perform the action successfully. If we accept that ought implies feasible, then we should reject some normative requirements on agents that Estlund would accept in light of his more permissive conditional account. But we can still recognise normative requirements on individual and collective agents that, if complied with, would result in a world that is radically better than our own.
... [Strawson 1962;Frankfurt 1971;Dennett 2003;Fischer 2006;Wallace 1994] и др., исходит не из логических, физических или метафизических истин относительно того, что представляют собой альтернативные возможности и могут ли они существовать в детерминированном мире, а из особенностей человеческой психологии и практик общественной жизни. Компатибилистские теории психологического типа утверждают, что детерминированный агент, обладающий определенными психологическими свойствами и находящийся в определенной ситуации, наделен такой степенью свободы воли, которой достаточно для приписывания этому агенту моральной ответственности, и дают, тем самым, положительный ответ как минимум на второй из приведенных выше вопросов о свободе воли.Компатибилистские теории психологического типа получили широкое распространение в дискуссиях о свободе воли, имевших место в последние десятилетия, тем самым поставив инкомпатибилистов перед необходимостью высказать формальное возражение, не сводящееся к интуиции о том, что моральная ответственность и физический детерминизм никак не могут быть совместимы. ...
... It is worth noting that some compatibilists who deny PAP nonetheless avail themselves of claims about the existence of nearby possible worlds. Fisher and Ravizza (1999), e.g., argue that an agent acts freely when she acts on the basis of a mechanism that is 'moderately reason responsive', and explain that such a mechanism is one in which the mechanism delivers different actions for non-actual reasons in at least some possible worlds. Such a version of compatibilism seems committed to Minimal PAP. ...
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Some proponents of compatibilist moral responsibility have proposed an historical theory which requires that agents deploy character control in order to be morally responsible. An important type of argument for the character control condition is the manipulation argument, such as Mele’s example of Beth and Chuck. In this paper I show that Beth can be exonerated on various conditions other than her failure to execute character control—I propose a new character, Patty, who meets these conditions and is, I argue, morally responsible for her actions despite lacking character control. Thus the character control condition is unmotivated. I suggest there may be an alternative basis for an historical theory of moral responsibility nonetheless.
... Even if regulative control might be precluded by evil neurosurgeons and by determinism , guidance control is precluded by neither . Fischer and Ravizza argue that " guidance control is the freedom - relevant condition necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility " ( Fischer and Ravizza 2000 , p . 441 , footnote 1 ) and that " [ g ] uidance control of an action involves an agent ' s freely per - forming that action " ( Fischer and Ravizza 1998 , p . 31 ) . ...
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Compatibilist methods borrowed from the free will debate are often used to establish doxastic freedom and epistemic responsibility. Certain analogies between the formation of intention and belief make this approach especially promising. Despite being a compatibilist myself in the practical debate, I will argue that compatibilist methods fail to establish doxastic freedom. My rejection is not based on an argument against the analogy of free will and free belief. Rather, I aim at showing that compatibilist free will and free belief are equally misguided because freedom is a concept that only applies to an agent’s actions and not to her mental attitudes. Compatibilist strategies that seek to define control by reason-responsiveness merely weaken the conditions for freedom such that arbitrary forms of control can be defined. I will demonstrate that these methods also commit to freedom of fear, freedom of hope and freedom of anger. However, I accept the compatibilist challenge to account for the addict’s and the paranoid’s unfreedom. I will sketch a unified approach to compatibilist free agency that does justice to these phenomena without the help of free will or free belief.
... In the present century, seeArpaly (2003),Bratman (2000),Cuypers (2006),Dennett (2003),Fischer (2002Fischer ( , 2004,Fischer and Ravizza (2000),Frankfurt (2002),Haji (2000),Kapitan (2000),McKenna (2004, n.d.),Pereboom (2001),Stump (2002),Vargas (2006), andZimmerman (2002Zimmerman ( , 2003. ...
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To what extent should an analysis of an agent’s being morally responsible for an action that he performed—especially a compatibilist analysis of this—be sensitive to the agent’s history? In this article, I give the issue a clearer focus than it tends to have in the literature, I lay some groundwork for an attempt to answer the question, and I motivate a partial but detailed answer.
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Some philosophers have recently argued that luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists and libertarians alike. But conceptual ambiguity regarding deterministic luck at the time of decision – henceforth C-luck – has obscured recognition of the problem C-luck poses to compatibilism. This paper clarifies C-luck and distinguishes it from present luck, showing that the former arises from contingent factors at the time of decision instead of presupposed free will requirements. We then argue that empirical findings confirm the existence of C-luck thereby raising a fundamental challenge to compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility.
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This paper argues against dismissing the Principle of Alternative Possibilities merely on the ground of so-called Frankfurt-style cases. Its main claims are that the interpretation of such cases depends on which substantive theory of responsibility one endorses and that Frankfurt-style cases all involve some form of causal overdetermination which can be interpreted either as being compatible with the potentially manipulated agent’s ability to act otherwise or as a responsibility undermining constraint. The paper also argues that the possibility of such scenarios can support the truth of classical compatibilism as much as the truth of semicompatibilism.
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In the contemporary debate on the use of the neurosciences in ethics and law, numerous arguments have been bandied about among scientists and philosophers looking to uphold or reject the reliability and validity of scientific findings obtained by brain imaging technologies. Among the most vexing questions is, Can we trust that technology? One point of disagreement is whether brain scans offer a window through which to observe the functioning of the mind, in such a way as to enable lawyers, judges, physicians, and lawmakers to detect anomalies in brain function that may account for criminal unconscious behavior. Those who stand behind brain imaging believe that this can indeed be achieved, whereas those in opposition stress that brain scans are highly open to interpretation and that the data they provide is insufficient to establish causal connections. The question essentially comes down to whether technology can reliably be used to determine the intentions of the individual, thus establishing mens rea, for example, and hence responsibility. This article focuses on the latter notion and explores whether we can rely on the neurosciences to shed light on a complex form of moral and legal reasoning, as well as the role of the neurosciences in reawakening a philosophical and legal interest in trying to set responsibility on an empirical basis.
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The manipulation argument poses a significant challenge for any adequate compatibilist theory of agency. The argument maintains that there is no relevant difference between actions or pro-attitudes that are induced by nefarious neurosurgeons, God, or (and this is the important point) natural causes. Therefore, if manipulation is thought to undermine moral responsibility, then so also ought causal determinism. In this paper, I will attempt to bolster the plausibility of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's semicompatibilist theory of moral responsibility by demonstrating how their account provides a distinctive line of response to three important types of manipulation.
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Implicit intergroup biases have been shown to impact social behavior in many unsettling ways, from disparities in decisions to “shoot” black and white men in a computer simulation to unequal gender-based evaluations of résumés and CVs. It is a difficult question whether, and in what way, agents are responsible for behaviors affected by implicit biases. I argue that in paradigmatic cases agents are responsible for these behaviors in the sense that the behavior is “attributable” to them. That is, behaviors affected by implicit biases reflect upon who one is as a moral agent.
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In a recent set of publications Ballantyne (Can J Philos 41(4):485-503, 2011, Synthese 185(3):319-334, 2012, Synthese 91(7):1391-1407, 2013) argues that luck does not have a significant role in understanding the concept of knowledge. The problem, Ballantyne argues, lies in what is commonly thought to be a necessary condition for luck—a significance or value condition (Pritchard, in Epistemic luck, 2005; Coffman, in Synthese 15(3):385-398, 2007; Lackey, in Austral J Philos 86(2):255-267, 2008, Ballantyne, in Can J Philos 41(4):485-503, 2011). For an event, like forming a true belief, to be lucky then it must be of some significance or value to an agent. Yet, if significance, as it has also been commonly thought, plays a role in determining the degree of luck (Pritchard and Smith, in New Ideas Psychol 22:1-28, 2004; Ballantyne, in Can J Philos 41(4):485-503, 2011), then this leads to a result similar to (but not the same as) an absurd form of pragmatic encroachment. If this problem cannot be avoided, then anti-luck epistemology should be abandoned. However, this paper will argue that with proper considerations about the nature of luck according to at least one theory, no such problem arises.
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Este artículo plantea tres objeciones a la propuesta de Richard Moran acerca de la relación entre razones y responsabilidad. En primer lugar, mostraré que la relación entre razones y responsabilidad que presenta Moran es problemática, por dos razones: primero, las creencias alienadas del agente pueden ser parte del razonamiento; y segundo, las llamadas razones de estado no cumplen el Principio de Transparencia, pero no eximen de responsabilidad. En segundo lugar, argumentaré que la propuesta atribucionista de Moran postula una relación demasiado exigente entre estados mentales y razonamiento. Tercero, señalaré la dificultad de la propuesta de Moran para recoger la intuición de que tanto la autoría como la responsabilidad se presentan en grados.
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In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza propose an account of moral responsibility according to which an agent is morally responsible for an action just when that action is the product of her own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, where reasons-responsiveness is explained in terms of the mechanism’s regular reasons-receptivity and weak reasons-reactivity. In a review of Fischer and Ravizza’s book Mele contends that their weakly reasons-reactivity condition is inadequate, constructing a case in which, according to their theory, an extreme agoraphobic is morally responsible for his staying in his home. In this paper I modify Fischer and Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility in light of Mele’s problematic example, suggesting a refinement of their weakly reasons-reactivity requirement via a distinction between weakly sufficient reasons and strongly sufficient reasons.
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I argue that one’s responsibility for one’s emotions has a two-fold structure: one bears direct responsibility for emotions insofar as they are the upshot of first-order evaluative judgements concerning reasons of fit; and one bears derivative responsibility for them insofar as they are consequences of activities of emotional self-regulation, which can reflect one’s take on second-order reasons concerning the strategic, prudential, or moral desirability of undergoing a particular emotion in a particular context.
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Suppose an agent has made a judgement of the form, ‘all things considered, it would be better for me to do a rather than b (or any range of alternatives to doing a)’ where a and b stand for particular actions. If she does not act upon her judgement in these circumstances would that be a failure of rationality on her part? In this paper I consider two different interpretations of all things considered judgements which give different answers to this question, one suggested by Donald Davidson, the other by Paul Grice and Judith Baker. I argue that neither interpretation is adequate. However, a third interpretation that combines features of the Grice/Baker view with the Davidsonian view is possible. In the final section of the paper I defend this interpretation against two objections.
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In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, John Fischer and Mark Ravizza argue against incompatibilist principles of moral responsibility and offer a compatibilist account of moral responsibility. The book has sparked much discussion and criticism. In this article I point out a significant flaw in Fischer and Ravizza’s negative arguments against the incompatibilist Principle of the Transfer of Non-Responsibility. I also criticise their positive argument that moral responsibility for consequences depends on action-responsiveness. In the former case I argue that their putative counterexamples against Transfer NR and Transfer NR* are underdescribed but once fully described depend upon consequence-particulars and not consequence-universals as they claim. In the latter case I argue that their account is unable to cope with quite ordinary cases of jointly determined consequences.
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In this article I propose a resolution to the history issue for responsible agency, given a moderate revisionist approach to responsibility. Roughly, moderate revisionism is the view that a plausible and normatively adequate theory of responsibility will require principled departures from commonsense thinking. The history issue is whether morally responsible agency – that is, whether an agent is an apt target of our responsibility-characteristic practices and attitudes – is an essentially historical notion. Some have maintained that responsible agents must have particular sorts of histories, others have argued that no such history is required. Resolution of this contentious issue is connected to a wide range of concerns, including the significance and culpability of different forms of manipulation, the plausibility of important incompatibilist criticisms of compatibilism, and of course, a satisfactory account of moral responsibility. As it turns out, history matters sometimes, but less frequently than we might think.
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I present two different models of moral responsibility -- two different accounts of what we value in behavior for which the agent can legitimately be held morally responsible. On the first model, what we value is making a certain sort of difference to the world. On the second model, which I favor, we value a certain kind of self-expression. I argue that if one adopts the self-expression view, then one will be inclined to accept that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities.