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... Rozšiřování NATO na východ od konce studené války odborníci na mezinárodní vztahy označují za velmi kontroverzní proces a zdůrazňují, že země rozpadlé Varšavské smlouvy, včetně postsovětských republik tento proces sice vítaly, ale RF tento proces vnímala jako hlavní hrozbu pro svoji bezpečnost (Eichler 2019: 15-16;144). Navíc někteří odborníci vyhodnotili pozvánku NATO pro Gruzii a Ukrajinu v roce 2008, jako vážnou hrozbu pro bezpečnost Ruska a začátek jeho revizionistické politiky v praxi (Mead 2014). ...
... "blízkém zahraniční", kde má Rusko mocensky dominovat) na základě využití rusky mluvících etnik, což potvrdilo nejenom návrat geopolitiky, která znovu představuje paradigma národních zájmů a zahraniční politiky, ale i zásadní změnu mezinárodních vztahů v duchu soupeření velmocí a mocenské revizionistické politiky. A Rusko označil za jednu ze tří revizionistických mocností, spolu s ČLR a Íránem (Mead 2014). ...
... With the U.S. unipolar moment facing challenges from the Great Recession of 2008, the shift of global wealth from the West to the East, and the rapid rise of China (Layne, 2012). Taking advantage of the decline of the U.S. liberal hegemony order, China, Iran, and Russia are increasingly assertive in their stance, driven by their geopolitical interests and desire to revise the status quo in their respective regions (Mead, 2014). Certainly, the resurgence of geopolitics in Europe and Asia brought direct threats not only to the U.S. liberal hegemony order but also to its alliance partners (Richey, 2019). ...
Since the Cold War, the United States-led alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region has been navigating through the changing international landscape, including in the context of the unipolar moment and decline of the liberal international order. The ambiguity surrounding the commitments to the alliance system, stemming from the return of Donald Trump as the president of the U.S. and the rise of China, has led to international structural change in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, this paper seeks to address the following question: Why does the Hub and Spoke Alliance System hold greater significance in U.S. foreign policy? This paper argues that the U.S.-led Hub and Spoke Alliance System is more important than ever for U.S. foreign policy today. If the U.S. is unable to preserve its status quo in the region, particularly in terms of its leadership among the alliance partners, the consequences are serious. This will give away an opportunity for China to fill the role not just as an economic provider to countries in the region but also as a security provider for the regional order. In sum, this paper believed that the U.S. had numerous strategic reasons to preserve the hub-and-spoke alliance system in Asia-Pacific to navigate and maintain its status in the context of the growing uncertainty in the region.
... As the decline of US power became evident and the assumed ideological supremacy of the West diminished, however, the recent circumstances were characterized as a "return of geopolitics" (Mead, 2014) against the backdrop of the "liberal international order" (Ikenberry, 2014). Critics of the US-led international order emphasized the "tragedy of great power politics" (Mearsheimer, 2014) positing that great power rivalry remained a major structural determinant of international society. ...
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine shocked the member states of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and led to the reconsideration of its Strategic Concept as regards “mission”, “capacity”, and “role-share”. In 2014 NATO started facing the “Ukrainian Dilemma” through the “hybrid warfare”. Since then, NATO has been struggling to support Ukraine without directly confronting Russia. This is a fundamental challenge to the concept of the alliance. There are critical implications in the efforts of NATO for the future of Japan and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
... В 2010-е гг. западные эксперты и политики все чаще называют РФ и Китай «ревизионистскими державами» (revisionist powers), то есть такими, которые пытаются изменить систему отношений, выстроенную западными странами и основанными на их интерпретации норм международного сотрудничества [Mead, 2014]. Это означает, что существующая «нормальность» мировой системы не исключает наличия стран, которые выступают с ее критикой изнутри, пытаясь настаивать на необходимости коррекций в соответствии со своими представлениями о нормах и нормальности. ...
“The War of the Worlds” of Herbert Wells documented the decline of Victorian England, the struggle between the old and the new. This battle in history culminated in the formation of a new system of relations and the emergence of new global players on the world stage. We propose to reflect on the complex process of forming a new “norm” from the perspective of global historical and political events. The discussion indicated a different vision of the terminological applicability of the “new normal”. It is postulated that there is no generally accepted understanding of what is considered the “new normal” even in the field of international relations. In the discussion participants assess world events (revolutions, the economic crisis-2008, COVID-2019, etc.) and consider them through the prism of the formation of a new “norm” in the interaction of states and societies. And if for some of them the crisis of 2008 has already formed a “new normal” in international relations, for other researchers the historical period after the world economic crisis is only a preliminary stage. Some discussants focused on the hypothesis that the “new normal” is a constructed reality. Each “normality” is noted as one more social construct; there are always various interested actors seeking to maintain or change “normality” for economic, political and ideological reasons.
... Walter Russell Mead's essay published in 2014 in Foreign Affairs described the Russian annexation of Crimea as a jolt to the false sense of security that had long comforted the US and Europe after the end of the Cold War. For what was being hailed as 'the end of history' and creation of an everlasting liberal order turned out to be a temporary post-Cold War geopolitical settlement (Mead 2014). The prophecy of liberal democracy subsuming rivalries and paving way for peace and development soon fell apart as revisionist powers like Russia and China began challenging the status quo. ...
For a long time, countries in Central Europe (CE) were caught in the structural rivalry of East and West, and Indian policy towards the region too remained passive. The end of the Cold War preoccupied India and the CE region alike, focusing on their economic transformation and recalibrating their respective foreign policies. India, however, with its rising political and economic clout, began an active pursuit of multialignment and thereby seeks a greater strategic engagement with the CE region. The shifting geopolitical landscape has made it inevitable to look at Europe beyond its traditional focus on the UK, France and Germany. Moreover, the steady growth trajectories of India and CE make a strong case for strengthening the bilateral partnership through enhanced political, economic and diplomatic investment. The paper thus explores the changing contours of India-Central Europe relations and avenues of cooperation where both sides could partner in building their domestic capacities and resilience. It argues that India needs to better its diplomatic outreach to CE and explain its distinct security and threat perceptions and strategic ambivalence on the Russia-Ukraine War. While China is a formidable rival with its expanding footprint, India can leverage its image as a safer and reliable economic partner. Likewise, the CE countries are keen to engage with India to widen their profile beyond their immediate neighbourhood.
... The emergence of multiple powers and player nation-states translates into multiple political agendas that may converge or diverge. When forces and agendas diverge, the phenomenon of geopolitical revisionism may arise whereby different powers seek to revise the existing status quo (Mead 2014). ...
The global geopolitical landscape is characterized by the rise of new powers and a shift toward multipolarity. This study examines the impact of multipolarity on international cooperation using an iterated game theory approach, particularly the classic prisoner’s dilemma, extended to a multiplayer setting. This effort can be regarded as a preliminary study of hypothetical optimal global cooperation. The main hypothesis is that an increase in the number of large countries in the international system will lead to higher levels of cooperation. Our simulation approach confirmed this. Our findings extend to the conclusion that multipolarity, under appropriate cultural and value systems, can foster new economic development and fair competition. Furthermore, we emphasize the importance of evolving strategies and cooperative dynamics in a multipolar world, contributing to discussions on foreign economic policy integration, sustainability, and managing vulnerabilities among great powers. The study underscores the necessity of strategic frameworks and international institutions in promoting global stability and cooperation amidst the complexities of multipolarity.
... With Russia seizing Crimea in 2014 and tensions between China and the USA on the rise, Walter Russell Mead (2014) asserted that the world was witnessing the "return of geopolitics". The collective "West", he argued, needed to wake up to the realities of the "end of the End of History". ...
... There is a credible geopolitical threat to global stability for the first time since the Cold War. Thirty-three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new era may have opened: the "return of geopolitics," as Mead phrased it (Mead, 2014). ...
Socioeconomic Dynamics Fostering Antidemocratic Regimes
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region:
Ongoing Wars, Contemporary Issues and Humanitarian Crises
... Gradually, the asynchronous development of the EU's traditional commitment to liberal values and the new reality of its international environment became visible (Smith 2011). In particular, the crisis of liberal ideas in global politics was diagnosed and the EU's handling of the return of geopolitics and realist power politics in its international environment was criticised (Niblett 2017;Mead 2014;Mearsheimer 2014). More recently, this development has been widely discussed under the term 'contestation' (Biedenkopf et al. 2021;Petri et al. 2020;Costa 2019;Joansson-Noguès 2020). ...
This book delves into the profound implications of Russia’s war against Ukraine for both the European Union (EU) and the field of EU Studies. It systematically addresses three overarching themes. 1) The Evolution of Theories and Approaches: This volume scrutinises how the ongoing war reshapes the landscape of EU Studies and how the war against Ukraine is received and discussed within the realm of EU and International Relations Studies. It rigorously examines the far-reaching consequences of the war on established theoretical frameworks, approaches and conceptual paradigms in both academic disciplines. 2) The Transforming EU Polity and Its Policies: An in-depth analysis unfolds the multifaceted impact of the war on the EU, spanning its external and internal dynamics. Particular attention is devoted to the intricate interplay between democracy and autocracy, the challenges surrounding the rule-of-law and the complex intersections of energy security, sustainability and emergency governance. 3) Ukraine’s EU accesion: Within the context of the war, this book explores the prospects, conditions and timing of Ukraine’s potential accession to the EU. It delves into the shifting narratives surrounding Ukraine, scrutinises perceptions of the EU’s role as a ‘normative power’ and assesses the extent to which the EU can assert this identity amidst contestations over accession conditions. Furthermore, it probes the evolving global perceptions of Ukraine and the war amidst a dynamic and shifting world order. In the introduction, we will sketch these problem fields, delving into their intricacies and indicating the answers given within the pages of this book.
... Iran is a revisionist state, therefore it is not satisfied with the balance of power nor with the order in the regional system primarily (Ehteshami & Molavi, 2012;Russell, 2014). The official ideological stance against the system can be traced by Press TV as the English-language division of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) established in 2007. ...
The conflict in Syria quickly escalated into a complex and prolonged civil war where states outside the conflict fueled rebel groups to fight. The onset of multiple proxy wars befell Syria. Proxy war happens when a ruler of a state devises and facilitates the provision of support to a rebel group that is engaged in carrying out violent activities in another state. Thus, an external state can influence the outcome of a civil war without having to bear the heavy costs of sending its army forces. States that wage proxy wars risk a potential conflict escalation, and gamble with provoking retaliation by either the offending state or its allies. Furthermore, inadvertent conse quences of backing rebel forces are also possible such as international condemnation. So, why does a state choose to form a relationship with a proxy group, instead of intervening directly? Why invest money and military power in a third party that could lead to a prolonged conflict? The analysis highlights that the political survival of regimes in the Middle East caused leaders to support rebel groups in Syria. I present a causal mechanism that is based on transnational threats to explain the phenomenon of proxy war in the Syrian civil war. Keywords: Syria, proxy war, Middle East, qualitative analysis, foreign policy.
... For many observers with liberal inclinations, these developments suggest that despite the increase in our era of economic, infrastructural and security projects connecting multiple state and nonstate actors, the defining new cleavage in global politics is between the democratic vs. authoritarian capitalists driving such projects. Realism takes this logic further in its vision of post-Cold War liberalism in general as giving way to renewed great power rivalry (Kroenig 2020;Mead 2014). ...
This chapter emanates from the view that mainstream International Relations (IR) has trouble making comparative sense of revisionist powers in and beyond greater Eurasia. This is due to the "hub-and-spokes" structure of IR knowledge production in which key concepts and prevalent theories are generated by Western experiences and expertise, with those concepts and theories subsequently driving the analysis of non-Western societies. This pattern is evident in analysts' tendency to either ignore or to reify the role of historical, geographic and cultural factors in shaping the behavior of any one revisionist power. To complement a growing body of "global IR" work that centers the complexity of situated experiences beyond the West, I propose a comparative area studies (CAS) bridge with which to facilitate "spoke-to-spoke" conversations, as well as dialogue between more mainstream, (neo)positivist and critical/interpretive perspectives on revisionist powers. I do so by proposing the notion of "family resemblances" across revisionist former empires as a basis for contextualized comparison. The approach allows us to capture both similarities and differences in the foreign policies and the historical, sociological, and political 2 factors at play. Identifying a set of structural, agential, and processual family resemblances across four revisionist former empires-China, Russia Iran, and Turkey-I show how these overlapping features significantly influence policy behavior. The result is a framework for more nuanced analysis of outstanding real-world phenomena, including the roles and aspirations of revisionist (Eurasian) powers at the dawn of multipolarity.
... These changes include the rise of new identity politics, far-right populism, the retreat of economic globalization following the United States (US)/China trade war, Brexit, the transition from openness to isolationism, tightness on migration-related policies, and a broader rise in anti-liberal activities across the Western world, suggesting that 'the core ideals of liberalism are now threatened or at variance with globalization' (Amadi 2020, 2). The continuing power struggles among the US, China, Russia, and the EU have not only paved the way for a newborn multipolar system characterized by a pursuit of hard power but also have underlined the importance of geopolitics in contemporary world affairs (Mead 2014;Heisbourg 2020). The rivalry among great powers is not only confined to realpolitik concerning economic and geopolitical interests; the deep-seated competition among those powers also has a normative dimension, allowing us to comprehend how the great powers of the 21 st century see the world differently. ...
... Russia's involvement in the Georgia's conflicts with South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the subsequent takeover of Crimea and support of separatist movement in Donbas gave many a reason to proclaim the return of "traditional geopolitics" (see, for example, Mead, 2014), including arbitrary border-making by dominant powers according to their "vital geopolitical interests" (determined by national security considerations) and by delimitation of spheres of influence by great powers. Some scholars and journalists (see, for example, Añorve Añorve, 2010; Marshall, 2016) proceed the assumption that Russia's response was primarily driven by strategic interests to prevent nato from establishing a foothold near Russia's core territory, which is poorly defensible due to its plain terrain and lack of natural obstacles. ...
After the disintegration of the USSR, Russia confronted the task of reforming its border security policy, which had previously emphasized stringent control over both inbound and outbound cross-border movements. This challenge was further compounded by the unprecedented management of 13 thousand kilometers of newly established borders with other states of the former Soviet Union. This article examines the evolving trends in Russian border security policy, encompassing the management of these new borders, endeavors to integrate Russia’s border security spaces with those of its post-Soviet allies, and the impacts of geopolitical expansionism. The transformation of Russian border security policy has yielded mixed results. On one hand, Russia has effectively embraced modern approaches to cross-border flow management. On the other hand, the scope of issues covered by Russia’s border security agenda remains extensive, encompassing geopolitical fears and other issued that cannot be managed effectively by the agencies tasked with routine border management.
... 196-201). In this era characterized by "the return of geopolitics" (Mead, 2014), the crucial question that seals the fate of the rest of the century is whether the Sino-American rivalry is heading toward a military conflict (Lemke & Tammen, 2003, p. 270). Putting excessive faith in the historical record, some claim that such a war is almost inevitable (Allison, 2017a). ...
The future of international politics today hinges on the manner in which the Sino-American rivalry unfolds. Views of this vary from expectations of peaceful evolution to hegemonic transition, but many seem to overlook the significant potential of the liberal international order (LIO) in shaping the course of events. Thanks to its structure and adaptability, the LIO is more than the mere environment surrounding this rivalry and may be the primary determinant of American and Chinese choices, propelling relations toward cooperation. Drawing on liberal internationalist theory, this article argues that the LIO demonstrates substantial potential to emerge as the ultimate victor of the intensifying rivalry between great power rivalry. By evaluating multiple arguments, this article’s analysis concludes that a reformed version of the LIO, one that accommodates both American and Chinese expectations and reflects newly shaped power dynamics, holds the solution to the Sino-American conflict.
The phenomenon of “international intra-state armed conflicts” poses serious challenges to the theory and practice of conflict resolution. The distinction between intra-state armed conflicts and international wars has created a strong perception that, while international wars were dominant in the past, most contemporary armed conflicts are intra-state. The disciplinary demarcation between Conflict Resolution and International Relations has resulted in biases that overlook “international intra-state armed conflicts.” Given the growing number of such conflicts, the theory and practice of conflict resolution need to transcend the bias stemming from the artificial distinction between international wars and “international intra-state armed conflicts.” Integrating deterrence into conflict resolution strategies is essential, as is the combination of international and domestic monitoring mechanisms with the mediation of conflicting parties. Furthermore, peacebuilding assistance should be globally reinforced by incorporating lessons learned from the end of the Cold War and the Global War on Terror. Adopting flexible perspectives, such as those promoted by the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) framework, can enhance international partnerships. For instance, Ukraine has the potential to emerge as a maritime power in the Black Sea, connecting the Indo-Pacific region through the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.
This article develops the concept of cities as geopolitical actors by proposing a new conceptual framework that foregrounds their space-making strategies. This intervention seeks to address the gap between research on cities as international actors and the growing interest in cities’ external geographies stimulated, among others, by the planetary urbanisation thesis. Drawing together recent discussions in urban governance with critical geopolitical scholarship and socio-spatial theory, the article makes two specific contributions: first, it defines the narrative that is usually mobilised to explain the rise of cities as international actors as a contested and ongoing spatialisation of world politics, in which city governments play an active role. Second, it proposes an analytical scheme to examine how cities contribute to processes of territorialisation, place-making, rescaling, and networking. Ultimately, this conceptual framework introduces a more spatially sensitive approach to the idea of cities as geopolitical actors by developing a toolbox to examine how they participate in the struggles for the production, control, and management of space.
This study evaluates the impact of information sources on public engagement in social actions related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Data were collected through an online questionnaire distributed across Albania, achieving a response rate of 83.8% from 500 distributed questionnaires. The survey ensured anonymity and confidentiality of respondents, enhancing the reliability of the data collected. The analysis began with an assessment of the internal consistency of the questionnaire using Cronbach's alpha, which resulted in a value of 0.723, indicating reliable measures. Factor analysis identified five key components influencing opinions on the Russia-Ukraine conflict: information sources and perception of reality, views on external stances and support, concerns about peace and sovereignty, military intervention and neutrality, and influences on Albania’s stance. Multiple regression analysis demonstrated that these factors significantly predict social action participation related to the conflict, with an overall model R² of 0.727. The analysis revealed that well-informed individuals are more likely to engage in social actions, while concerns about Albania's stance have a negative influence. This research underscores the importance of reliable information and external support views in shaping public engagement in social actions. The findings provide a structured understanding of how various factors influence public perceptions and actions, offering valuable insights for policymakers and researchers in conflict and social behavior studies. This paper has some limitation as; inclusiveness of all groups in society equally and psychological biases can affect our observations. Received: 3 November 2024 / Accepted: 31 December 2024 / Published: 05 January 2025
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the period between the second wave of NATO expansion and the end of the 2010s. This analysis is based on RQ 3 (Why is the structure of international security relations at the eastern border of NATO so confrontational?) and RQ 4 (What are the consequences of this trend?). The aim of this analysis is not at all to provide a defence of the RF and its policy. The aim is to explain the behaviour of the RF as a reaction to the second wave of the NATO expansion and to the publicly declared intention to invite Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO.
Industrial revolutions change the international distribution of power between states, businesses, and citizens. In the Fourth Industrial Revolution, China and the United States are competing for the technological dominance that will determine who will be the leader of the future, while the European Union struggles not to be left behind in the race. To be a great power, it will be necessary to achieve technological sovereignty, dominate activities of high economic value, attract the most qualified workers, and avoid unfavorable asymmetrical dependencies. At a time of uncertainty due to populism, trade protectionism, and techno-nationalism, the transition between the old and the new industrial system is taking place, which will give birth to a technological society with new great powers.
While it is often assumed that the core debates about nationalism were settled by modernist scholars already in the 1980s, there are reasons to question this theoretical ‘consensus’, especially because it fails to anticipate the wave of nationalist geopolitics that is currently sweeping through the world. Contemporary studies of nationalism typically refrain from conceptualising politics in spatial terms, while overstating states' ability to shape ethno‐national identities irrespective of their ethnic roots and offering little empirical validation. To overcome these limitations, it is useful to analyse how nationalism transforms the state, rather than the reverse. This article reports findings from an EU‐funded research project that uses historical maps covering borders of states and ethnic groups to show how nationalism causes increasing congruence between these borders and how a lack thereof makes conflict and border change more likely. This risk is further increased by ‘restorative’ narratives bemoaning supposedly lost independence and unity. Further research traces the spread of reactive nationalism through modernisation processes driven by railroad expansion until the early 20th century. Yet this does not mean that state partition offers the only, or the best, solution to nationality problems. Power sharing can pacify at least as well as ethno‐nationalist border change.
The various chapters contained in this volume attempt to understand the contemporary landscape of international politics and how interactions and international relations of the countries have transitioned to the present complexity and crises. Being sceptical of mono-causal explanations, the volume incentivises analysis as an intellectually viable means to the realisation of the ends of security. A myriad of crises in the contemporary world are gnawing away at the status quo. The point where the present differs from the past is perhaps with regard to the effects and manifestations of revision, whereby protracted crises are not necessarily culminating towards any commonly accepted notion of progress. Recognising the protean and crisis-prone nature of international politics—where crises at the unit level often coalesce to entrench the inescapable structural anarchy of the system—the volume attempts to locate, explain and predict the contemporary drivers and manifestations of permacrisis.
Das Zeitalter der uneingeschränkten Globalisierung scheint vorbei. Statt von Interdependenz und Integration ist gegenwärtig von „Deglobalisierung“ (deglobalization) und „Entkopplung“ (decoupling) die Rede. Wir interpretieren diesen diskursiven Abstieg eines einstmals hegemonialen Narrativs gleichzeitig als Routinisierung und als Krise. Dabei argumentieren wir, dass sich die Globalisierung einerseits tatsächlich narrativ durchgesetzt hat, andererseits aber in bislang nicht gekannter Weise gegenwärtig umstritten wird. Diese Gleichzeitigkeit beschreiben wir als Post-Globalisierung und möchten damit sowohl Kontinuitäten als auch Gegenentwicklungen und die daraus folgenden Widersprüchlichkeiten und Unsicherheiten zum Ausdruck bringen, welche uns in der Summe anregen, Globalisierung nicht als gegeben zu verstehen, sondern politisch wie politikwissenschaftlich neu zu denken.
This chapter examines major trends in European naval strategies, force structure, and operations between the violent protest in Kiev in 2014 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It discusses European responses to Russia’s increasingly aggressive behavior, China’s rise as a revanchist strategic competitor, security challenges emanating from authoritarian regimes, as well as transnational threats posed by radical Islamic terrorism and other non-state actors. The first chapter explores efforts to formulate appropriate strategic defense and security guidelines within a quickly changing security environment. In light of previous austerity measures and strategic myopia, the author contends that Europe naval forces reached their collective nadir during this period. He describes the challenges European states faced, both individually and as part of NATO and the EU, in closing capability gaps, recapitalizing their hollowed-out fleets, and fulfilling national and international obligations. The final chapter addresses the increasing tempo and complexity of naval operations that range across the gamut of the intensity spectrum: from maritime search and rescue to nuclear deterrence.