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Reconsidering counter-hegemonic dam projects: The case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Abstract
The paper questions the argument of the hydro-hegemony framework that counter-hegemonic mechanisms used by non-hegemons in transboundary rivers lead to a more equitable order of water and benefit-sharing, using the case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). It agrees with hydro-hegemony scholars that the GERD is a 'game changer' that challenges Egypt's hegemonic position, and an important step in the transition towards a new order in the Nile Basin. However, it scrutinises how Ethiopia and Egypt manage this transition through their policies to implement or contest the dam, and the conditions under which the GERD could lead to a more equitable order in the basin, and create incentives for cooperation beyond the project. It argues that Ethiopia's planning and implementation of the project, and Egypt's inconsistent response to it, have increased uncertainties about the benefits of the project to downstream countries, and even to Ethiopia, and fuelled the historical mistrust between the two countries. It suggests steps to build trust and translate the recent Declaration of Principles between the three Eastern Nile riparians into a benefit-sharing deal.
... The Nile River is the world's longest river, crossing the territorial boundaries of 11 countries (Tawfik, 2016(Tawfik, : 1035Okowth-Owiro, 2004: 2). The White and Blue Nile originate from tropical lakes in East and Central Africa and Ethiopia's highland plateaus, respectively (Hussein and Grandi, 2017: 801;Daniel, 1999: 141). ...
... The construction of the dam obliged the riparian states to undertake a series of tripartite dialogues about the outcome of gerd. The successive discussions resulted in a Declaration of Principles (dop) in 2015 (Tawfik, 2016(Tawfik, : 1046, which underscored the importance of cooperation in fostering confidence and trust in the gerd. It was a legitimate treaty based on "equitable and reasonable use" without causing "significant harm" to others (dop, 2015: 2). ...
... Environmental and development-induced pressures have made the Nile River's future uncertain and unpredictable (Tawfik, 2016(Tawfik, : 1043. Climate change, rapid population growth, poverty, environmental degradation, water scarcity and potential conflict are prominent features of the basin, which are forecast to worsen in the future (Ibrahim, 2011: 285). ...
The Nile River has been both an engine of development and a cause of controversy among its riparian states for millennia. This paradox took on an international dimension with the inception of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam ( GERD ). Using a qualitative research method, this paper investigates the GERD controversy and the role of a benefit-sharing approach in the Nile Basin. The dam negotiations have been hampered by unjust colonial treaties, the hardline interests of Egypt and Ethiopia, politicisation, uncertainty about the consequences of the dam’s use and lopsided third-party intervention. The paper argues that the adoption of a benefit-sharing approach in the basin can sustain the Nile ecosystem, promote regional peace, increase water flow and decrease unnecessary expenses through modest intraregional cooperation. The resolution of the Nile Basin conflict thus relies on identifying the potential of the basin and on integrated cooperative frameworks adopted by the technocrats of its riparian states and international experts.
... On the other hand, Tawfik (2016b: 1035) criticises the hydro-hegemony scholars since, they don't scrutinise 'tactics used by the counter-hegemon in terms of costs and benefits' of them. While considering GERD as a 'game changer' and counter-hegemonic project in the basin, she outlines Ethiopia's counter-hegemonic tactics deployed after the announcement of construction in three ways: delaying or manipulation of time, cooperating with Sudan and utilising a rhetoric which assumes that the GERD would cause no 'significant harm' for the entire region (Tawfik, 2016b(Tawfik, : 1037(Tawfik, -1039. Besides, Demerew (2022: 218) criticises both hydro-hegemony and counter hydrohegemony in three ways: scholars' underdetermining the causal variables and their focus on the streamflow; their ignorance on the evolution of constraints which allowed Ethiopia to pursue assertive policies; and their undercounting regarding the contrasting of legal norms and ideas. ...
... However, Sudan changed its Nile politics and supported the GERD in 2012 (Sudan Tribune, 2012). Such factor also contributed to the rise of Ethiopian challenge to the Egyptian hydro-hegemony and became the milestone for the Egyptian interests since Sudan had supported Egypt and was against the CFA in the beginning (Tawfik, 2016b(Tawfik, : 1037. Finally, the other Nile riparians supported not only the CFA but also the GERD. ...
... South Sudan can be considered another example of Egypt's increasing engagement in the Nile Basin. In 2014, Egypt developed its relations with the South Sudan that it declared the support for the South Sudan's water development projects, and both signed military agreement (Tawfik, 2016b(Tawfik, : 1045. Accordingly, during his historic visit to South Sudan in 2020, al-Sisi initiated a strategic alliance between Cairo and Juba. ...
The Framework of Hydro-Hegemony (FHH) has been applied several times to transboundary water disputes. Since it defines Egypt as a hegemon and Ethiopia as a counter-hegemon, many studies have focused on the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic activities in the Nile Basin. However, this article argues that Egypt has also deployed counter-hegemonic tactics to deal with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) from Neoclassical Realist perspective. In this context, it questions why and how Egypt has deployed hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tactics to respond to the GERD through process-tracing and utilising primary and secondary sources such as official statements, books, articles and journals.
... On the other hand, Tawfik (2016b: 1035) criticises the hydro-hegemony scholars since, they don't scrutinise 'tactics used by the counter-hegemon in terms of costs and benefits' of them. While considering GERD as a 'game changer' and counter-hegemonic project in the basin, she outlines Ethiopia's counter-hegemonic tactics deployed after the announcement of construction in three ways: delaying or manipulation of time, cooperating with Sudan and utilising a rhetoric which assumes that the GERD would cause no 'significant harm' for the entire region (Tawfik, 2016b(Tawfik, : 1037(Tawfik, -1039. Besides, Demerew (2022: 218) criticises both hydro-hegemony and counter hydrohegemony in three ways: scholars' underdetermining the causal variables and their focus on the streamflow; their ignorance on the evolution of constraints which allowed Ethiopia to pursue assertive policies; and their undercounting regarding the contrasting of legal norms and ideas. ...
... However, Sudan changed its Nile politics and supported the GERD in 2012 (Sudan Tribune, 2012). Such factor also contributed to the rise of Ethiopian challenge to the Egyptian hydro-hegemony and became the milestone for the Egyptian interests since Sudan had supported Egypt and was against the CFA in the beginning (Tawfik, 2016b(Tawfik, : 1037. Finally, the other Nile riparians supported not only the CFA but also the GERD. ...
... South Sudan can be considered another example of Egypt's increasing engagement in the Nile Basin. In 2014, Egypt developed its relations with the South Sudan that it declared the support for the South Sudan's water development projects, and both signed military agreement (Tawfik, 2016b(Tawfik, : 1045. Accordingly, during his historic visit to South Sudan in 2020, al-Sisi initiated a strategic alliance between Cairo and Juba. ...
The Framework of Hydro-Hegemony (FHH) has been applied several times to transboundary water disputes. Since it defines Egypt as a hegemon and Ethiopia as a counter-hegemon, many studies have focused on the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic activities in the Nile Basin. However, this article argues that Egypt has also deployed counter-hegemonic tactics to deal with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) from Neoclassical Realist perspective. In this context, it questions why and how Egypt has deployed hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tactics to respond to the GERD through process-tracing and utilising primary and secondary sources such as official statements, books, articles and journals.
... More often than not, this leads to shared control, whereby cooperation amongst riparian states exists, creating a more stable order (ibid). Another outcome can arise in situations of both positive or negative hydro-hegemon, is that of contested control; this by far is the least stable order, whereby there is fierce competition over shared resources (Tawfik, 2016b). ...
... In April 2011, Ethiopia sent shockwaves along the Nile basin by unilaterally announcing its plan to construct the GERD -set to be the largest hydraulic dam in Africa and projected to generate 6000 megawatts (MW) annually (Geberuel, 2014). The GERD will be constructed approximately 20 kilometers from the Sudanese border on the Blue Nile tributary (see Figure 5), which provides 59% of the Nile's water flows to downstream nations (Tawfik, 2016b). The dam's reservoir will have a storage capacity of 74 BCM, which will form the largest body of water in Ethiopia, spanning 1,874 square kilometers (IPOE, 2013) -about the size of greater London. ...
... The Sudanese leadership, for its part, has had more ambivalent rhetoric towards the GERD, but has maintained its intentions to use the Nile waters for its national development. In line with their age-old hydro-political alliance with Egypt, the Sudanese government initially presented fierce opposition to the GERD, based on the fear that it would affect their historical allocation of Nile waters and because of the project's close proximity to the Sudanese border (Tawfik, 2016b). ...
Using the hydro-hegemony and counter-hegemony frameworks, this dissertation will analyze how the contested control over Nile waters has impacted the basin’s hydro-politics, arguing that Egypt’s heavy-handed hydro-hegemony created an oppressive and inequitable order. Ethiopia’s unilateral construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) can be understood as a grandiose counter-hegemonic power-play. It has successfully shifted the hydro-political climate by creating facts on the ground that have forced Egypt’s hand at the negotiation table. However, it has not successfully developed a more cooperative and equitable benefit-sharing regime, as suggested by the counter-hegemony literature. Tripartite negotiations in the Eastern Nile have been fueled by nationalistic discourse, and their political elites have diverging visions for cooperation moving forward. The impasse engendered by these incongruent conceptualizations of cooperation has led to strained interstate relations. Resultantly, Eastern Nile states have sought to acquire international alliances and partnerships to increase their regional prominence; this has led to increased militarization and land-grabbing in the region. As more nations get involved, and Ethiopia forges on with its unilateral impounding of the GERD, tensions have metastasized, and the prospects for cooperation and benefit-sharing appear grim.
Keywords: Hydro-Hegemony, Counter-Hegemony, Eastern Nile Basin, Hydro-Politics, GERD, Transboundary Water Governance, Benefit-Sharing.
... Later, dams were built for the conversion of potential energy of the falling of water to mechanical energy to run mills and for aesthetic purposes (IRR, 2016), and currently they are being built for the purposes of creating new recreation areas, storing water, and creating electricity (Poff & Hart, 2002). Dams do well to fulfill the needs they set out to do, they can provide new sources of renewable electricity and water for millions of people (Ansar et al., 2014;Tawfik, 2016), be used as to export energy to boost the economy of a region (Tawfik, 2016), provide recreation areas (Sherren et al., 2017), allow for navigation (Ansar et al., 2014), raise the water table for new irrigation wells (NRC, 1992), and serve as a pillar of the local community's identity (Sherren et al., 2017). Dams also create opportunities for development around the reservoir including neighborhoods, restaurants, and other amenities (Brown et al., 2009), they can create fishing opportunities in the short term , and the water stored in the reservoir can be used in agricultural production (Brown et al., 2009). ...
... Later, dams were built for the conversion of potential energy of the falling of water to mechanical energy to run mills and for aesthetic purposes (IRR, 2016), and currently they are being built for the purposes of creating new recreation areas, storing water, and creating electricity (Poff & Hart, 2002). Dams do well to fulfill the needs they set out to do, they can provide new sources of renewable electricity and water for millions of people (Ansar et al., 2014;Tawfik, 2016), be used as to export energy to boost the economy of a region (Tawfik, 2016), provide recreation areas (Sherren et al., 2017), allow for navigation (Ansar et al., 2014), raise the water table for new irrigation wells (NRC, 1992), and serve as a pillar of the local community's identity (Sherren et al., 2017). Dams also create opportunities for development around the reservoir including neighborhoods, restaurants, and other amenities (Brown et al., 2009), they can create fishing opportunities in the short term , and the water stored in the reservoir can be used in agricultural production (Brown et al., 2009). ...
... Dams also create opportunities for development around the reservoir including neighborhoods, restaurants, and other amenities (Brown et al., 2009), they can create fishing opportunities in the short term , and the water stored in the reservoir can be used in agricultural production (Brown et al., 2009). Although dam building projects have slowed in the U.S., many other countries around the globe are still investing in massive infrastructure projects to benefit from these impacts of dams (Kaneti, 2020;Tawfik, 2016). ...
The United States is approaching a critical juncture regarding aging dam infrastructure. One increasingly common decision has been to remove dams, recreating a free-flowing river. The attention of the literature on ecological restoration is shifting from an ecological focus towards the importance of participation and the social dimensions of restorations. Social situations surrounding a dam removal can lead to expedited success, delays, or abandoned efforts. This study seeks to connect selected social dimensions of dam removals with the broader literature of ecological restoration by exploring social dimensions expressed in public participation in a dam removal process. A directed content analysis, qualitative research design, was employed to study selected social dimensions of dam removals. A codebook was developed to explore six social dimensions within public comment letters surrounding the removal of two dams on the Elwha River in Washington. The findings of this study revealed those with positive restoration attitude framed dam removal around potential ecological, economic, and social gains and more frequently referenced social dimensions of environmental attitude, place attachment, connectedness to nature, and sense of community. While participants with negative restoration attitude framed the dam removals around possible losses centered more of their testimonies around the economic situation surrounding dam removals. These findings emphasize the importance of framing, public participation, and future work regarding social dimensions of dam removal. As this restoration method becomes commonplace, environmental managers need to be able to effectively engage the public and understand not only ecological dimensions, but also social dimensions of dam removals. Advisor: Mark E. Burbach
... A second example lies in the long and complex history of regulating the transboundary Nile River 1,[189][190][191][192][193][194] that is shared by 14 riparian states 9 (Supplementary Table 1). Regional governance of the Nile basin has been dominated in the past by Egypt 193 , and has witnessed a number of basin-wide co-operative institutions and treaties 189 , including the 1929 British-Egyptian agreement, 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, Nile Basin Initiative signed in 1998, and 2010 Cooperative Framework Agreement 190 . ...
... 195,196 ). GERD promises to change Egypt's previous dominant role on basin water management 193 and raises challenges to water security and political interactions in the region 197 , but has the potential to produce a more equitable order in the Nile River basin 192,193,196,198 . ...
... 195,196 ). GERD promises to change Egypt's previous dominant role on basin water management 193 and raises challenges to water security and political interactions in the region 197 , but has the potential to produce a more equitable order in the Nile River basin 192,193,196,198 . ...
In the version of this Review originally published, the author name ‘Arthington’ was misspelt in refs 216 and 218. Further, in the sentence that starts “Global warming has also been linked to potentially significant increases in the flow of Russia’s three great Artic rivers..”, ‘Artic’ should have been ‘Arctic’. These errors have now been corrected.
... A second example lies in the long and complex history of regulating the transboundary Nile River 1,[189][190][191][192][193][194] that is shared by 14 riparian states 9 (Supplementary Table 1). Regional governance of the Nile basin has been dominated in the past by Egypt 193 , and has witnessed a number of basin-wide co-operative institutions and treaties 189 , including the 1929 British-Egyptian agreement, 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, Nile Basin Initiative signed in 1998, and 2010 Cooperative Framework Agreement 190 . ...
... 195,196 ). GERD promises to change Egypt's previous dominant role on basin water management 193 and raises challenges to water security and political interactions in the region 197 , but has the potential to produce a more equitable order in the Nile River basin 192,193,196,198 . ...
... 195,196 ). GERD promises to change Egypt's previous dominant role on basin water management 193 and raises challenges to water security and political interactions in the region 197 , but has the potential to produce a more equitable order in the Nile River basin 192,193,196,198 . ...
The world’s big rivers and their floodplains were central to development of civilization and are now home to c. 2.7 billion people. They are economically vital whilst also constituting some of the most diverse habitats on Earth. However, a number of anthropogenic stressors, including large-scale damming, hydrological change, pollution, introduction of non-native species and sediment mining, challenge their integrity and future, as never before. The rapidity and extent of such change is so great that large-scale, and potentially irreparable, transformations may ensue in periods of years to decades, with ecosystem collapse being possible in some big rivers. Prioritizing the fate of the world’s great river corridors on an international political stage is imperative. Future sustainable management, and establishment of environmental flow requirements for the world’s big rivers, must be supported through co-ordinated international funding, and trans-continental political agreement to monitor these rivers, finance their continual upkeep and help ameliorate increasing anthropogenic pressures. To have any effect, all of these must be set within an inclusive governance framework across scales, organizations and local populace. © 2018, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited.
... Anlaşmanın yürürlüğe girmesinin ön koşulu olarak ise üye ülkelerden en az altı tanesinin onaylaması şeklinde belirtilmiştir (Kılıç, 2011: 13 (Turhan, 2021: 75). Baraj, havzadaki uzun dönemli Mısır hegemonyasına karşı meydan okuduğundan ötürü ezber bozan (game changer) (Tawfik, 2016(Tawfik, : 1033 bir gelişme olarak görülmesine neden olmuş ve hatta Afrika'nın en eski jeopolitik mücadelesini sonlandırıp sonlandırmayacağı da tartışma konusu olmuştur (Gebreluel, 2014 (Swain, 2008: 209). ...
İklim değişikliği, insanoğlunun karşılaştığı en önemli sorunlardan biri olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bu nedenle iklim değişikliğine yönelik acil çözümler küresel siyaset gündemini meşgul etmiştir. Kyoto Protokolü ve Paris İklim Anlaşması önemli gelişmeler olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, bölgesel örgütler de iklim değişikliğinin ele alınmasında önemli rol oynamışlardır. Bu bağlamda, 1999’da kurulan Nil Havzası Girişimi (NHG) genellikle bölgedeki adil su paylaşımı, kullanımı ve yönetimi ile ilgilenmiş olsa da, iklim değişikliği ve bunun havzadaki su, gıda ve enerji güvenliği üzerindeki olumsuz etkilerini de gündemine almıştır. Bu nedenle, NHG’nin yeni oluşturulan stratejileri çoğunlukla su güvenliği temelinde iklim değişikliğine uyum ve azaltım konularını içermektedir. Bununla birlikte NHG’nin bu politikalarının yeterince başarılı olmadığı gözlenmiştir. Bu bağlamda çalışma, NHG tarafından yayınlanan politika belgeleri, dokümanlar ve raporlar ile üye devletlerin politikaları üzerinden söz konusu başarısızlığın nedenlerini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır.
... The media response from Ethiopia was not long in coming and passed through the statements of the Ethiopian military leaders made in an interview during a visit to the GERD shipyard in which they issued a statement, promising to "take revenge on any attacks on the dam" [44,45]. This scenario, therefore, seems to confirm a prediction made in 1995 by the then Vice President of the World Bank, Ismail Seralgedin, who declared that "if the wars of this century had been fought for oil, the wars of the next century would have been fought for the 'water" [46]. ...
This paper examines the transboundary water resources conflict resolution mechanisms. Although different research perspectives, including social planner, water market, game theory, static and dynamic systems engineering model, have already provided conflict resolution mechanisms that could be used to analyze transboundary water conflicts, here an ecosystemic approach based on an analytical model, is proposed. For this aim the case of GERD "Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam" on Nile Azzurro, is analyzed. The scenario of the GERD dam, besides being current and interesting in the water dispute between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, is suitable for the application of the proposed analytical model. This model could permit researchers and practitioners to develop more comprehensive mechanisms, complementary to political strategies, with stronger analytical capacity to analyze the different elements of the process of transboundary water dispute resolution.
... 50 Like in other parts of Africa, hydropolitical realities enhanced the unequal structural relationship between postcolonial states while negatively impacting the health and well-being of thousands of Lesotho's citizens. 51 Climate change has also begun to affect water deliveries to South Africa. These adverse effects are likely to have serious ramifications for both domestic and regional security. ...
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which exports water to South Africa, has enhanced the unequal structural relationship that exists between both states. Lesotho, one of the few countries in the world that exports water, has transformed from one of the largest sources of labor for South Africa to a water reservoir for South Africa. Though the project provides mutual strategic economic and political benefits to both riparian states, its construction has negatively affected environmental and human security in Lesotho. Due to hydropolitics, environmental threats in Lesotho caused by the project's construction are overlooked. These threats, which have devastating effects on resettled communities and the country's ecosystem, also constitute a threat to domestic and international security. The desire to prevent interstate conflict and maintain cooperation between the two riparian states further enhances the lopsided interstate relationship.
... The sudden announcement in 2011 of plans for the Gerd was influenced by geopolitics. By proceeding without Egypt's formal agreement, Ethiopia was challenging Egypt's assertion of the right to control developments upstream of its borders (Tawfik, 2016) although, by regulating Blue Nile flows, Gerd will enable co-operative resource management. Because of this dispute, Ethiopia needed international support. ...
The history of the Nile in Africa offers useful lessons for civil engineers seeking to build a sustainable future in which climate change is an existential challenge. For thousands of years, communities along the river have sought greater water security at the interface of technical possibility, politics and unpredictable nature. Large projects such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance dam and Jonglei canal in South Sudan continue to be controversial, but both show how civil engineers might help to address climate-change challenges. Once again, Nile communities need civil engineers to find and implement innovative, politically acceptable and sustainable development initiatives.
... As both Sudan and Egypt initially strongly opposed the GERD, a large share of articles have addressed the geopolitical (hydropolitical) context surrounding dam construction on the transboundary Nile River. Several studies have considered the historic evolution of Nile water agreements, different levels of Nile Basin cooperation and general pros and cons of the GERD (Demin, 2015;Gascon, 2015;Salman, 2016;Stokstad, 2016;Tawfik, 2016a;Taye et al., 2016), whereas others have focused on how the GERD has re-shaped regional hydropolitics, as the historic hegemonic position of Egypt has been challenged and opposing nationalistic discourses have long dominated the debate, hindering cooperation (Abdelhady et al., 2015;Aljefri et al., 2019;Cascão and Nicol, 2016;Nasr and Neef, 2016;Tawfik, 2016bTawfik, , 2016c. In addition to international politics, the GERD is also largely present in domestic politics. ...
In recent years, a renewed interest in large dams and large-scale irrigation schemes has developed, justified by the premise to make the agricultural and energy sectors climate-resilient. Despite this important climate effort, large dams and interbasin water transfers are controversial and have far-reaching impacts for river-dependent communities and the environments on which they depend. Since the year 2000, international standards on dam construction have been developed, but many dam projects currently still fail to meet environmental and social standards in practice as mitigation measures are not legally binding and a follow-up of impacts of large dams is not mandatory.
Drawing on GIS-analyses of remote sensing images, qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence from the field, this PhD dissertation has focused on the impacts of two large dams (Tekeze and Ribb) and an interbasin water transfer (Tana-Beles) on downstream socio-hydrologic systems, consisting of the strongly interconnected and mutually evolving environmental, agricultural and social sub-systems. The research results have indicated that (i) downstream hydrogeomorphic systems have drastically altered after river regulation and are developing a new hydrogeomorphic equilibrium, (ii) small-scale farmer-led irrigation systems have been more efficient in increasing crop productivities than several large-scale irrigation projects, (iii) the newly induced hydrologic regimes have strongly altered downstream social interactions due to impeded river crossing, and (iv) ill-prepared land redistributions and resettlements have left thousands of households with a high risk of impoverishment. With its extensive hydropower potential and ambitious dam building program, Ethiopia has been the perfect case study for this research.
... Explanation Analysis [191,192] Using a hydro-hegemony framework to analyse the role of power asymmetry in shaping patterns of hydropolitical relations in the Nile Basin Explanation Analysis [174] Jordan River ...
This paper examines the transboundary water resources conflict resolution mechanisms. Various academic fields have provided conflict resolution mechanisms that could be used to analyse transboundary water conflicts. These mechanisms include social planner, water market, game theory, static and dynamic systems engineering models, and negotiation analyses. These mechanisms share some common characteristic features. This similarity has led to a general belief that these mechanisms are competitive substitutes. However, closer examination by this research reveals that these mechanisms have more complementarity than similarity. This complementarity permits researchers and practitioners to combine any two or more of them to develop more comprehensive mechanisms with stronger analytical capacity to analyse the different elements of the process of transboundary water conflict resolution.
... Sudan has recognized the benefits that the dam is likely to provide through sediment reductions, hydropower uplift, flood management, and the potential for increased agricultural development (Basheer et al., 2018). Egypt has been reluctant to support the project, fearing reductions in future water use (Cascão & Nicol, 2016;Tawfik, 2016). At the current time, the countries are negotiating a plan to fill the reservoir, and no solutions have been put forth to coordinate the GERD with the existing infrastructure in Sudan or Egypt, creating a potentially precarious situation. ...
A water resource modeling process is demonstrated to support multistakeholder negotiations over transboundary management of the Nile River. This process addresses the challenge of identifying management options of new hydraulic infrastructure that potentially affects downstream coriparian nations and how the management of existing infrastructure can be adapted. The method includes an exploration of potential management decisions using a multiobjective evolutionary algorithm, intertwined with an iterative process of formulating cooperative strategies to overcome technical and political barriers faced in a transboundary negotiation. The case study is the addition of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and considers how its operation may be coordinated with adaptations to the operations of Egypt's High Aswan Dam. The results demonstrate that a lack of coordination is likely to be harmful to downstream riparians and suggest that adaptations to infrastructure in Sudan and Egypt can reduce risks to water supplies and energy generation. Although risks can be substantially reduced by agreed releases from the GERD and basic adaptations to the High Aswan Dam, these measures are still insufficient to assure that no additional risk is assumed by Egypt. The method then demonstrates how improvements to water security for both downstream riparians can be achieved through dynamic adaptation of the operation of the GERD during drought conditions. Finally, the paper demonstrates how the robustness of potential management arrangements can be evaluated considering potential effects of climate change, including increased interannual variability and highly uncertain changes such as increases in the future persistence of droughts.
Available open access at:
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2017WR022149
... As an evidence of Ethiopia's objective, the height and size of the Nada dam were maximized more than needed although this has affected the efficiency of the dam to generate power [120]. ...
It is clear that recent developments in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) file are witnessing an escalation of the conflict in hydropolitical interactions between the Egyptian and Ethiopian sides. Although “the Renaissance Dam” – known previously as “Border Dam” – was one of the dams and water projects proposed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) in its 1964 report on the exploitation of the waters of the Blue Nile, yet the new version of the Border Dam as reflected in the GERD version is considered as a stimulus for an Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict. This comes true especially in the light of Ethiopia’s quest for imposing a fait accompli, the deliberate consumption of time in negotiations, and the non-making of concessions in addition to the unilateral moves. Constructing GERD, Ethiopia aims to achieve some developmental declared goals in addition to some undeclared political and strategic objectives. Among these objectives is the imposing of “hydroelectric hegemony” on the Nile Basin which would consequently lead to achieving political and geostrategic leadership in that Basin. In its turn, this would lead to sieging of Egypt politically and strategically in the vicinity of its African circle/region. The study aims at verifying the following major hypothesis: The more the Ethiopian intransigence and obstinacy and its insistence on the construction of GERD in accordance with the declared technical specifications, the increased risks, damage and negative effects on Egyptian national security. Furthermore, Ethiopia would be able to achieve hydroelectric hegemony on the Nile Basin. Does Ethiopia aim to build GERD to achieve hydropolitical domination as well as development goals? What is the evidence?.
The Nile River has been both an engine of development and a cause of controversy among its riparian states for millennia. This paradox took on an international dimension with the inception of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam ( GERD ). Using a qualitative research method, this paper investigates the GERD controversy and the role of a benefit-sharing approach in the Nile Basin. The dam negotiations have been hampered by unjust colonial treaties, the hardline interests of Egypt and Ethiopia, politicisation, uncertainty about the consequences of the dam’s use and lopsided third-party intervention. The paper argues that the adoption of a benefit-sharing approach in the basin can sustain the Nile ecosystem, promote regional peace, increase water flow and decrease unnecessary expenses through modest intraregional cooperation. The resolution of the Nile Basin conflict thus relies on identifying the potential of the basin and on integrated cooperative frameworks adopted by the technocrats of its riparian states and international experts.
O objetivo deste artigo foi analisar os impactos sociais de um grande açude no semiárido brasileiro, segundo a população deslocada da área urbana como rural. Foram realizadas entrevistas semiestruturadas, abertas a 371 famílias, representando quase 10.400 famílias que moravam no novo município de Jaguaribara. Os resultados mostraram que os reassentados não estavam satisfeitos com suas novas condições de vida, apesar do seu contentamento com as suas novas casas, com o abastecimento de água e com o fornecimento de alimentos. Apesar da melhoria da infra-estrutura, os reassentados avaliaram mal os Sistemas de saneamento, de saúde e de educação, bem como a política de trabalho e renda. O governo investiu consideravelmente na infraestrutura, mas não em sua operação e manutenção, nem em pessoal qualificado, isso indicou que o foco dos investimentos foi principalmente a transferência de capital para a indústria da construção e não a prestação de bons serviços para os reassentados. A construção do açude Castanhão não proporcionou um padrão de vida melhor para os reassentados, o que sugeriu que a escassez de água pode ser uma das razões, mas certamente não foi a principal causa dos obstáculos ao desenvolvimento na região semiárida brasileira.
This paper attempts to explain why Ethiopia's recent development strategy functions as a counter-hegemonic strategy to Egypt's dominant position on the Nile, and why it is the source of tensions between the two states. We begin by observing, first of all, that for a long time Egypt, the downstream country, considered the Nile as its exclusive property. A position based on Egyptian civilization, economy, history and culture. We then observe that there are ten other states that are located directly in the Nile watershed and do not take full advantage of the opportunities offered by this river. Hence the feeling of revolt, hence the will expressed by these states—Ethiopia in particular, to demand a change in the paradigm of Nile management. Consequently, the supply of fresh water to Egypt is directly threatened. This paper, which is part of an analysis file around the issue of "water, stake of the conflicts in the 21st century" where we briefly addressed the Egypt-Ethiopia relations on the Nile. It integrates within another dimension of analysis focused on the evolution of power relations [hydro-hegemony—counter-hegemony] between Egypt and Ethiopia, in the sense to explain the facts at the origin of the tensions between the two states. This paper considers that the Nile as a shared resource, it is in the interest of all to reach a consensus. This is why we suggest that the African Union should take this dispute seriously and become more involved in the negotiations between the Nile riparian states to try to reach a mutually beneficial agreement for all stakeholders.
The GERD project is a game-changer in the hydro-politics of the region. The hydro-hegemony of the Nile river were solely controlled by Egypt for millennials. The colonial era agreements and the strategic allies with USA and other superpower countries were advantage for Egypt to exclusively use the Nile river without a strong push from upstream countries. However, the political dynamics in the region, the launch of GERD project, internal instability in Egypt and other contributing factors are changing the hydro-hegemony of the Nile river from control to cooperation. These dynamic changes are forcing Egypt’s foreign policy from war mongering to negotiations and cooperation.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explore the use of an arts-based methodology in conducting a doctoral study on The Nile Project , an East African based musical collective. Despite some evidence that music is an effective tool for qualitative inquiry, there are few studies on its use, especially the use of musicking in the interview process.
Design/methodology/approach
The author used a qualitative and arts-based research approach.
Findings
Outcomes suggest that music may help to create an “in-between” space challenging researcher positionality and giving voice to the “researched.” Music also acted as a bridging agent encouraging open and honest dialogue and relationship building.
Research limitations/implications
Findings suggest that music may be a useful tool for researchers interested in arts-based and participatory methods in qualitative research particularly when interviewing participants with varied linguistic, cultural, political and musical backgrounds.
Originality/value
There is sparse research on the use of musicking in the interview process of qualitative research.
Castanhão Dam, a mega-water-management work in Brazil, was built – according to the official reasoning – to reduce water scarcity and boost the economy. It compulsorily displaced over 10,000 people, whose satisfaction with the new standard of living, a decade after the resettlement, was marginally negative, contrasting with the pre-construction expectations. The government invested almost exclusively in infrastructure, signaling that their focus was the corporations, not the displaced citizens. Despite the improved water availability, the quality of life did not improve for the directly affected societal groups, indicating that water scarcity is not the main development hindrance in the Brazilian semi-arid region.
Since 1999 a multilateral effort termed the Nile Basin Initiative has been underway among the Nile riparians to explore opportunities for maximizing the benefits of the river's waters through cooperative development and management of the basin. However, to date there has been virtually no explicit discussion of the economic value of cooperative water resources development. We believe that a serious discourse among Nile riparians about the economics of Nile cooperation is both inevitable and desirable, and that this discourse will not diminish the importance of environmental, social, or cultural issues that new infrastructure on the Nile will entail. To initiate such a discussion, in this paper we present the results of the first economic model designed to optimize the water resources of the entire Nile basin. Total (potential) annual direct gross economic benefits of Nile water utilization in irrigation and hydroelectric power generation are estimated to be on the order of US$7-11 billion. This does not account for the costs of building or operating the infrastructure.
It has been argued that dam projects on shared rivers may provide opportunities for cooperation and the sharing of benefits among co-riparian states (discourse on international benefit sharing). In parallel, a discourse on local benefit sharing emphasizes that the population affected by dams should benefit from the projects in the long term. This raises the question of how international and local benefit sharing can be combined and whether these concepts are taken up in recent hydropower projects (HPPs) on shared rivers. This question was studied using the cases of the Ruzizi III and Rusumo Falls border river HPPs in Africa's Great Lakes region. The paper finds that the two projects indeed foresee both international and local benefit-sharing mechanisms, even if the actors involved hardly refer to international and local benefit sharing as concepts or link the two. At international level, the infrastructure will be jointly owned and electricity equally shared by the countries involved which can be considered good practice for border river projects. At local level, compensation processes are planned according to World Bank policies and various benefit- sharing mechanisms are envisioned. However, so far no revenue-based benefit sharing is foreseen that would ensure that the project-affected population will benefit in the long term.
Ethiopia has begun seriously developing their significant hydropower potential by launching construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile River to facilitate local and regional growth. The GERD, located just upstream of the border with Sudan, is the first dam ever to be constructed directly on the main stem of the Blue Nile and will become the largest dam in Africa. Although this has required substantial planning on Ethiopia's part, no policy dictating the reservoir filling rate strategy has been publicly issued. This filling stage will have clear implications on downstream flows in Sudan and Egypt, complicated by evaporative losses, climate variability, and climate change. In this study, various filling policies and future climate states are simultaneously explored through a linked set of models (rainfall-runoff, routing, and hydropower) to infer potential streamflow reductions near Sudan's Gezira Scheme, one of the largest irrigated areas in the world, and at Lake Nasser behind Egypt's High Aswan Dam. Simulations across 2011-2060 are evaluated at a monthly time step. Given intermediary tributaries and hydroclimatic variability, a clear nonlinear relationship exists between GERD filling rates and streamflow at key locations in Sudan and Egypt; this study quantifies these differences. For example, impounding 10% (25%) of monthly streamflow behind the GERD produces a 6% (14%) average reduction in streamflow entering Lake Nasser during the first 5 years; changes at the Gezira Scheme are even larger owing to fewer contributions from other tributary flows in between the GERD and the Gezira Scheme. Climate changes may shift this notably. A filling policy contingent on the GERD impounding water only if streamflow exceeds the long-term historical average produces a 7% reduction at Lake Nasser over the same 5 years, with a larger expected variance. The goal of this work, however, is not to prescribe a particular filling policy; rather it is to provide regional decision makers with a set of plausible, justifiable, and comparable outcomes for negotiation and consensus.
The escalation of tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over the construction of the Grand Renaissance is at least partly based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the risks this dam poses to Egypt. There is a two-part, win-win deal that can defuse tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia. First, Ethiopia needs to agree with Egypt and Sudan on rules for filling the Grand Renaissance Dam (GRD) reservoir and on operating rules during periods of drought. Second, Egypt needs to acknowledge that Ethiopia has a right to develop its water resources infrastructure for the benefit of its people based on the principle of equitable use, and agree not to block the power trade agreements that Ethiopia needs with Sudan to make the GRD financially viable. Sudan has a big stake in Egyptian-Ethiopian reconciliation over the use of the Nile. Although Sudan's agricultural and hydropower interests now align with those of Ethiopia, there does not seem to be a formal agreement between Ethiopia and Sudan for the sale of hydropower from the GRD. Because the economic feasibility of the GRD and other Ethiopian hydropower projects will depend on such agreements, Sudan has leverage with both Ethiopia and Egypt to encourage this win-win deal.
In the pursuit of economic development, Ethiopia has prioritized renewable energy production, emphasizing development of its hydropower potential. As part of this strategy, it is presently constructing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile River, ignoring opposition from the downstream Egypt. In this paper, we use the seven commonly shared strategic priorities prescribed by the World Commission on Dams (WCD) to evaluate the sustainability standard and geopolitical significance of the GERD project.
Ethiopia's policy of large dam construction in the Blue Nile River basin is evaluated by simulating the impact of one downscaled midrange climate change scenario (A1B) on the performance of existing and planned irrigation and hydropower schemes. The simulation finds that by 2100: 1) average basin-wide irrigation demand will increase; 2) annual hydroelectricity generation will be just 60% of potential; and 3) flow at the Ethiopia-Sudan border will be reduced from 1661 m/s to 1301 m/s as a consequence of climate change in combination with upstream water resource development. Adaptation to climate change and development must be considered together.
The paper will review briefly to hydraulic engineering history and the hydropolitical contexts of such development. After a century of activity inspired by an ambitious hydraulic mission the numerous stakeholders in the Nile system are currently influenced by a new water resources mission inspired by environmental and economic principles. The decade of the 1990s, in the post-Cold War era, has witnessed considerable positive progress towards a co- operative international relations regime over Nile waters. This progress has been made despite the numerous armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa, in the south of Sudan and in Rwanda and neighbouring territories. None of these conflicts has been water related; nor has there been any attempt to date to link Nile waters to other conflictual issues as is usual in other MENA (Middle East and North Africa) river basins. The analysis will be informed by international relations theory and illustrated by observation of the contribution of the upstream and downstream riparians to the very important discourse on an as yet very partially developed river basin.
This paper examines the implications for Egypt and Sudan of the development of Blue Nile water resources by Ethiopia. The long‐term development progamme produced between 1958 and 1963 by the Ethiopian government in collaboration with the US Bureau of Reclamation is summarized. A linear programming model is used to examine the effects on Egypt and Sudan of implementing this programme. It is found that water for agricultural use in Egypt and Sudan would actually increase, though there would be some adverse consequences for Egypt.
Prospects for the Upper Nile basin states of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia point to increasing competition for Nile water resources as population and development pressures intensify for all involved. In this paper we argue that it is in no one's best interest to maintain the lack of coordination in river basin development that persists in the Nile valley Decisions made today about investments in water development projects, new irrigation schemes, and industrial projects will have consequences far into the future when water resources are in much greater demand. Furthermore, the unanticipated environmental and climatic changes of the 1980s have accelerated the need to make economic, political, and legal adjustments in the existing Nile management and allocation regime.All countries in the basin stand to gain from cooperation in the development and management of Nile water resources. Water allocation need not be a zero sum game for the riparian countries; cooperative water development efforts can lead to increased usable water supplies for everyone. To illustrate this point, we examine three possibilities for cooperation in river basin development, with an emphasis on the importance of taking a basin-wide perspective on future water planning and investment.
Hydropolitics in the Nile River Basin have been dominated by Egypt,
which has developed its water-related infrastructure unilaterally. As a
result of Egypt's policies, relations with both Ethiopia and Sudan have
deteriorated over time, increasing the potential for contentious issues
to escalate into conflict. Recent population and agricultural trends
have only further exacerbated already tense relations. The challenge
lies in cooperation. Basinwide initiatives have been attempted, but,
until recently, have largely failed. The most recent Nile Basin Initiative
holds the strongest potential for establishing a basinwide framework for
cooperation. Nevertheless, a subbasin model would be more appropriate
and effective because it would diffuse existing tensions first without
jeopardizing basinwide cooperation prematurely.
This paper introduces the basic concepts of hydro-hegemony which are employed in the analysis of the contributors of this special issue. It emphasises the roles of hegemony, power and political –economy processes in shaping international transboundary water relations. Central to the analysis is Lukes' concept of the three dimensions of power and Gramscian notions of hegemony (see S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2005). Hegemony depends on the skilful use of hard and soft forms of power, between formally equal parties such as nation states. Hydro-hegemony is hegemony active in international transboundary water settings, the analytical framework for which is laid out in detail by Zeitoun and Warner in Water Policy vol 8 (2006, 435– 460). The challenges of conceptualising the complex nexus of international water relations are also addressed. A recurring theme is that both power and political economy processes are especially effective when they operate invisibly. The approach furthermore sets the frame for exploration of improvement of the options of hegemon riparians and non-hegemon riparians alike for more principled transboundary water governance.
The increasing structural and physical scarcity of water across the globe calls for a deeper understanding of trans-boundary water conflicts. Conventional analysis tends to downplay the role that power asymmetry plays in creating and maintaining situations of water conflict that fall short of the violent form of war and to treat as unproblematic situations of cooperation occurring in an asymmetrical context. The conceptual Framework of Hydro-Hegemony presented herein attempts to give these two features – power and varying intensities of conflict – their respective place in the perennial and deeply political question: who gets how much water, how and why?
Hydro-hegemony is hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through water resource control strategies such as resource capture, integration and containment. The strategies are executed through an array of tactics (e.g. coercion-pressure, treaties, knowledge construction, etc.) that are enabled by the exploitation of existing power asymmetries within a weak international institutional context. Political processes outside the water sector configure basin-wide hydro-political relations in a form ranging from the benefits derived from cooperation under hegemonic leadership to the inequitable aspects of domination. The outcome of the competition in terms of control over the resource is determined through the form of hydro-hegemony established, typically in favour of the most powerful actor.
The Framework of Hydro-hegemony is applied to the Nile, Jordan and Tigris and Euphrates river basins, where it is found that current hydro-hegemonic configurations tend towards the dominative form.. There is evidence in each case of power asymmetries influencing an inequitable outcome – at the expense of lingering, low-intensity conflicts. It is proposed that the framework provides an analytical paradigm useful for examining the options of such powerful or hegemonized riparians and how they might move away from domination towards cooperation.
The aim of this article is to identify where and how power relations in the Nile river basin have changed over the past decade, and to analyse how these dynamics have influenced not only the political relations between upstream and downstream riparians but also the management and allocation of the shared Nile water resources. The article sheds light on the ongoing political and economic changes in the upstream countries (as well as in Sudan) and on how these dynamics might affect and challenge both the regional balance of power and the ongoing regional cooperation process. A critical analysis of the relationship between power shifts and the evolution of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) will be provided. Finally, the article questions how unilateralist and multilateralist hydropolitical trends have co-existed in the Nile basin, and identifies possible future scenarios.
International rivers can elicit cooperation or conflict. The choice between the two will in large part be determined by perceptions of their relative benefits. In this paper, we explore the dynamics that drive the choice between conflict and cooperation, and present a simple framework for examining the extent of potential benefits that could underlie these choices. The paper seeks to broaden the range of perceived benefits, as some are obvious and some are much less apparent. The framework categorizes four types of cooperative benefits. First, cooperation will enable better management of ecosystems, providing benefits to the river, and underpinning all other benefits that can be derived. Second, efficient, cooperative management and development of shared rivers can yield major benefits from the river, in increased food and energy production, for example. Third, cooperation on an international river will result in the reduction of costs because of the river, as tensions between co-riparian states will always be present, to a greater or lesser extent, and those tensions will generate costs. And finally, as international rivers can be catalytic agents, cooperation that yields benefits from the river and reduces costs because of the river can pave the way to much greater cooperation between states, even economic integration among states, generating benefits beyond the river. While each of these four types of benefits could potentially be obtained in all international
The escalation of tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over the construction of the Grand Renaissance is at least partly based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the risks this dam poses to Egypt. There is a two-part, win–win deal that can defuse tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia. First, Ethiopia needs to agree with Egypt and Sudan on rules for filling the Grand Renaissance Dam (GRD) reservoir and on operating rules during periods of drought. Second, Egypt needs to acknowledge that Ethiopia has a right to develop its water resources infrastructure for the benefit of its people based on the principle of equitable use, and agree not to block the power trade agreements that Ethiopia needs with Sudan to make the GRD financially viable. Sudan has a big stake in Egyptian–Ethiopian reconciliation over the use of the Nile. Although Sudan's agricultural and hydropower interests now align with those of Ethiopia, there does not seem to be a formal agreement between Ethiopia and Sudan for the sale of hydropower from the GRD. Because the economic feasibility of the GRD and other Ethiopian hydropower projects will depend on such agreements, Sudan has leverage with both Ethiopia and Egypt to encourage this win–win deal.
In recent years, the concept of benefit sharing has been proposed as a means of fostering the cooperative use of international rivers. Most of the relevant literature focuses on opportunities for the generation of net benefits from cooperation; however, little attention has so far been paid to specific mechanisms for benefit sharing applied to the specific case of dams on international rivers. This paper fills this gap and asks both what incentives can be offered to encourage benefit sharing and what benefit-sharing mechanisms can be identified. Based on a conceptual approach, dam projects on the rivers Senegal, Columbia, Orange-Senqu, Nile and Zambezi are reviewed in order to explore the benefit-sharing mechanisms used at international levels. The paper also finds that negative environmental impacts are largely neglected, while social costs are not fully accounted for. The paper advocates for linking interstate with domestic benefit-sharing mechanisms which might be the ultimate step towards a socially inclusive, sustainable dam development.
It is generally accepted that conflicting demands over international rivers will intensify. There is an active debate on whether this will lead to "water wars" or to unprecedented cooperation. Framing the debate in this manner, however tends to cast the concept of cooperation as all-or-nothing, implying that "cooperation" is an extreme, in direct opposition to "war" This conceptual construct obscures the many practical levels of cooperation that states can undertake to their mutual advantage. It is important to recognize that it is entirely rational that states will always have a "national agenda" for a river that they share with other states, and that they will cooperate if it serves that national agenda. In practice, there can be a continuum of levels of cooperation, from simple information sharing, to joint ownership and management of infrastructure investments. Furthermore, it may not necessarily be the case that "more" cooperation reaps "more" benefits in all river basins. There are many different types of benefits that can be secured through the cooperative management of international waters, with each individual basin offering different potential cooperative benefits with different associated costs. For each international basin, the optimal mode of cooperation will depend on a mix of factors including hydrologic characteristics, the economics of cooperative investments, numbers and the relationships of riparians, and the costs of parties coming together.
This book examines the political economy that governs the management of international transboundary river basins in the developing world. These shared rivers are the setting for irrigation, hydropower and flood management projects as well as water transfer schemes. Often, these projects attempt to engineer the river basin with deep political, socio-economic and environmental implications. The politics of transboundary river basin management sheds light on the challenges concerning sustainable development, water allocation and utilization between sovereign states. Advancing conceptual thinking beyond simplistic analyses of river basins in conflict or cooperation, the author proposes a new analytical framework. The Transboundary Waters Interaction NexuS (TWINS) examines the coexistence of conflict and cooperation in riparian interaction. This framework highlights the importance of power relations between basin states that determine negotiation processes and institutions of water resources management. The analysis illustrates the way river basin management is framed by powerful elite decision-makers, combined with geopolitical factors and geographical imaginations. In addition, the book explains how national development strategies and water resources demands have a significant role in shaping the intensities of conflict and cooperation at the international level. The book draws on detailed case studies from the Ganges River basin in South Asia, the Orange-Senqu River basin in Southern Africa and the Mekong River basin in Southeast Asia, providing key insights on equity and power asymmetry applicable to other basins in the developing world.
Employing a multi-region multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling framework, this study estimates the direct and indirect economic impacts of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Eastern Nile economies. The study contributes to the existing literature by evaluating the impact of the dam under three different climatic and hydrological scenarios, taking into account both the transient GERD impounding phase and the long-term operation phase in a global CGE setting. The results demonstrate the significance of the GERD in generating basin-wide economic benefits and improving welfare in the Eastern Nile basin. During the impounding phase, the GERD benefits mainly Ethiopia and to some extent Sudan. GERD impounding inflicts economic costs, however, on Egypt, especially if it occurs during a sequence of dry years, and depending on the level of water withdrawal in Sudan. The negative effects of the GERD on Egypt's economy are reversed when the GERD becomes operational. In that case, the GERD generates substantial economic benefits and enhances economic growth and welfare in all the Eastern Nile countries. Instituting a basin-wide power trade scheme would substantially boost Egypt's economy and thereby further increase the economic value of the dam.
Africa's largest hydropower facility is currently under construction on the main stem of the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is poised to facilitate regional development with a 63 billion cubic meter reservoir and 6,000 MW of power generating capacity. To date, however, no reservoir filling rate policy has been established. This policy will have clear implications on the GERD's ability to generate hydropower in the near-term and coincidentally impact people and livelihoods in Sudan and Egypt through reduced streamflow availability. Implications of climate variability and emerging climate change within Ethiopia cast further uncertainty on potential filling policies and system operations. To address this challenge, numerous filling policies are evaluated through a climate-sensitivity approach to estimate impacts on reservoir filling time, hydropower production, and downstream flows. This provides viable and timely points of comparison for regional water managers and politicians negotiating system operations in the midst of ongoing project construction.
Disputes between Egypt and Sudan on the one hand and the Nile upper riparians on the other hand have dominated the Nile Basin for the last half-century. Nevertheless, there have been attempts at cooperation, and they culminated in the establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative and negotiation of the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). Ironically, the CFA resulted in solidification of the areas of differences and the emergence of the upper riparians as a power to be reckoned with. This article discusses the areas of difference over the CFA and analyzes its current status and the prospects for cooperation.
The Framework of Hydro-Hegemony (described by Zeitoun & Warner, in Water Policy8, pp 435–460, 2006) challenges mainstream analyses of hydro-political relations in transboundary river basins and highlights the role of power. The approach asserts that asymmetric power relations represent the cornerstone of the analysis of hydro-political relations. Varying hegemonic configurations and the unequal control of water resources among riparian states are characteristic of these relations. The hegemonic riparian in a given international transboundary water setting deploys several strategies to attain and maintain control, sometimes unilaterally, over the shared water resources. But is the control always as deep and entrenched as it sometimes seems to be?
The starting point of this paper is that hydro-hegemony is not incontestable. An established hegemonic order may often be challenged and resisted through a variety of counter-hegemonic strategies. Through examination of Ethiopian contest and consent of Egyptian hydro-hegemony, this study attempts to provide insights into the condition of counter hydro-hegemony and to provide a framework for further analysis in the field of transboundary water relations. The approach explores the options available for non-hegemonic riparians to challenge a particular hydro-hegemony and finds that these come from unexpected or unacknowledged sources. An assessment of these strategies shows how non-hegemonic riparians might challenge unequal hydro-political configurations and eventually contribute towards a more sustainable and equitable water and benefit-sharing regime.
Ethiopia is powering ahead with an ambitious energy development strategy, highly reliant on abundant hydropower potential. A changing climate, including uncertain water supply, however, may pose a salient challenge to meeting expected targets. Bridging the modeling gaps between climate, energy, and economics, and effectively transforming climate changes into economic measures, is an emerging inter-disciplinary field as nations attempt to position themselves for an uncertain future. Such a framework is adopted here to assess energy production and adaptation costs for four climate change scenarios over 2010–49. Scenarios that favor a drying trend country-wide may lead to losses of 130–200 terawatt hours over the 40-year period, translating to adaptation costs of US$2–4 billion, compared to a no climate change scenario. Even given these potential losses, energy development utilizing hydropower appears economically reasonable from this deterministic, sector-independent evaluation. This development is desperately needed, independent of future climate change trends, with the hope of appreciably reducing vulnerability to variability.
Ethiopia is the main source of the Nile River, and the country urgently needs water for irrigation and hydro-electric power development. To-date, however, Ethiopia is the country in the Eastern Nile basin that uses the least amount of water from the Nile run-off. There is no basin-wide agreement on the utilization and management of the water resources of the Nile Basin. Unilateral planning and implementation approaches have hindered the possibilities of cooperation and coordinated development. On the national level, economic and institutional capacities are also limited. Past initiatives as well as the current Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) are outlined regarding how far these dilemmas are dealt with. The paper ends with suggestions on how to deal with open questions and lessons learned from the ongoing NBI process.
"Ethiopia is at a critical crossroads with a large and increasing population, a depressed national economy, insufficient agricultural production, and a low number of developed energy sources. The upper Blue Nile basin harbors considerable untapped potential for irrigation and hydropower development and expansion. Numerous hydrologic models have been developed to assess hydropower and agricultural irrigation potential within the basin, yet often fail to adequately address critical aspects, including the transient stages of large-scale reservoirs, relevant flow retention policies and associated downstream ramifications, and the implications of stochastic modeling of variable climate and climate change. A hydrologic model with dynamic climate capabilities is constructed to assess these aspects. The model indicates that large-scale development typically produces benefit-cost ratios from 1.2-1.8 under historical climate regimes for the projects specified. Climate change scenarios indicate potential for small benefit-cost increases, but reflect possible significant decreases. Stochastic modeling of scenarios representing a doubling of the historical frequency of El Niño events indicates benefit-cost ratios as low as 1.0 due to a lack of timely water. An evaluation of expected energy growth rates reinforces the need for significant economic planning and the necessity of securing energy trade contracts prior to extensive development. A Ramsey growth model for energy development specifies project multipliers on total GDP over the 100-year simulation ranging from 1.7-5.2, for various climatologic conditions." Author's Abstract
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