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Abstract
China should not confine its sights to its coast and borders, and traditional rivals and partners; instead, it should make plans to "move westwards" and establish a new international geostrategic pillar for its Western Development strategy. The "march westwards" strategy is conducive to establishment of more balanced Sino-u.s. relations and helps build Sino-u.s. strategic mutual trust. As its economic interests grow in western countries, China is facing favorable opportunities for participating in multilateral coordination and contributing to its international status. However, the strategy will also bring risks and more attention should be paid to the environment, people's livelihood, and employment in the invested countries. Consular rules must be improved to better protect local Chinese and help them get integrated into local communities. This article does not in any way advocate making "marching westwards" a clear written national foreign policy strategy. Rather, it uses this idea to emphasize that as the geo-economic and geo-political situation constantly changes, China needs to have new and comprehensive thinking on geostrategic "rebalancing" that does not lead to clashes between China's land and sea power. © 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. All rights reserved.
... Beijing's plans are as opaque as its policy-making process. Arguably, the quasi-official rubric of the 'march westwards' (Wang 2014) is a guiding principle, but is challenged by China's démarche to Panama, which lies east. The one indisputable fact is the observable pattern of behaviour, which is how grand strategy overall is understood hereinbelow. ...
The globalisation of China's development strategy, from its origins as infrastructure diplomacy connecting its domestic west with its Central Asian periphery, into the transnational Belt and Road Initiative encompassing the periphery of the world system, epitomises the rapid evolution of a Chinese grand strategy of great economic and political ambition. The small state of Panama is a key node in the global trading system that can make an unexpectedly large contribution to China's national security and international influence. Accordingly, China's economic statecraft in Panama is not only opening up the Latin America and Caribbean markets to further Chinese commercial penetration, but is simultaneously expanding its political influence in this remotest part of the global South. China's is a two-track grand strategy positing to other nations a choice between a liberal internationalist co-prosperity and a zero-sum realist contest. This audacious approach relies on relational power amongst small states, especially semi-peripheral ones like Panama, to put China at the forefront of what is shaping up as a grand coalition of the global South collectively challenging American hegemony.
... Uno de los resultados de la política de "marchar hacia el oeste" del gobierno chino fue la presentación de la Iniciativa Cinturón y Ruta de la Seda en Astaná (ahora Nur-Sultán), Kazajistán, en septiembre de 2013. 45 2) En el caso de Alemania, en diciembre de 2013 comenzó el tercer periodo de gobierno de Angela Merkel: en esta ocasión estuvo integrado por una gran coalición y se designó a Frank-Walter Steinmeier (psd) como el nuevo ministro federal de Asuntos Exteriores. Como lo menciona Annegret Bendiek, hacia 2013-2014 el nuevo gobierno alemán se encontró con mayores responsabilidades en su posición de liderazgo en la ue y como potencia económica global (una de las pocas que se habían fortalecido durante el proceso de crisis económica) en temas como la continuación de la crisis en la eurozona, los conflictos en Medio Oriente (en 2011, Alemania había declinado su participación en la intervención de la otan en Libia), la crisis diplomática con ee.uu. ...
En este texto se analiza la trayectoria de la relación China-Alemania durante el periodo 2005-2018 y el contenido de la agenda bilateral que ambos países han impulsado. En la investigación se identifican dos prioridades compartidas: 1) la preferencia por el incremento de sus relaciones económicas y comerciales mediante el pragmatismo económico (aunque en detrimento de un diálogo sobre los valores de la buena gobernanza) y 2) el proceso de institucionalización de la agenda de cooperación bilateral por medio de la asociación estratégica integral China-Alemania. Se considera que el incremento en las relaciones de interdependencia económica es un incentivo fundamental para la ampliación de la agenda de cooperación en su asociación estratégica. De igual modo, la asociación estratégica es un espacio institucional para el acomodo de sus intereses y la diversidad de sus preferencias (por ej., el compromiso de Alemania con las relaciones transatlánticas o los principios estructurales de la política exterior de China, como el respeto a su soberanía).
... A more systematic approach to this position, centering on the strategic aspects of Chinese involvement in the Middle East, was presented a few months later in a resounding article titled 'March Westward' by Wang Jisi, one of China's most influential international relations scholars. 20 Wang envisaged a new strategy in Chinese foreign policy whereby China would expand its influence in regions farther westward, including the Greater Middle East. This strategy rested on the assumption that because of the shift to Asia in the US foreign policy -also known as Pivot to Asia, Return to Asia, or Rebalancing Asia -tension might be expected to rise on China's eastern front. ...
Since the early 2010s, there have been mounting calls in China to intensify its role in the Middle East. But seeing the region as highly turbulent, Beijing seems to restrain its political involvement there. So what role does China actually strive for in the Middle East? To answer this question, the article first presents China’s discourse on its future role in the region; next, it analyzes China’s involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the Syrian civil war, focusing on three diplomatic initiatives it has made concerning these issues. The argument here is that China strives to be part of major processes in the Middle East and attempts to advance its values and interests there, but in a unique pattern of big-power involvement in the region, it tries to achieve this without intensive investment of political, economic, and military resources.
Access: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0047117815619664
... Another important element that the new leadership bears in mind is the fact that in the last two decades, with a declining United States, the international balance of power is moving towards multipolarization. As a result, a "new round of geo-political and geo-economic competition between strategic powers" (Wang, 2014), is intensifying, and considering its fast rise, this main competitor of the US seems to be China. Washington "rebalance to Asia" in the last decade has increased China"s feeling of being encircled. ...
... Wang Jisi, for example, constructed a case for China to 'march westward' basing his assessment of the strategic pressure that the US 'rebalance' would place on China in the maritime domain of the Indo-Pacific. 43 For Wang, the 'eastward shift' in strategic focus of the Obama administration under the 'rebalance,' could potentially lock Sino-US relations into a 'zero-sum game' in East Asia. However, if instead, China shifted its strategic focus towards Eurasia the 'potential for US-China cooperation' across a variety of fields would increase and 'there will be almost no risk of military confrontation between the two'. ...
This article argues that Beijing’s ambitious ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) is driven by the convergence of Innenpolitik and Aussenpolitik motivations including a desire: to counterbalance perceived American predominance; to ensure economic growth to underpin the CCP’s legitimacy; and to present China as a viable alternate global leader to the United States. Due to challenges posed by Xinjiang and China’s geopolitically ‘hybridity’, the most likely effect of the BRI will be the division of the Indo-Pacific into a sphere of Chinese predominance in its Eurasian continental setting and the maintenance of American predominance in its maritime setting.
... Most importantly, in this respect, since the late 2000s and early 2010s, it has become a prominent part of Beijing's strategic plans to increase its engagement on its western peripheries. Such a vision was first publicly articulated in "Marching Westwards," a resounding article by Wang (2012), one of China's most influential international relations scholars. Wang envisages a new foreign policy strategy, whereby China would expand its influence in regions farther westward, including the Greater Middle East. ...
In recent years, the ties between Asian powers and Middle Eastern countries have grown significantly, and the consequence of this development is a gradual spin-off of intra-Asian political process to the Middle East. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides an intriguing illustration of such a possible spin-off. Japan’s response to BRI is mostly negative but less clear is the possible implications of the China–Japan confrontation over BRI for their interaction with the Middle East. Japan’s responses to the BRI and China’s perceptions thereof can expand the set of factors that shape the two Asian powers’ involvement in that region.
... Despite increasing friction with the United States in the Asia-Pacific, Beijing regarded the United States more as a potential partner as it expanded activities to its West into Central and South Asia. One of China's leading strategic thinkers, Wang Jisi, summarized the argument and justification for a strategic consolidation of Chinese foreign policy in this direction in his October 2012 article entitled "Marching Westwards: The Rebalancing of China's Geostrategy" (Jisi, 2012). One year later in Astana, Kazakhstan at Nazarbayev University, part of a five-nation tour of Central Asia, President Xi announced his new policy initiative "The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB)" (Xinhua, 2013). ...
This article examines U.S. policy toward the supercontinent of Eurasia from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the present. The baseline for U.S. policy was established in 1992, the prevention of a peer competitor emerging in Eurasia. The initial focus for ten years was on assistance to promote Russia's transition to becoming a market democracy while simultaneously hedging against the return of a revanchist Russia through promotion of expansion of NATO and the European Union.
The 9/11 attack in 2001 shifted the attention of the Bush Administration to the War on Terror with the United States military getting bogged down in two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Obama Administration sought to end both wars and withdraw U.S. troops with mixed success. In 2011/2012 with growing concern over China's more assertive policy in East Asia, U.S. foreign and security policy aimed to put more military, economic, and diplomatic resources toward East Asia. These efforts, however, were distracted by Russia's aggression in Ukraine, the civil war in Syria, and the emergence of ISIS.
Almost in the background over this quarter century, a far more significant phenomenon has been developing – the reconnection of Eurasia. With the rise of China, India and Russia, as well as the emergence of middle powers including Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, and others, the Eurasian supercontinent is being “rewired” economically, politically, and strategically. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has garnered the most attention, but virtually every state – large, medium, and small – are adjusting their national interests and foreign policies in a very fluid environment. To date Washington has struggled to grasp the breadth and depth of change and failed to develop its own strategy as well as allocate adequate analytical and policy tools to advance U.S. interests.
... Beijing's plans are as opaque as its policy-making process. Arguably, the quasi-official rubric of the 'march westwards' (Wang 2014) is a guiding principle, but is challenged by China's démarche to Panama, which lies east. ...
The globalisation of China’s development strategy, from its origins as infrastructure diplomacy connecting its domestic west with its Central Asian periphery, into the transnational Belt and Road Initiative encompassing the periphery of the world system, epitomises the rapid evolution of a Chinese grand strategy of great economic and political ambition. The small state of Panama is a key node in the global trading system that can make an unexpectedly large contribution to China’s national security and international influence. Accordingly, China’s economic statecraft in Panama is not only opening up the Latin America and Caribbean markets to further Chinese commercial penetration, but is simultaneously expanding its political influence in this remotest part of the global South. China’s is a two-track grand strategy positing to other nations a choice between a liberal internationalist co-prosperity and a zero-sum realist contest. This audacious approach relies on relational power amongst small states, especially semi-peripheral ones like Panama, to put China at the forefront of what is shaping up as a grand coalition of the global South collectively challenging American hegemony.
... Another concern is how China's recent economic downturn will affect the viability of its regional economic projects. In the meantime, China confidently marches on southwards and westwards (Wang, 2014), economically at least. ...
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing debate about “Chinese assertiveness”. The paper dissects the central articles on the topic and evaluates their conceptual and theoretical insights. It ascertains that the concept of assertiveness is poorly substantiated; that proponents of “Chinese assertiveness” largely claim that it derives from structural factors that produced effects in Chinese foreign policy behavior prior to
the US pivot to Asia; and ultimately, that critical accounts, since they reject the very concept, lack theories that can explain Chinese assertiveness. This article attempts to address these shortcomings. First, the article reconceptualizes assertiveness and connects it to grand strategy change. Second, this change is reactive and occurs after, not prior to the US pivot. Third, in order to provide greater theoretical adequacy, this article combines material factors with institutional factors and show how they dialectically interact with status aspiration, as part of the struggle for the positional good of leadership. To show the conceptual and theoretical plausibility of the argument, the paper outlines the dialectical interplay between positional barriers in the ADB and the US pivot to Asia, on the one hand, and reactive Chinese assertiveness and the AIIB, on the other.
... Çin'in önde gelen Uluslararası İlişkiler düşünürlerinden Wang Jisi, 2012 yılında yayınlanan bir çalışmasında, Çinli liderlere ABD ile mücadele etmek ve Doğu ve Güney Çin Denizi'ne odaklanmak yerine, ABD'nin etki alanının dışında kalan Orta, Güney ve Batı Asya rotasından Avrupa'ya yönelmelerini tavsiye etmiştir. Böylelikle Çin, faaliyetlerini daha rahat hareket edebileceği bir alanda yürütebilecek ve Pasifik'e ağırlık veren ABD ile mücadeleden kaçınabilecektir (Wang, 2014). Her ne kadar Donald Trump'ın 2017'de ABD Başkanlık makamını Obama'dan devralmasının hemen ardından Asya'ya Dönüş politikası rafa kaldırılmışsa da Trump yönetimi kısa bir süre içinde ülkesinin Çin'e karşı tavrını selefine kıyasla daha da sertleştirmiş ve "Serbest ve Açık Bir Hint-Pasifik" (Free And Open Indo-Pacific) adlı yeni bir stratejiyi uygulamaya koymuştur. ...
Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti’nin uluslararası düzen içindeki yükselişi, 21. yüzyılın en tartışılan konu başlıklarından biri olmuştur. Pek çok yazar Çin’in gelişimini mevcut düzen ve onun lideri ABD için bir tehdit olarak görmekte ve bu nedenle bir önlem alınması gerektiğini belirtmektedir. Diğer birtakım yazarlar ise Çin’in yükselişini, ülkenin küresel güney ülkelerine neoliberal modele alternatif bir kalkınma modeli sunması dolayısıyla olumlu bir gelişme olarak görmektedir. Bu kapsamda Çin’in son yıllardaki en önemli adımlarından biri 2013 yılının son aylarında Başkan Xi Jinping tarafından açıklanan Kuşak ve Yol Girişimi’dir. Türkiye’nin de katılımcıları arasında yer aldığı girişim kapsamında trilyonlarca dolarlık yatırımlar yapılması planlanmaktadır. Ne var ki KYG, henüz Türkçe yazında henüz yeterince tartışılmamıştır. Çalışma, Xi Jinping dönemi Çin dış politikasına ve Kuşak ve Yol Girişimi’ne odaklanarak Türkçe yazındaki bu eksikliğe katkı sunmak niyetindedir.
... A 2013-ban elindított program, Kína "nyugati nyitása" (Jisi, 2012) kezdettől fogva számolt Iránnal -mind a szárazföldön, mind a tengeren -, miközben célzottan el akarja kerülni Oroszországot, és lehetőleg elkerüli Indiát. A már említett helyi vagy rövid távú közlekedésihálózat-fejlesztések nagyobb dimenzióban is megjelentek: az utóbbi néhány évben több teherszállítási vasútvonal is kiépült Irán és Kína között, amelyek Közép-Ázsia különböző országain áthaladva kapcsolják össze a két államot, és szervesen illeszkednek az "új selyemút" kapcsolódási hálózatába. ...
Irán földrajzilag Nyugat-Ázsiában található, olyan ázsiai alrégiók metszéspontjában, mint a Közel-Kelet, a Kaukázus és Közép-Ázsia, de a keleti határával Délkelet-Ázsiához is csatlakozik. Miközben a „Nyugat-Ázsia” terminus – különösen ázsiai körökben – egyre inkább teret nyer, maga a térség az utóbbi évtizedek ázsiai diskurzusából többnyire kimarad, és nem csak civilizációs szempontok miatt. Az ázsiai kontinens nagyhatalmai – északon Oroszország, keleten Kína, délen India – mind biztonságpolitikai, mind civilizációs szempontból meghatározói (Samuel P. Huntington kifejezésével: magállamai) a saját alrégiójuknak. Nyugat-Ázsiának (azaz a Közel-Kelet Masrek térségének, illetve a Perzsa-öböl menti országoknak – a továbbiakban: öbölországok) azonban nincs egyetlen vezető hatalma, sőt történelmi-vallási-katonai okokból több állam (Irán, Törökország, Szaúd-Arábia) is igényt formál(hat) a regionális hatalmi státusza elismerésére.1 Emellett e sokdimenziós, törékeny egyensúllyal rendelkező térségnek a rendjét külső szereplők is alakítják, ami gyakran azt a képzetet kelti, hogy maguk is alanyi jogon részesei e regionális rendnek. Irán az Ázsiáról alkotott képében Oroszország, Kína és India mellett magát tételezi a kontinens negyedik pólusának, még akkor is, ha az Amerikai Egyesült Államokkal kiéleződött konfliktusa és a Teheránnal szemben kiépült szankciós rezsim a többi országgal ápolt kapcsolatait, s így a regionális hatalmi státusza elismerését nagyban korlátozza.2 Ugyanakkor a földrajzi fekvése és a geostratégiai tulajdonságai az ázsiai nagyhatalmak számára megkerülhetetlenné teszik: a konnektivitás és az (aszimmetrikus) egymásrautaltság mindhárom ország iráni kapcsolataiban meghatározó. A jelen tanulmány Iránnak az Oroszországhoz, Kínához és Indiához fűződő kapcsolatait vizsgálja, részben bilaterális, részben regionális (ázsiai) viszonylatban, elsősorban olyan, a világpolitikai napirendet is érintő „közös ügyek” kapcsán, mint a konnektivitás, a fegyverkereskedelem, az energiahordozók és az iráni nukleáris program. = Iran perceives itself as the fourth pole of Asia besides Russia, China and India – even if its regional power status is limited due to its conflict with the United States of America. Its geographical location and geostrategic assets, however, make Iran an unavoidable partner for the Asian great powers: connectivity and (asymmetric) interdependence are determinant elements of all three in their relations to Iran. The present study aims at analysing Iran’s relations to Russia, China and India – partly on a bilateral, partly on a regional (Asian) level – mainly along such “common issues” on the agenda of the international community as connectivity, arms trade, energy resources and the Iranian nuclear deal.
The existing accounts about the China-led multilateral development bank – the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – have focused on the American policy concerns and the economic and commercial reasons for China to establish it. Two deeper questions are left unaddressed: Was there any strategic rationale for China to initiate a new multilateral development bank and, if so, how effective is China’s strategy? From a neorealist, balance-of-power perspective, this paper argues that China has felt threatened by the Obama administration’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific strategy. In response, China is opting for a soft-balancing policy to carve out a regional security space in Eurasia to mitigate the threat coming from its east. China’s material power, premised on the fact that the country is a huge domestic market and flush with cash, has proved irresistible for Asian states, with the exception of Japan, to be enticed away from the USA. On the one hand, this paper adds weight to the claim that although the USA remains the pre-eminent military power in the Asia-Pacific, it has fallen into a relative decline in regional economic governance; on the other, China’s soft balancing has its own limitations in making like-minded partnership with, and offering security guarantees to, AIIB members. A China-led regional order has yet to arrive, even with the AIIB.
This article examines the dynamics of China’s soft power strategy in the Middle East vis-à-vis the United States. By way of doing so, Beijing has moved away from its early focus on energy and trade relations to the cultivation of bilateral and multilateral relations with Middle Eastern states via the Belt and Road Initiative that offers inter alia new energy, investment, and multilateral strategic cooperation.
As most studies on Middle East�East Asian relations focus on the interregional
dimension, the manner in which relations between East Asian powers influence, and
are influenced by, their policies in the Middle East are largely overlooked. Attempting
to add another layer to the study of Sino-Japanese relations, this article explores
whether Sino-Japanese rivalry extends to the Middle East. This undertaking requires a
conceptual distinction between measures related to Sino-Japanese competition in the
Middle East and measures which are related to their rivalry. Building on a minimal
definition of interstate rivalry, the article argues that neither the effort to secure
energy supply nor their economic or political competition there is shaped by their
rivalry. The only field that can be associated with that rivalry is Japan’s quasi-military
activity in the Middle East, which may enhance its security policy’s revision. That, in
turn, causes much concern and criticism in Beijing, thus assigning the region a certain
role in their relations.
For free access: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YAFsG9SIe6xHPnk9TJwU/full
East Asia and West Asia (the Middle East)2 are usually treated in the academic literature as two distinct and separate issues in Chinese foreign policy. Studies of China's policy in East Asia hardly mention the Middle East and studies of the Middle East hardly mention East Asia. In fact, these two regions are not simply interconnected in China's geopolitical outlook but provide clues to understanding Beijing's foreign policy toward each of them -they are interdependent. As such, they are connected vessels in the sense that the situation in one region affects, or even determines, China's policy in the other. This is evident in a number of perspectives: strategy, economics, energy, military and Islam. Mutual dependence is one of the features of contemporary international relations, after the end of the Cold War. While usually it is limited to one aspect or two (primarily economic and military), in the case of China and the Middle East, mutual regional dependence involve a number of levels.
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal (CCPS), Vol. 2, No. 3, December 2016, pp. 985-1265 (281 pp. + xiii). [Scopus] <http://rpb115.nsysu.edu.tw/p/404-1131-162781.php?Lang=en> <http://rpb115.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2375/CCPS2(3)-full-issue.pdf> <https://www.dropbox.com/s/lmd1wr9nq8i7qk7/CCPS-V2N3-full-issue.pdf>
This chapter describes how the BRI contributes to contest several elements of the current regional order in Asia. BRI is the most evident attempt to design a leadership role for China. Moreover, it contributes to the Westword re-orientation of the Chinese foreign policy from the East Asian region to the Eurasian continent. BRI also represents a fundamental step in the process of contestation of the market as regional primary institution, through the advancement of state capitalist practices. Finally, the chapter discusses the relationship between the BRI and the Chinese understanding of the international order. BRI contributes to edify a regional order closer to the Chinese preferences, but it also creates the premises for a Chinese foreign policy in contradiction with the practice of non-interference and respect of sovereignty.
China and the United States will likely be in competition with each other for many years to come. Indeed, the two countries seem destined to be locked into long-term competition because neither is likely to withdraw from world affairs in the foreseeable
future. In addition, each country perceives the other country as a significant rival, is deeply suspicious of the actions and intentions of the other country, and is highly competitive. To explore what extended competition between the United States and China might entail through the year 2050, this report focuses on identifying and characterizing
China’s grand strategy, analyzing its component national strategies (diplomacy, economics, science and technology [S&T], and military affairs), and assessing how successful China might be at implementing these over the next three decades. Foundational
prerequisites for successful implementation of China’s grand strategy are deft routine management of the political system and effective maintenance of social stability.
China’s grand strategy is best labeled “national rejuvenation,” and its central goals are to produce a China that is well governed, socially stable, economically prosperous, technologically advanced, and militarily powerful by 2050. China’s Communist Party
rulers are pursuing a set of extremely ambitious long-term national strategies in pursuit of the overarching goals of their grand strategy.
Two fundamental questions are at the heart of this report: (1) What will China look like by 2050? (2) What will U.S.-China relations look like by 2050? The answers are provided by analyzing trends in the management of politics and society and studying national-level strategies in diplomacy, economics, S&T, and military affairs.
Using these analyses, the report develops a range of possible future scenarios for mid-21st-century China and then generates an accompanying set of potential future trajectories for U.S.-China long-term competition.
p>A partir de 2012, el gobierno de la República Popular China instrumentó un discurso político que aspira a redefinir sus relaciones con Estados Unidos: el denominado Nuevo Modelo de Relaciones entre Grandes Potencias (NM). El nm es un ofrecimiento de China para estructurar una relación sino-estadounidense basada en términos políticamente simétricos. Un componente básico del modelo es el respeto mutuo de los proyectos de integración megarregional que han impulsado ambas potencias: algo relevante para el Proyecto Cinturón y Ruta. En esta investigación se describe la trayectoria de la relación China-Estados Unidos durante el periodo 2005-2017 que contribuyó a definir la estructuración del nm. Asimismo, se describen los límites del discurso chino y los riesgos que puede enfrentar la relación bilateral.</p
Conventional wisdom in international studies posits that small states are subordinate players, influenced by the hierarchy of international systems. Chapter 10 offers a close look at New Zealand’s proactive and pragmatic participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a case study of a small liberal state maneuvering its bilateral relations with the great powers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Lin argues that New Zealand, as an exemplar of a small liberal state, has the power to influence China’s foreign policy, such as in the case of the ambitious BRI. He contends that, despite exercising its power and influence in the early stages, New Zealand should be cautious about its increasingly vulnerable position under the BRI, and the limits of free trade-focused bilateral relations with China.
The geography of a country determines its role in the world affairs. Pakistan is located at a very significant strategic place on the globe. It is situated at the juncture of energy proficient to the energy deficient countries. The Gawadar Port in Pakistan is positioned at the Arabian Sea which is 72 Kilometers far from Iran, 320 Kilometers from Cape al-Hadd in Oman and about 400 Kilometers away from the Strait of Hormuz and relates to the Persian Gulf. Gawadar as a key shipping point may be able to play a key role in ensuring China’s energy security as it provides a much shorter route than the current 12,900 km route from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca to the eastern seaboard of China. China has been building its leading role in Asia and beyond for economic and political cooperation through “One Belt One Road”. OBOR project has two components: first, the land-based ‘New Silk Road’; and second, a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road through a vast network of transport corridors, pipelines, ports and fiber-optic cables spreading across the entire Eurasian landmass connecting East Asia, Central and South Asia, the Middle East and parts of Europe. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (hereafter CPEC) is very vital and a joint venture of Pakistan and China to connect Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region with the Southwestern Pakistani port of Gawadar. Under CPEC, China will invest $46 billion in Pakistan for the development of infrastructure and energy for the next 15 to 30 years. The four main pillars of CPEC are Gawadar port, communication infrastructure, energy infrastructure and industrial zones. Pakistan will serve as a crucial bridge between China and Central Asia; South Asia and the Middle East. This paper makes an analysis of the strategic parameters of CPEC from both the Chinese and Pakistani perspectives.
It is obvious that in the 21st century, the global power balance is changing. The Unite States’ relative power is declining, and the world’s centre of gravity is shifting from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific region. The rise of ‘two Asian giants’ China and India requires rewriting the strategies toward the region. The concept of Asia-Pacific now leaves its place to the “Indo-Pacific” conceptualisation. “Indo-Pacific” is the perception of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean as a single ‘geopolitical/ strategic’ region. The basic logic in the “Indo-Pacific” notion is to reduce the perception of Chinese power in Asia-Pacific and prioritising the perception of Indian power and its leading role coming from its ‘Raj’ legacy. The “Indo-Pacific” approach is the confluence of India’s “Look East/Act East”, China’s “String of Pearls & Belt-Road”, US’ “Pivot/Rebalance” strategies.
Keywords: Indo-Pacific, India, Raj, The USA, China.
This chapter reviews how China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is evolving. It begins with a discussion of the historical, economic, and geopolitical contexts in which the initiative was rolled out by Beijing in 2013. Through the BRI, China seeks to expand its diplomatic manoeuvring space, reclaim its past glory, provide infrastructure finance to neighbouring countries, and revive its slowing economy. By discussing, among others, the scope and the coordination financing mechanisms of the BRI, this chapter explains how the initiative is being implemented by the Chinese government. The broader trade and investment relations between China and three Asian sub-regions of interest, namely, East and Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia are provided. The major achievements of the BRI to date are also highlighted. The chapter concludes with an overview of the structure of the book.
I examine the views of Chinese scholars during the decade of Hu’s leadership concerning China’s diplomatic strategy with respect to the judgment of China’s national power, the orientation of China’s diplomatic goals, and the choice of China’s foreign policy. Chinese scholars increasingly judged China as an emerging major power in a multi-polarizing world. The mainstream academic attitude was that China should augment its international role. The discourse on China’s diplomatic goals experienced a skillful and tacit transition from the “keep a low profile” principle to the “harmonious world” proposal, featured by the shift in emphasis, the expansion of interpretation, and the substitution of concepts. The Chinese academia unanimously endorsed the governmental proposal of the road of peaceful development, while ambiguity can be observed in China’s more assertive responses to challenges to its “core interests”, agenda setting attempts in multilateral cooperation, and various endeavors to gain “soft power”. Underlying the transition of China’s diplomatic strategy was the materialist way of thinking concerning international relations.
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