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Erfahrung und Urteil : Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik

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... some proponents of analytic intellectualism, most notably Stanley and 10 Williamson in two influential papers (2001; 2017), argue that skill 11 may be successfully reduced to declarative and propositional knowl-12 edge, i.e. to knowledge-that. 3 Although this view already faces severe 13 ...
... show that, while the structure of most forms of knowledge-that is 10 aggregative, the structure of skilful understanding is dynamic and 11 ...
... possible (Husserl, 1939;1918-26/1966Heidegger, 1927Heidegger, -28/199532 1927/20061929/2010). However, as we also mention above, 33 ...
Article
One prominent intellectualist position in the debate on the nature of skill, famously defended by Stanley and Williamson (2001; 2017), claims that skill and knowing-how are reducible to knowledgethat. To defend this claim, Stanley and Williamson argue that skill and knowledge-that develop in a sufficiently similar way through different learning stages. In this paper we offer a novel argument to reject this version of intellectualism on methodological, descriptive, and conceptual grounds. We do so by drawing on the work of Heidegger, Dreyfus, and Ryle on skill. We first offer a descriptive account of skilful action based on the work developed by these authors, and we then move on to show that skill and knowledge-that exhibit significant differences. First, while skills cannot be imparted merely linguistically, some forms of knowledge-that can be exclusively imparted and learned verbally. Second, weshow that the temporal learning curves of skill and knowledge-that are importantly different: the former usually requires a more or less extensive training process, whereas the latter may be acquired in a relatively sudden fashion. Finally, we show that, while the structure of most forms of knowledge-that is aggregative , the structure of skilful understanding is dynamic and holistic , which entails that prior skill stages cannot be retrieved and re-enacted at will.
... This interpretation is fitting insofar as Husserl (1939Husserl ( , p. 21, 1973b) calls seeing things as this or that in our everyday lives the "pre-predicative experience. " Brudzińska (2017, p. 106) explains this term such that it contains no "veiling" idealities, i.e., no concepts. ...
... Given these anti-mathematical, 9 anti-conceptual and antipredicative tendencies in Husserl, one may wonder: How does Husserl propose research on essences and eide to be possible? Husserl's (1939Husserl's ( , pp. 409-443, 1938 answer is the method of eidetic variation: One varies the possible appearances of a selected essence, e.g., "table, " "thing, " or "perception, " in imagination. This way, in and through these imaginative variations, an identical essential structure that is invariant throughout the manifold of variations supposedly becomes intuitable. ...
... For instance, Husserl writes eidetic variation requires "an infinite variation in our sense as a foundation. " (Husserl, 1939(Husserl, , p. 423, 1973b) If so, one could only say: "As far as I have varied this essence in imagination, its eidetic properties are x, y, and z. " His characterization of how to intuit the essence "red" by running through ever more variants makes this mistake: "[A]t each level the red is more red. We anticipate a pure red, a red in pure perfection" (Husserl, 2012, p. 232, my translation). ...
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This article contrasts the views of the philosophers Husserl and Hegel on quantification in science and compares their proposals for conducting rigorous qualitative research. Both deem quantification integral to science, but furthermore proposed methodologies to investigate qualitative necessities achieved by a shift in conscious activity and awareness. However, their methodologies differ significantly. While Husserl rejects idealization and instead proposes intuitive means to ideate qualitative essential relations, Hegel suggests idealizing less one-sidedly, namely, qualitatively over and above quantitatively. The article first examines how quantification is achieved and how it contrasts with measuring. This contrast reveals that measuring implies knowledge of qualities. These qualities, however, thus far remain oddly external to the mathematical relations linking the various established equations. The article then follows Husserl’s reconstruction of the development of science to illustrate the dismissal of many experiential qualities and how philosophy further amplified skepticism about science on qualities. Husserl’s notion of the life-world and the method of eidetic variation are then introduced as means to counterbalance mathematical proceedings in science. However, this method reveals both eidetic qualitative structures and psychical structures without being able to distinguish between them. It is thus susceptible to idiosyncratic, traditional, and cultural biases. Subsequently, Hegel’s description of the shift in conscious experience that sets qualitative from quantitative thinking apart is introduced. This shift may overcome the biases, but it faces skepticism that calls for further investigation of the experience of different kinds of thinking.
... Working in the philosophy of technology, Mykhailov and Liberati (2022) use concepts from phenomenology and postphenomenology to analyse the nature of programs developed by the higher order computer programming language C++, and the unsupervised learning technique used in machine learning, the 'Generative Adversarial Model'. They refer to Husserl's (1939Husserl's ( , 1966 suggestion that objects passively 'relate' to us when we look at them. For them, this apparently small step in Husserlian phenomenology is significant, '…since it shows how the object is active in the intentional relation binding subject and object' (Mykhailov & Liberati 2022, p.843). ...
... They go on to consider the nature of the object in terms of Husserl's concept of its horizons (Husserl 1939(Husserl , 1950. They focus on the 'outer horizon' of an object, which consists of aspects of the background which constitute the object, '…a connection binding the object to what is around it, which is produced and structured by the object itself.' (Mykhailov & Liberati 2022, p.845). ...
Article
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In recent years, developments in Artificial Intelligence have produced Large Language Models (LLMs) leading to a form of generative AIs (GAIs) trained on vast corpora of texts, capable of producing convincing predictive synthetic texts such as essays, reports, or other texts instantaneously. This development has profound implications for human entanglements with technologies in terms of how these AIs might constitute new forms of subjectivities, texts, and knowledge practices. This development has particular significance for higher education in terms of academic writing, assessment, and research. In terms of higher education, specific concerns have been raised about the implications for assessment, study practices, and the status of knowledge and learning in the context of these ‘writing machines’. Universities and government bodies have reacted in various ways, with some commentators calling for the sector to ‘embrace’ these generative AIs (GAIs) as merely the latest ‘tools’ available for study and research, while others seek to outlaw their use. The current academic research surrounding this phenomenon is underdeveloped with relatively few studies having been conducted, due to the rapid recent acceleration of the technology. It is also under-theorised; early research has reacted to the fast-changing landscape of GAIs by focusing on the technical and practical capacities. Meanwhile, supranational private providers such as OpenAI are influencing higher education internationally, with a complex range of effects which are as-yet unknown. This paper reviews the current state of the art in related bodies of research literature and proposes that the field could benefit from a wider variety of critical and theoretical perspectives. Drawing on the concept of the sociotechnical imaginary from science and technology studies, it considers how discourses and practices surrounding GAIs are evolving in society and education. It then considers the effects of authorship and the writing subject, with reference to the concept of more-than-human authorship. It then draws on recent work in the philosophy of technology, proposing Husserl’s outer and inner ‘horizons’ as a potential framework with which to consider the complex entanglements of human and nonhuman agency, as enrolled in more-than-human authorship and entangled with the presence of GAIs in the ‘lifeworld’ of contemporary higher education. It concludes by proposing future directions for work in this area, in order to gain better theoretical purchase on the phenomenon at the various levels set out above.
... I am particularly indebted to Bernet and Melle's insights. of wish acts and his genetic phenomenology of drives. I outline the development of Husserl's mature theory of wishes by analyzing texts from: Hua XLIII/3, Hua XXXIX, Hua XLII, Mat = Materialien VIII, and Husserl, 1939and Husserl, /1975. I conclude in section five with a summary of results. ...
... I am particularly indebted to Bernet and Melle's insights. of wish acts and his genetic phenomenology of drives. I outline the development of Husserl's mature theory of wishes by analyzing texts from: Hua XLIII/3, Hua XXXIX, Hua XLII, Mat = Materialien VIII, and Husserl, 1939and Husserl, /1975. I conclude in section five with a summary of results. ...
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This essay accomplishes two goals. First, contra accepted interpretations, I reveal that the early Husserl executed valuable and extensive investigations of wishes—specifically in manuscripts from Studies concerning the Structures of Consciousness. In these manuscripts, Husserl examines two ‘kinds’ of wishes. He describes wish drives as feelings of lack. He also dissects wish intentions to uncover previously obscured partial acts, including nullifying consciousness, an existentially oriented act, and a preferring. Second, I reveal how these insights from Studies partially prefigure Husserl’s mature genetic phenomenology of drives and wish intentions. The mature Husserl develops his previous observation, that drives are experiences of lack, by describing these drives as having two moments: impulse and movement. Husserl also comes to new insights about wish acts, when he juxtaposes these intentions—as pure feelings that have no power to reach a telos—to drives, which he now conceives of as volitional doings.
... 2. The acts of volitional, evaluative, and, at the base, perceptual intentionality, which can gain increasing complexity, with syntactic-categorial elements, up to objectivities of understanding and judgment in the form of the "in general" (überhaupt). This "genealogy" is well presented in the work organized by Landgrebe, based on Husserl's texts, titled Experience and Judgement (Husserl, 1999). ...
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This article deals with the conscious and unconscious dimensions of mental life. I distinguish the transitive sense of consciousness, being conscious of something, intentionality, from the adjectival or adverbial sense, being conscious or consciously directed towards something. I show that an intentional act can be conscious or unconscious in the second sense and argue that, from this position, we can ask good questions about what consciousness is and its function in mental life. To achieve this result, I begin by framing the topic in the tradition of psychology before Husserl, namely Lipps, and Brentano, and then describe the unconscious dimension from the conceptual apparatus of phenomenology.
... Мы со своей стороны хотели бы предложить несколько иной путь: перед работой с указанными лекциями советуем познакомиться с одним из поздних произведений Гуссерля «Опыт и суждение» [Husserl, 1939]. Эту работу можно называть поздней не только в силу факта ее написания на склоне лет. ...
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The article is devoted to the problem of the autonomy of the studies of consciousness carried out by psychology and philosophy. The phenomenon of fantasy, fantasizing, is taken as a typological example. Based on the general picture of research on this phenomenon in modern psychology, the use of fantasizing in various techniques and practices, the asymmetry of theoretical and methodological efforts in this area is shown. On a number of examples from the field of the philosophical paradigm, a certain veil of the true role of fantasizing was noted. An assumption is made about the productivity of the concentration on the basis of Husserl's phenomenology of heuristic material of both psychology and philosophy for rethinking the significance of the phenomenon of fantasy in comprehending the depths of human consciousness.
... The "abilities and preferences" (Wilson and Sperber 2012: 7) of the users conducting online searches are aggregated into a maximal computation, which tends towards a strong "typification" (Husserl 1948) of our behaviors, an algorithmic characteristic that will then guide all our further research. This may not pose a problem to those who prefer mathematical models of research and do so knowing they will likely find what an AI system determined they should find. ...
Article
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The World Wide Web has been a fundamental part of our daily lives for years. Its algorithmic framework ensnares our online journeys in an “endless recurrence” of the “same” by creating multiple filter bubbles. Digital algorithms establish a precise “order of discourse,” leaving little to no room for deviation. Functioning as a colossal machinic apparatus, the web embodies the culmination of Artificial Intelligence (AI), transforming every piece of posted content into a database that profiles our online behavior and activities. This article explores whether approaches that describe everyday human communication, such as the theories of relevance developed by Alfred Schutz, or by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, can be applied to the realm of digital algorithmic grammars governing the web, and to the semiospheres that animate it. The conclusions raise some doubts: a gap exists between algorithmic language and its historical counterparts, characterized by a disparity between logical-mathematical grammar and other linguistic-historical-natural ones. While these two types of languages coexist within the digital landscape, their relevance differs; what may be “relevant” in an algebraic context may not necessarily translate to our live conversational exchanges, and vice versa. Although merged in the digital sphere, these languages operate distinctly, and proficiency in one does not guarantee adeptness in interpreting the other accurately.
... In addition, Husserl stresses that the subject lacks "power" over the object's autonomous performance of these actions. As if it were a living, breathing thing, the object influences human actions, aspirations, and tastes just by being itself (Husserl., 1939;Husserl, 1950). Focusing on the objects' intrinsic "life" via the examination of passive synthesis and phenomenological horizons, Husserlian phenomenology can address the activities done by digital technologies, even though it rarely discusses technologies in general. ...
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The article endeavours to understand and explain the position of AI humanoids in society. It further makes a unique attempt to describe humanoid robots as “artificial persons,” and while doing so, it sheds light on intriguing, less-debated topics like relationships between humans and artificially intelligent humanoids (AI) and the identity of AI humanoids. The goal of this manuscript is to present the argument that suggests that artificially intelligent humanoid robots are a remarkable creation of human ingenuity and are distinct from typical machines, as they exhibit qualities that extend beyond mere mechanics and aim to reach a degree of complexity akin to humans. These humanoids can form strong connections with humans and possess the ability to communicate, learn, generate information, and assist humans in a multitude of tasks. Therefore, it seems logical to attempt to describe these humanoids as “artificial persons” and try giving them a unique identification or digital signature that may be related in some manner to their owner’s biometric identity. The manuscript employs text analysis to support its arguments and, in the process, delves into the solutions to the aforementioned issues by exploring the concepts proposed by renowned theorists, classical philosophers, and psychologists.
... Every produced meaning is always an acceptance of one or another form of existential thesis (like certainty, probability, possibility, or negation, according to the natural attitude), intending its intentional object in one or another form of function (perceptive, imaginative, or signitive), delineated by a time horizon (although every experience, by definition, always happens in the living present, it can be oriented toward it or toward the past or the future, always framing every living experience). On the other side, modalities like affect, will, and property, although of crucial importance in most, if not all (property), of human experiences (Heidegger, 1927;Husserl, 1954b), may or may not be present in a particular text. So modalities (see also Figure 1) indicate the attitude of the individual in relation to the expressed meaning. Figure 2. Analysis of the "will" modality. ...
Conference Paper
Each and every thought, word, feeling or action of a person harbor a richness of meaning, opening on all the possible worlds accessible for him/her. A vision on those possible worlds, those open possibilities of action, should be of great interest for human science research. We believe that the phenomenological thinking of Edmund Husserl, reworked to adapt to the modern conception of the human sciences, can allow such an understanding of a person or a more or less large group, giving not a static picture of his mind, but a dynamic view of the ongoing process of constitution of meaning. In cross-cultural and/or intercultural comparative fields as well as developmental and educational fields, the researcher is confronted to language, in conversations, narratives, writings and texts studied, to understand the relations of individuals to their cultures. Collecting freely expressed narratives and texts, the researcher accesses the whole universe of the subject in all its richness, individual specificity and cultural and social characteristics. Hence the question of the meaning and interpretation of the narratives to be done by a lecture in intension to reconstruct the possible worlds of the subject by phenomenological analysis. MCA, “Meaning Constitution Analysis”, explores the pluralities of the significations lying in the texts and implied by it. Software, MCA – Minerva, has been developed as an efficient tool in the work of text analysis. By MCA-method any kind of text can be analyzed in a rigorous and controlled way. By allowing also for different statistical treatment of the results of the process of analysis, it might render obsolete the now almost classical distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods.
... According to him, the self and the other are not merged into a single entity without any distance, but rather they form a pairing relationship within an intersubjective community. (Husserl, 1939) Researchers such as Jacobson, Osler, Stanghellini, and Mancini collectively agree that individuals with anorexia lack genuine companionship or normal intersubjective relationships with others. In the case of AN, individuals may reject the act of sharing meals with others and might refuse to eat with others (Jacobson, 2006). ...
Article
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This paper delves into the complex and conflicting relationship between the body-subject and body-object, as well as the self and the other, within the context of anorexia nervosa. Within the field of phenomenology of medicine and health, the emphasis tends to be on the dimension of the lived body, with limited attention given to the physical dimension of the body. Recognizing the work of scholars who have acknowledged this oversight and made progress in addressing it, this paper aims to further unify the two bodily dimensions of the lived body and the physical body by drawing primarily on Husserl’s phenomenology of constitution and intersubjectivity. The central argument put forth is that in the case of anorexia nervosa, confronted with the inherent split between these dimensions and the conflicting relationship between the self and other, it is crucial to adhere to the constitutive principle of irreducibility of subjectivity. Moreover, there is a need to promote the constitutive interplay between the two dimensions and accentuate the constitutive dialectic structure of the self and other. Through these insights, the paper offers potential avenues for understanding and addressing the lived experiences of individuals battling anorexia nervosa.
... In Section 4, I identify the experiential structures that essentially affect the meaningconstitution of gestures in working with this kind of experimental media. Taking Husserl's later theory of types in Experience and Judgment (Husserl, 1939) as my point of departure, I argue that in the experience of slow-motion gestural objects, we are dealing with a deconstruction of gestural meaning determined by the constant disappointment of expectations that are based on what I call temporal typifications, i.e., passively acquired types regarding the duration and pace of temporal objects. In Section 5, I deal with another effect of slow motion, which I refer to as the intensification of interest in gestural meaning. ...
Article
This article deals with the relevance of video art and filmic techniques for the phenomenological method by thematizing how slow-motion scenes can be used in the analysis of gestures. Drawing on Edmund Husserl's theory of image consciousness, I argue that while, for the empirical researcher, slow motion is a non-analogizing moment that helps the researcher observe the positional image subject, for the phenomenologist, it depicts a different, neutralized image subject that serves as an initial example. This approach leads to further insights revealing a specific form of disappointment of our passively constituted patterns of anticipation concerning the pace of gestural interaction.
... Ecco individuato allora l'inizio: un fatto ordinario è per definizione contingente, cioè viene interpretato come qualcosa che realmente accade su uno sfondo 48 Cfr. Husserl (1882), (1887), (2021). 49 Così come egli affermerà in Hua VI (1976) e Hua XXIX (1992). ...
Article
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One of the most neglected aspects of Husserl's philosophy is certainly the phenomenological notion of "possibility" [Möglichkeit / Vermöglichkeit], which in the course of Edmund Husserl's great production has taken on multiple forms and meanings, in order to allow some fundamental questions to emerge and prove the legitimacy and the internal coherence of entire phenomenological method. The question which, to this regard, is decisive and which this short contribution aims to highlight is the following: what relationship exists between "consciousness" and "possibility"? Is it possible to establish a precedence of consciousness on empirical possibilities, or the latter are determined spontaneously and only subsequently enter into a relationship with transcendental consciousness? By analyzing this kind of problem, it will be clear that a fundamental role is played by the subjective and intersubjective kinesthetic dimension of recognition [Wiedererkennen], which provides a plausible possible solution to the question proposed. 1. Introduzione: A proposito del rapporto tra Possibilità, Essenza e Riconoscimento in Husserl. La «dottrina delle possibilità» in Husserl ricopre un ruolo di fondamentale importanza per comprendere l'origine e lo sviluppo dello stesso metodo fenomenologico. Nonostante l'estrema esiguità di risorse bibliografiche sull'argomento 1 , Husserl considera l'indagine sulla categoria della «possibilità» [Möglichkeit]-che non costituisce soltanto una categoria logica fondamentale-come un passaggio ineludibile per rintracciare all'interno del costrutto fenomenologico quella coerenza ed unità interna che permettono di legare insieme quelle che vengono tradizionalmente considerate le due anime della fenomenologia, quella "statica", che è propria delle prime opere di Husserl come Le ricerche logiche 2 e le Idee 3 , e quella "genetica" che si svilupperà successivamente alla pubblicazione di queste opere e che caratterizza la produzione husserliana a partire dagli anni '20 in poi 4. Tale dottrina ha la sua origine in ciò che nei primi studi sull'aritmetica e la logica [l'analisi matematica], ossia i primi studi sulla costituzione fenomenologica di un'ontologia formale, Husserl denomina come Dottrina delle molteplicità, ovvero la «dottrina delle forme possibili di teoria» scientifica 5. Non indugeremo ulteriormente su tale tema, tuttavia è necessario e congeniale allo studio qui proposto accennare all'origine di questa formula che fa riferimento alla formazione iniziale di Husserl, una formazione prevalentemente matematica alla scuola di Weierstrass e Kroneker, studiando i problemi legati ad una rifondazione logica e critico-empirica dei fondamenti delle scienze esatte 6 .
... orienta sobre o solo pré-predicativo do mundo-da-vida (Lebenswelt). Em cada mundo circundante (Umwelt), o seu e o meu, há uma certeza de ser como convicção (Überzeugung) (HUSSERL, 2015;1939). É a condição do "aí", a crença de que os objetos "já" se encontram à disposição a priori, isto é, na sua condição de pré-doação na simples certeza. ...
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In this chapter we discussed concept of cyberspace, understood as an experience of place through the lens of phenomenological geography.
Article
Teesid: Oma artiklis soovin arutleda kultuurifenomenoloogia kui meetodi üle. Sel teemal on Tõnu Viik avaldanud mitmeid nii inglis- kui ka eestikeelseid artikleid. Ma leian, et Viigi arendatud kultuurifenomenoloogia on liialt Husserli staatilise fenomenoloogia raamistikus – otsides invariantseid, eideetilisi struktuure (noeem–noees). Oma hilisemas filosoofias arendab Husserl aga geneetilist fenomenoloogiat. Kui uurida tähendusloome protsesse, siis peaks kindlasti vaatama Husserli geneetilist fenomenoloogiat ja tema aktiivse ja passiivse sünteesi ideed. Ma soovin näidata, et just kogemuse passiivne tasand aitab seletada mõningate kultuuriobjektide kogemist, samuti kultuurikriiside tekkeid ja nendest väljatulekuid. The aim of the article is to contribute to the study of the methodology of cultural phenomenology based on Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. More specifically, it aims to develop further, but also criticise, Tõnu Viik’s understanding of the meaning-formation in Husserl’s phenomenology. I find that the cultural phenomenology developed by Viik is too constrained in the framework of Husserl’s static phenomenology, describing the invariant, eidetic structure of consciousness. Husserl later developed genetic phenomenology that, in my view, is better suited to examine the processes of meaning-formation. This is why the concepts of passive and active synthesis in genetic phenomenology become important. According to Husserl’s distinction between passive and active synthesis (or genesis) presented in the Cartesian Meditations, passive synthesis is the lowest level of our experience. However, active synthesis, as a higher form, necessarily presupposes the passive synthesis in which the objects are already given. In active genesis, the Ego functions through specific Ego-acts that are productively constitutive. On the basis of already given objects (in passive synthesis), active synthesis can constitute new objects originally. As Anthony Steinbock emphasises, it is important to see that already passive synthesis functions to form intelligible, meaningful wholes out of diverse manifolds. Thus, passive synthesis is an important part of meaning-formation. In Experience and Judgment, Husserl divides passive synthesis into primary or original passivity (ursprüngliche Passivität) and secondary passivity (sekundäre Passivität). The former is a mere act of receiving the sense originally preconstituted in passivity and involves the structures of association and affection. Secondary passivity involves, for instance, habituality and traditions or sedimentations. In my article, I would like to show that the concept of primary passivity can be used to explain our strong emotional responses to certain cultural objects and that the concept of secondary passivity can be useful in understanding the emergence of cultural crises and the ways to overcome them. Simon Høffding and Tone Roald argue in their article ‘Passivity in Aesthetic Experience’ (2019) that Husserl’s concepts of passive synthesis and passivity are helpful in explaining intense aesthetic experience, that is, the experience of being moved or carried away, or the putative experiences of subject–object fusion. Harri Mäcklin follows Høffding and Roald’s approach in his article “Ingarden, Dufrenne, and the Passivity of Aesthetic Experience” (2021) and summarises ‘passive synthesis’ in the following way: it is a peculiar experience of which I have a sense of ownership (a sense of being the one who experiences the results of those acts), but no sense of agency (a sense of being the instigator of those acts). In my article, I take this description of passive synthesis to correspond to Husserl’s primary passivity and suggest that it is not limited to aesthetic experience. Some ordinary everyday life objects that we own, such as a cup of coffee, can evoke strong affective responses in us, so much so that we might even be reluctant to let someone else touch them. These experiences could be explained by the concept of primary passivity. Many of Husserl’s texts suggest that cultural crises are instigated by the upsurge of passive tendencies (containment, impotence and servitude). To overcome crises, we need renewal (Erneuerung) which can only be achieved through activity. As Husserl argues in the so-called Kaizo-articles, passive tendencies obstruct reflection and self-evaluation, that is, truly authentic human life. Authenticity consists in the sovereignty of the rational, active self over the passive self. However, as many Husserl scholars have shown, passivity can also play an important role in overcoming cultural crises. Victor Biceaga shows that there is no clear-cut divide between passivity and activity in Husserl’s philosophy. Moreover, passive sedimentations (secondary passivity) are necessary for the conservation of actively thought. Thus, passivity not only causes cultural crises, but also contributes to the accomplishment of the renewals. This article highlights the importance of distinguishing between passive and active synthesis to emphasise that passivity plays an important role in meaning-formation. A further step would be to examine whether primary and secondary passivity are culture-defined, culturally dependent. For example, is the strongly emotional experience of works of art specific to certain cultures? Or, do cultural crises manifest differently in cultures that do not consider rationality (Rationalität) and free will to be the ‘highest’ form of life?
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The experience error is the fallacy of attributing to our experience of a thing what we know to be true of that thing from an objective point of view. This paper argues that the “method of purification” advocated by Edmund Husserl for psychology is nothing other than avoidance of the experience error. The purity of psychology is not philosophical (transcendental) purity. Psychology remains in the natural attitude; it is pure if it is true to the subjective, psychical, genuinely lived content of experience and thus is purely descriptive. But that is easier said than done. Due to the dominance of the modern scientific outlook, the experience error is so insidious that, as the paper argues in a final section, Husserl himself was not immune to it.
Book
Husserl's Philosophy of Mathematical Practice explores the applicability of the phenomenological method to philosophy of mathematical practice. The first section elaborates on Husserl's own understanding of the method of radical sense-investigation (Besinnung), with which he thought the mathematics of his time should be approached. The second section shows how Husserl himself practiced it, tracking both constructive and platonistic features in mathematical practice. Finally, the third section situates Husserlian phenomenology within the contemporary philosophy of mathematical practice, where the examined styles are more diverse. Husserl's phenomenology is presented as a method, not a fixed doctrine, applicable to study and unify philosophy of mathematical practice and the metaphysics implied in it. In so doing, this Element develops Husserl's philosophy of mathematical practice as a species of Kantian critical philosophy and asks after the conditions of possibility of social and self-critical mathematical practices.
Chapter
Ausgehend von einer funktionalen und phänomenologischen Analyse des Vergleichs analysiert der Beitrag, wie unterschiedliche Gesellschaftsformen, insbesondere segmentäre, stratifizierte und funktional differenzierte Gesellschaften, bestimmte Vergleichsschemata bevorzugen und diese in ihren kosmologischen Selbstbeschreibungen verankern. Während segmentäre Gesellschaften häufig auf Analogien zur Erklärung ihrer sozialen Strukturen zurückgreifen, betonen stratifizierte Gesellschaften die Hierarchisierung durch steigerbare Ähnlichkeiten. In der funktional differenzierten Weltgesellschaft fungieren Äquivalenzen als Schematismen des Vergleichs heterogener, aber funktionsbezogener Problemlösungen. Der Artikel zeigt, dass Vergleichsschemata tief in den jeweiligen Differenzierungsformen von Gesellschaften verwurzelt sind und einen Schlüssel zur Analyse der strukturellen Logiken sozialer Ordnungen darstellen. Diese Untersuchung eröffnet neue Perspektiven auf die gesellschaftliche Rolle von Vergleichsoperationen und bietet methodische Impulse für die soziologische Forschung.
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The subject of this book is the ethical views of Italian philosopher Paolo Valori (1919-2003), one of the most important representatives of phenomenology in Italy. The primary objective of the research is to reconstruct his proposed concept of phenomenological ethics, considering the historical and philosophical context, and to analyse it critically.
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As is well known, sense-bestowal (Sinngebung) is a fundamental concept in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Husserl considers that everything, including nonsense or absurdity, is a result of consciousness’ production of sense. In the following article, I will argue against this thesis. More precisely, I claim that there are experiences that are not characterised by sense-bestowal. These experiences, which, in my view, are directly related to Husserl’s concept of limit-phenomena, can be called sense-withdrawal experiences. In order to show this, the paper has the following structure: First, I will analyse the highly nuanced concept of sense-bestowal, drawing connections to the notion of constitution. Second, I will introduce the concept of limit-phenomena, which I will interpret in terms of sense-refusing experiences. This, in turn, will enable me to delve into the concept of sense-withdrawal, which will serve as the focal point of the final segment of the paper.
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Descriptores: fenomenología, fenomenología social, sociología fenomenológica, teoría sociológica.
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Pain and pleasure are generally conceived as opposites and are often experienced as such. Nevertheless, there is the phenomenon that people voluntarily seek out and enjoy pain. In this essay, I argue that the pleasure of pain is not a rare deviance, but rather an everyday phenomenon. I use eidetic variation to examine the constitution of pain and attempt to shed light on the phenomenon by describing different pain pattern experiences and to show that pain and pleasure are not mutually exclusive.
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Wahrnehmungsvignetten entspringen einer phänomenologischen Methode der pädagogischen Praxis und Forschung. Sie schließt Wahrnehmungen, Beschreibungen und Reflexionsphasen für eine professionelle inklusive Haltungsentwicklung und Diagnostik ein. Die prozessuale Arbeit mit Wahrnehmungsvignetten fordert auf, idealtypische Muster, Kategorisierungen aller Art, Urteilsbildungen zu Prognosen zurückzustellen und genauer auf die individuelle und besondere Lage eines Menschen zu blicken. Der Band ist als Studien- und Arbeitsbuch konzipiert und umfasst theoretische Grundlagen, praktische Anwendungen der Methode und themenspezifische Übungen zum Wahrnehmen, Schreiben und Reflektieren.
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How can something finite mediate an infinite God? Weaving patristics, theology, art history, aesthetics, and religious practice with the hermeneutic phenomenology of Hans-George Gadamer and Jean-Luc Marion, Stephanie Rumpza proposes a new answer to this paradox by offering a fresh and original approach to the Byzantine icon. She demonstrates the power and relevance of the phenomenological method to integrate hermeneutic aesthetics and divine transcendence, notably how the material and visual dimensions of the icon are illuminated by traditional practices of prayer. Rumpza's study targets a problem that is a major fault line in the continental philosophy of religion – the integrity of finite beings I relation to a God that transcends them. For philosophers, her book demonstrates the relevance of a cherished religious practice of Eastern Christianity. For art historians, she proposes a novel philosophical paradigm for understanding the icon as it is approached in practice.
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In this chapter, I aim to take a first step toward developing a phenomenological theory of modern society. My focus is on one of the partial tasks of this ambitious project: exploring what is it like to experience society in the first-person perspective. Specifically, I limit my analysis to a mode of subjective experience of society that I term macro-social awareness via cognitive mapping. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section “The Project of a Phenomenological Theory of Society” outlines the project of a phenomenological theory of society. Section “What Is It Like to Experience Modern Society?” addresses the general issue of how society is experienced in the first-person perspective. Finally, the last and central section (“Cognitive Mapping as a Way to Overcome the Transcendence of Society”) offers a preliminary phenomenological analysis of macro-social cognitive mapping in everyday life.KeywordsTheory of societyPhenomenologyCognitive mapping
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