"THE REVOLUTION MUST CONTINUE" Strategic maneuvering in post-Mubarak Egypt

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29
((THE
REVOLUTION
MUST
CONTINUE"
Strategic maneuvering in post-Mubarak Egypt
Dima Mohammed
UN
I
VERSIDADE
NOV
A
DE
LI
SBOA,
PORTUGAL
Public
political
arguments
in
Egy
pt
, since
the
revolution sta
rt
ed
ther
e in
ea
rly 20
11
, are fasc i-
natin
g.
The
y are
int
ense, da
rin
g, and criti
ca
l, re
fl
ec
tin
g
th
e
promin
e
nt
revolutio nary
mood:
Nothin
g is beyond chall
enge
and every
thin
g
ne
eds to be r
e-co
nsi
de
red .
They
are also heated
and
gro
win
g
incre
as
in
gly
pol
arized , in a clear
indi
ca
tion
of
the cha
ll
enges
Egyptians
are
fa
cing
and
th
e
tran
sfo
rm
.a
ti
ons
th
ey are
go
ing
throu
gh.
Und
er the influence of
th
e
revolu-
tionar
y
mood
, typi
ca
l charact
er
istics of
publi
c
po
liti
ca
l arg
um
e
nt
s get
int
ensified:
Arguers
find
th
em selves
di
sc
u
ss
in
g several issues at
th
e
sa
me
tim
e
and
usin g arg
um
e
nt
s
as
discursive
me
an
s
to
disturb
existing
pow
er relationships
and
struc
tur
es
.
The
need
to
a
ddr
ess several i
ss
u
es
at
th
e
sa
me
tim
e,
cl
ea
rl
y prese
nt
in
Egypt,
is co
mmon
pr
ac
tice
in
public political arg
um
ent. Publi c politi
ca
l argu1nents are
op
en
to
participants
who
have differe
nt
int
er
es
ts
and
needs as we
ll
as
differe
nt
co
mmitment
s
and
po
sitions. Also,
parti
cipa
nt
s in
publi
c politic
al
arguments
fulfill
diff
ere
nt
rol
es
wi
th
whi
ch several
diff
ere
nt
goals ca n
be
associated. In ord
er
to achieve their goals
and
to a
pp
eal to th e
ir
heterogen
eo
us
audiences, arguers a
ddr
ess
multipl
e
is
su
es
at
th
e
sa
me
tim
.e
and
craft
th
e
ir
ar
g
um
e
nt
s s
tr
at
eg
i-
ca
lly
so
th
at
th
eir
po
sition in relation to each
of
the i
ss
u
es
they address is s
upp
orted
.
In
order
to
ca
ptur
e
th
e strategic aspect
of
argun1entative
ni.ov
es
that are crafted to address
several
is
su
es
at
th
e
sa
me
tim
e,
an arg
um
e
nt
ative exchange in which several i
ss
ues are addressed
ca
n be recons
tru
cte
d
as
a seri
es
of
several "s
imult
aneous di
sc
u
ss
ions," each
of
which is
about
one
of
th
e i
ss
u
es
(Mohammed,
20
11
,
20
13b) . A discu
ss
ion, here, is
of
co
ur
se
not
to be
und
er-
s
tood
in th e actual sense
of
a real li
fe
exchange
that
tak
es
place in a specific
tim
e and place.
Rath
e
r,
it
is a dialec
ti
ca
l analytic reconstruction
of
a di
sc
u
ss
ion, defined
in
te
rm
s
of
a s
tand-
point
and
th
e arg
um
e
nt
ation advanced
in
suppo
rt
of
it.
Two
or
mor
e di
sc
u
ss
ions
that
are recon-
stru cted
as
s
imult
aneous
ca
n happen in
one
and
th
e
sa
me real- li
fe
exchange.
Two
or
mor
e
di
sc
u
ss
ions are consid
er
ed s
im
ult
a
neou
s
if
th
ere is at least
one
argument,
or
one a
rgum
e
nt
ative
move,
that
plays a role
in
more
th
an
one
di
sc
u
ss
ion
,
without
any
of
th
e discu
ss
ions being s
ubor
-
din
ate
to
the
ot
her.
Th
e recons
tru
ction
of
one exchange as several s
imult
an
eo
us di
sc
u
ss
ions is
mea
nt
to
cap
tur
e the specifi c role
th
at a particular arg
um
entative move plays in the di
sc
ussion
of
each
of
th
e issu
es
addressed without mi
ss
in
g
th
e impli
ca
tion
s this h
as
for
th
e
ot
her i
ss
ues.
201

In - -
=Y·
I
.Ll.l!_-ze
-· e
..:
-
-:.....
argumen
ro addresses e ·eral
111a11e11veri11g
is cenrral. Van
Eemere
an
e
mpt
s to get their
poin
of
-iew
--
order
to strike
th
e bala nce
between
re.aso
-._,
his
of
srrarexil
to make s
tr
ategic c
hoi
ces in
every
rnon:·
hey
make. In every mO\·e. chey
ma
ke e
xp
ed
ient
choices
from
th
e topical
pot
e
mi
al
anilable
ro
rhem
. ada
pt
their
comri
burion
o
ptimall
y
to
th
e
expectations and
demands
of
th
eir audiences.
and
u e
th
e
most
effecti e
pr
es
entational
device
in
pr
ese
nting
th
e
ir
sta
ndp
o
int
s a
nd
arguments.
Th
e
top
ical selection, audi
ence
adaptation,
and
pr
ese
ntational
devices are
thre
e a pects
of
stra tegic
maneuvering
th
at are in separable in
pr
actice,
but
analyti
ca
ll
y can be
distingui
sh
ed
in
order
to
refin e
the
characte
riz
ation
of
the
s
trat
eg
ic fun ction
that
an
argumentativ
e move fulfi
ll
s
(va
n
Eemeren,
2010, p. 93) .
Takin
g
these
thr
ee
as
pects
into
account
when
analyz
ing
arg
um
e
nt
ative
mov
es
helps the anal
ys
t
highlig
ht
the specific strategic choices
th
at argue
rs
make
in
the course
of
th
eir
attempts
to
reach
outcomes
that
are favorable
to
the
m.
A "Letter
of
Love
to
the
Ikhwan Youth"
Th
e text [ analyze was
writt
en by
Hamd
een
Sa
bah
y,
a
promin
e
nt
Egypt
ian revoluti
onary
leader,
during
the second ro
und
of
the
Egyptian
pr
es
idential elec
tion
s
of
2012. Sabahy, a
l
ong-time
oppositio n activist, was
one
of
the cand
id
ates in the first ro
und
of
th
e elections. H e
received 20.74%
of
the
votes, coni.ing
third
after
Mohammed
Mor
si, the ca
ndidat
e
of
the
Mu
s
lim
Broth
e
rhood
who
received 24.78%,
and
Ahm
ed Shafiq,
the
last
prim
e
minist
er
und
er
Mubarak
who
received 23.66%.
The
sc
heduling
of
a second
round
of
elections, in
whi
ch the
tw
o
frontrunn
ers
wou
ld co
mpet
e,
trigg
ered
prot
es
ts and
inten
s
ifi
ed the a
lr
ea
dy
h
ea
ted public
di
sc
u
ss
ion.
On
the
one
hand
, it was diffic
ult
to believe
that
Mubarak
's
last
prime
mini
ster
could become the president
of
the post- revolution
Egypt.
On
the
ot
her
hand
,
many
were
grow
ing uneasy with
what
they
sa
w
as
the
Mus
lim
Brot
he
rhood
's
pur
s
uit
to
h
egemon
ize
powe
r; at th at
tim
e,
the
Mu
s
lim
Brotherhood
had a
lr
ea
dy
become
a majority
in
both
hou
ses
of
Parli
ame
nt
and
they
had a
majority
in
th
e
Const
itue
nt
Assembly.
Man
y were
unhappy
wit
h
th
e
grow
ing polarization
of
the politica l scene be
tw
een ex-r
egime
lo
ya
li
sts and
Mu
slim
Brotherhood
s
upporter
s,
a
polarization
that
was
being
e
mph
as
ized by the elections w here only
can
didat
es
of
th
ese
two
c
urr
e
nt
s
were
repre
se
nt
ed.
While
, for some,
thin
gs
becam
e
cl
ea
r - the
ca
ndidat
e
of
the
revolution (Morsi) was
run
ning aga
in
st
th
e
ca
ndidat
e
of
the
ex-
regim
e
(S
hafiq) - for
many
ot
hers,
thing
s were
not
so s
impl
e.
Saba hy's letter, which was
anno
unced
as
a " letter
oflove
to
the lk
hw
a n
yout
h" (the youth
of
the Musi i m
Broth
e
rhood)
, was
penned
in the middle
of
a
ll
that.
It
was first published
on
the official website
of
his
ca
mpaign
(Sabahy,
2012) and was republished in
major
newspapers and news sites. It then we
nt
viral
on
social
ne
twork
s and
trigg
ered much discu
ss
i
on
.
In
th
e le
tt
e
r,
Sabahy a
ddr
essed t
hr
ee ma
in
issues.1 First, he defended his
credib
ility
as
a
revolutionary activist
and
a political leader, arguin g
that
J,
Sa
bahy,
am
a cre
dibl
e l
ea
der
of
the
r
evo
luti
on
{s
tandpoint ·t
)-
This
was
nec
essary be
ca
u
se
he was a
tt
acked by
ac
tivists
from
the
Mu
s
lim
Brotherhood
who
saw his relu ctance to ex
pr
ess
s
upport
for their c
andidate
as
a sign
of
betraying
the re voluti
on.
The
standpoint
, as such , was not
exp
licitly ex
pre
sse
d,
but
the
arguments
that
s
upport
it
ca
nnot
be mis
se
d. Sec
ond,
Sabahy addressed
the
i
ss
ue
of
the
vote in
th
e second
round,
a
rguing
that
One should n
eit
her
vot
e for
Nlors
i
nor
for Shafiq
(s
tandpoint
2)-
Many,
es
pecially hi s supporters,
were
waitin
g for his advice conce
rnin
g
thi
s issue. The advice
was
not
pr
ese
nt
ed in a s
traightforward
mann
e
r,
thou
gh. Sabahy did
not
ex
pr
ess
hi
s main
202

"11
ie revolution
must
continue"
standpoint ab out the vote
ex
plicitl
y.
Instead, he arg ued that
On
e should not
vo
te fo r Morsi
(s
ub-
sta
ndp
o
int
2.
1a
) and
th
at One s
ho
ul
d not
vo
te fo r S
hafiq
(s
ub-
s
ta
n
dp
oint
2.
1b
). T he anal
ys
is to
fo
llow shows
th
at leav
in
g
th
e main standpo
int
abo
ut
th e vote implicit w
as
a strategic choice
Sa
bahy e
n1p
loyed to ma
int
a
in
credibilit
y.
Third,
Sa
bahy a
ddr
essed a m.uch broader i
ss
ue,
namely the i
ss
ue
of
the revoluti
on
in general, arg
uin
g
th
at The r
evo
luti
on
nn1st
co
ntin
ue
(stan
d-
po
in
t 3
).
Sa
bahy was
not
the only on e to do
th
at. Many voices were at
th
e
tim
e re-assess
in
g
the revolution and its out
co
me and di
sc
u
ss
ing
th
e possible next steps.
It
is
int
er
es
ting to
ob
se
r
ve
th
at this sta ndpo
int
was the only one that
Sa
bahy made explicit.
Thi
s,
as
th
e anal
ys
is
to
fo
ll
ow
shows, was a s
tr
at
eg
ic
cho
ice that allowed
him
to remain ambiguo us when clarity
w
as
to
hi
s disadvantage.
Strategic Maneuvering in Simultaneous Discussions
Sabahy's
tw
o sub-standpo
int
s ab
ou
t the vote refra med
th
e elec
ti
ons debate .
Re
frarning the
debate is a co
mm
on strategic maneuver
in
po
liti
ca
l arg
um
entation (Zarefsk
y,
2008
,
p.
324
).
In
th
e case analyzed, the debate was re
fr
amed
fr
om be
in
g about
th
e qu
es
tion of " W
ho
should
be
co
me pr
es
id
en
t,
Mo
rsi or Sha
ji
q?" to the qu
es
tion
of"W
h
at
sho
uld
E,r,zyp
ti
ans do in relati
on
to
the
secon
d r
ou
nd
of
el
ec
ti
ons?" T he first q u
es
ti
on was institutiona
ll
y
se
t by the electoral system.
th
at
re
quir
es
voters in
Eg
ypt to choose between t
wo
ca
ndidat
es
. lt e
nh
anced
th
e polarization
of
the political scene and the dichotomi
za
ti
on of the public debate be
tw
een
Mu
slim
Broth
erh
ood
suppo
rt
ers and
ex-
r
eg
im
e loyalists. T he second qu
es
tion
, rai
se
d by Sa
bah
y a nd o
th
er revolu-
tionaries, w
as
an attempt to d
e-
dichoto
mi
ze the public debate (Dascal,
2008)
by
ex
te
ndin
g
th
e range
of
choices available b
eyon
d
th
e t
wo
ri
va
ls.
Two
alte rn a
ti
ve co
ur
ses of action, called
on by political
gro
ups and activist
s,
beca me particu la
rl
y important: the ca
ll
on
Egy
ptians to
in
va
lidate
th
e
ir
vot
es
a
nd
th
e
ca
ll
to boyco
tt
th
e elec tio ns altogethe
r.
Sabahy's refram.ing
of
th
e debate redefined the arg
um
e
nt
a
ti
ve
dis
put
e
as
a qualitatively
multip
le one. A
qu
a
li
ta
ti
ve
ly
1nulti
pl
e
di
sp
ute
ar
i
ses
when di
sc
u
ssa
nt
s ex
pr
ess co
ntr
ary stand -
po
int
s
(va
n Eeme ren, Houtlosser & Sn
oeck
He
nk
em ans, 2007, p.
22-
24, 57). In the qualit
a-
ti
vely n
i.
ultiple dis
put
e about the second ro
und
of the
el
ection
s,
at least four ma
in
co
ntr
ary
standpo
int
s
ca
n be identi
fie
d: O ne s
ho
uld
11otefo
r
Mo
rsi
(+/
pl
),
On
e sho
uld
11o
tefor Shajiq (+/ p2),
One sho
uld
in
11a
lid
ate hi
s/
her
vo
te
(+/p3),
and One sh
ou
ld b
oyco
tt
th
e el
ect
i
ons
(+/ p
4)
. R
e-
fra
min
g
the disagreem
.e
nt
as
a qua
lit
atively
111
.ultiple di
sp
ute was ad
va
ntageous to
Sa
bahy
as
it allowed
him
to ex
pr
ess
oppositio n to sta
nd
po
int
s
ex
pr
essed by his oppo ne
nt
s
with
out adva ncing any
(positive) standpo
int
of
his
ow
n
or
clea
rl
y expressing his position conce
rnin
g other stan
d-
po
int
s in
th
e debate.
In
a qualitati vely m
ul
tiple dis
pu
te,
com
mitm
ent to one
of
th
e standpo
int
s enta
il
s
co
mmi
t-
ment to th e opposite
of
the
ot
her contrary sta ndpoint
s.
So,
fo
r example,
if
an arguer defends
th
at One sho
uld
vo
te for Morsi (+/ pl ), the arguer
ca
n be held co
mm
i
tt
ed to One slumld n
ot
vo
te fo r
S
hafi
q
(-
/p2), One sh
ould
not
inva
li
dat
e
hi
s/
her
11ote
(-
/p3), and One sho
uld
not b
oyc
ott
th
e el
ec
ti
ons
(-
/p
4)
. H owever, in this type
of
dis
put
e, opposition to one standpo
int
does not necessa
ri
ly
enta
il
any co
mm
itm
ent
to
any
ot
her con trary one. So, one
ca
n be opposed to One sho
uld
1Jo
te
fo r Morsi (i.e., express - /
pl
) w ithout be
in
g co
mmitt
ed to O ne sh
ou
ld
vo
te fo r Sh
qfi
.q
(+/
p2), One
sho
uld
in
va
lid
ate
hi
s/her
1Jote
(+/p3), or O ne sh
ou
ld
boy
co
tt
th
e
elec
tions
(+/
p4). Fra
min
g the
disagreement
as
a qualirarively multiple di
sp
ute a
ll
owed
Sa
bahy to do
ex
ac
tl
y th a
t:
to arg ue
against
th
e st
andpoint
rhar One sho
ul
d
1Jo
tefo r
Mo
rsi (i
.e
., arg ue that One sh
ou
ld
no
t 1
Jo
tefor
Mo
rsi,
-/
pl
) and aga inst the stand
point
that One sho
uld
vo
te fo r Shqfiq (
i.
e., argue
th
at
On
e sho
uld
no
t
IJO
tefor S
hafi
.q, - / p2), wirhour com m itting
him
se
lf to any
thin
g conce
rnin
g
wh
ether or n ot One
sho
uld
i1
wa
lid
ate
h
is
/h
er
v01e
(+/ p3) and whether or n
ot
One sho
uld
boyco
tt
the el
ec
ti
ons
(+/
p4).
203

Disturbing
arg
ument
The
a
mbiguity
in
Saba hy's
po
sition was s
tr
ategic (Eisenberg, 1984). It was
purpos
efully
used
to
save
Sa
bahy fr
om
an
un
favorable position.
Suppor
ting the
standpo
int
that
On.e
should
in
val
id
ate
one's
vote
(+/p3)
would have
comm
itt
ed
Sabahy
to
participate
in
the
elections, whi ch
is
so
me
thin
g
he
wo
uld rathe r avo
id
mainly
bec
au
se
he had
just
publicly
as
ked
fo
r alte
rn
ative
measures (namely
the
presidential co
un
cil).
Sim
ilarl
y,
supp
orti
ng th e
standpoint
that
On
e
should
boycott
th
e e
le
c
tion
s
(+/p4)
wo
uld have
com
mitt
ed
him
to cha
ll
e
nging
the l
eg
itim
acy
of
the elections, wh
ich
he
wou
ld rath
er
not
do
op
en ly for he
wo
uld risk be
ing
accused
of
being
involved
in
the elections
when
he
had
a chance
of
w
innin
g and
go
ing
aga inst the m after he
had lost. F
urth
ermore,
by n
ot
t
ak
ing any clear positi
on,
either in favor
of
in
va
lid
at
in
g one's
vote
or
in
favor
of
boyco
ttin
g
th
e elections, Saba hy
co
uld remain
on
the
sa
me side t
ogether
with
th
ose
who
thought
that
Egyptians
sho uld
invalid
ate the
ir
votes
as
well
as
thos
e who
tho
ug
ht
that
Egypt
ian s should
boycott
th
e elections altogether. In
ot
h
er
words, it a
ll
owed
him
to
put
himself
on the same side
wi
th a greater
num
.
be
r
of
revolutionaries
than
he
wo
ul
d
have been able to had he expresse d a clear positio n.
(Out
of
th
e
51
million
Egy
ptia n registered
voters, 27.3 milli
on
did not vote. O
ut
of
th
e 23.6
million
who voted, there
were
12.4 n1illion
voters
who
did
not
vote for e
ith
er Shafiq or
Mor
si.)
This
was obviously very u
se
ful for Sabahy
in
the discussion
abo
ut
hi
s credibility.
Thanks
to
thi
s
ambig
uit
y,
Sabahy cou ld avo
id
a chal-
l
enge
from
the
1T1any
Egyptian
yo
uth
, wh
om
he cla
im
ed to re
pr
esent, from.
diff
ere
nt
id
eo-
logical affi
li
ations.
Sabahy's c
hoi
ce
to
leave implic
it
hi
s
main
s
tandpoint
a
bout
the
vote was clearl y a s
trat
egic
choice.
lf
Sabahy had
tak
en
the
exp
licit s
tandp
oi
nt
that
One should neither 1
1ote
for
Morsi
nor
for
Shafiq, he would have conveyed a cha
ll
enge to
the
l
eg
itim
.acy
of
the
electoral syst
em
and
u
nderm
in
ed
hi
s credibility.
How
ever, Sabahy could n
ot
ju
st avo
id
co
mmitm
e
nt
to th
e chal-
lenge
of
th
e l
eg
itima
cy
of
the elections by l
eaving
hi
s sta
ndpoint
implicit.
One
of
th
e
main
argum
.e
nt
s that h e
exp
ressed in
th
e letter was
th
at Neither
Mors
i
nor
Shafi.q
r
epresen
ts
the
depoliti-
ci
zed and
defends
th
e
ir
r(r;hts
and inter
ests.
T h
is
arg
um
ent
could very easily be
und
ers
tood
as
a
su
pport
to a sta
ndpoint
like The el
ec
tion
s
are
ill
eg
itirn
ate
and
Sa
bahy wou Id have been consid
ered
committe
d
to
it, even
wit
ho ut
ex
plicitly
advancing
it. In
order
to
mak
e s
ur
e
that
he was
not
comm
itted
to
such a
standpo
int
, Sabahy
in
troduced
another
sta
ndpoint
that
could be
su
pported
by the
arg
um
ent
that Nei
ther
Morsi
no
r Shafi.q
represents
the
depo
li
ticized and def
ends
their
ri
g
ht
s
and
inter
es
ts. H e
exp
li
citly
argued
that
The politi
ca
l
proc
ess
is not de
li1
1e
ri
ng
sa
tisfa
ct
ory
ou
t
com
.
es,
and,
th
erefore, The rwoluti
on.
nrn
st
continue.
By
making
the
sta
ndpoint
abo
ut
th
e r
evo-
luti
on
exp
licit,
and
bringin
g it up ea
rl
y
in
th
e
in
trodu
ctory
paragraph
of
th
e le
tt
er,
Sa
bahy
gave
prominence
to
the i
ss
ue
of
th
e revoluti
on
, h
oping
to
mak
e
th
e issue
of
th
e vote seem
second ary. T he l
atter
could help
him
avoid undes
ir
able
com
mitments
in
relation to th e
elec
tion
s.
lt
is
important
to
rea
li
ze
that
it
was necessary for Saba hy to explicitly adva nce a
standpoi
nt
that
can
be
sup
ported
by
th
e arg
um
ent
th
at Neither 1\tf
orsi
nor
Shqfiq
represents
the
de
politici
zed
and d
efends
the
ir
ri,r;h
ts
and
i
nterests.
That
is to say
that
he could
not
have
ju
st left
the
arg
um
e
nt
wit
h
out
a s
tandpoint
that
is
exp
lici
tl
y
advan
ced,
which
is
some
thing
quit
e co
mmon
and
u
nprob
lern.atic
in
arg
um
entative dis course.
That
is because
witho
ut such an explicitly
advanced st
andpoin
t, Sabahy
wo
uld have had (even
more)
difficulty
avoiding
the
commit-
me
nt
to
the sta
ndpoint
that
The el
ections
are
ill
egi
tim
me
and
he
wo
uld have, consequently, had
even
mor
e diffic
ult
y
keeping
his
position
consiste
nt
. So.
e\
·enrually, Sabahy's strategic
maneu-
verin g
in
the discussion
abo
ut the revoluti
on
,
nam
ely his choice to
exp
licitly advance
th
e
standpoint
th
at The
revo
lution
mu
st continue, wa s necessar;·
fo
r his strategic
am.
big
uit
y
in
th
e
di
sc
u
ss
ion about
th
e vote
to
wo
rk.
204

"The
revo
lution
mu
st continue"
Concluding Remarks
Sa
bahy
man
euve red st
ra
t
eg
ically
in
betwee
n
th
e
thr
ee i
ss
u
es
he addressed. H e re
fram
ed
th
e
arg
um
e
nt
by d
e-
dichotomi
zing
the
elections debate
and
turnin
g
th
e disagreeme
nt
a
bout
th
e
vote
into
a qualitatively
multi
ple dispute in
which
he could afford
to
rem a
in
amb
iguous ab
out
the
qu
es
tion
of
how
to
vote.
On
the
one
hand,
hi
s a
mbiguity
about
th
e vote was necessary for
hi
s cla
im
about his
ow
n credibility
to
remain
suppo
rt
ed .
On
the oth er
hand
,
thi
s ambig
uit
y
could n
ot
have been ma
int
ained
without
a
ddr
ess
ing
th
e i
ss
ue
of
th
e revolu
tion
. O nl y by
mak
ing the issue
of
th
e
revolution
the
ma
in
issue a
nd
takin g an
ex
plicit
po
siti
on
abo
ut
it
could he afford
to
rem
ain
amb
iguo us abo ut the vote
and
credible
in
the eyes
of
his
audie
nce.
M y analysis
of
Sabahy's le
tt
er
shows
how
what is typical
of
public
po
liti
ca
l arg
ument,
n
am
el
y a
ddr
essin g multiple issues s
imultaneous
l
y,
ca
n becom.e, in revolutionary
tim
es,
th
e
means
to
dis
turb
pow
er relations and s
tru
c
tur
es.
Sa
bahy's d
e-d
ic
hotomi
za
tion
of
th
e electi
ons
debate would probably
not
have been
as
effective
in
ot
h
er
non-r
evoluti
onary
time
s whe re
po
liti
ca
l
in
s
titution
s are
we
ll
-estab
lished
and
ni.uch harder to c ha
ll
e
ng
e. In re
volutionar
y
tim
es,
wh
ere politica l
cult
ur
e is be
in
g res haped and ins
titution
s are
being
r
e-
built
, it becomes
po
ss
ibl
e,
if
not
necessar
y,
to
di
sturb
ex
is
ting
p
owe
r relat ions and s
tru
c
tur
es
.
Resorting
to
claims a
bout
th
e n
eed
to Continue the r
evo
luti
on
until
it
s
goa
ls
are
achieved
is p
ar
tic
ul
a
rl
y
powerful
in
th
ese contex ts.
ln the
Egyptian
case,
th
e
attempt
to
d
e-
dich
otom
ize public politica l argu
ment
s
and
de-po
larize
the
politi
ca
l scene is
part
icularly significant. It re
fl
ects a persiste
nt
will
to
cr
ea
te
an
alternative politi
ca
l c
urr
e
nt
bet
wee
n
th
e
Mu
s
lim
Brot
he
rhood
and
th
e
ex-
r
eg
im
e loyalists.
This is still th e case, now,
one
yea r after the le
tt
er analyzed above.
Mor
si
won
the
sec
ond
ro
und
wit
h a na
rrow
margin (he received 51.8% o f
th
e votes and Shafiq received 48 .2
%)
. T he
Muslim
Brot
he
rhood
's
pur
suit
ofhegemon
izin g
pow
er
co
ntinu
ed , whi ch fuelled
con
tinu
ous
popu
lar protests.
Th
e
prote
sts c
ulminat
ed in
the
army
int
erven
in
g and
removing
Morsi fr om
pow
er,
one
year after he beca me
th
e first elected
pr
es
ide
nt
in
Egypt.
The
Muslim
Bro
th
e
rh
oo
d
and
th
e
ex-
reg
im
e loya
li
sts co
ntinu
e their effo
rt
s
to
po
larize
th
e
politi
cal scene,
but
there
rema
in
s
tron
g voices
not
giving in to
thi
s and dete
rmined
to
l
ea
d
Egypt
towards a pluralistic
rath
er than a
bi-polar
po
litica l
culture.
My anal
ys
is of Sabahy's le
tt
er does
not
provid
e
in
sig
ht
s
into
th
e
Egyptian
politi
ca
l scene
o
nl
y.
After
a
ll
, the s
tr
ategic di
sc
ur
sive choices it hig
hli
g
ht
s
ca
n be made by any politicians
w ho are addressing multiple i
ss
u
es
s
imult
an
eo
usl
y.
My anal
ys
is shows t hat
th
e d
es
irable
outcomes
pur
sued by cer
tain
argumentative
choices
mad
e by the
arguer
ar
e
not
necessa rily
res
tri
cted
to
the di
sc
u
ss
ion
of
one
i
ss
ue onl y.
Th
is can be tho ug
ht
as
on
ly
natur
al
in
di
scourses
th
at address several i
ss
u
es
simultan
eo
usly. B ecause, in such disco
ur
ses, arg
um
e
nt
ative
move
s
are typi
ca
lly meant
to
co
ntribut
e to
th
e
di
sc
u
ss
ion
of
mor
e
th
an
one
i
ss
ue at a
tim
e,
th
e
stra-
t
eg
ic
man
euv
er
ing involved
in
d
es
ig
nin
g
them
s
imilarly
involv
es
th
e
pur
s
uit
of
d
es
ir
a
bl
e
e
ff
ects in relation to
the
several
is
su
es
a
ddr
essed. An
importan
t
dim
ens
ion
of the strategic
d
es
ig n
would
be lost
if
the di
sc
ussions
of
the
diff
ere
nt
i
ss
u
es
were analyzed independentl y
without
ca
pturin
g the strategic maneu ver
ing
that occ
ur
s
betw
een the
m.
T he
prop
osal to
recons
tru
ct
th
e di sco
ur
se
as
a
se
ries
of
s
imultan
eo
us
di
sc
u
ss
ions is mea
nt
to
pr
eve
nt
this sh
or
t-
co
min
g, in particul
ar
. By analyzing arguer
s'
s
trat
egic ma neu
vering
as
occ
urrin
g
in
be
tw
een
multiple di
sc
u
ss
ion
s,
the choices that are s
trat
eg
ic across i
ss
u
es
ca
n be highli g
ht
ed and a
mor
e
refined ana l
ys
is
of
the disco
ur
se
ca
n be offered.
205

Disturbing argume
nt
Note
1.
T he
identification
of these i
ss
u
es
is based on a
deta
il
ed arg
um
e
nt
ative anal
ys
is
ofSa
bahy's l
ette
r, in
which his sta
ndp
o
int
s
and
arg
um
e
nt
s w ere r
econs
tructed.
An
Eng
li
sh translation
ofSa
bah
y's le
tt
e
r,
which was publishe d in
Arabic
, a
nd
an e lab
orate
anal
ys
is
of
it
ca
n be
fo
und
in Moha
mm
ed (2013a).
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