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CONFIDENCE IN JUDGMENT - PERSISTENCE OF ILLUSION OF VALIDITY
... A second response is to investigate the informal properties of everyday experience in order to clarify what opportunities for learning they afford. For example, Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) have devised a general model of reality, one in which it is hard for people to discover that they have too great confidence in their own knowledge. (Fischhoff, 1981, p. 903) Ross and Nisbett demonstrate the power of formal analysis in their chapter 4, "The Search for Personal Consistency." ...
... A second potential value of a more formal approach is clarifying the difficulty of the tasks that people face in life (and the opportunities that they have for acquiring needed knowledge and intellectual skills). For example, the authors cite Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) as "point[ing] out [that] there is often blurred or even no feedback about job outcome" (p. 136). ...
... Finally, sometimes simple environmental constraints systematically create a biased sample. For example, if an environment permits the observation of only a chosen alternative's outcome, then an overly negative perception of a foregone alternative cannot be disconfirmed because its true value goes unobserved (Denrell 2005Denrell , 2007 Einhorn and Hogarth 1978; March 1996). Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) propose that human resource departments face this problem because they can more easily observe the performance of applicants they hire than the performance of those they reject. ...
... environmental constraints systematically create a biased sample. For example, if an environment permits the observation of only a chosen alternative's outcome, then an overly negative perception of a foregone alternative cannot be disconfirmed because its true value goes unobserved (Denrell 2005Denrell , 2007 Einhorn and Hogarth 1978; March 1996). Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) propose that human resource departments face this problem because they can more easily observe the performance of applicants they hire than the performance of those they reject. Empirical research has Feiler, Tong, and Larrick: Biased Judgment in Censored Environments Management Science 59(3), pp. 573–591, © 2013 INFORMS 575 found simil ...
Some environments constrain the information that managers and decision makers can observe. We examine judgment in censored environments where a constraint, the censorship point, systematically distorts the observed sample. Random instances beyond the censorship point are observed at the censorship point, whereas uncensored instances are observed at their true value. Many important managerial decisions occur in censored environments, such as inventory, risk taking, and employee evaluation decisions. In this research, we demonstrate a censorship bias—individuals tend to rely too heavily on the observed censored sample, biasing their belief about the underlying population. We further show that the censorship bias is exacerbated for higher degrees of censorship, higher variance in the population, and higher variability in the censorship points. In four studies, we find evidence of the censorship bias across the domains of demand estimation and sequential risk taking. The bias causes individuals to make costly decisions and behave in an overly risk-averse manner.
This paper was accepted by Teck Ho, judgment and decision making.
... 5 First, limits on attention, processing abilities and memory can contribute to how information is selected (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Second, individuals who believe they are already competent may have considerable inertia in adjusting their cognitive processes (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978). Third, emotions like anxiety and fear may act as mechanisms that overcome reason (Frank, 1988). ...
... Appendix 5: Adding the number of outcomes or branches in M3 See Tables 7 and 8. Humphrey (1999Humphrey ( , 2001 suggests that the perception of a split-form gamble could be dependent not only on learning the combined probabilities of the respective split events but also on learning the absolute number of the split events. Indeed, already Estes (1976) argued in favor of a psychological phenomenon termed the categorical memory for absolute frequency of outcome, which describes how the encoding of event categories is done in terms of cardinal numbers and not probabilities (see also Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) for related empirical evidence). 14 While Humphrey (1999) find mixed results in favor of this explanation in his study, Birnbaum and Navarrete (1998) find some evidence supporting the importance of the absolute number of branches in a gamble. ...
The majority consensus in the empirical literature is that probability weighting functions are typically inverse-S shaped, that is, people tend to overweight small and underweight large probabilities. A separate stream of literature has reported event-splitting effects (also called violations of coalescing) and shown that they can explain violations of expected utility. This leads to the questions whether (1) the observed shape of weighting functions is a mere consequence of the coalesced presentation and, more generally, whether (2) preference elicitation should rely on presenting lotteries in a canonical split form instead of the commonly used coalesced form. We analyze data from a binary choice experiment where all lottery pairs are presented in both split and coalesced forms. Our results show that the presentation in a split form leads to a better fit of expected utility theory and to probability weighting functions that are closer to linear. We thus provide some evidence that the extent of probability weighting is not an ingrained feature, but rather a result of processing difficulties.
... Ultimately, it is the confidence in a final judgment under uncertainty that determines if, and how, the final judgment will be used (Sniezek and Henry 1989). The relationship between judgment accuracy and confidence (calibration) has been examined in a number of decision settings (Einhorn and Hogarth 1978;Glenberg et al. 1982;Lichtenstein et al. 1982;Dunning et al. 1990). In general, these studies have found that individuals are overconfident (i.e., poorly calibrated) in the accuracy of their judgments, a finding that extends to auditor confidence in inaccurate memory (Moeckel and Plumlee 1989). ...
Research indicates that individual auditors commonly make memory errors and are overconfident in inaccurate
memories of audit evidence. A study extends this research by assessing whether auditor memory performance in 2 fundamental memory tasks, cued recognition and/or cued recall, is improved through multi-person processes.
Results indicate that recall volume and accuracy were greater when the memory task was performed in
conjunction with 2 other auditors and when the delay between evidence encoding and evidence retrieval was
short. Auditors were more accurate, and more confident, in recognition memory when acting with group assistance and after a shorter time delay. Group-assisted auditors also committed fewer incorrect acceptance errors in recognition memory than did individual auditors. However, group-assisted auditors were more confident that their recognition errors were accurate memories.
... Various researchers have studied behavioral pattern in decision making, particularly in purchasing and expenditure related decision. Behavioral decision theory (Einhorn and Hogarth ,1978) suggests that since feedback on effort expenditure tends to be immediate while feedback on accuracy is subject to delay and ambiguity, decision makers may be inclined to focus more on reducing cognitive effort than on improving decision accuracy. Kleinmuntz and Schkade (1993) also suggest that response to feedback on peer choices is reflected in expenditure related decisions. ...
In a relatively short period Social Media has become ubiquitous and indeed turned out to be an inseparable part of modern day lives. Enhanced presence of internet through computing and mobile devices fast changing generations of transmission technology and fascination among youth for connectivity have all contributed to this proliferation. Like any other social interaction, social media also has its share of opinion moulding and influencing dynamics. Yet, it is interesting to note that this influence has turned out to be unprecedented and trendsetting It remains to be seen how this credence and dependence, so distinctive of social media, verbalizes buying choices and brand preference. Undoubtedly, simply for its attraction towards newer modes of socializing and technology, the younger generation tends to be more social media savvy Does this fascination also make them susceptible to its influences in the matters of spending choices and buying behaviour? This paper undertakes to empirically study the extent of such influence along with a secondary perspective to analyze the Digital Marketing Strategies that stimulate regular online shopping pattern. It evaluates the factors that trigger purchase of new products through Social Media and examines the relative importance of online reviews, opinions and recommendations in purchase decisions.
... If things work out differently from expected after the patient's discharge from hospital, they often do not learn the truth. This situation may put their minds at ease and boost their confidence, but the feedback they obtain is distorted and thus prevents valid learning [2]. This becomes even more problematic if there is too much reliance on imaging and biochemical tests. ...
... Besides uncertainty, experience plays an important role in the creation of trust placed in building a relationship with a customer over time. A customer's additional experience with the same product after each consumption increases its familiarity and, thus, generates more trust (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978). The ability to understand the market and a customer's portfolio allows the company to anticipate opportunities, discern different events and trends in the marketplace and take appropriate action (Narver & Slater, 1990; Kohli & Jaworski, 1990; Yli-Renko & Janakiraman, 2008; Lukkari & Parvinen, 2008; Terho, 2009; Tarasi, Bolton, Hutt & Walker, 2011 ). ...
Esta investigación contribuye con una visión teórica y práctica de la nueva perspectiva de la gestión del valor del cliente (cvm) y sus implicaciones en los negocios. De hecho, el propósito de este trabajo es probar la influencia de la cvm en los resultados financieros a través de la participación de mercado (ms), el margen bruto (gm) y el retorno sobre el capital (roe). Para ello, el enfoque utilizado es un estudio empírico con datos de 107 ejecutivos de ventas de uno de los bancos más grandes de Chile. Los resultados apoyan la hipótesis de que el cvm tendría una influencia positiva en la tasa de retención, así como en la optimización de los costos de adquisición de clientes y los ingresos generados a partir de estos. Este trabajo además establece la influencia que tiene la cvm en los resultados financieros de la compañía. Para evaluar los resultados de la organización, se han seleccionado indicadores financieros relevantes en la evaluación del desempeño financiero de una empresa. Los resultados además señalan que para mantener un buen nivel de confianza las empresas necesitan alcanzar un buen nivel de comunicación con sus clientes, lo que es particularmente importante, en tanto un alto nivel de cvm podría ser un atributo necesario para el desarrollo de relaciones a largo plazo con los clientes y lograr un crecimiento sostenible de las ventas.
... When assessing the true cause-effect relationship between two variables (e.g. between the application of a specific investment strategy and the achieved results), people focus on cases where both variables were observed simultaneously (e.g. a specific rule was applied and above-average outcome was achieved) and simultaneously they seem not to notice examples of situations in which only one variable occurred and the other did not (e.g. a given strategy did not bring about the expected outcome or extraordinary results were achieved without the specific rule being applied). As the result of this selective approach, the decision-maker may develop the so-called illusion of validity, i.e. sticking to wrong convictions or even enforce them, at the same time demonstrating overconfidence (Einhorn and Hogarth 1978). ...
There are many reasons for the current state of affairs in the Eurozone, most of which fall within the scope of economics, politics, and human behaviour. In the first step, this paper briefly discusses the macroeconomic and fundamental background of the Eurozone turbulences. We argue that the roots of the crisis lie in the persistent imbalances within the Eurozone and the inflexibility of the common monetary policy that turned out to be inadequate for the dissimilar economies of the EMU. We also point at the mounting public debt, the high risks associated with the European banking sector, and the interdependence between the financial solidity of the banking system and government solvency across the Eurozone. However - contrary to many other commentaries - we consider the large public debt not as the primary reason for the crisis in Europe, but as an effect of the earlier lack of fiscal discipline and the result of external factors added on top. Later in this paper, attention is focused on behavioural aspects that might have contributed to the financial crisis and human inclinations that demonstrated themselves on that occasion. We discuss the extrapolation bias and problems with the time horizon of the decision makers, the underestimation of risk due to overconfidence and the difficulties with the probability estimation of extreme scenarios. We define "the Euro heuristic", a phenomenon responsible for overseeing the risk disparity among various members of the EMU, and explain why bad news gets accepted relatively slowly. Herding, the activities of hedge funds, and the role of rating agencies are also deliberated upon. The behavioural approach to the recent European crisis and the application of psychological inclinations in this particular context, constitute the original contribution of this paper. The findings of the paper may help to avoid similar mistakes in the future, especially for prospective Eurozone members in years to come.
... Surely is not surprising to hear its advocates claim that humans believe, let us say, in magic, because they do not reason correctly on the observations they make. They apply an incorrect appreciation on the random distributions, choosing variable samples which they recombine in the expectation of more precise forecasts (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978), which does not prevent them from manifesting an unshakable trust in their judgements and opinions, as if they exactly reflected reality. 'Thus', write Tversky and Kahneman (1980), people are more inclined to trust judgements which are questionable, a phenomenon one might well coin the illusion of validity. ...
... Being forced to rely on proxy variables that are only crudely related to the variable of true interest might exaggerate differences between experts and encourage reliance on irrelevant factors, as observed by Gaeth and Shanteau (1984). Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) argued that, in general, it may be difficult for people to make accurate appraisals of their own judgemental abilities. Under many common circumstances, people tend to overestimate the quality of their judgement because: (1) they tend to evaluate their expertise on the basis of the number of times they recall correctly predicting a positive outcome, rather than on a statistically appropriate basis that takes into account negative outcomes and failures to predict positive ones; (2) if there is a high base rate of true positives, then the ratio of true positives to false positives will be high, even if the judge has no discriminatory judgemental ability; (3) whenever the selection rate is higher than the base rate, little judgemental ability is required to obtain high frequencies of true positives; and (4) self-fulfilling treatment effects may inflate the observed number of true positives, leading to substantial overestimation of judgemental abilities. ...
... Ils ne concernent que rarement les manageurs, les chefs d'entreprises et plus rarement encore les élus. En effet, i) les résultats induits par chacun des choix sont assez souvent dilués dans une multiplicité de relations et sont assez peu attribuables à une décision en particulier, ii) l'environnement est tellement variable qu'une décision associée à un contexte donné se déroulera très vraisemblablement dans un environnement tout autre et l'on ne pourra pas l'évaluer à l'aune des raisons qui l'avaient motivée, iii) on n'a généralement aucune information sur ce qui se serait passé en l'absence de décision ou si une autre décision avait été prise, iv) enfin et surtout les décisions sont uniques et offrent peu de place à l'apprentissage (Einhorn et Hogarth, 1978, in Tversky et Kahneman, 1986. ...
Cahiers du GREThA N° 2011-13
... Ils ne concernent que rarement les manageurs, les chefs d'entreprises et plus rarement encore les élus. En effet, i) les résultats induits par chacun des choix sont assez souvent dilués dans une multiplicité de relations et sont assez peu attribuables à une décision en particulier, ii) l'environnement est tellement variable qu'une décision associée à un contexte donné se déroulera très vraisemblablement dans un environnement tout autre et l'on ne pourra pas l'évaluer à l'aune des raisons qui l'avaient motivée, iii) on n'a généralement aucune information sur ce qui se serait passé en l'absence de décision ou si une autre décision avait été prise, iv) enfin et surtout les décisions sont uniques et offrent peu de place à l'apprentissage (Einhorn et Hogarth, 1978, in Tversky et Kahneman, 1986. ...
... Ils ne concernent que rarement les manageurs, les chefs d'entreprises et plus rarement encore les élus. En effet, i) les résultats induits par chacun des choix sont assez souvent dilués dans une multiplicité de relations et sont assez peu attribuables à une décision en particulier, ii) l'environnement est tellement variable qu'une décision associée à un contexte donné se déroulera très vraisemblablement dans un environnement tout autre et l'on ne pourra pas l'évaluer à l'aune des raisons qui l'avaient motivée, iii) on n'a généralement aucune information sur ce qui se serait passé en l'absence de décision ou si une autre décision avait été prise, iv) enfin et surtout les décisions sont uniques et offrent peu de place à l'apprentissage (Einhorn et Hogarth, 1978, in Tversky et Kahneman, 1986. ...
Chapitre 2 du livre Regards sur la ville
... Technical analysts are prone to making excessively volatile predictions because they rely on representativeness as a rule of thumb. 13. Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) find that we are prone to search for confirming evidence. 14. ...
In this paper, studied the mathematical model concerning the transmission of Monkey-Pox disease. A class viral disease that mostly occurs in west and central Africa, transmitted from animals into human is belonging to the Small-pox family known is Monkey-pox infections disease. According to the scientist the primary best of the proposed disease is still in doubt. The proposed model will be investigate for the purpose of both qualitative and numerical solutions. At the early stage of this study, investigate the existence of proposed model. In this connection, the authors developed the desired condition of existence and stability for consider model by using the tools of analysis. At the second phase of this research work,the author investigated the numerical solutions for the consider Monkey-pox transmission diseases model. For numerical investigation, the authors use the tool of well know semi-analytical techniques known as Natural Transform coupled with Adomain Decomposition Method. The consider techniques are powerful tools for of obtaining approximate solutions of differential equation or system of differential equations. The proposed techniques base on recursive scheme for solutions of system of differential equations. For the authenticity and accuracy of obtain solutions, the obtain solutions are visualized graphically to desired the dynamical behavior of desired results with the help of Mathematica. That show the proposed method is best tools for solution of differential equations.
Purpose
This study aims to explore whether seeking recommendations for doctors from offline word-of-mouth or online reviews influences patient satisfaction after treatment, and how the source of recommendation affects this effect.
Design/methodology/approach
Using a unique dataset of more than three million reviews from a popular Chinese online health community, this study used the coarsened exact matching method and built fixed-effect models to conduct empirical analysis.
Findings
The results suggest that selecting doctors according to recommendations can improve patient satisfaction and mitigate their dissatisfaction when encountering service failures. However, online recommendations were found to be less effective than offline sources in improving patient satisfaction.
Originality/value
This study provides important insights into patient satisfaction and doctor-patient relationships by revealing the antecedents of satisfaction and the potential for improving this relationship. It also contributes to the understanding of how recommendations in the healthcare context can improve patient satisfaction and alleviate the negative impact of service failures.
Reviews studies on training, experience, and clinical judgment. The results on the validity of judgments generally fail to support the value of on-the-job experience in mental health fields. The validity results do provide limited support for the value of training. Other results suggest that experienced clinicians are better than less experienced judges at knowing which of their judgments are likely to be correct and which are likely to be wrong. Reasons why clinicians have trouble learning from experience are given. Recommendations are made for improving training and clinical practice.
In-group and out-group members were predicted to differ in the judged efficacy of coercion and conciliation as social influence strategies, with coercion perceived as relatively more effective than conciliation by outgroup rather than ingroup members. In Experiment 1, all subjects read a description of a conflict between two hypothetical nations, with half of the subjects taking the perspective of the defense minister of one nation and half the perspective of the other. Each nation was developing weapons that increased rather than decreased the likelihood of war. Each subject was asked to consider the effectiveness of an array of social influence strategies, varying in degree of coercive or conciliatory tone, that could modify the actions of either their own or the other country. The prediction was confirmed, both by indexes of rated effectiveness and by a ranking of effectiveness. In Experiment 2, the perspective-taking manipulation was weakened by merely asking subjects to imagine that they were citizens of one country or the other. Experiment 2 replicated the basic findings of Experiment 1. The implications of these results for international conflict, with particular reference to the arms race, are discussed.
Prior research indicates that students expect participation in the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance program (VITA) to improve both their technical competence and their soft skills. To date, the extant research primarily assesses student perceptions about these outcomes. We extend the research by empirically measuring technical competence and a broad range of soft skills at the beginning and end of VITA participation for seventy-one accounting majors (32 females and 39 males) who participated in the VITA program over two years at one major Midwestern university. Class credit with pass/not pass grading is earned for participating in the VITA program at this university if the volunteers pass the qualifying exams and earn participation points by completing at least a minimum number of returns. We test for actual changes in these skills. Our results indicate first-time participants in VITA do improve in technical competence, but students do not become better calibrated with respect to "knowing what they know" as a result of VITA participation. Importantly however, participants in the program improve in their soft skills. Further, both first-time and repeat participants improve their communication skills, although we do not find improvement in interpersonal relations or personal abilities for repeat participants. In sum, our empirical results indicate that the VITA program does deliver the hoped-for outcomes across a wide range of skills.
This presidential address attempts to predict the future directions of neuropsychology. Predicting the future is always a difficult thing. By examining population trends such as aging and demographics, a clearer picture becomes visible. The population is getting older and more ethnically diverse. Also, examination of the spending trends in health care indicates that neuropsychology needs to be able to adapt to working with larger population-based patient care as well as individual patient care. Shifts in the demographics of neuropsychology, in that the profession previously was 70% male dominate and now is >70% female dominant are also discussed. Trends in NAN's speaker and leader demographics are examined as well as the need to stay current in the trends and latest neuropsychological research lest we become dinosaurs in the next 5-10 years. Recommendations for new neuropsychologists and post-doctoral fellows are also presented.
This report presents an information processing framework for predicting the effects of stress manipulations on pilot decision making. The framework predicts that stressors related to anxiety, time pressure, and high risk situations will restrict the range of cue sampling and reduce the capacity of working memory, but will not affect decisions that are based upon direct retrieval of knowledge from long term memory. These predictions were tested on MIDIS, a microcomputer-based pilot decision simulator. Performance on a series of 38 decision problems was compared between ten subjects in a control group and ten subjects who had performed under conditions of noise, concurrent task loading, time pressure, and financial risk. The results indicated that the stress manipulation significantly reduced the optimality and confidence of decisions. The manipulations imposed their greatest effect on problems that were coded high on spatial demand and on problems requiring integration of information from the dynamic instrument panel. The effects of stress were relatively independent of problem demands associated with working memory and with the retrieval of knowledge from long term memory.
This study advances several propositions about the effects of time pressure on individuals' belief revisions within a pressure-arousal-effort-performance framework. There is a significant body of research that documents the importance of both time pressure and order effects in an accounting environment. However, prior research has not investigated how the order of information affects individuals' belief revision processes under varying levels of time pressure, even though the inclusion of a time pressure variable has been noted as relevant in belief revision research, both in general (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992) and in accounting (Kahle, Pinsker, and Pennington 2005; Trotman and Wright 2000). In this review, we extend prior belief revision research in accounting by describing how time pressure interacts with personal and task variables, and the subprocesses described in the belief-adjustment model (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). Propositions are advanced on the effects of time pressure on individuals' belief revisions. A better understanding of such interactive effects helps to explain the mixed results identified in prior studies.
The objective of this chapter has been to review the relevant psychological and sociological literature on trust and credibility in communication and to apply the findings of our search to the new area of risk communication. What are the major insights gained from our review and how may they be practically applied to risk communication programs? By carefully framing the information, by tailoring the content to the needs of the final receivers, and by conveying a clear, honest, and appealing message, risk communication can convey a basic understanding for the choices and constraints of risk management. It can thus create the foundations for gaining trust and credibility. Although many receivers of risk information may not agree with the actual decisions institutions have made in setting priorities or selecting management options, they may realize that these decisions are results of open discussions and painful trade-offs.
This chapter reviews extant research on the quality of expert judgement of probability and risk. Both types of judgement are of great relevance to the concerns of this book, because expert judgement under uncertainty is a key component in the making of decisions with scant information.
We introduce and discuss kinetic models describing the influence of the competence in the evolution of decisions in a multi-agent system. The original exchange mechanism, which is based on the human tendency to compromise and change opinion through self-thinking, is here modified to include the role of the agents' competence. In particular, we take into account the agents' tendency to behave in the same way as if they were as good, or as bad, as their partner: the so-called equality bias. This occurred in a situation where a wide gap separated the competence of group members. We discuss the main properties of the kinetic models and numerically investigate some examples of collective decision under the influence of the equality bias. The results confirm that the equality bias leads the group to suboptimal decisions.
We show how the tension between cooperation and competition affects the dynamics of learning alliances. 'Private benefits' and 'common benefits' differ in the incentives that they create for investment in learning. The competitive aspects of alliances are most severe when a firm's ratio of private to common benefits is high. We introduce a measure, 'relative scope' of a firm in an alliance, to show that the opportunity set of each firm outside an alliance crucially impacts its behavior within the alliance. Finally, we suggest why firms might deviate from the theoretically optimal behavior patterns. (C) 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Objective: To evaluate the clinical effects of implementing the use of a navigational system in sinus surgery in a community hospital setting. Study Design: Retrospective record review. Methods: The hospital records of 800 patients who had undergone sinus surgery performed by 7 physicians at one institution over 11 years were reviewed and tabulated. The information was recorded in 2 groups of 400 with those in group A being treated before the availability of an electromagnetic sinus navigational system and those in group B being treated after the unit had been installed. The following data were collected: date, age, gender, informed consent, physician, additional procedures, sinuses entered, use of navigational system, revision status, setup time, operative time, and complications. The results of the two groups were analyzed statistically, and comparisons were made. Results/Conclusions: The patient populations in groups A and B were determined to have similar demographic profiles. Significantly more sinuses, specifically in the frontal location, were entered in group B compared with group A. Adjusted for the number of sinuses treated, the median operative times did not differ significantly between groups. Major and minor complication rates were similar in both groups and were consistent with the published literature. In a community hospital setting, once an electromagnetic guidance system became available, it was used in 92% of the cases performed by several otolaryngologists. Key Words: Computer-aided, navigational, endoscopic, sinus surgery, electromagnetic.
Three experiments with 74 undergraduates investigated the effect of possessing a diagnosis on subsequent recognition of symptoms that were either conceptually related or unrelated to the diagnosis. In Exp I, a result typical of many studies in the schema and prototype literature was obtained: Ss making a diagnosis tended to falsely recognize symptoms not presented earlier that were related to the diagnosis. In Exp II, this loss in recognition accuracy was accompanied by 2 types of gain in accuracy: Compared to those not given the diagnosis, Ss given the diagnosis more accurately recognized symptoms seen before and more accurately rejected new symptoms unrelated to the diagnosis. In Exp III, 1 symptom inconsistent with the diagnosis was included in the original symptom set. This resulted in a decrease in recognition accuracy for those Ss possessing a diagnosis: They were less able to recognize the inconsistent symptom. Further, compared to diagnosis-possessing Ss in the previous experiment, the inconsistent symptom cost the diagnosis-possessing Ss the ability to correctly reject new inconsistent symptoms. Finally, no gain in recognition accuracy due to knowing the diagnosis occurred in Exp III. (17 ref)
Group model-building here refers to a system dynamics model-building process in which a client group is deeply involved in the process of model construction. The problem that is modelled can be reasonably well defined, but it can also take the form of an ill-defined or messy problem, i.e., a situation in which opinions in a management team differ considerably These messy managerial situations are difficult to handle, primarily because thus far little theoretical work has been conducted to shed more light on the question why these messy situations exist and why it may be difficult for a management team to reach agreement. This article fills this theoretical gap by drawing on literature from sociology, (social) psychology and small-group research. Insights from this literature are discussed and translated into guidelines for conducting Group Model-Building projects for messy problems. The article ends with the conclusion that system dynamicists should include Group Model-Building and facilitation training in their teaching programs. Copyright (C) 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
This study investigates the confidence of negotiators in their own ability to successfully use tactics to achieve desired outcomes-a concept defined as negotiation-efficacy that underpins Bandura's self-efficacy theory. A questionnaire survey was used to measure the frequency of and confidence with which negotiators used negotiating tactics and the achievement of negotiation outcomes. With the collected data, confidence indices were created to reflect the strength of negotiation-efficacy for each negotiating tactic. Relationships of negotiation-efficacy and the achievement of negotiation outcomes were then examined by multiple regression analyses. The findings show that the strength of negotiation-efficacy is significantly related to the achievement of certain negotiation outcomes. In general, for negotiators who have negotiation-efficacy in executing distributive (integrative) tactics, negative (positive) negotiation outcomes are likely. © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014. All rights reserved.
The increasing use of data visualization for displaying information in a transdisciplinary envi-ronment raises issues about client information seeking in the decision-making processes. Field experts and individuals with high confidence tend to seek less information for their decisions than non-experts and individuals who are less confident. This work fills a gap about the effect of the information display format, visual or nonvisual, upon the client's decision. In the context of data visualization and confirmation bias, this work provides needed research on computer aided in-formation seeking in a decision-making, informing environment. Guided by the theories of con-firmation bias and cognitive fit, we propose and test a model that investigates the impact of a-priori decision confidence on seeking more information and information usefulness. Findings in-dicate that both information presentation type and confirmation bias affect the decision process of the information seeker. Findings also indicate that overall, the higher the confidence, the less likely users will find disconfirming evidence useful.
Inference involves two settings: In the first, information is acquired (learning); in the second, it is applied (predictions or choices). Kind learning environments involve close matches between the informational elements in the two settings and are a necessary condition for accurate inferences. Wicked learning environments involve mismatches. This conceptual framework facilitates identifying sources of inferential errors and can be used, among other things, to suggest how to target corrective procedures. For example, structuring learning environments to be kind improves probabilistic judgments. Potentially, it could also enable economic agents to exhibit maximizing behavior.
Confirmation bias is defined as the tendency of people to seek evidence that verifies a hypothesis rather than seeking evidence to falsify it. Due to the confirmation bias, defects may be introduced in a software product during requirements analysis, design, implementation and/or testing phases. For instance, testers may exhibit confirmatory behavior in the form of a tendency to make the code run rather than employing a strategic approach to make it fail. As a result, most of the defects that have been introduced in the earlier phases of software development may be overlooked leading to an increase in software defect density. In this paper, we quantify confirmation bias levels in terms of a single derived metric. However, the main focus of this paper is the analysis of factors affecting confirmation bias levels of software engineers. Identification of these factors can guide project managers to circumvent negative effects of confirmation bias, as well as providing guidance for the recruitment and effective allocation of software engineers. In this empirical study, we observed low confirmation bias levels among participants with logical reasoning and hypothesis testing skills.
Hubris theory documents that bidder CEOs are overconfident about deal synergies without fearing the winners curse. We examine the role of bidder CEOs hubris over merger synergies on cost stickiness in the rapidly growing Korean market. Bidder CEOs who overestimate the merged firms growth retain more underutilized-capacity when sales decrease than do CEOs of stand-alone firms. Optimistic bidder CEOs induce greater cost stickiness through strong and irrational self-beliefs than do optimistic nonbidder CEOs. Given the learning and self-attribution effect, optimistic bidder CEOs who experience more successful operating synergies induce stickier costs than less successful CEOs with simply optimistic views. Implications for possible overslack and cost locking from bidder CEOs hubris are also discussed.
This paper argues that studying why and when people call certain actions stupid should be the interest of psychological investigations not just because it is a frequent everyday behavior, but also because it is a robust behavioral reflection of the rationalistic expectations to which people adjust their own behavior and expect others to. The relationship of intelligence and intelligent behavior has been the topic of recent debates, yet understanding why we call certain actions stupid irrespective of their cognitive abilities requires the understanding of what people mean when they call an action stupid. To study these questions empirically, we analyzed real-life examples where people called an action stupid. A collection of such stories was categorized by raters along a list of psychological concepts to explore what the causes are that people attribute to the stupid actions observed. We found that people use the label stupid for three separate types of situation: (1) violations of maintaining a balance between confidence and abilities; (2) failures of attention; and (3) lack of control. The level of observed stupidity was always amplified by higher responsibility being attributed to the actor and by the severity of the consequences of the action. These results bring us closer to understanding people's conception of unintelligent behavior while emphasizing the broader psychological perspectives of studying the attribute of stupid in everyday life.
Misinformation can have a negative impact on decision making. Little empirical attention has, however, been given to the effect of rumors, a type of misinformation, on person judgments. Although rumors have been shown to affect other areas of organizational functioning (e.g., corporate reputation, employee morale), there is a lack of research investigating how rumors may influence hiring decisions. This study argues why rumors may influence hiring decisions by drawing from attribution, social judgment, and judgment and decision making theories, and provides an experimental investigation of this argument. Although participants reported not believing and being less likely to use the rumor, rumors were not discounted when determining if an individual should be hired. In short, results suggest that rumors impacted hiring decisions.
What I have come to call "meta-cognitive myopia" (MM), using a term once suggested by Robyn Dawes, is the phenomenon that people are pretty accurate in utilizing even large amounts of stimulus information, whereas they are naive and almost blind regarding the history and validity of the stimulus data. This uncritical reliance on the information given is the most conspicuous when the task context makes it crystal-clear that the stimulus data should not be trusted. In the introduction, MM is located within a broader framework of meta-cognition research, and several examples are provided to illustrate the phenomenon. The central message is laid out that MM offers an alternative account of many biases in judgment and decision making, which have been traditionally explained in terms of capacity constraints, limited reasoning ability, motivational forces, or severely biased environmental input. The explanatory power of the MM construct, and its theoretical potential to predict new findings, is then demonstrated in a major review section with reference to five paradigms: inability to discard irrelevant information; utilization of selectively sampled information; conditional inference biases; sample-size neglect; and myopia for the impact of aggregation levels. The final discussion is concerned with the learning origins of MM and the question of why evolution did not equip Homo sapiens with more effective meta-cognitive tools. An analysis of the costs and benefits will reveal that MM may serve important adaptive functions, and that eliminating MM may have maladaptive effects. Nevertheless, in the context of many real decision problems, the costs and irrational consequences of MM cannot be denied. The final discussion therefore focuses on possible ways to avoid and alleviate MM and its irrational consequences.
Using computer simulation, we investigate the impact of different strategies on the financial performance of VCs. We compare simple heuristics such as equal weighting and fast and frugal trees with more complex machine learning and regression models and analyze the impact of three factors: VC learning, the statistical properties of the investment environment, and the amount of information available in a business plan. We demonstrate that the performance of decision strategies and the relative quality of decision outcomes change critically between environments in which different statistical relationships hold between information contained in business plans and the likelihood of financial success. The Equal Weighting strategy is competitive with more complex investment decision strategies and its performance is robust across environments. Learning only from those plans that the simulated VC invested in, drastically reduces the VC's potential to learn from experience. Lastly, the results confirm that decision strategies differ in respect to the impact of added information on the outcomes of decisions. Finally, we discuss real-world implications for the practice of VCs and research on VC decision making.
It is unclear whether decision makers who receive forecasts expressed as probability distributions over outcomes understand the implications of this form of communication. We suggest a solution based on the fact that people are effective at estimating the frequency of data accurately in environments that are characterized by plentiful, unbiased feedback. Thus, forecasters should provide decision makers with simulation models that allow them to experience the frequencies of potential outcomes. Before implementing this suggestion, however, it is important to assess whether people can make appropriate probabilistic inferences based on such simulated experience. In an experimental program, we find that statistically sophisticated and naïve individuals relate easily to this presentation mode, they prefer it to analytic descriptions, and their probabilistic inferences improve. We conclude that asking decision makers to use simulations actively is potentially a powerful - and simplifying - method to improve the practice of forecasting.
The primary objective of this study was to examine how the knowledge that one had weak, moderate, or strong support for one's position among fellow members of a decision-making group would affect several aspects of one's predeliberation thinking-viz., expectations about the eventual group decision, the number and evaluation of arguments generated for the decision alternatives, the perceived persuasiveness of other group members' arguments for each of the decision alternatives, and the expected enjoyment of deliberation. Before group deliberation, subjects were led to believe that they belonged to either a ten-, six-, or two-person faction in a twelve-person mock jury, or they were given no information about the factional structure of their group. Although subjects anticipated that there would be strength in numbers-i.e., as the size of a faction increased, the estimated probability of the group's adopting the faction's choice increased-subjects were less extreme in their expectations about the likely outcome than the size of their factions warranted. In addition, subjects' argument generation and evaluation and their expected enjoyment of deliberation were not materially affected by faction size. Those with at least some anticipated support in a group did not appear to materially alter their thinking about the decision task as a function of their degree of support in the group, at least not prior to group deliberation. Findings of relevance to the disproportionate influence of proacquittal jurors are discussed.
CEO remuneration is contentious and so we applaud Jacquart and Armstrong’s (2013) systematic evidence-based review. We augment their analysis in two ways. First, we highlight the lack of demonstrated validity of “unaided expert judgment” to set CEO remuneration by pointing out that the settings in which such judgments are made do not facilitate learning through experience and are subject to many biases. In particular, we briefly describe our empirical study that demonstrates illusory correlation in the form of a relation between golfing ability and CEO remuneration that does not mirror CEO performance (Kolev & Hogarth, 2010). Second, we provide novel analysis of empirical data that shows that boards of directors are unable to predict future performance of CEOs accurately when deciding on remuneration packages. Finally, we advocate the use of systematic methods in setting CEO remuneration.
The authors argue that what consumers learn from the experience of using products is not a simple matter of discovering objective truth. They frame the problem of learning from experience as a fourstage process (hypothesizing-exposure-encoding-integration) with three moderating factors (familiarity with the domain, motivation to learn, and the ambiguity of the information environment). The framework is used to identify where learning from product consumption experience is most open to managerial influence. The authors discuss strategic tools for managing experiential learning and consider applications to the simulation of learning in concept and pre-test-market product testing.
Discretionary legal decisions have become a recent focus of theory development and policy-oriented applied research. We investigated parole release decision making in Pennsylvania from both orientations. Analyses of post-hearing questionnaires and case files from 1,035 actual parole decisions revealed that the Parole Board considers institutional behavior and predictions of future risk and rehabilitation in the decision to release on parole. Predictions seem also to be based on diagnostic judgments identifying causes of crime such as personal dispositions, drugs, alcohol, money, and environment. A one-year follow-up of 838 released parolees showed that predictions were virtually unrelated to known post-release outcomes. An actuarial prediction device was developed that is more predictive than subjective judgments. The use of decision guidelines to structure discretion is discussed, as well as the utilization of our research in guideline development by Pennsylvania.
The preselection of goods for potential consumption is a feature common to all industries. In order for new products or ideas to reach consumers, they must first be processed favorably through a system of organizations whose units filter out a large proportion of candidates before they arrive at the consumption stage (Barnett 1953). Much theory and research on complex organizations is concerned with isolated aspects of this process by which innovations flow through organization systems-such as the relation of research and development units to the industrial firm (Burns and Stalker 1961; Wilensky 1968); or problems encountered by public agencies attempting to implement new policy decisions (Selznick 1949; Bailey and Mosher 1968; Moynihan 1969).
Summarizes research of the past 15 yr. directed toward discovering and explicating the organization of information processes that underlies human problem solving. The basic characteristics of the human information processing system (IPS) serial processing, small short-term memory, infinite long-term memory with fast retrieval but slow storage impose strong conditions on the ways in which the system can seek solutions to problems in large problem spaces. The current theory is described in 4 broad propositions: (a) a few gross characteristics of the human IPS are invariant over task and problem solver; (b) these characteristics determine that a task environment is represented (in the IPS) as a problem space, and that problem solving takes place in a problem space; (c) the structure of the task environment determines the possible structures of the problem space; and (d) the structure of the problem space determines the possible programs that can be used for problem solving. These propositions and their relation to the known characteristics of the IPS are developed.
Conducted a study with 120 male college students to extend L. Chapman and J. Chapman's (see record
1969-13004-001) finding that judges report popular invalid signs (illusory correlates) on the Rorschach as being valid indicators of homosexuality. As predicted, when Ss were tested both before and after 2 different kinds of training, in which various relationships between cues (Rorschach responses) and symptoms were presented, extremely strong a priori expectations were found for the illusory relationship between anal responses on the Rorschach and the symptom of homosexuality. In cue-symptom conditions where both the illusory and nonillusory cues were paired randomly with the symptom of homosexuality, a substantial decrease in illusory correlation occurred as a result of training. Little change occurred either when both the illusory and nonillusory cues were paired validly with homosexuality, or when illusory cues had a random relationship but nonillusory cues had a valid relationship. Different modes of feedback and different symptom base rates did not produce differential effects in posttraining estimates of the illusory relationship. (27 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Models proposed for probability learning largely represent performance rather than learning theory. Perhaps for this reason, quite different models have been required to provide accounts of data arising from different experimental paradigms. In the present approach, a common theoretical framework is sought in concepts of coding and organization in memory. Following the theoretical analysis, an observation-transfer paradigm is developed that permits the study of predictive behavior depending on categorical, as distinguished from episodic, memory. The paradigm was tested in 3 experiments with 116 Ss: Exp I assessed the effects of variation in both stimulus frequency and outcome probability, Exp II examined the role of stimulus familiarity, and Exp III attempted to vary the encoding of trial outcomes in memory. Results suggest that probability learning and transfer derive from frequency learning. The individual categorizes events and forms representations in memory of relative frequencies of event categories. When different cues in a multiple-cue, probability learning situation occur equally often, this process yields predictive behavior closely reflecting the probabilities that alternative events associated with a cue will occur when the cue is present. But when cue frequencies are unequal, the categorical memory model implies that predictive behavior may be grossly out of line with actual probabilities. In general, depending on task requirements, predictive responses are either direct reflections of relative frequency judgments or are governed by strategies involving an additional level of encoding of event categories. (59 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Considers the failure of several assumptions of stimulus-sampling models in binary prediction studies. An attempt is made to document the direction of current research. Recent trends are examined in research bearing on sequential variables, memory, instructions, discrimination, and age. A number of studies in these areas suggest, contrary to the no-memory, conditioning assumptions of several statistical models, that ss approach the prediction task in an active, hypothesis-testing manner, often relying on prior events in the sequence. Current thinking that attempts to describe these aspects of behavior, often in a cognitive or information-processing framework, is discussed. (4 P. Ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Aptitude * Treatment interactions are demonstrated with reference to G. Domino's studies (1968 and 1971) of instructor demand and student personality and J. K. Majasan's (1972) study which found that achievement in college psychology was greatest when the student's position on a scale of beliefs regarding behaviorism and humanism were similar to his instructor's. Further evidence on interactions in social psychology, personality, learning, and experimental psychology is cited. It is suggested that higher order interactions make it unlikely that social scientists will be able to establish generalizations applicable beyond the laboratory or that generalizations established in the field work will be maintained. Social research should be less concerned with hypothesis testing and more concerned with interpreting findings in local contexts. (59 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Investigated how often people are wrong when they are certain that they know the answer to a question. Five studies with a total of 528 paid volunteers suggest that the answer is "too often." For a variety of general-knowledge questions, Ss first chose the most likely answer and then indicated their degree of certainty that the answer they had selected was, in fact, correct. Across several different question and response formats, Ss were consistently overconfident. They had sufficient faith in their confidence judgments to be willing to stake money on their validity. The psychological bases for unwarranted certainty are discussed in terms of the inferential processes whereby knowledge is constructed from perceptions and memories. (15 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
REVIEWS STUDIES OF THE RELIABILITY AND THE VALIDITY OF DESCRIPTIVE, DIAGNOSTIC, AND PROGNOSTIC JUDGMENTS IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY AS A PRELUDE TO A MORE TECHNICAL DISCUSSION OF PRESENT-DAY METHODOLOGIES FOR STUDYING THE CLINICAL JUDGMENT PROCESS, I.E., THE MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH A JUDGE UTILIZES INFORMATION IN A COMPLEX (E.G., CURVILINEAR AND/OR CONFIGURAL) AS OPPOSED TO A MORE LINEAR MANNER. STUDIES OF THE JUDGMENTAL PROCESSES INVOLVED IN IMPORTANT DECISIONS IN SUCH FIELDS AS MEDICINE (DIAGNOSING MALIGNANT VS. BENIGN ULCERS), PSYCHIATRY (DECIDING ON THE ADVISABILITY OF GRANTING TEMPORARY LIBERTY FOR PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS), CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY (DIAGNOSING NEUROSIS VS. PSYCHOSIS FROM MMPI PROFILES), AND SECURITIES ANALYSIS (PREDICTING FUTURE STOCK PRICES) ARE BRIEFLY DESCRIBED. THE FINDINGS FROM AN INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION OF THE PROCESS OF LEARNING CLINICAL INFERENCE PROVOKE SOME SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE OPTIMAL CONDITIONS FOR SUCH LEARNING TO OCCUR. (3 P. REF.)
Practicing psychodiagnosticians (N = 32), when surveyed, failed to report observing Wheeler-Rorschach Signs 7 and 8 as accompanying male homosexuality although research evidence indicates that these are valid. They instead reported observing Wheeler Signs 4, 5, 16, 19, and 20, which research literature indicates are invalid. These signs were found to have much stronger rated, verbal associative connections to male homosexuality than the unpopular valid signs. 693 undergraduates (divided among 13 conditions) viewed 30 Rorschach cards on each of which was arbitrarily designated a patient's response and his 2 symptoms. The Ss "rediscovered" the same invalid Rorschach content signs of homosexuality as the clinicians reported, although these relationships were absent in the experimental materials. They did so regardless of the degree to which the clinically valid signs were valid in the contrived task materials.
Previous experiments have shown that educated adults generally fail to show an intuitive appreciation of correlation or contingency when judging the relation between events on the basis of a serial presentation. The effect on judgment of displaying information serially or in a summary form was examined. In contrast with some previous experiments, the events to be judged were identified in a way which should strongly suggest that the operation of chance must be taken into account. The Ss judged the amount of control exerted by cloud seeding over rainfall. The events (seeding or no seeding followed by rain or no rain) were presented to 1 group only serially, to a 2nd group in both ways with the serial display preceding the summary. Only in the group which received the summary without the serial display were the judgments of a majority of Ss more consistent with an appropriate rule of judgment involving a comparison of probabilities than with 1 or another of several inappropriate rules involving the frequency of certain favourable events.
RECENT STUDIES HAVE SHOWN THAT MAN IS MATHEMATICALLY INACCURATE AS AN INTUITIVE STATISTICIAN. IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE PARAMETERS OF PERCEIVED VARIABILITY, PILOT STUDIES WERE CONDUCTED WHICH INDICATED THAT THE COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION IS NOT A SUFFICIENT EXPLANATION AND THAT SS ALSO RELATE SEQUENCE EFFECTS TO VARIABILITY. IN THE 1ST STUDY, MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND LAMBDA (A MEASURE OF SEQUENCE EFFECTS) WERE INDEPENDENTLY MANIPULATED. IN THE 2ND STUDY, THE STANDARD DEVIATION AND LAMBDA WERE MANIPULATED UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO IGNORE SEQUENCE EFFECTS. THE RESULTS SHOW THAT SEQUENCE EFFECTS ARE NOT ELIMINATED BY INSTRUCTIONS TO DISREGARD THEM. THE COMBINED RESULTS OF THESE STUDIES ARE DISCUSSED WITH RESPECT TO DECISION THEORY AND SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY.
This study investigated whether psychologists' confidence in their clinical decisions is really justified. It was hypothesized that as psychologists study information about a case (a) their confidence about the case increases markedly and steadily but (b) the accuracy of their conclusions about the case quickly reaches a ceiling. 32 judges, including 8 clinical psychologists, read background information about a published case, divided into 4 sections. After reading each section of the case, judges answered a set of 25 questions involving personality judgments about the case. Results strongly supported the hypotheses. Accuracy did not increase significantly with increasing information, but confidence increased steadily and significantly. All judges except 2 became overconfident, most of them markedly so. Clearly, increasing feelings of confidence are not a sure sign of increasing predictive accuracy about a case.
Policy formation involves the interaction of two systems, the environmental system and the human cognitive system which attempts to form a judgment about it. At present, the interaction between these two systems is not under rational control. That is, although a) interactive computer models of environmental systems have been constructed and are in increasing use, and b) interactive computer models of human judgment have been constructed and have been found to be of practical use, c) links between the two until recently have not been considered. The specific aim of this article is to describe such a link for the purpose of developing an aid for planners and policy makers.
Ecological ‘dimensions’ along which psychologists choose their experimental environments are surveyed in terms of the following characteristics: nominal-quantitative stimuli, determinism-probabilism, number of stimuli per event, event and causality, repetition of stimuli. A distal distinction between predictive and descriptive responses is suggested and perceptual learning is discussed with this classification as background. It is argued that cognitive mapping of ecological relationships is an indispensable mediator as far as predictive behavior is concerned. The dependence of experimental learning on ecological properties of the learning material is stressed.
Performance in a probabilistic learning task was studied under conditions in which learners received (1) knowledge of results after every trial (outcome-feedback), (2) information about task properties, and (3) both outcome-feedback and information about task properties. Outcome-feedback was not only unnecessary for improved performance, but was found to impede performance as well.
According to the normative theory of prediction, prior probabilities (base rates), which summarize what we know before receiving any specific evidence, should remain relevant even after such evidence is obtained. In the present study, subjects were asked to estimate the probability that one of two states was true on the basis of (a) information about the prior probabilities of the states (b) information specific to the case at hand and known to be accurate with probability p. Subject's responses were determined predominantly by the specific evidence; the prior probabilities were neglected, causing the judgments to deviate markedly from the normative response. Theoretical and practical implications of this results are discussed.
The expert can and should be used as a provider of input for a mechanical combining process since most studies show mechanical combination to be superior to clinical combination. However, even in expert measurement, the global judgment is itself a clinical combination of other judgmental components and as such it may not be as efficient as a mechanical combination of the components. The superiority of mechanically combining components as opposed to using the global judgment for predicting some external criterion is discussed. The use of components is extended to deal with multiple judges since specific judges may be differentially valid with respect to subsets of components for predicting the criterion. These ideas are illustrated by using the results of a study dealing with the prediction of survival on the basis of information contained in biopsies taken from patients having a certain type of cancer. Judgments were made by three highly trained pathologists. Implications and extensions for using expert measurement and mechanical combination are discussed.
This investigation examines the extent to which intelligent young adults seek (i) confirming evidence alone (enumerative induction) or (ii) confirming and discontinuing evidence (eliminative induction), in order to draw conclusions in a simple conceptual task. The experiment is designed so that use of confirming evidence alone will almost certainly lead to erroneous conclusions because (i) the correct concept is entailed by many more obvious ones, and (ii) the universe of possible instances (numbers) is infinite.
Six out of 29 subjects reached the correct conclusion without previous incorrect ones, 13 reached one incorrect conclusion, nine reached two or more incorrect conclusions, and one reached no conclusion. The results showed that those subjects, who reached two or more incorrect conclusions, were unable, or unwilling to test their hypotheses. The implications are discussed in relation to scientific thinking.
"Organismic achievement may extend in two main directions; (1) specificity regarding certain stimulus variables as antecedents or causes of reactions, and (2) specificity regarding certain results of organismic reaction." The probability character of the causal relationships in the environment demands a fundamental, all-inclusive shift in methodological ideology regarding psychology. If psychology wishes to deal with vitally relevant molar aspects of adjustment and achievement, it must become statistical throughout. Traditional statistical treatment is inadequate. The viewpoints of Lewin, Hull, and others are examined and their limitations noted. To establish the methodological unity of science, it will become increasingly important to emphasize thematic differences. There can be no truly molar psychology unless it gives up the nomothetic ideal in favor of a thoroughly statistical conception. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The use of such measures as
k for evaluating the predictive efficiency of correlation coefficients has led to considerable pessimism with regard to the practical utility of the validity coefficients which are ordinarily obtained for industrial and educational tests. However, the predictive efficiency of a validity coefficient will be a function of the proportion of individuals considered satisfactory on the basis of some criterion measure and the proportion of the tested group which is selected. Therefore the forecasting value may be considerably higher than is indicated by
k. Based on Pearson's "Tables for finding the volumes of the normal bivariate surface," 11 tables are presented from which relationships may be found among the size of the validity coefficient, the proportion of individuals considered satisfactory, the proportion of tested individuals to be selected, and the proportion of those selected who will be satisfactory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
In the first of two experiments on the concept of correlation in adult subjects, the subjects' frequency estimates and inferences of relationship were studied relative to five different 2 × 2 distributions, each presented in a fixed sequence. In experiment II, the subjects' spontaneous strategies in subdividing and analyzing one 2 × 2 distribution were studied in a free situation. It is concluded that adult subjects with no statistical training apparently have no adequate concept of correlation (based on the ratio of the two pairs of diagonal frequencies), and that, in so far as they reason statistically at all, they tend to depend exclusively on the frequency of ++ cases in judging relationship. The need for studies involving ordinal scale and fully quantified variates is stressed.
In recent years there have been several hundred studies within the rather narrowly-defined topic of information utilization in judgment and decision making. Much of this work has been accomplished within two basic schools of research, which we have labeled the “regression” and the “Bayesian” approaches. Each has its characteristic tasks and characteristic information that must be processed to accomplish these tasks. For the most part, researchers have tended to work strictly within a single approach and there has been minimal communication between the resultant subgroups of workers. Our objective here is to present a review and comparative analysis of these two approaches. Within each, we examine (a) the models that have been developed for describing and prescribing the use of information in decision making; (b) the major experimental paradigms, including the types of judgment, prediction, and decision tasks and the kinds of information that have been available to the decision maker in these tasks; (c) the key independent variables that have been manipulated in experimental studies; and (d) the major empirical results and conclusions. In comparing these approaches, we seek the answers to two basic questions. First, do the specific models and methods characteristic of different paradigms direct the researcher's attention to certain problems and cause him to neglect others that may be equally important? Second, can a researcher studying a particular substantive problem increase his understanding by employing diverse models and diverse experimental methods?
The age—old question of the generalizability of the results of experiments that are conducted in artificial laboratory settings to more realistic inferential and decision-making situations is considered in this paper. Conservatism in probability revision provides an example of a result that (1) has received wide attention, including attention in terms of implications for real-world decision making, on the basis of experiments conducted in artificial settings and (2) is now apparently thought by many to be highly situational and not at all a ubiquitous phenomenon, in which case its implications for real-world decision making are not as extensive as originally claimed. In this paper conservatism is considered in some detail within the context of the generalizability question. In a more general vein, we discuss some of the difficulties inherent in experimentation in realistic settings, suggest possible procedures for avoiding or at least alleviating such difficulties, and make a plea for more realistic experiments.
This paper explores a judgmental heuristic in which a person evaluates the frequency of classes or the probability of events by availability, i.e., by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind. In general, availability is correlated with ecological frequency, but it is also affected by other factors. Consequently, the reliance on the availability heuristic leads to systematic biases. Such biases are demonstrated in the judged frequency of classes of words, of combinatorial outcomes, and of repeated events. The phenomenon of illusory correlation is explained as an availability bias. The effects of the availability of incidents and scenarios on subjective probability are discussed.
This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness,
which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process
B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a
class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical
prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead
to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could
improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
Peer Reviewed http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/33544/1/0000043.pdf
Departing from the traditional model for teaching and learning, this article deals with the problem of teaching and learning the effective application of knowledge already acquired. To this end, a model for the process of exercising judgment was outlined, and the results of an empirical study of judgmental learning were employed to show the inadequacy of the traditional outcome feedback procedures. Computer graphics techniques were used to provide new forms of information to the learner; the results are promising for the rapid learning of a task that would otherwise be difficult to learn.
Two experiments were carried out to investigate the difficulty of making the contra-positive inference from conditional sentences of the form, “if P then Q.” This inference, that not-P follows from not-Q, requires the transformation of the information presented in the conditional sentence. It is suggested that the difficulty is due to a mental set for expecting a relation of truth, correspondence, or match to hold between sentences and states of affairs. The elicitation of the inference was not facilitated by attempting to induce two kinds of therapy designed to break this set. It is argued that the subjects did not give evidence of having acquired the characteristics of Piaget's “formal operational thought.”
Clinical vs. statistical prediction is only ½ the problem––and the last ½ at that. The prior problem, largely neglected, is clinical vs. mechanical measurement––for data can be collected, as well as combined, in either way. Such neglect promotes an incomplete and mismatched dialogue where "clinical" and "statistical" may have different meanings to different persons. Examining clinical and mechanical methods of both measurement and prediction provides a broadened framework that defines the several possible "clinical" and "statistical" methods, and their combinations. Applying this framework to 45 studies shows an apparent superiority for mechanical modes of both data collection and combination, and also suggests that the clinician is more likely to contribute through observation than integration. Grossly uncontrolled differences, however, in clinical training, Ss, criteria, etc., prevent definitive conclusions. To achieve more adequate comparison requires certain specified methodological improvements. (3 p. ref.)
Elementary learning is not sensitive to contingencies between presence—absence variates. Even adult subjects, who under optimal conditions are capable of grasping the concept of contingency, normally do not appear to utilize this concept. The available evidence reduces confidence in the realism of clinical judgments, and is consonant with certain widespread fallacies in clinical research.