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Challenging the Values of Hunting: Fair Chase, Game Playing, and Intrinsic Value

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Abstract

Hunting is typically valued for its instrumentality for food procurement, wildlife management, conservation, heurism, and atavism. More importantly, some hunting is valued intrinsically. A particular form of hunting (i.e., fair-chase hunting) is a game and game playing, categorically, is often valued intrinsically. This view can be further supported with an application of a concept of caring and an accompanying argument that hunting generally, and fair-chase hunting in particular, is cared about deeply by millions of its practitioners. There are normative grounds for a shift in the way that hunting is valued. While hunting as game playing is valued and cared about deeply by millions of fair-chase practitioners, which is (morally) far more important than any of its various instrumentalities, the position that such hunting is morally villainous can be sustained.

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