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Reciprocity in International
Volunteer Cooperation
Benjamin J. Lough
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
i
© 2016 Fredskorpset (FK Norway)
This discussion paper was commissioned by FK Norway to an external consultant. The findings,
interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the FK
Norway or its financial sponsors—nor does FK guarantee the accuracy of the information included in
this work.
All queries on the rights, adaptation, and other use of this report should be addressed to:
Fredskorpset
8055 Dep, 0031
Oslo, Norway
Phone: +47 24 14 57 00
E-mail: fredskorpset@fredskorpset.no
Please cite the work as: Lough, Benjamin J. 2016. Reciprocity in International Volunteer Cooperation.
Oslo: Fredskorpset.
ii
Foreword
Reciprocity has always been a core value within international volunteering for development. Today, this
ideal is considered a cornerstone in most initiatives within international development cooperation. But
what does reciprocity entail in practice?
When the Norwegian Parliament transformed FK Norway (Fredskorpset) into a model of mutual
exchange in 2000, it took a bold step to redesign and modernize the Norwegian model of international
volunteer service. Through the last 15 years, FK´s understanding and implementation of reciprocity has
evolved through the people-centered development instrument it represents, wherein individuals and
institutions creating relationships across borders are themselves the change agents.
However, issues of global injustice and unequal distribution of power are factors through which
stakeholders continuously must navigate when striving to maintain cooperation based on the values of
reciprocity and solidarity. Thus the exchange of volunteers across countries, as a humble contribution
to the fulfillment of the Sustainable Development Goals 16 and 17, prepare a cadre of global citizens
ready to make the world a better and more just place.
FK Norway has commissioned Dr. Benjamin Lough to provide a knowledge base that may contribute to
further developing the ideological fundament of FK’s work. This paper outlines preconditions, pitfalls,
and benefits of reciprocity, and looks at some of the criteria defining good practices and equitable
relationships.
FK Norway trusts this paper will be a platform for informed dialogue with its partners, on a theme that
is relevant to everyone working within the field of international development cooperation.
Nita Kapoor
Director General,
FK Norway
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Introduction
“Reciprocity” has become a common buzzword in international development cooperation. Its virtues
are often touted with little critical reflection on the depth of the concept or how the principles of
reciprocity can truly be implemented in organizational policies and practices. Likewise, many scholars
and practitioners have noted a meaningful lack of precision about the fundamental concepts
constituting reciprocity (Bringle & Clayton, 2012; Dostilio et al., 2012). The intent of this paper is to
untangle critical assumptions behind this term—asking the readers to stop and consider how this
concept, along with the underlying values and ideas associated with it, are understood, expressed, and
valued in international volunteer co-operation.
Genuine reciprocity is extremely difficult to achieve in traditional aid relationships. On a practical level,
reciprocity is a condition where the needs of two or more groups are evenly met—creating an equal
partnership between mutually-empowered parties (Stirrat & Henkel, 1997).
However, the very concept of aid implies a relationship of giver and receiver, which tends to create an
implicitly asymmetrical relationship. As a result, concepts of patronage, power, and inequality are
embedded in most conventional aid relationships (Stirrat & Henkel, 1997). The partner with greater
resources will nearly always exercise more power and control—even when he or she is explicitly
conscious of these inequities. To accomplish objectives of reciprocity, the conventional role of the
higher-resourced “giver” aiding the lower-resourced “receiver” must be turned upside-down and re-
conceptualized. This requires an authentic valuing of bottom-up views and contributions, and an
eagerness to modify and shape otherwise top-down development objectives.
Given that it is performed within a system of
mutual exchange and cooperation,
international volunteering may offer a
valuable alternative over conventional forms
of aid—perhaps even achieving legitimate
reciprocity between South-ern and Northern
partners. Indeed, volunteers often expect to
receive new knowledge, abilities, friend-
ships, and résumé-building experiences in
exchange for their gifts of time (Polonijo-
King, 2004). Nonetheless, a number of
studies have found comparatively low levels
of reciprocity from the perspective of volunteer hosting-organizations based on the supply-driven
nature of many volunteer placements (Heron, 2007; Perold et al., 2013; Tiessen & Huish, 2014).
Low levels of reciprocity embedded in historically dominant North-to-South models of inter-national
volunteering raise critical questions about the moral dimensions of international volunteering. When
reciprocity is low, volunteering as “service” tends to reinforce power differences in the minds of both
giver and receiver—often in equal measure to other conventional aid relationships. Recognizing the
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challenges inherent in the conventional North-to-South volunteer cooperation model, some
international volunteer cooperation organizations (IVCOs) have begun to make incremental (and
occasionally radical) changes to their programs. For example, a review of the FK Norway North-to-
South model of volunteer cooperation led to its eventual closure in 1999, reopening in 2000 with a new
model of mutual exchange and an objective: “To promote contact and cooperation between individuals,
organizations and institutions in Norway and in the developing countries, based on solidarity, equality
and reciprocity” (Tjønneland, Helland, Kruse, & Norbakk, 2016).
Administering programs consistent with the value of reciprocity is a noble goal, and there are many
pathways to achieve it. In search of greater equity in international partnerships, IVCOs have employed
a mix of diverse practices. Although IVCOs use different modalities in their reach for reciprocal
partnerships, the common unifying principle is movement away from a unidirectional model of
charitable giving—from privileged to the underprivileged—and toward a multi-directional model of
mutual giving and learning by all parties.
In support of the practical application of diverse reciprocity-targeted practices, scholars have produced
rich theories that examine and explain the concept of reciprocity. Central to these theories are the
concepts — face-to-face communication, trust through mutual co-operation, symmetry of priorities
and resources, and the sustained duration and continuity of relation-ships—that play significant roles in
reciprocal exchange (Ostrom & Walker, 2003).
Research on volunteering for development has identified that similar variables link program practices
to development outcomes (Sherraden, Lough, & McBride, 2008). Such connections be-tween theory
and practice are critical, as they help to explain why the principle of reciprocity is central to effective
international volunteer cooperation.
This paper begins by exploring reciprocity as a concept,
drawing from a wide body of literature on international
cooperation and exchange.
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It also explores some of the
hidden and unintended consequences that might
emerge from reciprocal relationships. The discussion
then considers whether IVCOs and volunteers acting
together with host-country partners can embrace an
authentic expression of partnership — being mutually
empowered to make and act on targeted development
priorities. This question draws on many diverse dimensions of reciprocity that contemporary IVCOs
practice. Finally, with an acknowledgment that full reciprocity may be problematic in some instances,
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It's worth noting that service learning literature discusses the concept of reciprocity with far more regularity
and rigor than can be found in literature on international volunteering. Perhaps this is due to a common
expectation in service learning that students should receive tangible benefit from hosting organizations.
Although the product is different, the exchange of services justifies the need for reciprocal and mutually-
beneficial relationships.
Reciprocity Boosters:
Face-to-face communication
Trust through mutual cooperation
Symmetry of priorities and resources
Sustained duration and continuity of
relationships -Ostrom and Walker, 2003
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the paper explores the potential strengths of reciprocity within the contemporary system of
international volunteer cooperation.
Why Reciprocity?
For more than half a century, advocates have touted the potential for international volunteering to
enhance reciprocity in international development cooperation (Henderson, 1971; Lough, 2015b). In
many ways, the ideal of reciprocity embedded in volunteers’ relationships with communities is a
defining feature that makes international volunteering different from other forms of international aid.
Without the relational component, volunteers could be viewed as just another resource to be deployed
as a means to accomplish the goals of development agencies. Therefore, a discussion of reciprocity is
important to understand the added value or distinctive contributions of volunteers to development
(Lough & Matthew, 2013).
On the surface, the concept of reciprocity is difficult to argue against. Reciprocity is founded on time-
honored values of social and distributive justice, equity, and fairness. It is a necessary condition for
lasting solidarity, social cohesion, and unity. As social scientists have noted, “Social ties are created,
sustained and strengthened by means of reciprocal gifts. These acts of gift exchange are at the basis of
human solidarity” (Komter, 2007, p. 103). Cooperation is built on a foundation of trust, and reciprocity
is the key moderating condition that generates trust between different parties (Ostrom & Walker,
2003).
As a development practice, international
volunteering models that lack reciprocity are often
viewed as paternalistic, neocolonial, and even
oppressive (Perold et al., 2013). Some argue that
unidirectional aid relationships are, by nature, built
on a foundation of inequality that “ultimately robs
the recipient of self-respect using altruism as a
form of social oppression” (Polonijo-King, 2004, p. 109). In cases where the unidirectional aid mentality
is embodied in unreciprocal models of international volunteer service, there is ample precedence for
active opposition from Southern countries that argue that North-to-South models of service, in
particular, may create dependency and reinforce power dynamics that privilege the leisured classes and
disempower recipient identities (Hautzinger, 2008).
Because most IVCOs assume that reciprocity is a legitimate and virtuous goal, they primarily focus on
how to make the concept work in practice; few stop to consider whether reciprocity is a worth-while
aspiration in all aspects. Deconstructing the concept reveals critical challenges that may be worth
confronting. Struggling with the concept of true reciprocity is not a mere exercise in semantics, nor is it
of minor concern. Falling short of reciprocal relationships in international cooperation can create real
dependencies, disempowerment, and other harms. Just as real are the challenges that may arise when
partners strive for reciprocity, but do so without a sufficient “critical consciousness” of their unexplored
assumptions.
“Social ties are created, sustained and
strengthened by means of reciprocal gifts.
These acts of gift exchange are at the
basis of human solidarity.”
-Komter, 2007, p. 103
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First, it is important to consider how the term is understood and interpreted as a general principle. In
anthropological, sociological/social psychological, and economic disciplines, reciprocity is conceived as
the equal exchange of real or symbolic goods or services (Komter, 2007; Mauss, 1990). Any truly
reciprocal relationship requires that intangible services and tangible gifts must be matched tit-for-tat.
In principle, without equal exchange, true reciprocity cannot be achieved.
As one form of international assistance, volun-teers offer their services and skills as gifts of time to
hosting organizations and communities (Polonijo-King, 2004). Operating within a system of true
reciprocal exchanges, IVCOs and volunteers would not expect to give without a comparable expectation
of equal return from partner organizations and communities. Partner organization would, therefore, be
obligated to provide equivalent value—perhaps matching volunteers’ “gifts” with an alternative
measure of worth.
In practice, such reciprocal relationships are rarely achieved. Although volunteers certainly gain much
from their service experiences, few would claim that they expect gifts of equal value from recipients.
This point was supported in a literature review from VSO “Valuing Volunteering” research, which
explicitly referenced the unreciprocal nature of many volunteer partner-ships: “In the particular case of
volunteering, there is no expectation of reciprocity. The giver and receiver do not expect the latter will
ever have the possibility to pay back; therefore, the volunteer’s time and effort becomes an
unreciprocated gift” (Franco, 2012, p. 12). As this passage suggests, neither the volunteers nor the
hosting organizations expected that the lower-resourced partner would have the capacity to
reciprocate. This is not an uncommon expec-tation in systems of international volunteer cooperation.
Any time volunteers go abroad with the intent to “serve,” “help,” or “provide assistance,” the meanings
implicit in these concepts presume that volunteers have skills, ability, knowledge or resources to offer—
some gift to give. Beyond this, research with hosting communities have found that intended recipients
often describe the volunteers’ ideas as “better” or more advanced than those generated locally (Kothari,
2006; Lough & Carter-Black, 2015). Many people from the North also assume that Southern volunteers
may have less to offer. As Pinkau (1978) asserted: “As most foreign technical assistance assignments
are designated to provide skills not available in the receiver country, finding a counterpart [from the
receiver country] is like seeking a person who does not exist”. While these assumptions may be
incorrect, they are not uncommon. International volunteering is often marketed as unidirectional
helping by knowledgeable and skilled volunteers to less-able and deprived populations abroad
(Simpson, 2004). On the other hand, returned volunteers consistently assert that they received far more
than they were able to give, and clearly learned new and better ways of doing things (Lough, McBride,
& Sherraden, 2009; Machin, 2008). If volunteers also benefit in a significant and meaningful way, then
how might the value of this reciprocal giving be more clearly understood and communicated to all
partners?
Furthermore, should IVCOs and volunteers categorically expect to receive equal value from their
partnerships? If so, should they explicitly communicate this expectation to partner organizations? Such
questions are not typically asked or addressed at a strategic level. However, the consequences for failing
to engage in true reciprocity have been problematized from the perspective of both the “giver” and the
“receiver.” First, from the perspective of the giver:
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By means of abundant gift-giving we are putting ourselves in a morally superior position, and we may cause
the recipient to feel indebted….Giving gifts may serve to dominate, humiliate and to make others dependent
upon our benevolence and our willingness to share valuables and resources with them (Komter, 2007, p. 99).
There is a propensity to give, but before doing so an inner calculus is made about the respective participants’
position on the ‘debt-balance’ (Schwartz, 1996). Feelings of being morally obliged to return a gift, and not
purely altruistic motives are the main psychological impetus to reciprocal giving (p. 100).…As long as the
recipient of a gift has not given back, the giver holds a certain power over the recipient (p. 103).
According to such assertions, if partner organizations do not view themselves as having the resources
or the capacity to give back to volunteers in equal measure, they will be locked in a disempowered
position. When no return is expected, one partner is effectively left in a state of indebtedness. The
recipient—recognizing an informal contract to reciprocate—may either reject the service or choose to
accept the service along with feelings of indebtedness and obligation. As one recipient described this
challenge: “We cannot always refuse from a gift. In such occasions we land in the sphere of exchange,
and we end in the lower position than a donor. We can return our position only by donating a return
gift” (Ilmonen, 2004, p. 16).
Although reciprocal exchange may promote equality in principle, the implicit conditionality of
reciprocity also raises concern that an expectation of return may place an added burden on partner
organizations. The phrase “obligation of reciprocity” is often used when discussing mutual exchange
because the cyclic burden of returning gifts is unavoidable in reciprocal relationships (Komter, 2007;
Stirrat & Henkel, 1997). In aiming for reciprocity in international volunteering, to what degree do
Northern IVCOs and volunteers want Southern
partners to feel obligated to them? Although most
stakeholders would agree that such conditionality is at
odds with the spirit and values of volunteer service,
they would also likely agree that dependency and
indebtedness are inconsistent with ideals of
development partnerships.
The following section explores different modalities of reciprocity in international volunteer
cooperation. Looking across these different modalities advances the argument that reciprocity is a
worthwhile goal, and can be achieved to some degree. To achieve this ideal, however, all partners
should be expected to bring different but relatively equal and complementary benefits to the
relationship—though this can be difficult to accomplish without an explicit recognition of the
comparative equity between tangible and intangible contributions. As a sector, far greater
consciousness and intentionality are needed to strategically program for reciprocal international
volunteering partnerships.
Modalities of Reciprocity in International Volunteering
Given the relational nature of international volunteering, nearly all development-oriented IVCOs claim
to practice reciprocity in some form or another. However, different IVCOs have a distinct way of
interpreting the concept. These different definitions and interpretations of the concept are reflected in
The phrase “obligation of reciprocity” is
often used when discussing mutual
exchange because the cyclic burden of
returning gifts is unavoidable in
reciprocal relationships.
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diverse organizational policies and practices. This diversity is also reflected across different levels of
partnerships and through an assorted mix of development actors.
Perhaps the most commonly discussed mode of reciprocity fits within the partnership between
volunteers and hosting organizations and communities. This discussion of reciprocity counters the
person-to-person interactions that often position volunteers as “experts” and local actors as
“beneficiaries.” The goal of relational reciprocity at this level is to disrupt the helping narrative by
recognizing the mutual sharing and giving of experiences, expertise, and culture-specific knowledge
and capabilities.
The next level of reciprocity is positioned between local organizations and IVCOs. Within this
relationship, reciprocal partnerships aim to ensure that the goals and priorities of both organizational
partners are met. IVCOs aim to ensure that the “supply” of volunteers meet partner organizations’
“demand” for volunteers with a specific skill set. As another method at this level, local partner
organizations may agree to provide safe and secure working and learning environments in exchange for
specific services provided by volunteers. Whatever the practice, both partners are engaged in mutual
decision-making to determine jointly-negotiated project priorities.
Further down the decision tree, IVCOs’ relationships with donors determine the degree to which
reciprocal volunteer exchange is possible. For example, funding from governments is typically limited
to supporting bilateral North-to-South volunteer placements. For many IVCOs, decades of such funding
priorities have normalized the acceptability of limited reciprocity in their volunteer cooperation
programs (Lough, 2015a). Although there are a number of obvious exceptions, the goal of reciprocity
at this level is to move policy and funding from bilateral volunteer sending to multilateral and
multidirectional volunteer exchange and cooperation. In this case, reciprocity reflects a value-based
concern for global equity; North-to-South volunteering would ideally require a match of resources to
support South-to-North exchange.
Scholars have described these various levels of volunteer cooperation as situated within the
geopolitical, political, and learning environments that involve multiple actors and complex relationships
(Schech, Mundkur, Skelton, & Kothari, 2015). In theory and practice, a concern for reciprocity has been
acknowledged and discussed at each levels of these partnership arrangements (see Figure 1).
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Relational Reciprocity: Strengthening Trust and Solidarity
The form of reciprocity described in this first section is perhaps the most commonly understood notion
of reciprocity associated with volunteering. Reciprocity is touted as one distinctive benefit of
volunteering associated with trust, solidarity, and mutual interdependence. This form of reciprocity is
embodied in the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) program description as a core method of volunteers’
contributions: “Volunteerism benefits both society at large and the individual volunteer by
strengthening trust, solidarity and reciprocity among citizens, and by purposefully creating opportunities
for participation.” (Leigh et al., 2011).
New relationships are inherently fragile and insecure. To grow fruitfully, they require trust and
solidarity, which are strengthened through repeated positive reciprocal exchange. Caplow (1982)
theorized that gifts and intangible forms of giving are remarkably useful at fortifying insecure or
unstable relationships because they initiate a moral bond based on enduring patterns of exchange
(Caplow, 1982). This bond produces an ongoing circular expectation to return in kind and fosters mutual
reliance, trust in continued benefit, and social commitment. As Komter (2007) describes, reciprocal
giving is particularly well-suited to developing sustainable relation-ships:
Gifts have the superb characteristic of being at the same time free and obligatory, altruistic and self-oriented.
It is exactly this double-sidedness of the gift that makes it such a fortunate solution for the fragility and
insecurity inherent in any newly developing social relationship.
Such relational forms of reciprocal exchange are the basis of biological and social symbiosis.
Joint decision-making
and mutual benefit
Relational
Reciprocity
Multilateral
Reciprocity
Governments and
Donors
IVCOs
Host organizations
& communities
Volunteers
Figure 1: Different types of reciprocity among diverse volunteer cooperation actors
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Perhaps more than most social interactions—as well as other forms of aid—volunteering has the
capacity to quickly build trust and stabilize new relationships. Volunteer service can initiate feelings of
gratitude in the hearts of recipients to respond in reciprocal fashion. By initiating and maintaining this
reciprocal game of giving–receiving–giving..., relationships are founded on mutual contribution. Such
relationships can establish trust more quickly than comparable relationships wherein gifts of gratitude
are not regularly expected and exchanged. To reap the benefits of this pattern, however, both parties
must perceive that they are able to give and return in equal measure. Relative equality of contribution,
therefore, emerges as a key precondition to effective relational reciprocity.
Preconditions of Reciprocity
Relative equality
Many international volunteering policies that shape “effective practices” are intended to function as an
equalizing force. Such practices include living in the homes of local populations, embedding volunteers’
in community-level projects, working face-to-face with local populations, and maintaining volunteers’
stipends comparable to living wages of domestic workers. Although such practices may have inherent
merit based on their alignment with core values of equality and fairness, they are also necessary
preconditions to achieving relational reciprocity. An allusion to this connection was articulated in a VSO
position paper:
The reciprocal nature of volunteering is particularly valuable. In this model volunteers will often share housing
with community members and they will cooperate together in labor projects. Living and working within
communities over an extended period of time encourages sensitive and appropriate responses and a sense of
equality that increase the likelihood of a successful outcome (Voluntary Service Overseas, 2002, p. 2).
Incidentally, highly balanced power relationships and equal social status are not always possible—and
may not actually be desirable in some circumstances. As Aked (2015) asserted, when volunteers use
their comparatively high social standing, influence, and networks with other power holders, this may
actually be the most efficient route to meaningful social change. However, social and economic equality
are not theoretically required for effective reciprocal relationships—as long as all parties can act
autonomously according to the strengths they bring to the relationship, and bring these strengths to
bear in equal measure (Komter, 2007).
Repeat interaction
Another precondition for effective relational reciprocity is repeat interaction. Theory and research
predict that parties in a partnership often fail to reciprocate with equal measure when the relationships
are of a short duration or composed of “single-shot” interactions (Ostrom & Walker, 2003). When
people do not expect meaningful future interactions, they easily justify taking advantage of the other
party (Ostrom, 1998). However, partnership models that include longer time perspectives and repeated
inter-actions will build trust and adopt norms of reciprocity and fairness in the expectation of long-term
returns (Ostrom & Walker, 2003). In all longstanding partnerships, the thought of ending the
relationship (i.e., the “grim trigger”) has been shown to be a sufficiently rational incentive to encourage
enduring reciprocation from all parties (Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986; Ostrom & Walker, 2003).
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This theory has obvious implications for policy and practice in volunteer cooperation. Among the most
obvious is to structure international volunteer placements for longer durations. Ideally, this practice
allows volunteers to establish reciprocal relationships built on norms of trust and mutual contribution
through continued and sustained engagement with local populations. When volunteering for the long-
term is not possible, relational reciprocity can be encouraged through repeat visits by shorter-term
volunteers. This model is common practice for many “professional” volunteer cooperation facilitated
by organizations such as the Singapore International Foundation and the USAID Farmer-to-Farmer
program.
Evidence suggests that repeat visits by volunteers has a significant influence on the ultimate quality of
the relationships, as perceived by partner organizations (Lough, 2016). These partnerships can be
greatly enhanced through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between IVCOs and host-
organizations. An MOU can help cultivate a “shadow of the future” for repeat interaction, and can
provide a level of security and assurance necessary for sustained partnerships (see Axelrod, 1984;
Umoren, James, & Litzelman, 2012).
Communication
Research also supports the conclusion that communication substantially increases the likelihood that
people will reciprocate (Ostrom & Walker, 2003). For international volunteering, communication
depends on volunteers’ proximity to community members in physical space, their language capacity,
and a level of cultural understanding that can foster effective communication. The critical role of
communication with partners was cited in studies of select FK Norway projects. As an evaluation of one
of these partnerships noted, shared language was critical for reciprocal collaborations:
Both partners recognize that there are challenges to establishing a good collaboration, and that they have
very different views on the purpose of the partnership. . . The language-barrier is believed to be the main
cause of the lack of reciprocity in the exchange (Scanteam, 2005, p. 89).
Conditions of relative equality, repeated inter-actions, and effective communication are not the only
preconditions for reciprocal relationships. However, they are perhaps the most common conditions
observed in research on international volunteer cooperation. In the following sections, these conditions
also lay the foundation of other alternative understandings of reciprocity in practice. The following
section expands on the idea of mutual benefit and giving from all parties in a partnership.
Mutual Benefit
Discussions of reciprocity often focus on a “community driven development” approach, which
prioritizes the needs of host organizations. Other approaches privilege volunteers’ contributions while
undervaluing the capabilities of hosting organizations. These approaches tend to position local partners
in the role of passive recipient. A truly reciprocal exchange model, however, recognizes and prioritizes
mutual benefit; neither partner is given primary concern or exclusive benefit; give and take is expected
from both sides (Hartman, Paris, & Blache-Cohen, 2014, p. 110; Palacios, 2010).
In line with this principle, effective program logic models are organized with “dual purposes” that
explicitly outline proposed benefits to both local partners and volunteers (Hartman et al., 2014).
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Because the partners often have different capacities and resources to contribute, discuss-ions of how
reciprocity can be achieved in practice often focus on the relative economic versus noneconomic
exchanges that can be provided by Northern and Southern partners (Dostilio et al., 2012, p. 22). To the
degree that volunteers are able to contribute knowledge, skills, or resources, partner organizations are
also expected to reciprocate with comparable contributions. This notion of mutual benefit has been
referred to as “strategic reciprocity” wherein volunteers’ motivations are structured around the
strategic returns they expect to receive from their volunteer experience (Manatschal & Freitag, 2014).
Reciprocal learning is one expression of strategic reciprocity. If both parties perceive the primary benefit
from volunteering is interpersonal exchange and communication, then this is a comparatively easy
objective to achieve. When the FK Norway Youth program began in 2002, a primary objective was to
bring young people from different parts of the world together to share ideas, activities, and work
experiences. A proposed benefit of the program was merely to “offer an inspirational means of
reciprocal learning” (Borchgrevink & Skard, 2004, p. 8; Slagman, Thiis-Evensen, & Olsen, 2005).
Although the mutual contributions provided by each partner need not be motivated by a modernization
(i.e., economic) paradigm of development, they do need to be articulated.
Articulating and making the expectation of dual benefit explicit offers a number of advantages,
particularly to community partners. For one, community partners are empowered to expect
compensation for all services provided. As is often the case, compensation may come in the form of
volunteer assistance. However, in situations where volunteers are comparatively unskilled or unhelpful,
partner organizations might legitimately expect compensation in the form of resources and tangible
supports in exchange for hosting volunteers.
Another advantage of emphasizing the different ways both parties contribute is a blurring of the
conventional boundaries between giver and receiver. Strengths-based dialogue has been used to
articulate mutual advantage—empowering local partners to better identify and capitalize on the
beneficial aspects of their distinct contributions. By emphasizing the significant benefits that volunteers
receive as they live and work in host communities, local partners may more accurately recognize these
relationships as reciprocal rather than as unilateral aid.
In addition to working with hosting organizations to recognize the value of mutual contributions, a
higher awareness is also needed on the “sending side” of the partnership. Not all volunteers stop to
recognize the strengths inherent in communities and the benefits they are likely to receive as they
volunteer in the Global South. For instance, IVCOs may alter expectations by more accurately
portraying the strengths of partner communities in the Global South, and more realistically
communicating the contributions of, and benefits to, volunteers. When discussions about reciprocity
and asymmetries in power are an explicit component of volunteer orientation, these conversations can
challenge volunteers to reflect on their own unconscious or unobserved helping biases, and to consider
how they might avoid perpetuating inequities through their work.
Reciprocity as mutual benefit can also break down the common division of international volunteer
programs in scholarship as “demand-based” (i.e., driven by the needs of the host community or
organization) or “supply-based” (i.e., driven by the needs of the volunteer, IVCO, or sending-country)
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(see Brassard, Sherraden, & Lough, 2010; Lough, 2012; Perold et al., 2011). When reciprocity through
mutual benefit is prioritized, international volunteering operates on market principles whereby utility is
maximized through the balanced and mutually-beneficial principles of supply and demand.
In situations wherein the IVCO/community partnership fails to clarify dual contribution, local partners
may be unable or unwilling to participate in decisions about the direction of projects. As Franco (2012)
asserts, “... beneficiaries are reluctant to give criticisms or reject initiatives because it would seem that
the only symbolic repayment possible is the acknowledgement of the support, and the statement of
shared commitment with the volunteering [nongovernmental organization] in its effort to promote
development” (Franco, 2012, p. 21). This statement assumes, as is common in development
cooperation, that the only meaningful contribution local partners can provide is a “symbolic
acknowledgement of support.” This assumption clearly falls short of the ideal of reciprocal partnerships.
Joint Decision-Making
Related to the idea of mutual benefit, practicing reciprocity in international cooperation is expressed
through the locus of decision-making power (Sherraden, Lough, & Bopp, 2013). For example, joint
decision-making is a primary way that the Swiss Unité program has defined and discussed reciprocity
in their reports; the volunteers’ value is best realized when relations between Northern and Southern
partners share common motivations, visions, and objectives (Unité, 2007).
Key questions relevant to this conception of reciprocity include the following: Are hosting organizations
and communities jointly involved in the creation and critique of projects? Who has more substantive
power to determine the activities and priorities assumed by volunteers? Who ultimately decides which
projects to support or fund?
At the most basic, and perhaps the “thinnest,” conception of reciprocity in decision-making is engaging
partners in a participatory and consultative process. Some have described this as “working with a
partner as opposed to doing something to or for a partner” (Sandmann, Kliewer, Kim, & Ommerikwa,
2010, p. 5; Sherraden et al., 2013). In one example from a UNV report, volunteers helped to change local
government practices as they brought together Roma community representatives and Albanian
government actors by “adopting participatory consultations, negotiations and mediations [and]
achieving consensus regarding priorities and needs in cases when interests of many stake-holders are
different” (Baken, Taho, & Tepelena, 2010, p. 3).
Beyond arranging for community members to participate in a consultative role, a higher level of
reciprocity is arranging for all stakeholders to share ownership of the project (Hautzinger, 2008;
Reardon, 2006). This type of reciprocity has been conceptualized as “thick reciprocity” when done
correctly because it substantively transfers and equalizes power between stakeholders (Jameson, &
Jaeger, 2011). This is also the conception of reciprocity closest to the spirit of Sustainable Development
Goal (SDG) target 16.7, which aims to “Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative
decision-making at all levels”. In this arrangement, partner organizations are equally involved in the
selection, allocation, and mobilization of volunteers according to mutually negotiated strategic
objectives (Perold et al., 2013). Training of volunteers includes joint supervision and instruction—
12
trusting partners to manage and direct the work of volunteers (Haarberg, Dale, & Whist, 2011).
Similarly, the timing, duration, and continuity of volunteer-supported programs meet the needs of both
partners. In addition, there is clear transparency in budgeting and program design (Hartman et al.,
2014).
A review of the North-to-South component of the FK program found a number of barriers that limited
genuine reciprocity with partners. In particular, the review stressed the inequality of resources and
decision-making power inherent in the management model, which is common in many North-to-South
international volunteer cooperation programs.
In the North-South partnerships the driving force is the Norwegian partner who...is responsible for
monitoring and accounts for the funds received from Fredskorpset…. Furthermore, in many cases there are
significant differences in resource endowments between North and South partners, for instance in terms of
financial and human resources and in terms of communication technology. This makes it even harder to
achieve balanced partnerships. In general, the North-South partnerships cannot be assessed as equal.
(Norad, 2006, p. 33)
Such imbalances in partnerships from top-heavy management decisions and resource inequities is
often more common than not in international volunteer cooperation.
Joint decision-making is compared to unilateral processes in which the strengths and assets of people
in poverty are overlooked—and therefore undervalued, under recognized, and under-appreciated. As
one Valuing Volunteering researcher concluded, “when volunteers are regarded as ‘expert’ and local
actors as ‘beneficiary,’ reciprocity is rarely a feature of [these] volunteer networks” (Aked, 2015, p. 37).
In contrast, when volunteers are not viewed as experts but rather as members of a team, notions of
competition and paternalism from volunteers can be substantially reduced through reciprocal decision-
making (Rockliffe, 2005).
A moderate deconstruction of joint decision-making is of relative importance to this discussion. Many
advocates of sustainable development assert that efforts should be “community-driven.” At the
conceptual level, however, a community-driven model is not necessarily more reciprocal than a
volunteer-driven model. Under the reciprocal approach, projects and priorities should be mutually
negotiated and agreed. Although power differences cannot be ignored, project decisions should aim to
occupy the space that fulfills the interests of all stakeholders, including the IVCOs, their donors, and
volunteers (see Figure 2).
13
Seeking to integrate the priorities of donors, volunteers, IVCOs, and other development cooperation
organizations may grate against some ideals of community-driven development, which aim to devolve
power to the community to drive project priorities (Nkonya, Phillip, Mogues, Pender, & Kato, 2012;
Wong, 2012). On the other hand, positioning community representatives as the primary decision-
making actors could also result in poor consequences at the collective level. For example, community
partners may be less concerned about the environmental impacts of a program if they believe that
embracing such concerns may have detrimental effects on local livelihoods. In addition, projects
focusing too heavily on the priorities of local partners have been criticized for being ignorant of the
power differences inherent in local groups and civil society organizations, which can also be highly
detrimental to marginalized groups (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). Although joint decision-making is not
easy to achieve, it is a key objective for reciprocal partnerships.
Multilateral Reciprocity
For some IVCOs, reciprocity primarily implies an exchange of volunteers from the Global North and
Global South. For example, the multilateral exchange of volunteers is a key way that FK Norway has
conceptualized the practice of reciprocity. Although reciprocity has been a component of the FK
Norway model since its establishment in 1963, the policy change to strengthen multilateral placements
and to prioritize North-to-South and South-to-North exchanges was “only partly integrated into the
original concept” (Borchgrevink & Skard, 2004, p. 6). It was nearly four decades after its founding that
FK Norway ultimately changed its modality to enhance reciprocity through multilateral exchange.
Alongside FK Norway, Canada World Youth was also a pioneer in both South-to-North and South-to-
South exchanges (Volunteer and Service Enquiry Southern Africa [VOSESA], 2013).
Joint ownership and
decision-making
Donors, IVCOs,
Volunteers
Partner Organizations,
Community Members
Figure 2: Negotiated project priorities in reciprocal volunteer cooperation
14
A related model aims to foster mutually beneficial partnerships between volunteer-supported civil
society organizations (CSOs) in the North and South. A few programs that follow this type of reciprocal
exchange includes Canadian Cross-roads International, the VSO Global Exchange programs, and
smaller regional programs such as the Kölner Freiwilligen Agentur e.V. In the Canadian Cross-roads
International model, for example, volunteers from a Southern CSO travel to work within a Canadian
partner CSO, while volunteers from Canada do the same in the Southern country. In Kölner Freiwilligen
Agentur e.V., young adults from one of Cologne’s sister cities volunteer in a German nonprofit
organization for at least six months, while a young person from Cologne volunteers in the sister city.
In the South-to-North exchange models, both volunteers aim to learn new skills during their work with
the organizations, and they bring this new learning back to CSO in their home country (Norad, 2006).
Although FK Norway and VSO Global Exchange programs also support these types of exchanges, their
volunteers typically serve for a longer duration (ITAD, 2011). A few other noteworthy examples of
South-to-North exchange include the Kenya Global Peace Youth Corps—a partnership between East
African and Korean volunteers (Caprara, Mati, Obadare, & Perold, 2013), and a small three-year pilot of
the German weltwärts program that aims to foster more equitable global exchanges (AKLHÜ, 2015;
Weltwärts, 2013). The UK Department for International Development supported Inter-national Citizen
Service also has a model of “reciprocal visits to the UK by staff from host organisations” (Hawkins,
Verstege, & Flood, 2013, p. 38).
All told, alternatives to traditional North-to-South models of international volunteering are following a
clear growth trend (VOSESA, 2013). Northern governments are increasingly willing to fund youth
exchanges from other countries. Over the past ten years, a number of IVCOs have begun to facilitate
South-to-North exchange models as a small fraction of their overall portfolio (Norad, 2006; Schreiber,
2001). Despite this trend at an administrative level, however, many Northern governments remain
reluctant to admit young people from the Global South into their country, and the rejection of visa
applications is an not uncommon practice (Allum, 2013).
Despite the promotion of South-to-North exchange as a reciprocal model, it is sometimes still viewed
as an unequal partnership given a normally heavier investment of resources by the Northern
organization (Mati & Perold, 2011). Because volunteers typically pay a higher fee to cover costs of
Southern volunteers, the exchange is often viewed as a gift from the Northern IVCO or volunteer. As
one respondent to FK’s partner survey commented: “Since the North partner has the money there will
always be inequality” (FK Norway, 2007, p. 55).
For South-to-North exchange to be considered reciprocal, both parties need to view the level of giving
as equally valuable. To accomplish this, stakeholders must challenge the respondent’s perception that
disparities in money and resources (which are inevitably a component of any North-to-South
cooperation), do not ultimately determine the level of giving and benefit. In the end, Northern partners
and volunteers need to value the contributions of the Southern volunteers equal to the level of
resources expended. Likewise, Southern volunteers need to value their level of contribution as justifying
any extra scholarship or fees paid by Northern volunteers.
15
Though equitable exchange is legitimate in theory, how might IVCOs and their partners accomplish it
in practice? If reciprocity is truly a goal, how do partners equalize the relationship in contexts where
financial resources are inevitably unequal? Should Northern CSOs expect higher results from Southern
volunteers? Perhaps the exchanges can be justified by recruiting volunteers with different levels of skill
from Northern and Southern contexts? These questions might touch a nerve for some readers, but such
methods may already be implemented to a certain degree. For example, in a review of FK’s youth
program partnerships, the consultants identified that their partners “specified separate objectives and
indicators for the North and South partners,” which were viewed as consistent with the ideals of
partnerships embedded in FK’s youth-based programs (Borchgrevink & Skard, 2004, p. 35).
Although pairing North-to-South with South-to-North exchanges is relatively easily to distinguish as a
reciprocal model (excluding the nuances discussed in the previous paragraphs), many would argue that
South-to-South and North-to-North volunteer cooperation models have an even stronger degree of
reciprocity (Fulbrook, 2007; Leigh et al., 2011). Why might this be the case? With vertical (i.e., North-to-
South, South-to-North) exchanges, both parties tend to have implicit dichotomies between privileged/
underprivileged, lucky/unlucky, giver/receiver, developed/underdeveloped, etc. Some scholars have
argued that horizontal volunteers exchange models (i.e., South-to-South, North-to-North) to balance
and blur differences in status—which promises a greater likelihood of mutual benefit and shared
learning—and thereby more reciprocal partnerships (Donahue, Bowyer, & Rosenberg, 2003; Norad,
2006; Plewes & Stuart, 2007).
Only a handful of IVCOs have managed to develop and operate functional South-to-South volunteer
programs. A few notable examples include FK Norway, Canada World Youth, VSO, UNV, SayXchange,
America Solidaria, and Reach Out to Asia (VOSESA, 2013). Among the major IVCOs, UNV easily has the
largest and longest-standing South-to-South volunteer cooperation program (Lough, 2015b).
Although research on the comparative effectiveness of different multilateral reciprocal approaches are
rare, a 2009 evaluation of FK Norway found that the South-to-South programs appeared better at
capacity building and transferring skills because Southern volunteers tended to spend far less time
adjusting to cultural differences and could begin working almost immediately after arriving in their
partner agency (Nordic Consulting Group, 2009). Evaluations also found that participants in the South-
to-South program believed that they benefited more significantly from networks developed during the
placements, and were more satisfied overall than participants in the North-to-South program (Nordic
Consulting Group, 2009; Tjønneland et al., 2016). However, these results were somewhat contradicted
with survey results from FK partner organizations. These surveys, conducted over multiple years,
consistently indicate that Southern partners working with Norwegian volunteer coordinating
organizations rate the highest in their level of satisfaction with the equality, reciprocity and
transparency of placements (FK Norway, 2013, 2016).
Volunteer Counterparts
Related in principle to South-to-North volunteer exchange, some programs aim to enhance reciprocity
by pairing international and national volunteers in a “counterpart” or “twinning” model of volunteer
cooperation (Beigbeder, 1991; Scott-Smith, 2011). This was the first mainstream method that IVCOs
16
attempted historically when striving for reciprocal cooperation (Lough, 2015b; United Nations
Volunteers, 1985). Although a number of bilateral IVCOs experimented with this form of reciprocal
programming in early years, they eventually abandoned the idea because of ongoing disparities that
ultimately prevented reciprocal cooperation (Lough, 2015b). In the end, inequalities in stipends,
insurance, and other fringe benefits provided to international volunteers and their local counterparts
quickly hampered feelings of equity and reciprocity between counterparts (Gillette, 1972). In addition,
it was difficult for volunteers to overcome the often “rural/urban, educated/uneducated, wealthy/poor”
divisions between volunteers from high- and low-income countries (Woods, 1974, p. 39).
Despite historical challenges with implementing the counterpart model, a number of modern
organizations practice this form of reciprocal engagement. For example, in Sweden’s Sida Exchange
Programme, the concept of ömsesidighet (i.e., reciprocity) is a key guiding principle. In the Sida model,
young people from the North and South are matched together for at least four weeks—spending time
in pairs for at least two weeks in each country (Norad, 2006). In Sida’s model, however, participants do
not necessarily engage in volunteer action or aim to contribute to development in their exchange
country. In contrast, the UK’s International Citizen Service program explicitly pairs young volunteers
from the UK with young volunteers in the Global South, and volunteer action is a centrepiece of the
young people’s experience (ITAD, 2011).
A number of commentaries have emphasized that encouraging and strengthening national youth
volunteering is critical for any international volunteer partnership that claims to prioritize objectives of
reciprocity—even when IVCOs do not formally follow a volunteer counterpart model (Franco &
Shahrokh, 2015; Scott-Smith, 2011). As one researcher articulated: “Organisations aiming at
developing and/or strengthening youth volunteering actions must put greater emphasis on
encouraging national youth volunteering with elements of reciprocity” (Franco, 2012, p. 19). According
to this perspective, reciprocity between countries justifies investing in equitable volunteer
opportunities for all young people.
17
Table 1: Spectrum of Reciprocal Partnerships in International Volunteer Cooperation
Less
Reciprocal
More
Reciprocal
Relational
reciprocity
Conditions of privilege (e.g.
living and working with other
international volunteers, high
stipends)
Shorter durations of service
One-off volunteer placements
Lack of continuity in IVCO and
partner relationships
Inability to communicate
effectively due to language,
physical distance, cultural
misunderstanding, or other
barriers
Conditions of equality (e.g. living and
working with community members,
low stipends)
Repeat interactions: Longer duration
of service; multiple volunteer
placements
Continuity in IVCO and partner
organization relationship (including
memorandum of understanding)
Ability to communicate effectively
Mutual benefit
Supply orientation (supply of
volunteers > demand for
volunteers)
Uneven gains by volunteers,
hosting-community, or
organizations
Volunteer-centered learning
Unbalanced costs and benefits
Market balance of volunteers (supply
= demand)
Mutually-strategic gains by all
stakeholders
Reciprocal learning
Balanced costs and benefits
(including compensation if needed to
hosting organizations)
Joint decision-
making
Top-heavy ownership and design
of projects
One-sided selection, allocation,
mobilization, and supervision of
volunteers
Undisclosed budgeting and
spending
Joint ownership and design of
projects
Joint selection, allocation,
mobilization, and supervision of
volunteers
Transparent budgeting and spending
Multilateral
reciprocity
Unidirectional North-to-South
volunteer sending
International volunteers only,
without national volunteer
counterparts
Reciprocal North-to-South and
South-to-North exchange
South-to-South or North-to-North
volunteer coordination
International / national volunteer
counterparts
18
Conclusion
As illustrated above, diverse conceptions and practices of reciprocity depend on a variety of actors—
stretching from macro geopolitical partnerships to micro interpersonal relationships. The metaphor of
the simple saw and the complex kaleidoscope has been used to illustrate the concept of reciprocity. The
saw represents a give-and-take or tit-for-tat conception of reciprocity, while the kaleidoscope
represents the variety of practices that embody the values of equality and multidirectional giving and
learning (Dostilio et al., 2012, p. 29). Reaching for a more explicit understanding to “say what we mean”
when discussing the principles of reciprocity in international volunteer cooperation, Table 1 summarizes
the spectrum of reciprocal partnerships and practices discussed in international volunteer cooperation
circles.
It may be unrealistic for each IVCO to practice fully reciprocal international volunteer cooperation at all
levels. Indeed, at the geopolitical level of partnerships, few IVCOs have enough flexibility with their
donors to realize multilateral South-to-North volunteer placements or to practice largescale volunteer
counterpart placements. Despite limitations, however, all IVCOs can all work towards more reciprocal
relationships with partners at lower levels of partnership—such as between volunteers and local actors.
Some solutions may, in fact, be relatively independent from resources or donor priorities. It is certainly
likely that all IVCOs could enhance the spirit of reciprocity through strengths-based dialogue and by
encouraging critical consciousness in volunteers, partner organizations, and communities. Through
such dialogue, disparities in power and resources can be acknowledged as constant and present, and
organizational policies can be implemented to minimize the effects of differences as they are
recognized. If reciprocal relations are truly a valued ideal, even small differences in power and partiality
can be acknowledged, made explicit, and translated into creative and innovative policies and
organizational practices.
Target 17.16 of the SDGs aims to “Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development,
complemented by multi-stakeholder partner-ships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise,
technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development
goals.”
2
The spectrum of partnerships described above illustrate the potential for volunteers, IVCOs,
and local partner organizations—together with governments and donors—to support the aspirations
advanced in the new global goals. Reciprocal relationships are necessary to genuinely engage these
multiple partners in equitable and sustainable partnerships for development.
3
Although achieving full reciprocity will remain a demanding challenge, programs that prioritize mutual
exchange and cooperation between Southern and Northern partners can overcome many of the
complications inherent in conventional aid relationships. To the degree that diverse international
volunteer partnerships strive to embody principles of reciprocity, at whatever level is feasible, they offer
meaningful alternatives over less equitable forms of aid.
2
See also SDG Target 17.17: Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partner-ships, building
on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships.
3
SDG Target 16.7: Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.
19
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