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Cyber-combat's first shot
Abstract
The attack on Syria has shown that Israel is a master of the high-tech battle. The surveillance is providing clues that how Israeli aircraft maintained to escape Syrian air defenses to bomb the site at Dyaraz-Zawr. US analysts says that main elements of the attack includes, some brute-force jamming, which is an important element of attacking air defenses. Observations provide evidence that a sophisticated network attack and electronic hacking ability is an operational part or the Israel Defense Forces' arsenal of digital weapons. The ground surveillance radar vision in the country is capable of providing data streams from large, active, electronically scanned array radars, while the intelligence version provides the signals surveillance and analysis. Israeli military and government officials confirm that network invasion, information warfare and electronic attack are the part of Israel's defense ability which has changed everything for them.
... But cyber attacks loom on the horizon as a threat that is best understood as an extraordinary means to a wide variety of political and military ends, many of which can have serious national security ramifications. For example, computer hacking can be used to steal offensive weapons technology (including for weapons of mass destruction) or to render an adversary " s defenses inoperable during a conventional military attack (Fulghum et al., 2007). In that light, attempting proactively to deter cyber attacks may become an essential part of national military strategies. ...
... Since the earliest days of the World Wide Web, Chechen guerilla fighters, armed not only with rifles but with digital cameras and HTML, have demonstrated the power of Internet-enabled propaganda (Goble, 1999). In 2001, tensions between the United States and China spilled over into a non-state, " patriotic " hacker war, with uncertain consequences for national security leadership. 1 In 2007, Syrian air defense was reportedly disabled by a cyber attack moments before the Israeli air force demolished an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor (Fulghum, 2007). In 2009, the entire nation-state of Kyrgyzstan was knocked offline during a time of domestic political crisis (Keizer, 2009), and Iranian voters, in " open war " with state security forces, used peer-to-peer social-networking websites to avoid government restrictions on dialogue with the outside world (Stöcker et al., 2009). ...
National security planners have begun to look beyond reactive, tactical cyber defense to proactive, strategic cyber defense, which may include international military deterrence. The incredible power of nuclear weapons gave birth to deterrence, a military strategy in which the purpose of armies shifted from winning wars to preventing them. Although cyber attacks per se do not compare to a nuclear explosion, they do pose a serious and increasing threat to international security. Real-world examples suggest that cyber warfare will play a lead role in future international conflicts. This article examines the two deterrence strategies available to nation-states (denial and punishment) and their three basic requirements (capability, communication, and credibility) in the light of cyber warfare. It also explores whether the two most challenging aspects of cyber attacks – attribution and asymmetry – will make cyber attack deterrence an impossible task.
... In a globalized, interconnected world, a cooperative nation-state would only seem to be hurting itself, and a terrorist group may crave a higher level of shock and media atten- 17 Lewis, 2002. 18 Fulghum et al, 2007. 19 Verton, 1999"Yugoslavia..." 1999. ...
Cyberspace is the outcome of technological progress, connectivity and a global
connection to the Internet.
The increasing dependency on Cyberspace brings tidings of technological
innovation and tremendous development for man and his environment.
But alongside these, a threatening space is developing, affecting the business
organizations, the integrity of production processes and the confidentiality of
corporate information.
Cyber-attacks could harm the organizations and halt the production processes,
causing economic damage and harming the reputation of the business.
The State of Israel conducts a national effort for the defense of civil cyber space.
The Corporate Defense Methodology is a component of the National Defense
Concept, consisting of various levels of protection on the Israeli economy and its
functional continuity.
The Corporate Defense Methodology considers the organization as a whole,
and enables raising the level of organizational resilience through continuous
integration of processes, practices and protection products.
The application of a Corporate Defense Methodology will enhance the
organizational resilience and robustness in face of cyber-attacks.
... In a globalized, interconnected world, a cooperative nation-state would only seem to be hurting itself, and a terrorist group may crave a higher level of shock and media atten- 17 Lewis, 2002. 18 Fulghum et al, 2007. 19 Verton, 1999"Yugoslavia..." 1999. ...
Cyberspace is the outcome of technological progress, connectivity and a global
connection to the Internet.
The increasing dependency on Cyberspace brings tidings of technological
innovation and tremendous development for man and his environment.
But alongside these, a threatening space is developing, affecting the business
organizations, the integrity of production processes and the confidentiality of
corporate information.
Cyber-attacks could harm the organizations and halt the production processes,
causing economic damage and harming the reputation of the business.
The State of Israel conducts a national effort for the defense of civil cyber space.
The Corporate Defense Methodology is a component of the National Defense
Concept, consisting of various levels of protection on the Israeli economy and its
functional continuity.
Increased geopolitical competition, nuclear multipolarity, and emerging technologies are steadily undermining strategic stability as well as the existing arms control and non-proliferation regime architecture. The 1980s and 1990s were a high-water point in terms of the normative and legal institutionalization of arms control and non-proliferation regimes, including, but not limited to, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Open Skies Treaty (OST), the Vienna Document (VD), and the Wassenaar Arrangement. We are seeing a disintegration of these regimes.
This report first offers an in-depth analysis of how both geopolitical and technological developments affect strategic stability. It then looks at the arms control, non-proliferation and deterrence policy measures that states have at their disposal to contain and prevent the production, proliferation, deployment and employment (PPDE) of weapon technologies that threaten strategic stability, to provide new solutions for a new generation of durable arrangements. While arms control and non-proliferation efforts are aimed at countering the production, the proliferation and the deployment of such capabilities, deterrence seeks to prevent their actual employment. Rather than singling out one weapon technology or one specific arms control regime, it introduces a new analytical framework that assesses the feasibility of policy measures to control weapon technologies along the PPDE-chain. Applying this framework to ten emerging weapon technologies, the report identifies specific policy measures to curtail the risks associated with each of them. The overview of measures offers European and Dutch policymakers a blueprint for a broader integrated arms control agenda, and facilitates careful consideration of the appropriate balance of policy mixes along the PPDE-chain included therein. On that basis the report offers a set of policy recommendations to policymakers to bolster strategic stability.
The US-China face-off over allegations of Huawei’s equipment being compromised has brought the subtle art of hardware trojan warfare right into the open spotlight. This paper focuses on cyberattacks at the root of trust – IT hardware trojans (HT), primarily the most malicious of these trojans, the one which is surreptitiously implanted inside a semiconductor System on Chip (SoC) or Integrated Circuit (IC) for sabotage. Though a thoroughbred trojan of this kind is yet to be found in the wild, hardware trojans continue to shape public policies and fund technical research on their possibilities, detection and avoidance. This paper explores a highly under-researched area, the economics of real hardware trojans, including examples from the Syrian radar breach to iPhone trojans sold on Amazon.com.
El progreso de los medios cibernéticos y su aplicación como medio de defensa - ataque por parte de diversos actores de la sociedad internacional, así como la utilización del campo de batalla virtual (ciberespacio) por parte de los Estados y sus fuerzas armadas para garantizar la seguridad nacional, ofrecen la oportunidad de examinar el poder de la tecnología digital y el espectro electromagnético como medios de ataque y destrucción de los potenciales enemigos así como medio de defensa de la información estratégica crítica. De igual forma, esta fórmula entre tecnologías de la información y poder, presenta una nueva condición de conflicto internacional que debe ser regulado, a fin de: evitar las atrocidades del pasado observadas en conflictos interestatales, garantizar el respeto de los no combatientes y definir claramente cuando se debe utilizar la fuerza militar para responder a un ataque cibernético. Por ello, el ciberespacio se ha convertido en un ámbito de la guerra en donde las vulnerabilidades del enemigo son explotadas sin necesidad de la fuerza; en consecuencia los Estados deben contar con una estrategia que dé respuesta oportuna y precisa a las amenazas que se enfrentan.
Today, everything that happens in the “real world” — from interpersonal conflicts to international conflicts — is mirrored in cyberspace. All political and military conflicts have a cyber dimension, whose size and impact are difficult to predict. The South East Europe (SEE) security community is no different, and its law enforcement and national security institutions will continue to be challenged by a ubiquitous and unpredictable Internet.
Cyber operations are expected to become more important, and thus military commanders and staff will need to be trained in these operations. The aim of this paper is to describe an approach for simulating the effects of cyber operations in constructive simulations used for training by modern military forces. The paper argues that it is not currently possible to realistically simulate military cyber operations in a cost-effective manner, due to of the lack of existing data on the subject and the fact that it is not possible to validate available data from the civilian realm against military cyber operations. However, we argue that to educate senior military leaders, it is more important to simulate the effects of cyber attacks than to simulate the actual attacks themselves with a high degree of fidelity. The paper will discuss a set of cyber effects, and introduce an attack taxonomy that focuses on these effects. This taxonomy will discuss the effects of various attack types, along with the level of access to the target computing resource that is required to prosecute the attack. The effects of attacks will be described in terms of their impact on the computing network, computers or other devices. From this, we will derive impacts on mission capabilities, and discuss how these could be implemented inside constructive simulations. For example, to demonstrate the effects of a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, it is not necessary to carry out the attack itself; it may be sufficient to disconnect the server that is the target of the DoS attack. When prosecuting an attack, adversaries must always contend with limited resources and time. In order to integrate cyber operations in constructive simulations with a measure of realism, the paper will discuss a mechanism to limit the cyber attacks available to an attacker in terms of available resources and time. The approach will also introduce the concept of stochastic attack success by assigning probabilities of attack success against known defences. Finally, the paper will discuss avenues of future and related work, including the relationship of this work with the Metrics Framework for Cyber Command and Control paper, (Bernier et al. 2012) also presented at this conference.
Safe and reliable operation of formations unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) necessitates developing situational awareness capacities for assessing and predicting the health status of both network and assets, particularly when evolving in adversarial environments. This chapter proposes a dynamic feature that is instrumental in achieving vulnerability assessment of a network of UAVs, whose control system is possibly affected by the diffusion of malware. The feature consists of the characterization of the transition from stability to instability with probability one. The stability of the networked UAVs can be indirectly affected by malicious attacks targeting the communication units or the control systems. The network is modeled as a discrete-time, jump, linear system whose state- space variables represent the probabilities that each node receives a malware and is infected by it. The stability analysis is obtained by means of a stochastic Lyapunov function argument and yields a sufficient condition expressed as a linear matrix inequality (LMI). This LMI involves the networked asset state- space matrices and the probability that each UAV’s control system is infected. An approximation to the sufficient condition is proposed so that convergence of the system trajectories could be monitored online. The proposed detection technique is validated by simulations of a UAV formation.
For some realists, cyber warfare is ‘old wine in new bottles’, with marginal added value. This misses the larger possibilities for political/military chain reactions that cyber warfare may prompt, possibly leading to armed conflict. This article utilizes Offense-Defense theory to appraise the influence of cyber warfare on international security and the prospects for conflict. Offense-Defense theory, as applied here, better explains the relationship between technological innovation and international politics, and leads to different conclusions from other realist approaches. Redefining the Offense-Defense balance to accommodate cyberspace leads to an emphasis on the offensive advantages of cyber capabilities. The offensive and defensive cyber postures of China, Russia, the United States, and NATO are examined here to empirically assess the role of cyber warfare in security policy. Evidence shows that innovations in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) allow states to take greater risks and adopt more vigilant or offensive positions toward adversaries. Cyber capabilities do not cause armed conflict, but make decisions to escalate easier and cheaper. A strategic enabler that provides attackers greater freedom of action, cyber warfare is becoming a necessary condition for the conduct of war, even if it is not a sufficient one.
For almost two decades, experts and defense establishments the world over have been predicting that cyber war is coming. But is it? This article argues in three steps that cyber war has never happened in the past, that cyber war does not take place in the present, and that it is unlikely that cyber war will occur in the future. It first outlines what would constitute cyber war: a potentially lethal, instrumental, and political act of force conducted through malicious code. The second part shows what cyber war is not, case-by-case. Not one single cyber offense on record constitutes an act of war on its own. The final part offers a more nuanced terminology to come to terms with cyber attacks. All politically motivated cyber attacks are merely sophisticated versions of three activities that are as old as warfare itself: sabotage, espionage, and subversion.
Adversary threats to critical infrastructures have always existed during times of conflict, but threat scenarios now include peacetime attacks from anonymous computer hackers. Current events, including examples from Israel and Estonia, prove that a certain level of real-world disorder can be achieved from hostile data packets alone. The astonishing achievements of cyber crime and cyber espionage – to which law enforcement and counterintelligence have found little answer – hint that more serious cyber attacks on critical infrastructures are only a matter of time. Still, national security planners should address all threats with method and objectivity. As dependence on IT and the Internet grow, governments should make proportional investments in network security, incident response, technical training, and international collaboration.
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