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The Boko Haram Paradox: Ethnicity, Religion, and Historical Memory in Pursuit of a Caliphate
Abstract
To Boko Haram, Nigeria is a colonial construct, lacking Islamic legitimacy and destined to lead society in a downward spiral of Western immorality. The only way to regain northern Nigeria’s former glory is through a repudiation of democracy, constitutionalism, and Western values and a return to Islamic governance on the model of the historic caliphates. We argue that Boko Haram’s leaders draw their inspiration and legitimacy from Usman Dan Fodio’s 1804 Fulani-led jihad and his subsequent establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in northern Nigeria but seek to implement this style of caliphate in the Kanuri homelands of the former Kanem-Borno Empire.
... In many cases, the privileged status of the families claiming religious leadership can be traced back to the Fulani Caliphate (or 'empire') of Sokoto, which dominated northern Nigeria in the nineteenth century under the military-religious leadership of Usman Dan Fodio, an ethnic Fulani. Dan Fodio subjugated to its authority all the then-existing kingdoms, and threatened to overthrow with its jihad the, by then declining, Kanem-Bornu empire, rooted in today's Borno State (Pieri and Zenn 2016). Even today, religious leaders across the whole of northern Nigeria often refer to the Sokoto heritage and claim Fulani ethnic origins. ...
... This was aimed at internationalising the conflict by branching Boko Haram with other jihadist organisations in Africa and fostering transnational coordination. Interestingly, Shekau is more fluent in his native Kanuri language than in Hausa or Arabic, and he has showed himself proud of its Kanuri heritage (Pieri and Zenn 2016). On the other hand, Al-Barnawi and Nur are believed to be former members of AQIM and Al-Shabaab, respectively (Hütte et al. 2015). ...
... Boko Haram thus progressively consolidated the hold on 'its' territorial core, i.e., the rural areas at the north-easternmost corner of Nigeria. By the end of 2014, the organisation was reportedly in control of about 20,000 square miles of territory in north-east Nigeria (Pieri and Zenn 2016). Here, Boko Haram tried to put in place an original Downloaded by [88.17.29.236] at 00:32 18 December 2017 (albeit rudimentary) form of religiously inspired administration, functioning like 'a state within a state' (Elden 2014, p. 421), steered by a cabinet in which ethnic Kanouri were the majority. ...
By analysing Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, this article argues that ascriptions to international jihadist brands are linked to local movements’ political economy and geopolitical imaginaries, and, therefore, driven more by contingent strategic considerations rather than by ideological motives. Consequently, three sets of evidence are discussed, by drawing also on fieldwork conducted in Mali and Niger from 2013 to 2016: the discourses of these actors; their political economies; their use of political violence. In conclusion, we analyse the ‘territorialised-deterritorialised cleavage’ and argue that this has greater heuristic value to understand African ‘jihadisms’ than existing categorisations of political violence.
... Before developing this line of inquiry, a digression with respect to the overt channeling of Usman dan Fodio's jihad by Boko Haram is in order. Pieri and Zenn (2016) reveal this association most directly, while revealing a geo-historical paradox. The Fulani-led Sokoto jihad of Usman dan Fodio was opposed by the Kingdom of Kanem (also known as Bornu), in today's northeastern Nigeria (see Figure 9.6). ...
... 6 Both Mohammad Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram's two successive leaders, and 80 percent of their followers, are, according to sources cited by Pieri and Zenn (2016), Kanuri. 7 The term "shatterzones" deliberately echoes Bartov and Weitz's (2013) historical anthology on the violent borderlands of Eastern Europe. ...
... It is possible to understand Boko Haram's affinity for borderlands in a number of different ways. A retreat to the borders when faced with state persecution certainly fits with overarching historical and religious narratives across the Islamic world, and in this case particularly with the hijra (emigration/flight into exile) of Usman dan Fodio, the Fulani cleric who became the inspirational founder of the Sokoto Caliphate at the beginning of the nineteenth century (van Beek 1988;Pieri and Zenn 2016;Fenwick 2013). Dan Fodio's conflict with Yunfa, the Sultan of the Hausa state of Gobir, his withdrawal into exile and his ultimate triumph in turn echo Muhammad's flight from Mecca to Medina in AD 622a powerful antecedent for Muslims, and one that in northern Nigeria was in the twentieth century sometimes conflated with dan Fodio's hijra (van Beek 1988, 173). ...
... The popular attraction of a history in which righteous Muslims retreat from the strongholds of a wicked and tyrannical ruler, to build their strength and ultimately return in triumph, is obvious. By March 2015, most of the territory of modern Borno State in Nigeria was under at least partial Boko Haram control, with the state capital at Maiduguri virtually surrounded and under regular attack (Pieri and Zenn 2016, fig. 1). ...
Boko Haram is a religiously motivated insurgency with a complex history in Nigeria and origins in urban Maiduguri. Through most of its existence Boko Haram has shown an affinity for border regions: the frontier zones between Nigeria and Niger, the Mandara Mountains on the border with Cameroon, and the shorelines and islands of Lake Chad. This paper argues that this is an historically mediated process. Boko Haram as a borderland phenomenon echoes the hijra of Usman dan Fodio, but also structured forms of violence and wealth creation that have historically united elites and their followers in the region. Moreover, there are continuities between the actions and actors associated with earlier phases of border violence and processes involving Boko Haram today. This suggests that Boko Haram will not be “defeated,” but rather that the region will see a reversion to forms of border violence that were prevalent as recently as the early 2000s.
... As put forward by Loimeier (2012), Adegbulu (2013), and Murtada (2013), Boko Haram emerged from the various social movements that existed in the northern part of Nigeria, including Mohammed Marwa's Maitatsine 6 movement of the 1980s to the Sahaba Muslim Youth Organization, Abubakah Lawan's Ahlulsunnawal Jama'ah, and the Yobe Taliban, which existed from the 1990s to the early 2000s (Aghedo 2014;Olojo 2015;Azumah 2015;Chiluwa 2015;Gray and Adeakin 2015;Voll 2015;Iyekekpolo 2016;Pieri and Zenn 2016;Amaechi 2017;Magrin and De Montclos 2018;Rasak 2018). These organizations later evolved to what is today known as Boko Haram. ...
... Studies by other scholars (Adegbulu 2013;Hill 2013;Zenn et al. 2013;Aghedo 2014;Olojo 2015;Chiluwa 2015;Gray and Adeakin 2015;Pham 2016;Pieri and Zenn 2016), focused on the negative misrepresentation of ideology and the weaponization of religion by terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram to recruit members. This could be seen through the negative teachings given by Mohammed Yusuf to his followers that Islam abhors 'Western civilization' and all its imprints (see Umar 2012, p. 144). ...
This article attempts to shed light on the challenges confronting relevant actors (state and non-state) in countering the threat of terrorism recruitment by focusing on the Boko Haram terrorist organization, whose presence and activities threaten the security of the Lake Chad region. The article uses a qualitative research technique combining key informant interviews with stakeholders familiar with the conflict, academic and non-academic documents, reports, and policy briefs. The findings of the article suggest that despite the various initiatives by stakeholders aimed at containing the strategies of recruitment, the group continues to expand its base by launching coordinated attacks that further destabilize the region. These challenges stem from a lack of a clear-cut counterterrorism strategy, a dearth in technological and mutual trust between actors and locals in the management and utilization of intelligence, and the inability of state institutions to ‘coerce and convince’ citizens in terms of its capacity to counter the danger of terrorism recruitment and expansion. The article, amongst other things, recommends a community policing model similar to the ‘Nyumba-Kumi security initiative’ adopted by most countries in East Africa for the effective assessment and detection of threat forces; the state and its agencies should show the capacity to coerce and convince in dealing with the (ideological, religious, social, and economic) conditions, drivers, and factors promoting the spread of terrorism as well as other forms of violent extremism in the society; furthermore, there is a need for stakeholders to adopt a comprehensive and holistic counterterrorism/violent extremism strategy to reflect present-day security challenges as well as to guarantee sustainable peace.
... Other ideological discourse motivating the jihadi campaign of Boko Haram is based on the dogmatic application of the doctrine of takfı̄r. As posited by Pieri and Zenn (2016), Boko Haram consider the concept of takfı̄r as a way of differentiating between true believers and those who in their view have accepted other social and religious practices in a manner that is inconsistent with the interpretation of Islam. By describing them as infidels, Boko Haram considers these people as legitimate targets of jihad. ...
... Additionally, Boko Haram leaders elicit support from individuals by consistently using religious rhetoric to justify the group's campaign of violence against the Nigerian State (Brigaglia, 2015). Such rhetoric has been designed to appeal to Muslims support and provide a narrative that generates fears amongst pious Muslims of the looming threat of Islam losing grounds to the forces of immorality (Pieri & Zenn, 2016). ...
There is a need to address current military strategies to defeat the resilience of the Boko Haram Terrorist (BHT) group. The purpose of this qualitative study was to provide a counter-ideology framework as an alternative strategy to defeat the group. The relational/vengeance and relative deprivation theories provided the theoretical foundation for the study, and the research question addressed the extent to which counter-ideology strategies can be instituted to defeat the BHT group. Data were collected through semi structured interviews from 20 participants who were Muslim clerics, community leaders, and military personnel, and data were analyzed using Nvivo software. The themes for the study were developed using a content analysis approach. The findings indicated that the resilience of Boko Haram was due to the group’s ability to maintain an ideological consistency with the extreme version of Jihadi-Salafism. Thus, there is a need to develop an effective reconciliatory national security strategy that is focused on counter-ideology policies to augment the ongoing military strategy. Given that counter-ideology offers a nonmilitary counterterrorism approach, it can deescalate the security situation in Northeast Nigeria, which can lead to socioeconomic benefits for the youth in Nigeria.
... As Heidenheimer (1970, p. 485) asked: BTo what extent does public knowledge of extensive corruption in the administration undermine the legitimacy of the regime?^In this research, Heidenheimer's question is explored in the case of modern-day themselves more poorly armed than their Boko Haram counterparts (Onuoh 2014). In parts of Borno State, Boko Haram moved from simple occupation of territory to the creation of a short lived BCaliphate^in which they attempted to institute Islamic forms of governance, completing for some time the delegitimization of the state in that its violence symbolized (Pieri and Zenn 2016). ...
... The organization is generally viewed under the larger rubric of Islamist religious extremism (Onuoha 2010;Cook 2011;Danjibo 2009) and may be considered the descendant of various, far smaller and less successful, radical Islamic movements that have operated in Northern Nigeria since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Falola 1998;Agbiboa 2013a, b). Boko Haram claims its roots in even earlier Jihadist movements going back to the Jihad of Dan Fodio, who established the Sokoto Caliphate in 1809 (Pieri and Zenn 2016). ...
There is an extensive literature on the ramifications of corruption for economic growth, as well as for democracy. Largely unexplored, however, is how corruption works to lessen government legitimacy and empower violent anti-state movements. In this article, the perception of corruption in Nigeria is considered. Noting that Nigeria must suppress the violent extremist group Boko Haram in order to continue to govern the nation, the connections between Nigerian perceptions of corruption and support for the movement are treated. Until this research, however, there existed no empirical evaluation of this relationship. Using analysis of a survey of over 10,000 Nigerians accomplished in 2012 and 2013, we show that issues of state illegitimacy and endemic corruption have contributed to Nigeria’s present security crisis by fomenting support for non-state violent actors.
... Their tasks basically were patrolling of streets, guarding of Churches (Gana, 2019). The news of this single act spread across communities and towns, and the state at large, and soon, civilians at the grassroots began to mobilise as counter forces against Boko Haram, using mostly sticks, cutlasses, daggers, bows and arrows as weapons (Pieri, 2016). This practice also spread to neighboring Yobe and Adamawa because of the moral philosophy and motivation of taking action to protect one's community against an aggressormostly considered the outsider. ...
Armed Violent Groups (AVGs) are becoming so pervasive across different African regions that it appears to erode the gains of democracy achieved in the continent. In this study, we have been able to strategically analyse local grassroots responses to emerging AVGs in Nigeria. The significant findings of this chapter are that one, the response of the state to these AVGs, using the NSS 2019 as a policy guide has not been effective because the criminal activities of these AVGs such as kidnapping, banditry, farmer-herder conflicts, and violent separatist agitations have been on the increase. Second, local communities in rural and urban settlements have become frustrated with the inability of the government to secure their lives and property, thus, leading to the proliferation of self-help groups to counter the criminal activities of AVGs within and outside their immediate communities.
... Boko Haram asymmetric warfare has been incubated, entrenched, and sustained by several factors, most of which are not peculiar to Northern Nigeria. Among others, poverty, inter-religious rivalries, and the perceived decline of the traditional Islamic system have been identified as the principal reasons why people, particularly the youths, join Boko Haram (Hinds, 2013;Pieri & Zenn, 2017). ...
While previous studies have interrogated the motivations of Boko Haram and the role of security agencies in counterinsurgency, explanations of the escalation of Boko Haram attacks on Nigerian security agencies have received limited academic attention. This study re-examines the dynamics of counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria within the context of the fragile state thesis. It argues that fragility of relevant state institutions has compromised the military-led counterinsurgency operations by flipping out strategic intelligence to the terrorists, embezzlement of arms procurement funds, sabotage and deplorable welfare condition of combatants, among others. Thus, the relevant state institutions should be strengthened to proactively respond to the maladies bedeviling the military-led counterinsurgency operations in the North-East region.
... However, more often than not, these hazardous consequences for the womenfolk are hardly seriously considered as weighty enough to warrant an outcry against the migration phenomenon. Their vulnerability opens them to sexual assault, exploitation, forced marriages and gang-rapes, forced labour and even used as suicide bombers among other anti-social behaviours (IOM -Nigeria, 2015; Pieri & Zenn, 2016;Weeraratne, 2017). These terrorists use of women as properties were borrowed from the patriarchal ideologies of African society, more especially of Islamic tenets which sees early and forced marriage as a common cultural practice to control female behavior (Adeyemo, 2013;Braimah, 2014;Oriola, 2016;Oriola & Akinola, 2018;Itebiye, 2016). ...
Forced migration is generally inimical to mankind but particularly hazardous to women. However, these hazardous acts which make women vulnerable are hardly considered as substantial enough to warrant an outcry against the migration phenomenon. Women face major challenges resulting from forced migrations, which expose them to violence, rape and other anti-social behaviours imposed on them by the circumstances. All these tend to have significant impacts on their social, economic, cultural and environmental development. This paper, therefore, uses Cole’s Embers to critically interrogate the issues of forced migration as a gendered problem. This work shall expose the claims that the problem of forced migration is an offshoot of the opportunistic post-colonial Nigerian rulers who have assisted to change the narratives of the family structure and peaceful order of society to a chaotic world. The paper focuses on the IDP Camps that are highly fuelled by corruption and the challenges for womanhood.
... These groups continue to use their platforms to push intensify the embers of violence and extremism to ensure their survival and sustainability (Pieri and Zenn 2018;Prud'homme 2019). To further justify the theory's claim and stance on radicalization, its proponents criticized other scholars and experts who claimed that the 9/11 terror attack in the United States of America served as a precursor to the various violent processes and actions that propelled individuals and groups towards radicalization and engagement in acts promoting terrorism in society (Silber et al. 2007;Borum 2011aBorum , 2011bNeumann and Kleinmann 2013;Pieri and Zenn 2016;McCauley and Moskalenko 2017;Coolsaet 2019;Dawson 2019). They have been criticized for being misinformed or under-informed regarding the operational and theoretical understanding of radicalization and acts of terrorism. ...
This article examines the role of faith-based organizations (FBOs) in counter-radicalization in Nigeria, with emphasis on the Boko Haram terrorist group operating in northeast Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region. A qualitative methodological approach is employed that makes use of primary and secondary documents, key informant and stakeholder interviews, and focus group discussions with critical religious actors and organizations. The findings of the article suggest that FBOs play a critical role in the disengagement and deradicalization process of countering the ideological and radical messages of Boko Haram. However, challenges such as the lack of effective stakeholder involvement in the various initiatives by the state in counterterrorism, fear of reprisal and attacks, lack of unison by various FBOs and clerics in countering these negative messages, and the inability of relevant stakeholders in addressing structural factors such as poverty, social and economic exclusion, and unemployment that give rise to radicalization amongst other challenges, have impeded the effectiveness of the FBO sector in its counter-radicalization efforts in Nigeria. To address these challenges, the article proposes a bottom-up approach to counterterrorism that provides room for the multi-sectoral involvement of major stakeholders, especially FBOs, to complement pre-existing initiatives and other measures to counter the negative weaponization of religion by radical and rogue clerics, and also to prevent Boko Haram from expanding its frontiers.
... 48 At the same time, Boko Haram's leaders and members are predominantly Kanuri operating in the areas of the former Kanem-Borno Empire. 49 Like Ansar Dine or Katibat Macina, Boko Haram and its splinter group the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are therefore in the paradoxical situation of relying on ethnicity for popular support while attempting to unify all Muslims beyond ethnic or national lines. ...
Contemporary conflict in North and West Africa is characterized by a high degree of social and political complexity. Hundreds of rebel groups and extremist organizations are involved in a shifting series of alliances and rivalries with regional governments and with each other. These changing relationships can be represented as a social network that provides both opportunities and constraints to violent organizations. To better address this complexity, this article models the temporal evolution of both opposition and cooperation networks using detailed information on nearly 40,000 events in North and West Africa from 1997–2020. Using a relational approach called Dynamic Social Network Analysis (DSNA), the article suggests that the increasing number of belligerents, increasing density of conflictual relationships, and polarization on powerful organizations capable of conducting extensive military operations make a peaceful resolution of the North and West African conflicts more elusive than ever.
... Boko Haram lures youths with free Islamic education, informal jobs, interest-free loans, employment schemes, wheelbarrow gifts, sewing machines, motorbikes (achaba), free wives, and a monthly salary (Abrak, 2016;Pieri & Zenn, 2016;Agbiboa, 2015, p. 8;Onuoha, 2014). ...
This paper is an examination of the membership recruitment strategies of two violent extremist organizations (VEOs), namely al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. The majority of the literature on VEOs concentrates on the conceptualization of terrorism, motivations for terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies, as well as a focus on the frequency of VEO attacks, number of fatalities and funding sources. The literature tends to portray poverty as the main driver of recruitment. The focus on recruitment strategies has been relatively recent. There is therefore still a lack of in-depth analyses on the processes of recruitment of specific extremist groups, and this impacts on the development of effective counter-insurgency policies and practices. We conclude that there is a need for more nuanced studies of recruitment practices, including radicalization strategies, of specific VEOs in Africa. This understanding of recruitment practices, particularly by VEOs such as Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, will enable more context specific counter-insurgency programmes that target the ability of these organizations to recruit and expand. There can be no one-size-fits-all approach to dealing with the challenge of violent extremism in Africa.
... In the wake of these events, terrorism and religious studies have sought to explain the group's use of violence and increased targeting of civilians. Some hold that Boko Haram created a hybrid takfiri ideology influenced by the Sokoto Caliphate (Pieri & Zenn, 2016), which could explain its use of violence as well as the split from the Shekau faction in 2012 to form Ansaru al-Musulmina fi Bilad al-Sudan ('Ansaru'). Rejection of man-made (as opposed to divine) laws could explain its ability to maintain international links (Kassim, 2015), a dimension which came under scrutiny when Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015. ...
The ways in which jihadist insurgents in the Sahel govern is rarely considered in the academic literature. They have often been portrayed as ‘Islamic terrorists’, who achieve their objectives by using brutal force against the civilian population and who finance their activities through criminal networks and activities. However, scattered empirical evidence reveals a different picture. Jihadist insurgents, like other insurgent groups, often use a
variety of strategies to rule territory and populations. The scale, character and form of how such groups govern differs not only between countries but also at the sub-national level within the same group. Nevertheless, until recently jihadist insurgent governance in Africa and particularly the Sahel region has largely been overlooked. This synthesis reviews the existing literature on jihadist governance in West Africa, with a particular emphasis on the understudied region of the Sahel. The review is organised as follows: first, we clarify key concepts and provide definitions. Second, we provide a brief overview of Islam and politics in the Sahel, contextualising the rise of Salafist-jihadism as well as historical cases of jihadist governance. Third, we provide a brief overview of the
literature and synthesise the existing research on jihadist insurgent governance in the Sahel. Fourth, we examine some key cases of jihadist governance in northern Mali, Nigeria and the Liptako-Gourma region straddling Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Finally, we conclude by summarising our findings, discussing the implications for the study of civil war and insurgency and consider avenues for future research.
... The killings and massacre from one ethnic group to the other since the end of the war are disturbing. Many of the killings and destructions from the Fulani herdsmen, the Boko Haram, the Maitasine uprisings etc, have ethnic undertone (Pieri & Zenn 2016). There are pieces of evidence of activities linked to ethnic militia that claim to protect the interest of their various ethnic groups against marginalization from the Nigerian State (Sandve, 2009). ...
... It first frames the rebels in relation to the hostile Takfiri stance against moderate Muslims who do not strictly adhere to the Islamic teachings, thus threatening the security of Muslim communities in general. Secondly, Takfiri ideology rejects all of the manifestations of Westernization, liberalism and the concept of democracy, considering them an indication of relegation to apostasy (Pieri and Zenn 2016). Accordingly, framing the rebels within Takfirism informs two semantic macrostructures: religious radicalism and anti-West (Figure 9). ...
This study explores the influence of a government’s ideology on linguistic representation in a news agency that characterizes itself as independent. It focuses on the coverage of the Syrian civil war as reported by the Iranian news agency Fars, addressing the discursive constructions of anti-government powers in relevant online reports released between 2013 and 2015. Since the Islamic Republic of Iran was a major regional ally of the Syrian government, we questioned the extent to which ideological independence could be expected during a politically critical time frame. Taking a corpus-based linguistic approach, the study explores the semantic macrostructures representing the opposition as well as the lexical clusters and keywords characterizing the news discourse. The findings indicate that Fars’ representation of the Syrian Revolution was, to some extent, biased, despite its claimed independence of the government’s political stance. It excluded the Sunni social actors, suppressed the Islamic faction identity of the rebels and depicted the uprising as a war against foreign-backed militants. The rebels were stereotyped in terms of terrorism and non-Syrians. In addition, the analysis reveals Fars’ tendency to emphasize the power of the government, depicting it as the defender of the Arab land and foregrounding the discourse of international conspiracy against Syria. The results of this work project the dimension of media bias caused by the underpinning political perspective of media institutions.
... Perhaps, such weapons have made it easy for the group to carry out surprise attacks like suicide bombings, jail breaks among others against targets ranging from government institutions, political figures, unaffiliated mosque, churches, banks, prisons, schools, media houses, security formations, recreational centres, to international institutions within its reach (LeVan, 2013;Osumah, 2013). The group was also known to have temporarily captured and controlled a land mass of about 20,000 square miles in the Northeast region of Nigeria which it declared a Caliphate in August 2014 but failed to govern justly (Campbell, 2014;Blair, 2015;Pieri & Zenn, 2017). ...
Contrary to studies that highlight the lethality or morality of terrorism, this paper makes the case that there is need to interrogate acts of terrorism from a political economic point of view. It was argued that this excessive focus on the violence neglected an economic understanding of modern terrorism from various groups across the globe. This paper thus situated the incidence of the Boko Haram and the Islamic State terrorist groups on a political economic framework. The study showed that terrorism was not a 'stupid thing'. The study further revealed that both terrorist groups and their sponsors were not psychopaths but rational beings who derived huge economic benefits from their violent acts. The paper concludes by arguing that until the economic reward on terrorism evaporates, such acts may never cease to occur in the regions and beyond.
... Boko Haram lures youths with free Islamic education, informal jobs, interest-free loans, employment schemes, wheelbarrow gifts, sewing machines, motorbikes (achaba), free wives, and a monthly salary (Abrak, 2016;Pieri & Zenn, 2016;Agbiboa, 2015, p. 8;Onuoha, 2014). ...
... It led to the appointment of a close friend and financier of Yusuf, Alhaji Buji Foi, as a commissioner in the state cabinet. Additionally, the group received permission to build their mosque close to a train station and was granted a license for a microfinance scheme, which, according to Pieri and Zenn (2016), was an attraction for the urban poor (71). While Sheriff's use of a religious cleric to gain political advantage says much about the nature of his politics, Yusuf's strategic utilization of this relationship to meet the economic needs of his congregation and would-be followers indicates his approach to Jihad. ...
This article explores the relevance of the dominant, population-centered, counterinsurgency doctrine in an era dominated by Salafi-inspired state challengers. Building on Weinstein's (2007) argument, I argue that an insurgent group's emergent nature, shaped by its origin, affects how it will operate and the kind of strategy most likely to defeat it. I investigate the plausibility of my claims through an examination of Boko Haram. I demonstrate the disconnect between Boko Haram's Salafi ideology and its objective of establishing a caliphate, on the one hand, and the strategy of dialogue and socioeconomic reforms to end the insurgency, on the other. In light of this disjuncture, I argue that the key to Boko Haram's defeat lies in the mobilization of international military and intelligence resources to strengthen the Nigerian government's enemy-centered counterinsurgency operation against the group.
... Several studies have ascribed various causes to the emergence of the sect, its metamorphosis from a recluse religious sect to a full blown terrorist organisation. These include: extremist religious ideology (Thurston, 2016); ethnic discrimination (Pieri & Zenn, 2016); poor economic conditions, reflected in poverty, unemployment, etc. (Harnischfeger, 2014); bad governance, particularly corruption and mismanagement (Egiegba Agbiboa, 2013); limited political participation (Mohammed, 2014); and revolt against the ruling elite (Onuhoa, 2014). ...
This paper explores the connection between socioeconomic development and insecurity in Nigeria. Of particular significance to this paper is the link between economic decline (characterized by high rates of unemployment, low wages and income, corruption and injustice) and the proliferation of conflict particularly in the northeast. The data presented in this study show a relationship between insecurity challenges in the northeast and rates of poverty and unemployment in the zone. Furthermore, the study shows that despite increased spending by the government, the number of attacks and resulting casualties continued to rise between 2009 and 2017. In the final analysis, it is here argued that for proposed long term solutions to the insecurity situation in Nigeria to be effective, they must be predicated on the rule of law, protective of personal and political freedoms and equality, accountable and transparent and more importantly, in service of the common good.
... Boko Haram 1 emerged around 2002 in Maiduguri, in Nigeria's northeastern state of Borno. Muhammad Yusuf formed the group out of dissatisfaction with more mainstream Salafist movements in the region ( Pieri & Zenn, 2016;"The black," 2015). Boko Haram's formation came at an opportune time, as the seeds of discontent had already been sown in Nigeria's Muslim-dominated northern states, where violent Islamists had previously staged a failed uprising. ...
This article examines efforts to counter Boko Haram’s campaign of terrorism in Northern Nigeria from a deterrence–backlash perspective. Drawing from previous research, the authors develop hypothetical expectations for deterrence and backlash effects when counterterrorism policies are conducted at governmental and community levels. Using parametric survival analysis, the authors conclude that government policies designed to curb Boko Haram attacks resulted in backlash. Conversely, community-based efforts resulted in deterrence.
... This invariably created avenue for this article to avoid a vacuum in the knowledge industry concerning insurgency-external relations nexus as relating to Nigeria. In the second place, while some scholars (Azumah 2015;Khan and Cheri 2016;Olaniyan andAsuelime 2014, Pieri andZenn 2016;Suleiman and Karim 2015) have examined and attributed an array of religious, political, and economic mainsprings as remote and immediate causes of the insurgency, others (Asuelime and David 2015) have concentrated on how such political and religious violence could be resolved. However, analysts have paid little or no attention to the critical analysis of the internal dynamics and propelling factors precipitating close engagement and concerted actions between Nigeria and contiguous states in the twenty-first century under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). ...
Terrorist acts metamorphosed into an insurgency in Nigeria when the Boko Haram terrorist group ferociously challenged the territorial integrity of Nigeria and proclaimed authority over 14 local governments. Consequently, Nigeria orchestrates counterinsurgency strategy that incorporates her contiguous neighbors. It is against this background that this article interrogates the rise of insurgency in Nigeria and its influence on Nigeria’s relations with her immediate neighbors. The article argues that the insurgent uprising reinvigorates rapprochement between Nigeria and the nearby states. It concludes that cooperation in this context for national security is inexorable for mutual survival.
This study provides exploratory research with forced recruits into Boko Haram, focusing on how they entered the organization, the conditions they experienced in camps and settlements, their exits from the group, their subsequent experiences in state hands, and their perspectives about future reintegration. These themes are particularly pertinent at the time of writing (spring 2022) given the mass disengagements currently being experienced by Boko Haram, and the extent to which federal and state systems lack the capacity to absorb and handle the large numbers involved. Our research was undertaken at Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC), which was established in 2016 by the Nigerian state to provide an off-ramp for members of Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) deemed to be 'low risk' by military intelligence. We conducted thirteen in-depth interviews with OPSC 'clients' (as they are referred to by the program) who were purposively selected to achieve variance in their former roles in Boko Haram.
We study the effects of terrorism on political trust and national versus ethnic identification. Making use of unexpected attacks by the extremist group Boko Haram in Nigeria, which occurred during the fieldwork of a public opinion survey in 2014, we show that even in a context of weak state institutions and frequent terrorist activities, terror attacks significantly increase political trust. We also find that the attacks significantly reduced the salience of respondents' national identity, instead increasing ethnic identification. These findings run counter to arguments that “rally around the flag” effects following terror attacks result from increased patriotism. The results have important implications for understanding the effects of terrorism in contexts of weak state institutions, frequent political violence, and politically salient ethnic divisions.
The aim of terrorism all over the world is to have fear rule over people’s lives. The consequences of terrorist attacks, however, are substantially different across contexts. In this paper we study the association between exposure to Boko Haram’s attacks and households’ fertility choices in Nigeria. We hypothesise that households exposed to terrorism increase their number of children as a way to insure against future unexpected shocks. We test this hypothesis using geolocalised panel data linked to information on terrorist attacks that occurred in the region. Consistent with our hypothesis, terrorism is found to increase fertility (proxied by the number of surviving children per household): a one standard deviation increase in the number of fatalities increases the probability that a household hit by terrorism has a newborn by $1\%$. This association is robust to the use of difference-in-differences and instrumental variables models—and therefore can be given a causal interpretation.
RÉSUMÉ
Au Cameroun, les victimes de la violence de Boko Haram au Nigeria et celles de la crise centrafricaine tombent sous le coup de stigmatisations plus ou moins justifiées de la part des populations d’accueil et du gouvernement, au grand mépris des textes internationaux qui organisent la protection et l’assistance à apporter aux personnes en détresse. La manne humanitaire, prévue pour venir en aide aux victimes, démobilise les bénéficiaires, frustre les populations hôtes et exacerbe les antagonismes entre les migrants forcés et les populations d’accueil qui revendiquent un droit d’accès aux dividendes nés de la crise. La crise migratoire n’affecte pas seulement les déplacés et les réfugiés, elle met en déséquilibre la société entière. Cela crée un climat d’opportunisme qui se traduit par une ruée vers les camps. Le fait de mettre exclusivement le primat sur la situation des migrants en ignorant celle des populations hôtes offre une vue incomplète de la réalité. Prévus pour l’accueil de cette catégorie sociale démunie, les camps sont massivement désertés. Les victimes sont plus nombreuses à s’établir en dehors des camps où elles peuvent se mouvoir à volonté et se prendre en charge. Le confinement imposé aux réfugiés Mbororo en est une illustration et appelle à d’autres méthodes tenant compte des spécificités locales.
Since 2013, the northern region of Nigeria has witnessed the unprecedented mobilization of militia group Civilian Joint Task Force to aid combating the Islamic fundamentalist Boko Haram. The participation of the militia was reportedly successful in routing the insurgent. Before the CJTF, Boko Haram defied most of the counterinsurgency measures of the government including the military and the political approaches. However, despite the successes of the CJTF, the strategy that influences the successes was not adequately known. This article, therefore, investigated the strategy of the CJTF that influences its successes. The study was conducted using a qualitative method designed in a case study. Data were collected from thirteen informants through in-depth interviews supported by non-participant observation. The finding shows that CJTF is a kind of informal self-defense group that emerged in response to the inadequate protections by the State. The combating successes of the group were influenced by the information-centric approach of its campaign. Careful intelligence gathering and procession along with the sociocultural linkage of the participants and in-depth knowledge over the physical terrain emerged influential to the groups’ combating. The article recommended that the Nigerian government should re-strategize its existing conventional counterinsurgency approach to adapt to the population-centric paradigm. The government should also adopt palliative measures of promoting sustainable counter-insurgency that should focus on inclusive governance, accountability, and addressing socio-economic issues of poverty and unemployment with all levels of seriousness rather than sticking to the security-only campaign.
In this paper, we use an evolutionary game theoretic approach to model how two populations, a neopatrimonial rebel population, and a neopatrimonial state elite population might contextually adapt their conflict strategies. This approach explicitly assumes that individuals are not hyper-rational utility maximizers. We model rebels as a population with two possible conflict strategies-controlling and redistributing direct rents or controlling the state to extract and redistribute rents. State elite populations too can respond aggressively or try to come to an arrangement with rebels. We show how contextual parameters like the initial distribution of strategies in the population, the availability of direct rents, the ability of the state to extract rents and the extent to which a bargained rent share influence how agents adapt their conflict strategies. We then illustrate these processes using the two Nigerian conflicts, in the delta and with Boko Haram. Our model suggests that the availability of rents is a critical determinant in how civil conflict can change. Moreover, the availability of rents can explain how the nature of conflict can diverge within the same country; making country-level analyses of the causes of civil conflict problematic.
This article explores the rise of and the response to violent extremism, as well as the state of affairs regarding ‘soft’ approaches to counter-terrorism in Sudan. Using unique primary data, I argued that the growth of violent extremism in Sudan is far from being solely an extension of the global jihad movements; rather, it is a manifestation of domestic political and historical dynamics.
As more data emerges on the Boko Haram phenomenon, the controversy over the roots of the insurgency persists. While some emphasise transnational motivational factors based on the Salafist ideology, others focus on diverse local structural factors, including the economy, religion, and politics. Although this article acknowledges the importance of these factors, it argues that these are ubiquitous contextual factors which insufficiently explain the location and timing of the insurgency. By introducing the Political Relevance Model, this article theorises the insurgency onset by focusing on the agency of the local political elites and their relationship with the sect. It finds that the insurgency is rooted in an initial mutually beneficial relationship between the local political elites and a politically relevant group that turned sour, resulting in the attempt by the elites to withdraw the group’s earlier privileges using state coercion which the group frames as state repression requiring violent resistance. These agents have, in their interest, framed this struggle to resonate with the people.
The debate concerning the Nigerian terrorist Boko Haram is typically simplified across two false dichotomies. First, it is treated as either a local conflict in northeast Nigeria with its epicentre in Borno State or part of a broader conflict in Northwest Africa (and beyond), encompassing northern Cameroon, southern Chad, Niger, and reaching into Libya and Mali. The second dichotomy concerns whether it is animated by local material conditions on the ground, or is part of a broader anti-West jihad. The Boko Haram insurgency is not that simple. It is, rather, a multidimensional conflict and can change overtime.
The chapter explores the extent to which the Boko Haram insurgence can be seen as having ethnic undertones. This is especially imperative against the realization that a long history of centrifugalism has made social conflicts embodiments of ethnicity in Nigeria. It argues that while the Kanuri ethnic group is well-represented in the leadership hierarchy of Boko Haram, the sect also comprises members of the majority Hausa-Fulani group and other minorities in the Northeast. However, the Kanuri factor is seen as largely valuable in the negotiation of the socio-cultural environment by Boko Haram, its evasion of security agencies and even recent forays into neighbouring nations. The chapter also argues that while initially the violence of the group suggested targeting of ethnic groups from the South of Nigeria, events since 2012 have nullified this and shown that Boko Haram is more religiously driven and focused than ethnically motivated.
One of the consistent and primary goals of Boko Haram is the enthronement of a total Islamic state in Nigeria. This goal contradicts the constitutional secularity of the Nigerian state. Thus, the Boko Haram insurgence is an affront to Nigeria’s secularity and raises questions about the sustenance of secularism in Nigeria. There is a constitutional ambivalence in which while propping up a secular system, the same constitution endorses public institutions and practices which are religious and nullifies the secularity of the state. Therefore, the chinks in the secular armour of the Nigerian state are exploited by Islamic fundamentalist groups like Boko Haram which promote ideologies radically antithetical to secularity. Undoubtedly, the complicity of the state in anti-secular practices makes it impossible to reinforce secularity. As a result, secularity becomes imagined by groups in the nation as simply token and mere symbolic appeasement of some other groups in the federation.
The article examines the place of African countries in the US counter-terrorism strategy under the administrations of G.W. Bush and B. Obama. It is alleged that at the turn of the 2010-s the significance of this trend has increased due to the intensification of Islamists in the countries of West Africa and the new round of the civil war in Somalia. This led to an intensification of the military presence and tightened cooperation with the allies, on which the Americans also sought to entrust the main struggle against the radicals. There are several directions of counterterrorism policy: the provision of technical assistance to partner countries for the development of special forces; the building of subregional mechanisms for coordinating counter-terrorism actions; intensification of cooperation in the financial sphere; carrying out separate military operations, mainly by UAV forces. In the end, itwas the African direction that turned out to be the most successful example of Obama’s “leading from the behind” strategy. Despite the fact that under the influence of the Arab Spring and the rise of the ISIS in the Middle East in 2011-2014, there was an escalation of violence in the region, in general, the main goals of combating Islamist terrorism by the end of 2016 were achieved by the USA. In Somalia, Nigeria and Libya, Americans relied on the local forces concerned, restricting participation by coordinating allies, providing intelligence and striking individual blows. The French intervention in Mali in 2013 enabled the Europeans to shift the main burden of fighting local Islamists. In addition, Egypt, receiving abundant military assistance from the United States, did not allow the expansion of the ISIS’s zone of operations in the Sinai Peninsula, but it was not possible to fully cope with the small local branch due to the instability of relations with local tribes that remain outside the control of the central government.
Boko Haram's operations and ideology have been the subject of increasing research in recent years. This article, in contrast, explores the culture of Boko Haram through an ethnographic analysis of the group's internal videos that were not intended for public release. The authors find that in their everyday lives Boko Haram foot soldiers are different from the image the group presents to the world in propaganda videos. While unmistakably a violent movement, in territories under the group's control that it attempted to administer, foot soldiers participated in conflict resolution with elders, explained the group's position on external alliances to villagers, engaged in recreation to pass time off the battlefield and created bonds of solidarity with other members of the group. Using insights from anthropology and the examination of ‘Jihadi Culture’, this article's insights help us understand how and why Boko Haram foot soldiers fight beyond the group's public ideology or stated goals: for many of them, it is simply a lifestyle.
Entre 1990 et 2010 et jusqu’à la chute de Kadhafi en 2011, l’ethnicité a été la principale source de mobilisation politique pour les mouvements rebelles, notamment Touaregs (Le Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), le Mouvement Nigérien pour la Justice (MNJ), le Front des Forces de Redressement (FFR), etc.), auxquels les démocraties naissantes au Niger et au Mali se sont trouvé confrontées. Toutefois, à partir de 2011 et de façon encore plus prononcée à partir de 2014, les organisations identitaires qui opèrent dans la bande du Sahel (Al-Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI), Ansar Dine, le Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO), etc.) semblent avoir choisi d’accorder plus d’importance aux normes et aux valeurs religieuses comme instruments de mobilisation politique. Ce changement, même s’il concerne en grande partie de nouvelles organisations, (les organisations qui sont nées après 2011), témoigne d’un certain déclin du rôle de l’ethnicité et de celui, croissant, de la religion dans les formes de luttes politiques violentes auxquelles certains entrepreneurs identitaires ont recours. Ce changement amène aussi à s’interroger sur les nombreuses implications qui en découlent, notamment sur le poids relatif de ces identités collectives dans un contexte de globalisation, les nouvelles formes de conflits qu’il nourrit, les relations transethniques qu’il instaure entre membres d’organisations et réseaux identitaires ou terroristes, et plus fondamentalement encore, sur la façon dont tels ou tels clivages culturels ou sociaux, dans les sociétés ethniquement divisées, deviennent ou sont perçus comme plus efficients comme instruments de mobilisation politique.
What is the cause of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria? Studies on Boko Haram insurgency onset has largely emphasized economic poverty, religious ideology, and the historical north-south identity fractionalization. Some others which focus on Nigerian politics as the cause of the insurgency have largely analyzed how corrupt politicians have caused economic poverty and inequality which have resulted in grievances in northern Nigeria. While these studies have made invaluable contributions to the literature, this study begs to deviate from their emphasis by showing how political elites have mobilized and given political relevance to the Boko Haram group. This study specifically investigates the cause of the insurgency by adopting the state-centered approach which argues that insurgencies are caused by structural vulnerabilities in certain kind of states. In doing this, this study advances the following four propositions. Firstly, when factions of political elites compete for political power at the national level on identity basis, identity groups emerge at the subnational level in defense of these identities. Secondly, identity groups gain political relevance when factions of the political elites ascribe such relevance to them in the process of competing for political power. Thirdly, when a fundamentalist identity group becomes political relevant, it makes fundamental demands which spark antagonism between it and the political elites. Finally, insurgencies based on fundamentalist identity claims go unchecked in a partial democracy with political elites factionalized along identity lines.
Groups, movements and political parties that directly invoke Islam as their raison d’être constitute key players in the Sahel. Analysts rightfully take this Islamic dimension quite seriously as they try to understand the dynamics of security in the region. In doing so, however, it is important not to forget other forms of solidarity which intersect with Islam. Ethnicity and social status (‘caste’) are categories that impact in various ways the mobilisation efforts made on behalf of Islam. Drawing examples from Mali, Senegal, Mauritania and Nigeria, this paper presents three configurations in which these identities intersect: representations of untrustworthy ‘ethnic others’; the ethnicization of Islam; and intra-ethnic debates.
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