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... 36 The virus, that causes polio has been built from scratch in the US conventional lab, using nothing more than genetic sequence information from public databases and readily available technology. 37,38 Another example, -a scientist funded by the US government has deliberately created an extremely deadly form of mousepox, a relative of the smallpox virus, through genetic engineering. 39 . ...
Pandemics as ‘Weapons of Mass-Manipulation’
Highly infectious disease outbreaks are some of the natural threats that the world faces. Much more recently, there has been an increased awareness of the potential for deliberate acts, which may lead to public emergencies, - such as chemical and biological contamination of vulnerably civilian targets, or emergencies like threats of a terrorist attack.
Accidental threats of highly pathogenic or novel micro-organisms are no less dangerous than the acts of bioterrorism attacks. These ‘accidental threats’ can cause disease outbreaks of zoonotic kind – in humans.
During the past 20 years, a new form of mass global control has started to emerge. It is based on how high/serious is the threshold of the impending pandemic and the fear of people of the new and “strange” diseases; we have actually already witnessed such diseases – for example, the bird flu of 1997, SARS outbreak in 2003, H1N1 influenza of 2009 and other related and recent ones (e.g. COVID-19). These kinds of threats create panic, fear, and can very substantially influence the economy of countries/geographic regions of the world.
It is a very possible reality that threats of impending epidemics can be deliberately used as a new source of mass control over population, and influence over the economics of targeted countries. I have named this new and a very rapid operational global influence as – ‘weapon of mass influence’ or ‘weapon of mass manipulation’ – in other words, let’s call it ‘information-bioterrorism’.
I analyze the mechanics and methods of such influence, note its’ similarity with methods used by secret services (e.g. through so-called 'active measures'). I also describe that this new type of influence over people can potentially be implemented by organizations which have their own interests in using this type of a ‘weapon’, and also I have put together various scenarios of future activities of ‘information-bioterrorism’.
... Thus, in 1970, the US Defense Science Board Task Force report on secrecy concluded that ''more might be gained than lost if our nation were to adopt-unilaterally, if necessary-a policy of complete openness in all areas of information''. A similar sentiment was expressed in 1982 by a US National Academy of Sciences panel, which claimed that ''security by accomplishment'' promises more than security through controls on information (Cohen 2003). Later in 1985, President Reagan signed the NSDD 189 in order to assure that the products of important research are to remain unrestricted to the maximum extent possible (Wilson 1986). ...
The rapid advance of life science within the context of increased international concern over the potential misuse of findings has resulted in the lack of agreement on the issues of responsibility, control and collaboration. This progress of knowledge outpaces the efforts of creating moral and legal guidelines for the detection and minimization of the risks in the research process. There is a need to identify and address normative aspects of dual-use research. This paper focuses on the issues of safety and global collaboration in life science research by highlighting the importance of openness, enabling policies and cooperative governance. These safeguards are believed to reduce the risks related to the misuse of science while enabling the important research to move forward. The paper addresses the need for a better definition of dual use concept and, based on the historical precedents, explores the moral concerns and governmental strategies of dual-use research. The three necessary moves in addressing the issue of security in life sciences are suggested: the move from constraining to enabling types of policies, the move from secrecy to openness, and the move from segregation to integration of the public voice.
... And we can see in the warnings of Dean (2002) and Hotz (2002), and the observations by Tickner & Wright (2003) that the conditions noted by Habermas have become much intensified. The secretive corporate grip on current and proposed science grows ever tighter through patenting, while military/science cooperation at all levels is now hidden behind a shroud of "antiterrorist" legislation (Orr 2004, Glanz 2004 in which many scientists are willing collaborators, even to the extent of having their research outcomes hidden from each other (Cohen 2003). ...
Journalism has a vital and urgent role to play in societies that are increasingly the paymasters for and the recipients of scientific and technological development in which they have little or no say. What amounts to the gagging and blindfolding of citizens in the science-policy debate is in contrast to the rapidly growing demands for increased democratisation throughout the world, which, as an important part of the agenda, have included demands for democratisation of science and the scientific informing of democracy. Whether they are being immediately heeded or encouraged, citizens continue to pressure governments and the science establishment for greater transparency in science policy and development, along with a greater share of the discussion about the application of such policy and development. This paper will seek to show that most areas of the 'public sphere' appear no longer capable of facilitating this broad social movement. However, new public demand, and the facilities of new technology indicate that journalism, which has thus far failed to demonstrate any great interest or ability in resolving science issues in the public sphere, can be seen as positioned to take on this function - even if by default - in the 21st century.
zf. Man nennt unser heutiges Zeitalter das Informationszeitalter, IT/Informationstechnologien sind Dauerthema und Selbstverständlichkeit im modernen Alltag, und falsche Informationen – Fake news – neuerdings grosses Thema in den Medien. Letztere sind natürlich keine Erfindung der Gegenwart, vielmehr sind sie bekannte Elemente von Machtpolitik und Kriegsführung. Propaganda und Lüge sind keine Neuheiten unter der Sonne, mit Internet und Computer haben sich allerdings Möglichkeiten, Ausmass und Tempo der Verbreitung massiv erhöht. Vor diesem Hintergrund stehen auch die Ausführungen des in Neuseeland lebenden Biowaffen-Experten Alexander Kouzminov zum Thema Informations-Bioterrorismus.
This paper makes a preliminary exploration of new opportunities for journalists and media to establish relevance and audiences through engagement with science issues. It looks at developments in the “democratisation” of science and, in the light of an analysis of a recent Eurobarometer survey, attempts to discover how a largely untapped active audience for the media may be attracted.
Since 11 September 2001 and the anthrax attacks that followed in the US, public and policy concerns about the security threats posed by biological weapons have increased significantly. With this has come an expansion of those activities in civil society deemed as potential sites for applying security controls. This paper examines the assumptions and implications of national and international efforts in one such area: how a balance or integration can take place between security and openness in civilian biomedical research through devising professional codes of conduct for scientists. Future attempts to establish such codes must find a way of reconciling or at least addressing dilemmatic and tension-ridden issues about the appropriateness of research; a topic that raises fundamental questions about the position of science within society.
The dual-use dilemma arises in the context of research in the biological and other sciences as a consequence of the fact that one and the same piece of scientific research sometimes has the potential to be used for bad as well as good purposes. It is an ethical dilemma since it is about promoting good in the context of the potential for also causing harm, e.g., the promotion of health in the context of providing the wherewithal for the killing of innocents. It is an ethical dilemma for the researcher because of the potential actions of others, e.g., malevolent non-researchers who might steal dangerous biological agents, or make use of the original researcher's work. And it is a dilemma for governments concerned with the security of their citizens, as well as their health. In this article we construct a taxonomy of types of "experiments of concern" in the biological sciences, and thereby map the terrain of ethical risk. We then provide a series of analyses of the ethical problems and considerations at issue in the dual-use dilemma, including the impermissibility of certain kinds of research and possible restrictions on dissemination of research results given the risks to health and security. Finally, we explore the main available institutional responses to some of the specific ethical problems posed by the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences.
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