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Economic Relations Between Myanmar and China
Abstract
As the relationship between China and Myanmar become closer under the military regime, Myanmar deepened its economic dependence on China. Although economic ties with China contributed to the stability of Myanmar, but made little contribution to Myanmar’s broad-based growth and industrial development and even resulted in hindering the country’s reforms and in causing anti-Chinese sentiment. After 2011, its rapidly improving relations with the international community enabled Myanmar to broaden and to restore balance in its external economic relations. Myanmar’s economic dependence on China is likely to be mitigated; however, the bilateral economic relations will continue to have a strategic impact.
... Since Myanmar's citizens did not support their military government, the afore-mentioned situations generated anti-Chinese sentiments. 37 On the whole, an imbalance between the top-level expectations with regard to prospects for Myanmar's cooperation with China, and grassroot sentiments focusing upon day-to-day aftereffects of this cooperation, was noticeable. This factor threatened to undermine Myanmar-China dialogue making it vulnerable and prone to setbacks. ...
The article gives a critical insight into Myanmar’s relations with China between 2000 and 2010. Starting from an analysis of the political vector of these relations, the article explores the specificity of economic coopera-tion, including China’s investment in Myanmar’s infrastructure projects to finally turn to the grass-root perception of China’s policy in Myanmar. In the author’s opinion, China’s influence in Myanmar should not be overestimated owing to a gap between official declarations of the Tatmadaw regime and the grassroot-level Sinophobia premised upon perceptions that Chinese business practices were inefficient, corrupted, and were implemented without due regard to the interests of local citizens.
... Atsuko Mizumo stated that "Myanmar economy gradually deepened its dependence on China". 45 As a side effect of sanctions, Myanmar's exports gradually dropped in Sino-Myanmar trade in 1997 and 1998 with 73.41 million USD and 62.04 million USD respectively. 46 For the fiscal year of 1998, the bilateral trade reached the total value of 642 million USD, with China receiving a trade surplus of 452.82 million USD. 47 On the other hand, the Myanmar-China Chamber of Commerce (MCCOC) re-energized its activity and embarked on a range of business and economic exchanges with China. ...
The article gives insights in relations between Myanmar and China after Myanmar’s generals seized power through a coup d'état in September 1988. As a result of repressions and the failed power transition to the opposition in 1990, the US and Europe imposed harsh economic sanctions on Myanmar’s military government. This forced the Yangon to establish closer political and economic ties with Beijing. The author outlines the specificity of cooperation between Myanmar and China along the political-military, the economic and the social tracks with the focus upon discrepancies between the official and the grass-root levels. In the author’s opinion, the growing imbalance between these dimensions accounted for the key vulnerability factor in the dialogue between the two countries.
... Han 2017E. Han , 2018Mizuno 2016;Steinberg 1990). For that reason, some Indian analysts such as, Rana (2020), Blah (2018) and Jacob (2017), are apprehensive of the expanding role undertaken by China via BRI. ...
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the nature of border trade between India and Myanmar. India is an emerging power with fast economic growth, geographic size, natural resources, and dynamic population. It has adopted a new foreign policy and economic orientation towards its South East Asian bordering neighbors including Myanmar. China, however, initiated a global strategy-the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. This study looks into the geopolitics of the Sino-Indian rivalry in the context of the global power configurations and inter-state economic relations. To this end, the methodology of a case study for Moreh-Tamu border trade along the Indo-Myanmar cross-border region has been applied in this paper. The findings reveal growing trade relations and bilateral economic engagements of both India and Myanmar. India’s Northeastern border issues, ASEAN connectivity, the BCIM economic corridor of the BRI, India’s neighborhood policy, as well as the geo-political dynamics, among other factors, are the principal factors affecting India-Myanmar border trade. The problems of the Sino-Indian rivalry, weak borderlands infrastructures and ethnic insurgencies have emerged as the major obstacles to border trade along the Moreh-Tamu border region. This study concludes that India and Myanmar are increasingly engaged in cross-border trade and economic cooperation.
... Sometimes, local people come to the streets, and involve themselves in protesting against these Chinese projects. As a result, President Thein Sein declared that, the Myitsone project would be closed on September 29, 2011 (Mizuno, 2016). ...
Myanmar's geopolitical and geostrategic position is very important for China and India, the two regional powers in East Asia and South Asia. Myanmar is the main connecting hub for South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia, and it is also connected with the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. Myanmar is connected with the two corridors of China's ambitious projects, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM). Chinese ships have to navigate at the Malacca Strait, especially in the case of fuel oil imports and exports to global markets, which are, both times consuming and 322 strategically risky. But, using the Rakhine state's Kyaukpyu port will reduce China's dependence on the Malacca Strait and expand trade. Due to the US presence in the Indian Ocean, the recent Sino-Indian conflict, and Myanmar's geostrategic position, Sino-Myanmar relations are now one of the topics of study. This article will analyze the geostrategic and economic issues of Sino-Myanmar relations. The study has found that both China and Myanmar have greatly been benefitted through the establishment of strong bilateral relationship based on trade and investment, connectivity, constructions of ports and special economic zones. The main objective of this study is to find a diplomatic way to improve the Bangladesh-Myanmar relations based on the results of the strong relationship of China and Myanmar. This study is a major contribution to the field of China-Myanmar bilateral relations in the context of some geostrategic and geo-economic issues. The study has been carried out based on secondary data with some primary data of border survey and focus group discussions. At the conclusion of this study, there has been provided with some policy recommendations to improve the geostrategic and economic relations between the two neighboring countries.
... Since economic cooperation played a crucial role in the country's economic growth, Myanmar's economic dependency on China has become deeper and deeper. China was Myanmar's largest trading partner and biggest foreign investor between 1992 and 2011 ( Mizuno, 2016). The bilateral trade between the two countries has increased gradually starting in 2000 and China became the largest trading partner for Myanmar in 2011. ...
Myanmar and China have been in bilateral relationship since ancient times. After the
British Empire ended his colonial claim on former Burma and the new proclaimed
neighbour’s Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has been established, the relationship
underwent up- and downs during the last decades. Since the official start of the Chinese
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 to strengthen China’s economic market with the
world by creating hard and soft infrastructure as well as intercultural relationships,
Myanmar increased his relationship and dependence on China’s policy by every year.
Therefore, China is supporting strategically placed developing countries with massive
financial Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and development projects. One of the major
project strategies is, to enhance and invest for transport ways like oil- and gas pipelines,
railroads and highways, which in debt these countries enormously and brings long-term
concessions on economically trade areas and products. By bonding these indebted vassal
states to China by concessions and debt-trap policy, Chinese BRI policy can be seen as a
modern way of neo-colonialism. This paper will highlight China’s influence in
Myanmar’s economic, social and political spheres under neo-colonialist implications and,
it effects on Myanmar’s society. Furthermore, historical relationship between Myanmar
and China will underline the intercultural dependence and sovereignty of Myanmar.
Since the late 1980s, generations of Myanmar jewellers have settled down in the Chinese border cities next to northern Myanmar. Currently, most of them are based in Dehong Prefecture, a border prefecture in southwestern China’s Yunnan Province. In the past few years, they have faced increasingly precarious economic and social conditions due to China’s anti-corruption campaign, the Belt and Road Initiative and the rise of live-streaming trade in the transnational jewellery business. Our study focuses on the Myanmar jewellers’ economic and social predicaments in the live-streaming era of the late 2010s. Applying the theory of urban scalar reconfiguration, this study argues that the economic and social marginalisation facing the Myanmar jewellers is produced by the prefecture’s urban scalar reconfiguration and the corresponding division of labour. It contends that the prefecture’s urban scalar reconfiguration redraws the boundary of inclusion and exclusion in the border urban space and reshapes the urban socioeconomic hierarchies in which the Myanmar immigrants are situated. The article provides an alternative approach to understanding the changes in transnational immigration in urban contexts. Ultimately, it presents an empirical case study of the much-neglected immigrant population in the China-Myanmar borderlands.
In recent years, many observers perceive ascendant Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Existing research attributes China’s recent advances in the region to Beijing’s successful implementation of a dual strategy of coercion and inducement or Washington’s lack of commitments to the region. In a departure from the literature, this article emphasizes the agency of Southeast Asian states. It argues that great power competition empowers the secondary states by reducing their vulnerability, increasing available resources, and lending credibility to their threat of exists. As a result, domestic agenda plays a predominant role in determining a secondary state’s foreign policy orientation. To illustrate this proposition, the changing dynamics of China’s relations with Myanmar and the Philippines are examined closely. This article demonstrates that although the two states had realigned away from China since 2010–11, new agendas that emerged from their domestic politics in late 2016 tipped the balance in favor of China.
After decades as pariah state, Myanmar embarked on a transition toward democracy in 2010 which culminated in the first free elections in 25 years in 2015. In parallel to political liberalization, the country also opened up and reformed economically. Foreign capital started flowing in, trade increased enormously, the financial sector expanded, private business began to flourish, and rapid economic growth ensued. Lately, however, the road of transition has become bumpier. Peace negotiations and national reconciliation are moving only slowly and the economic reform momentum has slowed. Myanmar’s economy continues to suffer from limited diversification, low productivity, and poor infrastructure. Regional and global economic integration has progressed but remained fairly shallow. This chapter notes various social indicators that have improved as well as shortcomings that persist.
India and Myanmar were historically part of the extended British Empire in Asia. Since the two countries became independent at the end of World War II, relations between them have by and large been friendly. At the outset Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and U Nu worked closely with each other in the area of economic development. India even provided some military assistance to Myanmar, and both were active members of the Non-Aligned Movement. However, relations between the two became strained in 1962. India strongly opposed the imposition of military dictatorship in Myanmar by General Ne Win and supported the prodemocracy forces. The Ne Win regime adopted an anti-Soviet stance at a time when relations between India and the Soviet Union were burgeoning, refused to join the Commonwealth of Nations, and withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement in 1979.
Yun Sun argues that China’s policy failures on Myanmar in 2011 are rooted in several strategic post-election misjudgements. Following President Thein Sein’s inauguration in March 2011, the Sino–Myanmar relationship was initially boosted by the establishment of a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership,” and China sought reciprocation for its long-time diplomatic support in the form of Myanmar’s endorsement of China’s positions on regional multilateral forums. A series of events since August have frustrated China’s aspirations, however, including Myanmar’s suspension of the Myitsone dam and the rapid improvement of its relationship with the West. Several strategic misjudgements contributed to China’s miscalculations, including on the democratic momentum of the Myanmar government, on the U.S.–Myanmar engagement and on China’s political and economic influence in the country. China’s previous definition of Myanmar as one of China’s “few loyal friends” and the foundation of its strategic blueprint has been fundamentally shaken, and China is recalibrating its expectations regarding future policies.
Against the background of closer diplomatic, political and security ties between Myanmar and China since 1988, their economic relations have also grown stronger throughout the 1990s and up to 2005. China is now a major supplier of consumer and capital goods to Myanmar, in particular through border trade. China also provides a large amount of economic cooperation in the areas of infrastructure, energy and state-owned economic enterprises. Nevertheless, Myanmar’s trade with China has failed to have a substantial impact on its broad-based economic and industrial development. China’s economic cooperation apparently supports the present regime, but its effects on the whole economy will be limited with an unfavorable macroeconomic environment and distorted incentives structure. As a conclusion, strengthened economic ties with China will be instrumental in regime survival, but will not be a powerful force affecting the process of economic development in Myanmar.
The growing centrality of economic concerns in Beijing's relations with developing countries in the 1990s reflects a change in Beijing's Third World policy in general and foreign aid policy in particular. Beijing's foreign policy will continue to be guided by the principles of peaceful co-existence throughout the 1990s, but Beijing's selection of its aid recipients has always been influenced by changes in its individual foreign policy goals. Past experience and increasing domestic competition for financial resources make it very unlikely that foreign aid will play the major role in Beijing's policy toward the developing countries that it did in the past, though Beijing is trying to reach every possible aid recipient in order to extend its foreign relations. In the 1990s, Beijing is endeavoring to use its limited foreign aid funds to achieve the maximum economic benefit and to diversify recipients by undertaking projects involving multilateral cooperation, contracting for projects through bilateral cooperation, providing commercial credit to be paid through product compensation, and establishing joint ventures.
China and India have always been separated not only by the Himalayas, but also by the impenetrable jungle and remote areas that once stretched across Burma. Now this last great frontier will likely vanish - forests cut down, dirt roads replaced by superhighways, insurgencies ended - leaving China and India exposed to each other as never before. This basic shift in geography is as profound as the opening of the Suez Canal and is taking place just as the centre of the world's economy moves to the East. Thant Myint-U has travelled extensively across this vast territory, where high-speed trains and gleaming shopping malls now sit alongside the last remaining forests and impoverished mountain communities. In Where China Meets India he explores the new strategic centrality of Burma, the country of his ancestry, where Asia's two rising giant powers - China and India - appear to be vying for supremacy. Part travelogue, part history, part investigation, Where China Meets India takes us across the fast-changing Asian frontier, giving us a masterful account of the region's long and rich history and its sudden significance for the rest of the world. Thant Myint-U is the author of The River of Lost Footsteps and has written articles for the New York Times, the Washington Post and the New Statesman. He has worked alongside Kofi Annan at the UN's Department of Political Affairs and currently works as a special consultant to the Burmese government.
A history of Myanmar since ancient times: Traditions and transformations
- M Aung-Thwin
- M Aung-Thwin