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Boletín de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Cooperativo
ISSN: 1134 - 993X, Núm. 48/2014, Bilbao, págs. 191-204 191
Principle of «concern for community»: beyond «social
responsibility» in cooperatives1
Airton Cardoso Cançado2 y Maria de Fátima Arruda Souza
Federal University of Tocantins
Ariádne Sclafoni Rigo
Federal University of Bahia
Jeová Torres Silva Junior
Federal University of Cariri
RecIbído: 27.03.2014
Aceptado: 01.07.2014
Summary: I. Introduction. II. The principle of concern for com-
munity. III. Social responsibility. IV. The paradigm of the gift – the obli-
gation to give, receive and reciprocate. V. Inconsistent relationship bet-
ween the principle of concern for community and social responsibility.
VI. Coherent relation between the principle of concern for community
and theory of gift. VII. Concluding remarks. VIII. Bibliography.
Abstract: This article aims to demonstrate the principle of cooperatives
Concern for Community represents the way cooperatives interact to its com-
munity, especially in a social aspect. Thus there is no need of using the termi-
nology «Social Responsibility for Cooperatives» once the cooperative principle
already encompasses the social actions of the cooperative in a more com-
plete and organic way. This discussion is related to traditional mimicry of co-
operatives management (technics and tools) from management of companies,
which weakens the identity of cooperatives. This text also demonstrates the
Theory of Giving can support the theory and practice of the Concern for Com-
munity principle.
Key-words: concern for community, social responsibility, theory of giving,
cooperative.
Resumen: El objetivo del artículo es demostrar que el principio coopera-
tivista de «Preocupación por la Comunidad» representa la manera por la cual
las cooperativas interactúan con su territorio y la sociedad, especialmente en lo
que se refiere a los aspectos sociales de su gestión. Por lo tanto, el concepto
de «Responsabilidad Social de las Cooperativas» no es aplicable en la justifi-
1 A previous version of this paper was published and presented at International
Summit of Cooperatives Quebec 2012.
2 Correo electrónico: airtoncardoso@yahoo.com.br
© Universidad de Deusto
Principle of «concern for community» Airton Cardoso, Maria de Fátima Arruda, Ariádne Sclafoni & Jeová Torres
Boletín de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Cooperativo
192 ISSN: 1134 - 993X, Núm. 48/2014, Bilbao, págs. 191-204
cación de sus objetivos de gestión. Porque el principio de la cooperación in-
cluye, de forma integral y orgánica el concepto de responsabilidad social. La
discusión es parte del tradicional mimetismo discursivo de la administración
de empresas con fines de lucro (herramientas y técnicas de gestión) que inten-
tan imponer a los modelos de gestión de cooperativas, lo que trae como con-
secuencia el debilitamiento de la identidad de las cooperativas. Se propone en
este artículo un análisis crítico de la Teoría de la Dadiva con el fin de sustentar
la teoría y la práctica del principio de la Preocupación por la Comunidad en el
cooperativismo.
Palabras claves: Preocupación por la Comunidad, Responsabilidad So-
cial, Teoría de la Dadiva, Cooperativismo.
© Universidad de Deusto
Principle of «concern for community» Airton Cardoso, Maria de Fátima Arruda, Ariádne Sclafoni & Jeová Torres
Boletín de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Cooperativo
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I. Introduction
Cooperatives have been driven by principles that make them dif-
ferent from other organizations since their origin. The statute from
the first experience on cooperatives in 1844, in Rochdale, contained
principles upon which a cooperative organization should be created
(Cançado et al., 2012). According to Schneider (1999), some founders
of the Rochdale cooperative had already participated in pre-coopera-
tive experiences and were familiar with the ideas of Robert Owen, a so-
cialist utopian and founder of the cooperative movement. Others had
joined Carter’s political thought, echoing his call for the emancipation
of the proletariat by political means through the right to vote. After a
few failed insurrectionary attempts, both of these fractions joined and
moderated their perspectives.
Many of the Rochdale pioneers participated in movements to im-
prove basic working conditions. These experiences enabled the ideas
of a cooperative to mature, and it was upon these experiences that the
rules of the Rochdale cooperative were formulated. The founders of
the cooperative did not only want food at fair prices; they also aimed
for education of family members and access to housing and employ-
ment —through the purchase of land and factories— for the unem-
ployed and underpaid. The success of Rochdale fostered great expan-
sion of the cooperative movement in Britain and Europe and in the rest
of the world (Schneider, 1999; Holyoake, 2008).
With the growth of world cooperative arises the necessity to create
a transnational organization to represent the movement. In 1895, the
International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) was created in London, Eng-
land, with the initiative of English, French and German leaders (Sch-
neider, 1999). Since then, the ICA has provided subsidies and «has
become formal and explicit [of] Rochdale’s legacy» (Schneider, 1999,
p. 56). The ICA thus serves as an «authority» when discussing basic co-
operative principles.
Several events have been carried out by ICA. Some of them, in
1937, 1966 and 1995, directly addressed the adequacy of cooperative
principles. Among these, the principle of «Concern for Community»
was included during a key meeting in 1995 which took place in Man-
chester, England (Cançado et al., 2012).
In addition, the management at cooperatives often relies upon the-
oretical and practical frameworks used in companies — or what we call
mimicry. It is understood that copying models or tools of business man-
agement contributes to the loss of identity of cooperatives, as the goals
of these organizations are markedly different from cooperatives. This is
© Universidad de Deusto
Principle of «concern for community» Airton Cardoso, Maria de Fátima Arruda, Ariádne Sclafoni & Jeová Torres
Boletín de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Cooperativo
194 ISSN: 1134 - 993X, Núm. 48/2014, Bilbao, págs. 191-204
not an academic position based on simplistic or romantic principles in
the face of increasing competitiveness, but rather a critical argument
made on the basis that the theoretical and practical underpinnings of
cooperatives are sufficient.
Linked with these points is the need to address notions of «Social
Responsibility», a concept that is gaining increasing attention within
the cooperative movement. The purpose of this paper is to demon-
strate that the principle of «Concern for Community» contains this no-
tion of «Social Responsibility» without having to mimic company-based
management models. In other words, the principle of «Concern for
Community» is fundamentally different from the «Social Responsibil-
ity» practiced by companies, as it embodies the values of cooperatives
regarding the need to intervene in social affairs. These differences will
be addressed in greater detail below.
This paper is largely theoretical. We adopt a theoretical framework
drawing from the «Theory of Gift» to understand the principle of Con-
cern for Community and its differentiation from Social Responsibility.
The text is divided into six sections. In the following section, we present
the principle of Concern for Community, then the concept of Social
Responsibility is introduced. Section three will address the «Theory of
Gift,» followed by discussion of the results and final remarks.
II. The principle of concern for community
Cooperative principles have been revised by the ICA in 1937 (Paris),
1966 (Vienna) and 1995 (Manchester). It is noteworthy that these
changes were preceded by extensive consultations with cooperatives,
representative bodies of the cooperative sector and researchers around
the world, taking many years of study before proposals were brought
forward (Schneider, 1999). These changes to cooperative principles can
be regarded as updates, bringing a more contemporary outlook to the
cooperative movement while keeping the essence that guided the col-
lective action of the Rochdale Pioneers (Cançado et al., 2012).
While we discuss the principle of Concern for Community in this
paper, Concern for Community itself is closely related to other con-
cepts, especially the principle of democratic member control. The 2007
ICA definition for the principle of Concern for Community is that «co-
operatives work for the sustainable development of their communities
through policies approved by their members». The principle of Concern
for Community is founded on two pillars: a) the sustainable develop-
ment of communities where cooperatives are located; and b) the ac-
© Universidad de Deusto
Principle of «concern for community» Airton Cardoso, Maria de Fátima Arruda, Ariádne Sclafoni & Jeová Torres
Boletín de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Cooperativo
ISSN: 1134 - 993X, Núm. 48/2014, Bilbao, págs. 191-204 195
complishment of this development through policies approved by their
members.
The first pillar, sustainable development, is based upon the use of
natural resources in the present without compromising its use in the
future, generating synchronic responsibility to the current generation
and diachronic responsibility to future generations. Another widely ac-
cepted concept shows sustainable development as development that
is socially just, environmentally sound and economically viable. In both
cases, the concepts are compatible with cooperative. Cooperative or-
ganizations are built to provide services to current and future members.
Cooperatives are formed to serve more than one generation and are
therefore compatible with the concept of sustainability. The coopera-
tive is made to grow and develop.
The second pillar points to interdependence between the princi-
ple of Concern for Community and the principle of democratic mem-
ber control. Policies for sustainable development of communities are
decided by the members who live in the community. The cooperative
members and residents in the territory discuss and decide how the or-
ganization will support sustainable development in their own territory.
There is, therefore, a very strong link between decision-making and liv-
ing with the impacts of these decisions. In the following section, we
present a discussion on Social Responsibility.
III. Social responsibility
Social Responsibility initiatives by companies are not new. There are
reports of actions related to Social Responsibility in virtually all parts of
the world throughout different eras. What has changed is the societal
reaction to companies that perform —or refrain from performing— ac-
tions of Social Responsibility.
In recent decades, companies have been in permanent confrontation
between private interests and collective welfare; that is to say, between
the pursuit of satisfying the interests of shareholders (profit maximiza-
tion) and responding to pressures from society or the local community
to improve or maintain their quality of life and environment. Among the
main drivers of corporate activism to Social Responsibility are: a) «social
problems», which become barriers to the modernization of production
systems in achieving higher standards of competitiveness; b) the current
social context requires organizations to maintain a balanced relationship
with stakeholders by fostering requirements such as transparency; c) in-
tentionally or not, people and organizations are granting more public at-
© Universidad de Deusto
Principle of «concern for community» Airton Cardoso, Maria de Fátima Arruda, Ariádne Sclafoni & Jeová Torres
Boletín de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Cooperativo
196 ISSN: 1134 - 993X, Núm. 48/2014, Bilbao, págs. 191-204
tention to the social actions they perform (Fischer, 2006). We add to this
the crisis of confidence in the ability of the state to maintain basic needs
for its citizens (Schoeder and Schoeder, 2004).
In the case of Social Responsibility, the central theme revolves
around reputation. According to Srour (2003), to talk about reputa-
tion is to talk about an intangible, fragile asset that depends upon re-
spect and the perception of others in relation to the organization. In
this sense, reputation is closely linked with considerations developed
by the community. Reputation is characterized as a process in constant
construction. For Fischer (2006), companies should work to increase
their reputational capital, understood as the value of their market at-
tributes based on their image and the perception of their performance.
This reputational capital would strengthen the company brand through
actions that foster Social Responsibility.
Thus, banks, airlines, research institutes, medical clinics, hospitals
and many other organizations can only survive in the market because
they maintain positive reputations throughout their existence. In this
sense, «companies that care about their image or reputation, give to
the ethical reflection a relevant part of business strategy» (Srour, 2003,
p. 82). Moreover, the loss of reputation by any organization represents
a breakdown of collective trust, which is generally irreversible, particu-
larly with respect to the significant role that media play regarding alle-
gations of fraud and other illegal actions.
Social Responsibility is not just a lot of isolated, occasional actions
or attitudes motivated by marketing and other business advantages.
Rather, such actions should encompass a comprehensive view of the
policies, programs and practices that permeate all business operations
on the basis of respect for the interests of the population while pre-
serving the environment and meeting basic legal requirements. Fisher
(2006), however, draws attention to the fact that excessive exposure of
companies’ social actions can lead to a blurring of perception between
good and opportunistic actions; that is to say, social actions can very
easily be classified as crass institutional marketing tools. One cannot ig-
nore that market rationality permeates the Social Responsibility ethic
and that much of what companies say they do, is never actually done
(Soares, 2004).
According to Ferrell et al. (2001), Social Responsibility can be subdi-
vided and better understood based on the following categories:
— Economic Responsibility: involves the company’s obligations to
be productive and profitable. The Social Responsibility of the bu-
siness activity is economic in nature.
© Universidad de Deusto
Principle of «concern for community» Airton Cardoso, Maria de Fátima Arruda, Ariádne Sclafoni & Jeová Torres
Boletín de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Cooperativo
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— Legal Responsibility: expectations from society that businesses
comply with obligations under existing legal frameworks.
— Ethical Responsibility: companies adopt appropriate behavior in
line with expectations of society within the context of where
they are situated.
— Discretionary Responsibility (or philanthropic): reflects the com-
mon desire that companies are involved in improving the social
environment and going beyond the basic functions traditionally
expected from business activity.
Also, included in this classification is the concept of Strategic Phi-
lanthropy, which means linking philanthropic donations to the strategy
and general objectives of the company. To Ferrell et al. (2001), this is a
business approach that results in a more positive image, increasing the
loyalty of employees and strengthening ties with customers.
In general, discussion about the engagement of companies in So-
cial Responsibility is antagonistic. On one side, the arguments in fa-
vor of Social Responsibility are based on the premise that it is ethical
and moral, or on the premise that, most socially responsible com-
panies are more competitive and end up profiting from this kind of
behavior in the long run. On the other hand, adverse arguments
are based on the premise that other institutions like governments,
churches and civil organizations exist to conduct Social Responsibil-
ity functions, and also on the premise that the allocation of resources
from businesses to government (taxes) should take account for these
social aspects.
In short, the existing views on Social Responsibility practiced by
companies can be classified as follows:
1. Broad responsibility:
a) Modern: social actions benefi t the company in long-term; and
b) Philanthropic: defend the actions of Social Responsibility even
if they do not bring any profit.
2. Narrow responsibility:
a) Socioeconomic: its function is the maximization of value to
shareholders, but the actions of Social Responsibility can help
in this regard; and
b) Classical: Social Responsibility’s actions do not generate value
for the company and should not be developed.
© Universidad de Deusto
Principle of «concern for community» Airton Cardoso, Maria de Fátima Arruda, Ariádne Sclafoni & Jeová Torres
Boletín de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Cooperativo
198 ISSN: 1134 - 993X, Núm. 48/2014, Bilbao, págs. 191-204
Figure 1 elucidates how the Social Responsibility (SR) dimensions re-
late to each other.
Figure 1. Dimensions of Social Responsibility
Source: Adapted from Srour (2003, p. 82).
According to the figure, broad Social Responsibility relates to activi-
ties that go beyond economic aspects of the company, while narrow
Social Responsibility relates to the objective or function of the company
(i.e. add value to shareholders). The next section will present the «The-
ory of Gift» to complete the theoretical basis of this article.
IV. The paradigm of the gift – the obligation to give, receive and
reciprocate
Caille (1998) characterizes three regulatory models of society. The
individualistic paradigm focuses on Homo economicus and social rela-
tions must be understood as a result of the use of utilitarian calculus
by individuals (Weber, 2002; Ramos, 1989). In the holistic paradigm,
individuals are expressions of society. These individuals are molded by
a totality of influences from their surrounding society. The ascendancy
of this holistic paradigm is so strong that it is now widespread in the
social sciences and can be tied to diverse strands of thought, includ-
ing: functionalism, in which individuals are expressions of the reality
of society through the functions that they play; culturalism, in which
individuals are expressions of the reality of society through the val-
ues that they contain; and structuralism, in which individuals are ex-
pressions of the reality of society through the rules that they follow
(Caille, 2002).
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Principle of «concern for community» Airton Cardoso, Maria de Fátima Arruda, Ariádne Sclafoni & Jeová Torres
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And where is the gift, as a third paradigm or an alternative to in-
dividualism and holism? According to Godbout (1998 and 1999) and
Caille (1998), actions are not explained either by the holistic paradigm
or by individualistic paradigm. On one hand, the social bond is not un-
derstood by holism, and methodological individualism regards all forms
of cooperation between individuals as purely formalist and utilitarian.
For these two dominant paradigmatic theoretical perspectives, trust
—a basic construct in authentic social relations— is negated by selfish-
ness (from the perspective of individualism) or by the lack of individual
freedom (from the perspective of holistic thinking).
Thus, it is only possible to restore confidence in individual coopera-
tion and concern for others by adopting another paradigm. The «The-
ory of Gift» is an additional —not exclusive— third way relative to the
two prevailing paradigms. The engine of social action is not pure indi-
vidual utility. There is an obligation and a freedom to social action. This
paradigm, according to Mauss (2001), is supported on the relieved ob-
ligation to give, receive and reciprocate (give back).
In this context, a sociological definition for a gift is «any provision
of goods or services made without guarantee of return, in view of the
creation, maintenance or regeneration of the social bond» (Godbout,
1999, p. 20). In a more generic approach, the gift can be understood
as any social action performed without expectation, guarantee or as-
surance of return, which carries a dimension of «gratuity.»
A deeper understanding of the gift paradigm requires further elab-
oration on the General Law on the Fu0nctioning of the Society, pro-
posed by Caille (1998 and 2002) and Godbout (1999). According to
these authors, there are two forms of social relation that are imperative
for the functioning of society: the primary sociality and the secondary
sociality.
The primary sociality is based on the obligation to give. In pri-
mary sociality, personality is more important than the tasks performed.
The bonds in this type of sociality are more important than the goods
(Caille, 2002). The primary sociality has its configuration justified in
family relationships, among friends and neighbors. On the other hand,
what matters in secondary sociality is the functional efficacy —gov-
erned by rules of neutrality— in which functional competence is worth
more than personality. This secondary sociality is represented by the so-
ciety of the market, state administrators and the society of science ac-
cording to Godbout (1999).
Furthermore, in secondary sociality, economic organization and
management does not work if it cannot mobilize people. Mobilizing
people means impelling them to give something to contribute, to get
© Universidad de Deusto
Principle of «concern for community» Airton Cardoso, Maria de Fátima Arruda, Ariádne Sclafoni & Jeová Torres
Boletín de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Cooperativo
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involved and support an institution; in other words, a call to (re)con-
struct a primary sociality within the secondary sociality, driving peo-
ple to a relationship of giving within the organization. To Caille (1998),
contrary to what the world wants us to believe, social relations and as-
sociative ties should not solve in the contract or to dilute in the market.
The understanding is that there are new forms of economic regulation
in addition to public and private spheres. In this context of other forms
of regulation lies the cooperative.
Facing opposition, the paradigm of the gift settles and seeks rec-
ognition. This epistemological perspective is not exclusionary as it ac-
knowledges the existence of the market and the state, along with the
holistic paradigm and the individualistic-methodological paradigm. In
fact, Godbout (1998) argues that while one must recognize the impor-
tance of the other two systems, it is also essential to understand and
recognize the more hidden role of the cooperative system.
V. Inconsistent relationship between the principle of concern for
community and social responsibility
The main differences between the principle of cooperative Concern
for Community and Social Responsibility fall within four dimensions: (I)
the reason that generates the action; (II) the method of decision making;
(III) territoriality; and (iv) participation in the implementation process.
With respect to the reason that generates action, the principle of
Concern for Community is built into the very fabric of cooperative or-
ganizations. It is known that co-operatives already provide services to
the communities where they are located, valuing the producers and
workers, moving intermediaries away and in some cases serving as reg-
ulators of prices and interest rates. The inclusion of Concern for Com-
munity within cooperative principles in 1995 only reinforces a practice
that has been done since Rochdale.
Conversely, the Social Responsibility is based on philanthropic actions
(Broad Philanthropic Social Responsibility), where there are clear rela-
tions of power and dependency or influences from market pressures (see
Broad Modern Social Responsibility and Narrow Socioeconomic Social Re-
sponsibility above). Thus, the actions of Social Responsibility can also be
understood as acts of institutional marketing, and in some countries, as a
strategy for tax planning (tax relief linked to Social Responsibility). Com-
panies are motivated by the pursuit of maximizing results (Srour, 2003;
Fischer, 2006), and one way is to increase reputational capital, which has
influence on a company’s market value. Social Responsibility can improve
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Principle of «concern for community» Airton Cardoso, Maria de Fátima Arruda, Ariádne Sclafoni & Jeová Torres
Boletín de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Cooperativo
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the image of a company, garner loyalty from employees, and strengthen
ties with customers (Ferrell, Fraedrich and Ferrell, 2001).
There are also big differences with respect to decision making proc-
esses. In cooperatives, the principle of Concern for Community is ap-
plied through collective decisions as, for example, with sustainable de-
velopment cooperative priorities (lCA, 2007). We will not discuss here
the difficulties arising from this decision-making process because it is
not the subject of this work. What is important here is the possibility of
participation in decision making based on principle.
In Social Responsibility, it is clear that in companies decisions are
taken by owners or their representatives. Even in companies with more
participatory management processes, where employees can be heard
and participate in decisions, such participation is permitted by the own-
ers and will always be limited. Here we are, back to the reason that
generates the action of Social Responsibility. If the company seeks to
maximize results, then the actions of Social Responsibility will be cho-
sen strategically among those choices that can» give more results» in
terms of visibility and/or reputational capital. Thus, this «choice» is in-
tended to have the maximum results with the application of the mini-
mum resources possible. Some of these organizations do research to
understand what society values most and then aim to optimize their
Social Responsibility contributions based on these values.
Differences are even more latent with respect to geographical po-
sition. The cooperative has a scope of action that generates an iden-
tity linked to this territory —often the name of the cooperative has
the same name of the place. What is important is that cooperative
members live in the territory where the cooperative is formed (i.e. di-
rectly on the site where the practice of Concern for Community hap-
pens). Moving from there, it is clear that members make decisions
relating to Concern for Community within their own territory, increas-
ing their commitment to both the decision— making and the imple-
mentation of these actions. Another important issue is continuity. If
the cooperative will always act in their area, these actions have conti-
nuity and can be conceived in medium and long-term, fostering sus-
tainable development.
Again, Social Responsibility is markedly different from the principles
of Concern for Community. Companies that are able to perform ac-
tions of Social Responsibility will seek to maximize the performance of
these actions, choosing regions of greater commercial appeal for their
actions, which may be in another country or even another continent, in
some cases strengthening the dependence of developing countries. It
does not mean that we are against these actions, as there are certainly
© Universidad de Deusto
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important beneficiaries, especially those at risk. Yet actions of Social
Responsibility may create or reinforce dependency relationships with a
very dangerous side effect; namely, there is no guarantee that the ac-
tions of Social Responsibility will continue in these territories. In sum-
mary, the companies choose where to hold their actions of Social Re-
sponsibility according to its «social appeal» in order to maximize their
reputational capital and the problem is that these actions may be dis-
continued, either because another territory becomes more attractive or
because of a retraction of Social Responsibility investments.
Regarding the outcomes, cooperative members that made deci-
sions are simultaneously —even indirectly— benefiting from these ac-
tions because they are within their own territory. If these actions bring
positive results, the cooperative member benefits; if the results are neg-
ative, he/she will suffer its negative effects. This organic relationship re-
inforces the commitment of members within the decision-making proc-
ess itself and with its implementation and outcomes.
In the perspective of companies, this commitment to outcomes is
more related to their image than to the outcome of Social Responsibil-
ity within society. As many actions of Social Responsibility are difficult
to assess, companies present their results in the way that suits them. In
this case, the owners are unlikely to be affected by the actions of Social
Responsibility, even indirectly. Their interests are in the visibility of these
actions, and the cost-benefit output generated by them.
All four dimensions prove to be very different when comparing
Concern for Community and Social Responsibility. It now remains to
demonstrate how the Theory of Gift can be integrated into the princi-
ples of Concern for Community. The actions related to the principle of
Concern for Community are motivated by the very reason for the exist-
ence of cooperatives. Decisions about what to do are taken collectively
by the members. The actions have a territoriality which fosters continu-
ity and sustainability. Finally, the actual decision-maker will suffer the
impact of his or her decision, which reinforces the commitment to the
decision, its implementation and its results.
VI. Coherent relation between the principle of concern for
community and theory of gift
The Theory of Gift is established through the creation, maintenance
and rebuilding of social bonds through the triad of «giving, receiving
and giving back». There is no contract, agreement or equivalence be-
tween giving, receiving and returning. Rather, bonds through reciproc-
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Principle of «concern for community» Airton Cardoso, Maria de Fátima Arruda, Ariádne Sclafoni & Jeová Torres
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ISSN: 1134 - 993X, Núm. 48/2014, Bilbao, págs. 191-204 203
ity are established. When performing actions upon the principles of
Concern for Community, the cooperative creates a link between the
organization and the community. If this community is going through
a process of sustainable development, for example, it becomes a bet-
ter place to live for members who are the cooperative. The cooperative
can see, even indirectly, the effects of their decisions based on the prin-
ciples of Concern for Community, effectively closing the triad and start-
ing the process of reciprocity. Thus, we argue that there is a strong re-
lationship between the Theory of Gift and the principles of Concern for
Community.
On the other hand, the Theory of Gift cannot establish itself
within relations of Social Responsibility because utilitarian calculations
do not foster the appropriate conditions. Companies are not seeking
to establish social bonds through Social Responsibility; rather, they
are seeking reputational capital to enhance their brand and increase
visibility.
Thus, it is clear that there is a rapprochement between the The-
ory of Gift and the principles of Concern for Community. It must be
stressed that we are not setting a simplistic Manichean value judg-
ment: Concern for Community is good and Social Responsibility is bad.
The goal is to distinguish between these two kinds of action; define
Social Responsibility and its meanings; and demonstrate that the prin-
ciples of Concern for Community adhere more closely to cooperative
ideals when associated to the Theory of Gift.
VII. Concluding remarks
The purpose of this study was to outline the principle of Concern
for Community, Social Responsibility and the Theory of Gift, to high-
light the discrepancies between Concern for Community and Social Re-
sponsibility, and to note the consistency between Theory of Gift and
Concern for Community. However, the perspective adopted here is
theoretical. We suggest that research be conducted in an attempt to
find empirical proof or refutation of this argument. Another promis-
ing research agenda is the search for theories compatible with the real-
ity of cooperatives as a benchmark that can serve as a support for co-
operatives. Finally, this study reinforces the need to broaden the scope
of discussion of cooperative identity, avoiding mimicry with companies,
which is often done to improve the management of cooperatives. The
tools used to manage organizations that seek profit should at least be
adapted to organizations without a strict profit-motive.
© Universidad de Deusto
Principle of «concern for community» Airton Cardoso, Maria de Fátima Arruda, Ariádne Sclafoni & Jeová Torres
Boletín de la Asociación Internacional de Derecho Cooperativo
204 ISSN: 1134 - 993X, Núm. 48/2014, Bilbao, págs. 191-204
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