Toward a Decolonial Alternative to Development? The Emergence and Shortcomings of Vivir Bien as State Policy in Bolivia in the Era of Globalization

Abstract

There is an urgent demand for the examination of the critical perceptions of new kinds of ‘development’ which are emerging in the Global South in response to—and often opposed to—the global capitalist political economy. This article discusses the case of contemporary Bolivia in which indigenous political alternatives have emerged as the resistance to economic globalization and the powers of capital accumulation, as well as to the cultural and epistemological commitments of the Western order. Through an ethnographic approach, it examines the emergence and shortcomings of the notion of vivir bien—a local, decolonial, indigenous concept of good life—as state policy. It argues that despite its transformative potential, the translation of vivir bien discourses into state practices has not been, to a large degree, achieved.

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Globalizations
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Toward a Decolonial Alternative to Development?
The Emergence and Shortcomings of Vivir Bien as
State Policy in Bolivia in the Era of Globalization
Eija Maria Ranta
To cite this article: Eija Maria Ranta (2016) Toward a Decolonial Alternative to Development? The
Emergence and Shortcomings of Vivir�Bien as State Policy in Bolivia in the Era of Globalization,
Globalizations, 13:4, 425-439, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2016.1141596
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Toward a Decolonial Alternative to Development? The
Emergence and Shortcomings of Vivir Bien as State Policy in
Bolivia in the Era of Globalization
EIJA MARIA RANTA
University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
ABSTRACT There is an urgent demand for the examination of the critical perceptions of new
kinds of ‘development’ which are emerging in the Global South in response to—and often
opposed to—the global capitalist political economy. This article discusses the case of
contemporary Bolivia in which indigenous political alternatives have emerged as the
resistance to economic globalization and the powers of capital accumulation, as well as to
the cultural and epistemological commitments of the Western order. Through an
ethnographic approach, it examines the emergence and shortcomings of the notion of vivir
bien—a local, decolonial, indigenous concept of good life—as state policy. It argues that
despite its transformative potential, the translation of vivir bien discourses into state
practices has not been, to a large degree, achieved.
Keywords: vivir bien, alternatives to development, decolonization, indigeneity, resource
extraction, Bolivia
Introduction
We live in times of crisis: in a historical situation in which our global economic system has
proved its dysfunctions and debilities. This is a moment in which we are faced with a shared
concern over environment and climate change and, dare I suggest it, even a crisis of humanity:
a situation in which our social relations, our bodies, and our minds are being commoditized at an
increasing pace. Development, as we know it, has reached its limits economically, environmen-
tally, and socially. Yet the question remains as to whether we have done as much as we might
have to change the course of events, and to curb those processes that seem to proceed like
unstoppable forces. In many parts of the Global South, where mass-scale poverty and
Correspondence Address: Eija Maria Ranta, Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki, POB 16, 00014
Helsinki, Finland. Email: eija.ranta@helsinki.fi
#2016 Taylor & Francis
Globalizations, 2016
Vol. 13, No. 4, 425–439, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2016.1141596

inequalities have always been the other side of the coin of capitalist accumulation, critical pol-
itical alternatives and perceptions of new kinds of ‘development’, or social change, have
emerged.
This article outlines one of those alternatives; the emergence of the notion of vivir bien,or
good life: a conglomeration of critical ideas, worldviews, and knowledge deriving from a
complex set of social movements, indigenous groups, activist networks, and scholars of indi-
geneity in Latin America (Farah & Vasapollo, 2011; Gudynas, 2011a; Vega, 2011; Walsh,
2010). Most specifically, it will focus on the case of Bolivia; an ethnically heterogeneous
South American country in which ethnic and economic inequalities and hierarchical power
relations have been deeply inscribed in the lives of people, and in the nature of state and
society construction, ever since the colonial conquest. And they are still evident in its
modern-day equivalents of economic exploitation and the spread of universal (that is,
Western) development paradigms. Consequently, the notion of vivir bien has emerged as a
local, decolonial, indigenous alternative to long-term Western hegemony over defining what
development is: as a resistance to, as Gudynas (2011a, p. 455) states ‘the reductionism of life
to economic values and the subsequent commodification of almost everything’.
The article is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2008 and 2009 among
Bolivian ministers, public servants, indigenous activists, and development experts about their
perceptions and actions related to the notion of vivir bien as state policy. The main methodologi-
cal aim was to follow the discourse of vivir bien: who uses the term; in what ways; where does
the concept originate, and so forth. Consequently, I interviewed those scholars, political figures,
and activists, who had been elaborating the concept at different stages of their lives. Further-
more, I tracked the notion of vivir bien in the everyday practices of public servants and consult-
ants, who were trying to translate it from political discourse into policy practice. Most
specifically, I participated and observed development policy events, seminars, and meetings
organized by the Vice-Ministry of Planning and Coordination, led by the then Vice-Minister
of Planning and Coordination Noel Aguirre. While this article is first and foremost based on
interviews with Bolivian ministers, the overall data for the research consisted of 54 individual
interviews, 6 group interviews, policy documents, and six months of participant observation
at the offices and corridors of state institutions. The access was partly facilitated by my
earlier work experiences and contacts from an indigenous NGO and UN office during 2001
and 2002, when I lived in Bolivia for a total of 13 months. Although most informants were
still very enthusiastic about the state transformation process during my fieldwork, the use of eth-
nographic methodologies helped me to grasp tensions, contradictions, and conflicts lurking
behind official state discourses. These power conflicts that I discuss more in detail in my doctoral
dissertation (Ranta, 2014) were heating up especially among ministers, between ministers and
public servants, between Left-wing activists and indigenous activists, as well as among and
between social movements.
The article starts with an introduction to conceptual and theoretical concerns making the case
for the utility of combining global political economy with Latin American decolonial thinking.
Then the article proceeds by providing the empirical case of Bolivia, where the governing
regime of Evo Morales, the country’s first president of indigenous origin, has been translating
indigenous political alternatives into policy options for the state. It will first examine the trans-
formative potential of vivir bien as a discursive construction, and, second, bring concrete
examples of the contentious politics emerging in its practical implementation, especially in
regards to natural resource extraction. It is argued that while the notion of vivir bien represents
a transformative horizon for the construction of alternative futures outside and at the margins of
426 E. M. Ranta

global capitalist political economy and Western epistemological hegemony, its translation into
concrete policy alternative is fairly limited and filled with contradictions and conflicts.
Vivir Bien as an Alternative to Development as We Know It
Lately, an abundance of scholarship on the notion of vivir bien has emerged (Farah & Vasapollo,
2011; Gudynas, 2011a,2011b; Medina, 2006; Vega, 2011; Walsh, 2010; Yampara, 2001). While
these accounts offer important introductions to the concept, ethnographic descriptions of what is
concretely happening at the level of state policy-making in countries pursuing vivir bien policies
are still largely lacking. For example, while Gudynas (2011a,2011b) who has offered some of
the first general introductions to the concept portrays it as an ‘alternative to development’, my
article tries out this claim in the concrete empirical context of the much contested Bolivian state
transformation process. Vivir bien, as it stands today, may be perceived as the contemporary
expression of the kind of post-development era introduced by Escobar (1995), who, among
others (Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997; Sachs, 1992), questioned the very idea of ‘development’.
Development was perceived as a Western hegemonic discourse rooted in ideologies of
growth, capital accumulation, and exploitation of nature, and spread across the Global South
through such instruments as development cooperation. The concept of vivir bien, as Gudynas
(2011a, p. 445) argues, is, instead, grounded in ethical, intercultural, and environmental
values as a reaction against the conventional overemphasizing of economic values and anthro-
pocentric worldviews. Consequently, it is ‘an expression of decolonial efforts’ against Western
development (Gudynas, 2011a, p. 443), because ‘the very idea of development itself is a concept
and word that does not exist in the cosmovisions, conceptual categories, and languages of indi-
genous communities’ (Walsh, 2010, p. 17). Gudynas (2011a, pp. 446 – 447) suggests that this
alternative differs not only from liberal multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 1995), but also from social-
ist traditions (Ramı
´rez, 2010) originating in Eurocentric political thought.
These views resonate with Latin American decolonial thinking (Escobar, 2010; Mignolo,
2005; Quijano, 2000). These writings have inspired some key Bolivian thinkers and politicians,
such as former Vice-Minister Rau
´l Prada and, to an extent, the current Vice-President Garcı
´a
Linera (Walsh, Garcı
´a Linera, & Mignolo, 2006; see also Garcı
´a Linera, Gutierrez, Prada,
Quispe, & Tapia, 2001). What Mignolo (2005), one of the main figures of the so-called Coloni-
ality Group, means by the geopolitics of knowledge is that, in his assessment, Latin America has
been constructed on the basis of knowledge and epistemologies of European origin, thereby pro-
ducing and reproducing hierarchical colonial relations within Latin American societies and
between Latin America and other countries via global capitalism. Knowledge production and
resource struggles are mutually intertwined. Quijano (2000) adds ethnicity and race to the
relations between power and knowledge with the concept ‘coloniality of knowledge’ whereby
structures of political and economic inequality are maintained and legitimized nationally and
globally by knowledge and epistemologies that are based on distinctions between indigenous
peoples and others. According to these views, therefore, ‘coloniality’ is a major feature of both
knowledge production and economic relations in Latin America with indigeneity at the center.
Scholars such as Mignolo, Quijano, and Escobar see an alternative residing in Latin American
social movements and indigenous organizations that during the last decade or so have become
agents in processes that Escobar (2010) calls ‘epistemic/cultural decolonization’. While, in its
more traditional sense, decolonization refers to the abolition of ‘the political control, physical
occupation, and domination of people over another people and their land for purposes of extrac-
tion and settlement to benefit the occupiers’ (Crawford, 2002, p. 131; quoted in Smith & Owens,
Toward a Decolonial Alternative to Development? 427

2005, p. 288), Latin American decolonial thinking departs from this view. First of all, despite
early formal independence struggles and decolonization processes in Latin America (Slater,
1998), ‘nothing much has changed in the world economic order since independence, in that pat-
terns of economic power and unequal exchange remain more or less exactly as they were’
(Manzo, 2014, pp. 332–333). Many countries of the Global South continue to be inserted
into the global capitalist economic system in ways that deepen their economic dependency
and allow foreign nations and global actors to impose agendas that favor foreign economic, pol-
itical, and military interests (Hoogvelt, 1997; Young, 2001).
While there is no necessary discrepancy between global political economy and postcolonial
thought (Manzo, 2014, p. 334), Latin American decolonial thinking expands its critical
inquiry from the examination of economic exploitation to the problematization of power
relations in a wider sense, including class, indigeneity, ethnicity, knowledge production, and
epistemologies. Consequently, Escobar (2010) has argued that decolonization confronts two
issues: first, economic globalization and the neoliberal development paradigms; and second,
the ‘modern project’, which refers to ‘the kinds of coherence and crystallization of forms (dis-
courses, practices, structures, institutions) that have arisen over the last few hundred years out of
certain cultural and ontological commitments of European societies’ (Escobar, 2010, p. 9).
Therefore, an analysis of the Bolivian decolonial alternative to development requires an exam-
ination of the intersections between resource struggles aimed at overcoming economic exploita-
tion, and identity construction on the basis of indigeneity and diverse knowledge orientations:
that is, multiple power relations.
The Emergence of Vivir Bien as State Policy: The Case of Bolivia
Bolivia has quickly become one of the loudest worldwide critics of economic globalization and
the spread of universal policy ideas through development cooperation. Within global indigenous
movements, the rise of Bolivian social movements, indigenous organizations, and peasant
unions to political power through the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in late 2005 raised
high hopes for indigenous liberation elsewhere. Together with the late Hugo Cha
´vez from Vene-
zuela and Rafael Correa from Ecuador, the Bolivian president Evo Morales, a union leader and
movement activist of Aymara origin, has become one of the leading Latin American proponents
of anti-neoliberal and anti-American agendas. Combining an indigenous cause with increasing
anti-globalization sentiments, the MAS evolved rapidly from a popular protest movement com-
prising social movements, indigenous organizations, and peasant unions into the governing pol-
itical instrument (Van Cott, 2008). In 2006, the control of the executive and legislative powers
was shifted from liberal and conservative political parties to the hands of movement activists,
indigenous actors, and union leaders (Tapia, 2007).
Indigenous peoples’ ideas have rarely become overarching policy principles for the state. In
contemporary Bolivia, however, the notion of vivir bien (‘living well’ or ‘good life’ in English)
has been employed since 2006 as the guiding policy principle of the National Development Plan
(Plan Nacional de Desarrollo: Bolivia digna, soberana, productiva, y democra
´tica para Vivir
Bien). It is a Spanish translation from indigenous terminologies such as suma qaman
˜ain
Aymara, sumak kawsay in Quechua, and n
˜andereko in Guarani elaborated by social activists,
indigenous organizations, anthropologists, and other scholars. Together with a fellow Andean
country, Ecuador, Bolivia has brought indigenous policy ideas to the fore in the state transform-
ation process. They are portrayed as local alternatives to global development discourses spread
by International Financial Institutions (IFIs), development agencies, and transnational
428 E. M. Ranta

corporations. The promotion of indigenous notions has, however, been intimately shaped and
enhanced by global indigenous discourses, lobbying, and policy work on indigenous rights
and self-determination both in the spheres of transnational organizations and across global indi-
genous networks (Brysk, 2000; Yashar, 2005).
In the following, I will explore more in detail how the notion of vivir bien is discursively por-
trayed within the spheres of Bolivian state policy. I will first describe and analyze it as the resist-
ance to the cultural and epistemological commitments of the Western order, and second, as the
resistance to economic globalization and the powers of global capital accumulation.
Indigenous Epistemologies and Decolonial Policy
The NDP (Repu
´blica de Bolivia, 2007, p. 2) starts with the definition of the new concept of
development which is stated to reside in the notion of vivir bien:
The notion of vivir bien expresses encounters between indigenous peoples and communities, and
respects cultural diversity and identity. It means ‘to live well among ourselves’; it is about commu-
nitarian coexistence [convivencia comunitaria]... without asymmetries of power; ‘you cannot live
well, if others do not’. It is about belonging to a community and being protected by it, as well as
about living in harmony with nature ...
This excerpt underlines such characteristics as the egalitarian nature of indigenous communities
and the interdependence of social, economic, and ecological aspects within it. The then Vice-
Minister of Planning and Coordination Noel Aguirre told me in an interview (24 October
2008) that, in his view, the essence of the notion of vivir bien is that it promotes harmony
with nature and balance with one’s surroundings, including people, Gods, and nature. He
further emphasized this view in a seminar speech (Segundo taller de metodologı
´a para la ela-
boracio
´n de los planes sectoriales de desarrollo, Auditorio IICA, Chasquipampa, 7 November
2008) by stating that the notion of indigenous good life highlights the importance of indigenous
communities and their mutually dependent coexistence (convivencia) manifested in the govern-
mental slogan mentioned also in the above policy excerpt: ‘No se puede vivir bien si los dema
´s
viven mal’. The second important aspect that Aguirre raised in the interview was that the notion
of vivir bien as policy highlights positive aspects of indigeneity, as well as promotes the active
agency of indigenous peoples as subjects of change. This is important given that universalizing
approaches to poverty reduction and economic growth tend to label indigenous peoples as poor
and deficient, thereby constituting them as objects and targets of development interventions. The
third issue that he listed was that unlike liberal modernization paradigms and socialist ideas of
social change through class struggle—both of which tend to focus mainly on material aspects of
development—the notion of vivir bien also takes affections, spirituality, and identity into
account. Although anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and committed to social justice, the vivir
bien paradigm is therefore not about socialism, because the latter comprises ‘part of the
modern rationality, such as, for example, its faith in progress and its materialist perspective’
(Gudynas, 2011a, p. 446).
Together with Carlos Villegas, the then Minister of Development Planning, and other auth-
orities at the ministry, Aguirre had been responsible for the elaboration of the NDP. Prior to
his involvement with the MAS, he had been involved with NGOs working on education and indi-
genous affairs. Drawing on his own humble family background in a mining and peasant commu-
nity in Oruro and years of experience on intercultural bilingual education, he felt the need for
the cherishing of indigeneity as a positive rather than pejorative denominator. In the interview
Toward a Decolonial Alternative to Development? 429

(24 October 2008) Aguirre identified that the origins of the notion of vivir bien as state policy lie
in the upsurge of indigenous movement activity and political mobilization since the 1980s and
1990s. The revitalization of indigenous cultures and identity concerns occurred at the same time
as the co-opting of the notion of development by economic growth agendas and global market
rhetoric. This, according to Aguirre, motivated indigenous intellectuals, activists, and organiz-
ations such as the Consejo de Ayullus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) and Confederacio
´n
de Pueblos Indı
´genas de Bolivia (CIDOB) to elaborate on the meanings and conceptualizations
of alternative forms of development. This often occurred with the help of foreign anthropolo-
gists, NGOs, and global indigenous networking (Albo
´,2008; Yashar, 2005). Foreign Minister
David Choquehuanca, who, according to Aguirre, brought the notion of vivir bien into govern-
mental discourses during the second half of 2005, can be associated with this indigenous
strand—especially the Aymara—within the governing regime. With a background in an indigen-
ous NGO for the recovery of indigenous worldviews and training of indigenous leaders, Choque-
huanca’s suggestion to choose vivir bien as the MAS’ policy proposal drew on his grassroots
experiences at mobilizing indigenous movements. By 2005, the notion had also become an
important political rhetoric for such indigenous organizations as the CONAMAQ; one of the
core organizations within the conglomeration of social movements, indigenous organizations,
and peasant unions that brought Evo Morales into political power (the so-called Unity Pact
[Unidad de Pacto]). Because of the vast diversity of social movements, indigenous organiz-
ations, Left-wing activists, university scholars, and NGO professionals that formulated the
MAS, there was an urgent need for a common policy goal. Aguirre’s opinion was that the
notion of vivir bien came to represent a compromise among various concepts and initiatives
that different political actors brought to the table: a common unifier among various—and
very heterogeneous—political demands.
By the time of my fieldwork, many governmental actors had indeed started to argue that the
notion of vivir bien is not a new version of modern development discourses but rather an alterna-
tive to development altogether; something beyond it. This distinction has been much discussed
in the academic literature (Escobar, 1992; Pieterse, 1998). An example of this political discourse
is represented in the following quotation from an interview (28 January 2009) with Hugo Fer-
nandez, the then Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs:
It is not good to translate vivir bien as development. The concept of vivir bien is an Aymara concept.
Although it is not static, neither is it linear as is the Western concept. Development is a linear concept
that always moves from negative to positive. That is why we tend to talk about better life: ‘I want to
live better’. Contrary to that vivir bien ... is about re-establishing balance ... Colonization
destroyed the balance [of indigenous communities], which is to be recovered now. And this
balance is good life; you cannot have a good life, if people around you are not living well. Vivir
bien is the new paradigm; it is a new way of seeing things.
Fernandez, a Catholic Jesuit and the former director of the NGO in which Choquehuanca—his
superior at the ministry—had worked, told me that he had adopted these views in working with
Aymara, Chiquitano, and Guarani communities in such fields as intercultural bilingual education
and capacity building of indigenous leaders. He perceived that the notion of vivir bien was an
expression of an alternative form of knowledge originating from indigenous communities
and, therefore, can be regarded as decolonial policy option.
In all this, the formulation of policy on the basis of indigenous ideas coincided with a similar
process in Ecuador. Approved in 2008, the Ecuadorian constitution based on the kichwa
(Quechua) notion of sumak kawsay (buen vivir in Spanish) defines it not solely as a collective
well-being deriving from indigenous cosmologies and philosophies but more importantly as a
430 E. M. Ranta

set of rights (Walsh, 2010). The Bolivian constitution (2009), on its part, defines indigenous con-
cepts, such as suma qaman
˜aor n
˜andereko, as major guiding ‘ethical-moral principles’ and
values of the state. After embarking on this idea, the notion of vivir bien unexpectedly vanishes
from the constitutional text. Due to political compromise between the internally heterogeneous
MAS and the right-wing oppositional Poder Democra
´tico Social (PODEMOS) party, ideas and
concepts in the constitutional text represent various political discourses and ideologies (Postero,
2013; Vega, 2011). Within the MAS itself, different tendencies emerged: some promoting deco-
lonizing indigenous practices, others centralization, as indicated, for example, in the stronger
role of the president and in the cooption of social movements into governing arrangements
(Tapia, 2007).
Counteracting ‘Neoliberal Colonialism’
On the one hand, the NDP is, therefore, based on the critique of Western epistemologies and
knowledge claims by indigenous ideas. On the other, it presents a strong critique of economic
globalization and introduces a new approach to state formation. The NDP argues that a process
of decolonization of the state is needed, because its structures, institutions, and practices are
thoroughly infiltrated by neocolonial domination, ethnic exclusion, and racism. ‘Decoloniza-
tion’ here refers to a process which aims to abolish historically and globally constructed econ-
omic and social inequalities manifested most specifically in the lives of indigenous peoples
(Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2007, pp. 106 – 107). In the process
of decolonization, indigenous policy ideas serve as the ideological basis for the construction
of the Plurinational State of Bolivia (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia) (Repu
´blica de
Bolivia, 2008). The plurinational state refers to a decolonized and decentralized state that com-
prises a conglomeration of various naciones (nations), autonomous indigenous territories,
municipalities, and regions (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2007,
p. 485).
Paralleling the observation by Molero Simarro and Paz Antolı
´n(2012), Vice-Minister Aguirre
told me that, in economic terms, the NDP pursues to change the pattern of an export economy
based on a few natural resources (patro
´n primario exportador) in order to decolonize neoliberal
forms of economic relations; the so-called ‘neoliberal colonialism’. Echoing the state-led econ-
omic schemes in the Bolivian nationalist revolution era (from 1952 onwards), the NDP con-
cludes that the way out of inequality and poverty demands that the state takes a more active
role in the use and control of major means of production through, for example, nationalizations
and industrialization of natural resources, which would also create additional surplus for the
state. Until quite recently, however, Bolivia had been celebrated by IFIs and other international
actors as a model student of neoliberal restructurings of economy and state (Kohl & Farthing,
2006). Under the rubric of the Washington Consensus policies, it was one of the first countries
in the world to adopt structural adjustment programs (SAPs). However, the implementation of
the SAPs led to the closure of mines, the opening of the country to foreign investments and trans-
national corporations, and the acceleration of the privatization of state enterprises and services
with the consequent disappearance of tens of thousands of jobs; these were all factors contribut-
ing to growing income inequalities, unemployment, and social problems (Kohl & Farthing,
2006, pp. 61–62, 71). The growth of foreign investment did not create employment or
provide economic well-being for a large sector of the population (Hylton & Thomson, 2007).
By increasingly intruding onto indigenous lands and territories, transnational oil industries,
logging companies, cattle ranchers, and the expansion of mono-crop cultivation and
Toward a Decolonial Alternative to Development? 431

agribusiness, especially soya, were increasingly threatening traditional indigenous ways of life
and financial subsistence (Yashar, 2005).
Vice-Minister Fernandez portrayed vivir bien as an alternative that challenges this unequal
global political economy. He accentuated in the interview (28 January 2009) that:
[The notion of vivir bien]... questions a development model created by capitalism. We believe that
the global capitalist model has reached its limits; it is no longer sustainable. [The capitalist] devel-
opment model has to be changed on a global level. Changes are required in standards of living and in
lifestyles in developed countries. There is no longer room for concepts such as developing countries
and developed countries; we won’t accept that. We are not living good life if this division [between
rich and poor countries] continues to exist. When everyone has an adequate standard of living—and I
am saying adequate, not higher or lower—balance will be established and we can all live a good life.
The statement of the problem in the NDP, therefore, revolves around the notion of ‘neoliberal
colonialism’, a concept concerning both the critique of neoliberal globalization and the need
to change the colonial nature of knowledge and epistemologies prevalent within the state and
spread by transnational actors. The solution implicit in this is that the notion of vivir bien
serves as the tool for decolonizing neoliberalism and the coloniality of the hierarchical state.
For these reasons, a new role for the state is proposed in the pages of the NDP: the state will
constitute the provider of education, health, and social services; it will operate as an active
agent in regulating and controlling productive relations through, for example, nationalizations
of strategic natural resources; and it will recover national sovereignty vis-a
`-vis IFIs, transna-
tional corporations, and other global actors. Various economic reforms have indeed taken
place since Morales’ election, one of the most significant of which has been the renegotiation
of contractual terms of two of Bolivia’s most strategic resources—oil and natural gas—in
favor of the Bolivian state (a process often labeled both by the governing regime and scholars
as ‘nationalization’). The income resulting from this process through the launching of the
direct tax on hydrocarbon resources (impuesto directo a los hydrocarburos) has been directed
into social benefits and conditional cash transfer programs (Molero Simarro & Paz Antolı
´n,
2012; Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2007; Webber, 2011).
Shortcomings of Vivir Bien as State Practice: Toward Conflicts and Contradictions
In terms of concrete changes in the political economy achieved by this approach, the response of
different commentators has been mixed. During my fieldwork in late 2008 and early 2009, most
governmental actors and social movement activists that I interviewed perceived the increasing
role of the state in the regulation of market forces and in the provision of services as a major
shift. Many academic commentators, however, have offered the criticism that ideas suggesting
a postneoliberal era are fairly discursive because the underlying political economy has not been
so radically changed. Despite the increasing role of the state, Webber, for example, has
suggested that the process is far from radical change. He (2011, p. 232) explains that ‘the ten-
dency of the political economy over the entire ...Morales’s first term was toward a reconstituted
neoliberalism, one that abandoned features of neoliberal orthodoxy, but retained its core faith in
the capitalist market as the principal engine of growth and industrialization’. Some of the key
features of what Webber (2011) calls ‘reconstituted neoliberalism’ were the continuation of
extractive capitalism, the continuing influence of transnational capital, and the export of
primary natural resource commodities. Molero Simarro and Paz Antolı
´n(2012) have further
argued that the extractive model of the Bolivian economy has been intensified during
Morales’ presidency.
432 E. M. Ranta

These views resonate with the views of some critical commentators during my fieldwork,
including, for example, the miners’ union and Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo
Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA); the critical research institute that together with some other insti-
tutes has recently been accused by the Vice-President Alvaro Garcı
´a Linera of enhancing trans-
national interests. During my fieldwork, however, a researcher from the CEDLA whom I
interviewed (19 November 2008) rather criticized Morales’ government for continuing with
capitalist export economy and private investments, as well as for not having nationalized
enough.
1
One research report of CEDLA (2006), for example, criticized that despite the so-
called process of nationalization, transnational corporations still hold a share of 18–49% of
oil and gas extraction. Although trade relations with the USA, Canada, and Europe have
declined sharply, exports to Latin American countries, and most specifically to Brazil, have
increased to two-thirds of total exports in 2008 (Webber, 2011, p. 196). The main export
markets for Bolivia’s principal export product, natural gas, are Brazil and Argentina
(Webber, 2011, p. 194).
Toward State-Led Extractive Capitalism?
The role of the state in the field of economy has become a source of tensions and conflicts. It
appears as if the state is taking over the role of transnational corporations in natural resource
extraction. Aiming at state-led economic growth through the exploitation of nature—and
lands and territories often belonging to indigenous groups—stands in stark contrast with the
principles of vivir bien. Unresolved discrepancy between national interests versus indigenous
rights of self-governance and control over territory and resources is a universal problem, now
increasingly contentious in Bolivia.
Differing from the views of the indigenous strand within the MAS, one of the vice-ministers to
whom I talked in an early stage of my fieldwork in 2008 stated very clearly that indigenous
issues were not his main priority. Working in an economic sector related to Bolivia’s strategic
resources, he emphasized the role of the state in economic and social affairs. Without any
mention of the notion of vivir bien (or other indigenous terminologies), his interpretation of
the state transformation process focused on changing the course of the intense processes of pri-
vatization that Bolivia had experienced during the 1980s and 1990s. Dealing with economic glo-
balization and the functioning of free market economy was to be accomplished by increasing the
regulatory role of the state, as the Vice-Minister declared to me in an interview (21 October
2008):
Since 1985, all productive means have practically been given to the private sector on very unfavor-
able conditions. Only scraps have been given to the country and most of the benefits have gone
abroad. Since 2006, the new national development plan has attempted to construct a dignified and
productive Bolivia by emphasizing a strong state role in productive areas. The process of nationali-
zation has been initiated ... We are promoting development through the state ...
The emphasis given here by the Vice-Minister was on bringing back the role of the state in the
promotion of development processes. The nationalization of natural resources was offered as the
prime example of the shift toward state regulation of the markets. This implied that Bolivia, a
former model student of World Bank and IMF-conditioned privatizations and market liberaliza-
tion, was in the process of changing the course of its economic and social affairs with the state at
the fore. The Vice-Minister suggested that indigenous peoples had seriously misunderstood the
nature of the state transformation process.
Toward a Decolonial Alternative to Development? 433

For some reason, peasants have understood that they are proprietors of everything; if they live in
some region, they think that they are owners of the land, owners of the subsoil; owners of everything.
All assets are going to be recovered [from the private sector] but it is the state that is going to admin-
ister them; a community member cannot administer [natural resources]. Yet community members
have understood it the other way around; that assets would be recovered for them.
This excerpt revealed that conflicts have emerged over the question of who is to administer the
process of redistribution and the logic by which it will function. According to the Vice-Minister,
indigenous peoples were demanding too much when opting for self-determination within their
lands and territories. In his opinion, they did not understand the increasing importance of the
nation-state in decision-making processes and in the control of natural resources and territories.
Rather than indigenous autonomies, he stated that the agent of redistribution is the state. Eliding
reference to their cultural difference, it became clear that he considered indigenous peoples ben-
eficiaries of state-led modernization schemes. Related to the exploitation of natural resources in
his ministerial sector, he stated that:
The whole country has been declared [a territory for exploration]. It is of the state; the state admin-
isters it; it is from this point of view that we promote development. The role of the indigenous popu-
lation is to benefit from development, and to make sure they become employees, technicians; to have
stable work and income. We have consultation processes with them so that they know what is being
done ...
Instead of functioning as agents of change, the role of indigenous peoples—‘peasants’ in his
mind—was to enjoy the benefits of the redistributive policies of the state. In his view, they
were merely targets of development for the interventionist state.
The case of encounters between the state and indigenous peoples at the Madidi Park which
occurred during my fieldwork serves as an optimal example of this. The question of indigenous
peoples in the Madidi National Park, North of La Paz, became an issue of conflict when Morales’
executive authorized the exploration and drilling of oil on indigenous lands within the park. Indi-
genous resistance and protests in the area were repressed and oil exploration by the state-led
Yacimientos Petrolı
´feros Fiscales Bolivianos started. Much indigenous resistance activity span-
ning the late 1980s and the 1990s was directed at transnational corporations entering their lands
and territories, yet the MAS executive that rose to political power through this same protest
movement was now repeating the actions of transnational corporations via state enterprises.
The case of Madidi Park seemed to be suggesting that national interests had become a priority
at the expense of indigenous demands for territorial self-governance.
This observation from the time of my fieldwork received more evidentiary support when the
MAS launched its new governmental program in 2010 (Movimiento al Socialismo MAS-IPSP,
2009). While the 2006 NDP was constructed around the indigenous notion of good life, the new
governmental program was almost devoid of indigenous terminologies; it had a strong theme of
modernization through state-led industrialization and other state initiatives such as infrastruc-
ture, transportation, agricultural production, and social services. Its main emphasis rested on
the so-called ‘Great Industrial Leap’ (Gran Salto Industrial).
Contentious Politics Re-emerges
One major conflict that aptly exemplifies contradictions between the transformative ideals of
vivir bien and the newly arisen state enthusiasm on resource extraction has been the case invol-
ving the Isiboro Secure
´National Park and Indigenous Territory (Territorio Indı
´gena y Parque
434 E. M. Ranta

Nacional Isiboro Secure
´[TIPNIS]) (for a profound analysis, see McNeish, 2013). Commencing
in August 2010, the TIPNIS situation resembles that of Madidi Park, though more aggravated
and conflictive, with a long historical record of contentious relationships between migrant pea-
sants and lowlands indigenous groups, and mobilizations against the state and colonizers in the
name of indigeneity (Yashar, 2005). At the center of the conflict lie the plans of Morales’ execu-
tive to construct a highway between the towns of Cochabamba and Trinidad in the department of
Beni through the TIPNIS-protected natural park and lowlands indigenous territories. From the point
of view of the Morales’ executive, the justification for this plan was that road building would unite
the Andean and Amazonian regions that have, historically, been largely unconnected. This would
facilitate economic opportunities and the provision of social services. Yet many indigenous groups
living in TIPNIS furiously resisted the project. They argued that the road would only open up econ-
omic opportunities for coca-growing peasants, Morales’ principal political support basis. Addition-
ally, better infrastructure would open up lowlands indigenous territories for Aymara and Quechua
migrants (colonizadores), which would further enhance conflicts over lands and territories. Further-
more, natural gas had been found to the west of the park territory, and contracts had been granted to
the state-led Bolivian-Venezuelan company, Petro-Andina (Yacimientos Petrolı
´feros Fiscales
Bolivianos and Petro
´leos de Venzuela S.A.) (McNeish, 2013, p. 225).
In contrast with ideals implicit in the notion of vivir bien, this initiative rather highlights the
focus of the new 2010 governmental policy through large-scale development projects such as
road building and resource extraction (Repu
´blica de Bolivia, 2010). The conflict has shown
that the executive has a growing interest in extending its control over national territory and
natural resources—and social and indigenous movements located in those areas—through
large-scale development projects. It brings up inconsistencies and contradictions between
anti-imperialist discursive commitment to the indigenous cause and environmental protection,
and the real-life exploitative practices of the state against its people (Webber, 2011, p. 235).
A major conflict between the Morales’ executive and various lowlands indigenous groups
developed. The aggressive intervention of the state into indigenous territories also attracted the
increasing attention of indigenous and environmental activists worldwide. Many indigenous
groups at the TIPNIS, together with the CIDOB, actively framed their resistance using global indi-
genous discourses and mobilized international NGOs to campaign against the Morales’ executive.
They also initiated a massive march toward the capital La Paz in 2011. Violent conflicts and
repression by the police and army occurred when peasant unions and the governing regime con-
fronted indigenous marchers. The TIPNIS conflict reflected internal conflicts and diverging inter-
ests between indigenous groups (McNeish, 2013). Many peasants and coca-growers living in the
area, including the Consejo Indı
´gena del Sur (Conisur), defended the construction of the highway
in order to enhance their economic opportunities. While social movements, indigenous organiz-
ations, and peasant unions had formed a united front to support the rise of the MAS to political
power, historical differences between them, and respective quarrels and conflicts re-emerged
(Morales, 2013). In 2012, however, the government organized a consultation process (consulta
previa), which was highly criticized by indigenous, environmental, and human rights groups as
authoritarian and pre-determined, but which, according to the government, gave legitimation to
the construction process (Achtenberg, 2012). However, the Brazilian loan was withdrawn and
the process postponed. Although both Morales and Garcı
´a Linera later acknowledged their mis-
takes during the consultation process, the initiative was revived during the 2014 electoral cam-
paigns. It is represented as one of MAS’ policy proposals for the third term in the proposed
governmental program ‘Juntos Vamos Bien Para Vivir Bien 2015 – 2020’ (Working Together to
Live Well); a policy plan in which vivir bien reappears (Achtenberg, 2014).
Toward a Decolonial Alternative to Development? 435

Concluding Remarks
This article has examined the emergence and shortcomings of the notion of vivir bien as state
policy in Bolivia. I described and explained how the Bolivian state through its progressive
regime composed of social movement activists, indigenous activists, and Left-wing scholars
has adopted the notion of vivir bien as the key policy terminology uniting various interests
and ideologies within the government. Subsequently, I outlined how the concept of vivir bien
is discursively portrayed as a local, decolonial alternative to development. It is an example of
critical perceptions of new kinds of ‘development’ that have emerged in the Global South as
a response and resistance to economic globalization and Western epistemic hegemony.
However, it appears that its transformative potential has, to a large degree, been vanishing in
the process of translating the notion of vivir bien from political discourse into concrete practices.
Instead of becoming an alternative to growth-based development, it appears that the notion of
vivir bien has become a new state-led development model that draws both from modernization
paradigms and socialist traditions with few concerns for environmental protection or indigenous
peoples’ rights. Developmentalist paradigms of economic growth, natural resource extraction,
and exploitation of nature still seem to prevail. Consequently, if neoliberalism is perceived as
the hegemony of economic growth agendas and the commodification of social and environ-
mental values, then neoliberal policy patterns are continuing in Bolivia as Webber (2011), for
example, has suggested.
However, if neoliberalism is about prioritizing private actors, the Bolivian case rather
resembles state-led extractive capitalism than ‘reconstituted neoliberalism’. Although a poor
country’s possibilities to shift from one of the most privatized economies in Latin America to
processes of complete nationalization have proved unrealistic, the regulatory role of the state
has been strengthened in economic and social sectors. Given the country’s steep inequalities
and history of heavy reliance on foreign development aid in the provision of social services,
this is a much needed effort. If redistribution benefits the poorest and levels income and other
disparities, it can be perceived as a success for vivir bien as state policy; as the gradual recover-
ing of balance and harmony between people (‘living well as others also live well’). A more equi-
table distribution of economic and social well-being may be perceived as a modern equivalent to
ideals of vivir bien; an ideal of a community—or the nation-state or the global world—without
steep hierarchies and power imbalances. Furthermore, Bolivia has more sovereignty to decide
over its own development paradigms.
In addition to contradictions and conflicts related to the role of the state in the economy, unre-
solved shortcomings of vivir bien as state policy also include questions related to internal demo-
cratization, respect for pluralism, and environmental values. From the perspective of many
grassroots indigenous groups, for example, threats that transnational and private actors used
to pose on indigenous lands and territories, their income generation, and ecological sustainability
are now partly overtaken or replaced by state actors. The degrading environmental conditions
that state-led extractive capitalism produces are being experienced locally. While the capacity
of the Bolivian state vis-a
`-vis transnational actors may have improved, vivir bien as state
policy has not enabled local communities to decide over their own parameters of development,
as has been manifested, for example, in the case of TIPNIS. Despite some attempts to organize
consultations, the role of the governing regime in dictating what is needed for the ‘development’
of the nation has superseded local struggles for indigenous self-governance. Violence, repres-
sion, and silencing of protesters by force make Morales’ government not too different from
its predecessors. The centralization of the state in terms of decision-making and governance
436 E. M. Ranta

comes across as a sign of the continuing coloniality. In addition to further enhancing state-led
redistribution of means of production, wealth, income, and social benefits, vivir bien as state
policy would require increasing internal democratization and respect for pluralism, indigenous
self-governance, and environmental values.
To conclude, I want to go back to what I started with: to the notion of crisis. Now in 2016, we
are still living in a world of massive global inequalities and exploitation. Living at the expense of
the poor of the South has been an endemic part of existence for the North. In many parts of the
Global South, and in Bolivia in particular, however, radical structural change, based on critiques
of modernist development, has been more visible. They have said: ‘No. We no longer accept this
world order.’ Indeed, the Bolivian case is an example of a movement that is visibly spreading
across the Global South: of increasing demands among peoples who are opting to take the
future of their lives and societies into their own hands, thereby shaping the definition of devel-
opment through their own paradigms. And as such, the notion of vivir bien as an ideal for an
alternative future horizon serves its purpose.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for excellent commentaries that allowed greatly to
improve the article. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Jeremy Gould, Maaria Seppa
¨nen,
Elina Oinas, and all my informants in Bolivia.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This research was funded by the Finnish Graduate School of Development Studies (DEVESTU) and the Academy of
Finland (258235).
Note
1 Considering possible harm that controversial points of views might cause for informants in current or future political
scenarios, I have opted anonymity with most of them. I refer solely to such politicians or scholars whose views are
publicly known to most Bolivians with their own names.
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Eija Ranta is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Swedish School of Social Science, University of
Helsinki. She holds a PhD in Development Studies from the University of Helsinki. She has con-
ducted ethnographic fieldwork on social movements, alternative development paradigms, devel-
opment policy-making, and state formation processes in Bolivia and Kenya.
Toward a Decolonial Alternative to Development? 439