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Informality and Segmentation in the Mexican Labor Market

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Banco de México
Documentos de Investigación
Banco de México
Working Papers
N° 2015-25
Informality and Segmentation in the Mexican Labor
Market
December 2015
La serie de Documentos de Investigación del Banco de México divulga resultados preliminares de
trabajos de investigación económica realizados en el Banco de México con la finalidad de propiciar el
intercambio y debate de ideas. El contenido de los Documentos de Investigación, así como las
conclusiones que de ellos se derivan, son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores y no reflejan
necesariamente las del Banco de México.
The Working Papers series of Banco de México disseminates preliminary results of economic
research conducted at Banco de México in order to promote the exchange and debate of ideas. The
views and conclusions presented in the Working Papers are exclusively the responsibility of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect those of Banco de México.
Carlo Alcaraz
Banco de México
Daniel Chiquiar
Banco de México
Alejandrina Salcedo
Banco de México
Informality and Segmentation in the Mexican Labor
Market*
Abstract: In developing countries, some workers have formal jobs while others are occupied in
informal positions. One view regarding this duality suggests that sectors are segmented, which means
that a worker in the informal sector identical to another in the formal sector cannot get a formal position
due to entry barriers. A second view states that workers self-select into informal jobs. Previous research
suggests that these two situations may coexist in the same labor market. In this paper we identify the
proportion of informal workers who are in each situation for the case of Mexico. Using a simple model
of self-selection with entry barriers into the formal sector, we estimate that between 10 and 20 percent of
informal workers would prefer to have a formal job. While this result provides evidence of the presence
of some segmentation in the Mexican labor market, it suggests that an important proportion of workers
in the informal sector self-select into it.
Keywords: Informality, Segmentation, Mexico, Labor Market.
JEL Classification: J42, J46
Resumen: En países en desarrollo, algunos trabajadores tienen empleos formales y otros informales.
Una visión respecto a esta dualidad sugiere que existe segmentación entre sectores, lo que significa que
un trabajador informal idéntico a otro formal no puede obtener un trabajo formal debido a barreras a la
entrada. Una segunda visión señala que los trabajadores se auto-seleccionan a la informalidad.
Considerando que ambas circunstancias podrían coexistir, en este documento se identifica la proporción
de trabajadores informales en cada situación para el caso de México. Utilizando un modelo de
autoselección con barreras de entrada al sector formal, se estima que entre el 10 y el 20 por ciento de los
informales preferirían tener un empleo formal. Si bien este resultado provee evidencia de la presencia de
cierta segmentación en el mercado laboral mexicano, también sugiere que una importante proporción de
trabajadores informales se autoselecciona al sector informal.
Palabras Clave: Informalidad, Segmentación, México, Mercado Laboral
Documento de Investigación
2015-25
Working Paper
2015-25
Carlo Alcarazy
Banco de México
Daniel Chiquiarz
Banco de México
Alejandrina Salcedox
Banco de México
*The authors would like to thank seminar participants at the XVII Meeting of the Central Bank Researchers
Network of the Americas in Montevideo (2012), Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, Alfonso Cebreros and an anonymous
referee for very helpful comments, and María José Orraca for excellent research assistance.
y Dirección General de Investigación Económica. Email: carloalcaraz@banxico.org.mx.
z Dirección General de Estabilidad Financiera. Email: dchiquiar@banxico.org.mx.
x Dirección General de Investigación Económica. Email: asalcedo@banxico.org.mx.
1 Introduction
In many countries an important proportion of workers have informal jobs, that is, they are not
hired according to the labor regulation. Researchers have been interested in analyzing whether the
formal and informal sectors are segmented or integrated (see Fields, 2009 for a literature review).
Early studies on informal labor claim that labor markets in developing countries are segmented.
In this case, the existence of entry barriers to the formal sector prevents workers from obtaining
jobs in this sector, which means that an informal worker who would prefer to be formal cannot
get a formal job even when he is identical to another worker employed in the formal sector (Lewis,
1972; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Rauch, 1991; Magnac, 1991). Given that entry barriers are the only
reason preventing an otherwise identical informal worker from getting a job in the formal sector,
these workers are considered involuntary informal workers. The entry barriers could be generated
by the presence of strong unions, restrictive labor market regulations, or minimum wages above
market clearing wage levels, among other factors.1More recent studies have proposed an alterna-
tive explanation for the existence of informal workers in developing countries. In this case, rather
than a survival strategy, informal labor is seen as voluntary. That is, some workers self-select to
informal jobs because, given their characteristics, it is in their best interest. For example, Maloney
(1999) for the case of Mexico argues that there is no segmentation and that informality exists be-
cause some workers want to take advantage of the dynamic and unregulated informal labor market.
However, the possibility that these two types of informal labor could coexist in the same market
has also been proposed (Fields, 1990; Perry et al., 2007), and this is the topic of interest of this paper.
Several authors have discussed the possible empirical implications of having a segmented or a
non-segmented labor market (Portes, 1995; Fiess et al., 2010). In particular, they claim that under
a segmented labor market one would expect low mobility between formal and informal jobs (or only
informal to formal transitions) and countercyclical informal employment. For a non-segmented la-
bor market, they expect high mobility between formal and informal jobs and procyclical informal
employment. While some authors have argued that significant formal–informal wage differentials
could also suggest segmentation (see Fields, 1980 for a literature review and Pratap and Quintin,
2006), evidence of wage differentials is not necessarily proof of segmentation since informal workers
could be obtaining non-observed benefits, such as a greater flexibility in working hours, which could
compensate them for these differentials (Maloney, 2004).
1Other explanations of barriers to the formal sector include: lack of formal jobs (Moser, 1978; PREALC, 1985) and
the presence of an efficiency wage setting mechanism where formal firms (bigger and more complex than informal
firms) have to pay higher wages in order to elicit effort from their workers (Bulow and Summers, 1986; Esfahani and
Salehi-Isfahani, 1989).
1
In the case of Mexico, using the National Statistics Office (INEGI) definition, around 58 percent
of workers are informal. This definition includes both wage earners that do not have access to social
security and self employed workers that do not follow a formal accounting system. Some evidence
associated with segmentation between the formal and informal sectors exists, such as the presence
of a restrictive labor legislation (Heckman and Pag´es, 2004; Botero et al., 2004) and countercycli-
cal informal employment (Alcaraz, 2009; Gasparini and Tornaroli, 2009; Fiess et al., 2010). Some
authors have argued that there is also evidence consistent with voluntary informal employment,
such as high mobility between formal and informal employment (e.g. Levy, 2007) and procyclical
informal employment (Maloney, 1998). Apart from methodological or data differences, these ap-
parently contradictory results could be reflecting the fact that some workers in the informal sector
are voluntary (self-selected) and others are involuntary (would prefer a formal job but cannot get
one).
Even recognizing that the informal sector is composed of both voluntary and involuntary work-
ers, estimating the relative prevalence of each type is not straightforward because being voluntarily
or involuntarily employed in the informal sector is not observable. In particular, we can tell whether
the worker is employed in the formal or in the informal sector, but we cannot observe whether an
informal worker is employed voluntarily or involuntarily in such sector. In this paper we propose
a simple empirical model of self-selection into the formal or informal sector, where we introduce a
barrier to entry into the formal sector. This way we allow workers to self-select into the informal
sector, but also consider that not all workers can have access to a formal job even if they wish to.
In particular, the entry barrier into the formal sector is introduced as a probability that determines
whether a worker obtains a formal job whenever he prefers a position in this sector. In the model,
workers select their preferred sector according to their socioeconomic characteristics. The results
from a maximum likelihood estimation indicate that between 10 and 20 percent of informal workers
would prefer to have a formal job, and this proportion is statistically significant. Furthermore, the
significance of the coefficient related to the barrier to entry into the formal sector provides evidence
of the presence of segmentation in the Mexican labor market. However, the results also suggest an
important proportion of workers self-selecting into the informal sector.
Among the papers that are closely related to this one, we should mention Duval and Smith
(2011). These authors use the model of Dickens and Lang (1985) and modify it to allow for vol-
untary and involuntary informal workers and self-selection between sectors. They estimated the
parameters of the model by maximum likelihood.2However, given that the purpose of their paper
2Dickens and Lang (1985; 1988) estimate models using maximum likelihood to identify two non-observed sectors in
the labor market of the United States, and have become key papers for the literature on segmented labor markets.
2
is to estimate the effect of changes in social security services provided by the Mexican government,
they do not estimate the proportion of involuntary informal workers. To our knowledge, the only
other paper that tries to estimate the fraction of involuntary informal workers in an economy is
unther and Launov (2012), who apply their methodology to the case of Cˆote d’Ivoire. They as-
sume that the labor market is composed of a formal sector which is homogeneous, and an informal
sector that is heterogeneous and consists of two latent (unobservable) segments, each characterized
by its own earnings equation. These authors find that 45 percent of the informal workers in that
economy are involuntary. The model they develop is based on a finite mixture model to which
they add sample selection into the labor market. However, conditional on labor force participation
the finite mixture model does not account for self-selection into formality versus informality.3Our
model takes into account barriers to formality and self-selection into informality, allowing us to
directly estimate the fraction of the informal sector that is involuntary.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we construct a model of self-selection
into the formal or informal sector, where we also introduce an entry barrier into the formal sector.
Section 3 develops the definition of informality and describes the data. Section 4 presents the
empirical estimation of the model, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model of Segmentation and Self-selection
In the model that we propose in this section there are two sectors in the labor market: formal
and informal. We abstract from the decision to join the labor force, and workers only focus on
the decision about which sector they want to work in. Workers first voluntarily decide to look
for a job in the sector that will give them the highest utility based on their characteristics. Such
characteristics include those that could directly affect their labor income (like education), but also
those that affect the choice of sector and are not directly associated to their potential labor income
(like household composition). The implicit assumption is that jobs in the formal sector are different
from those in the informal sector. This could be due to flexibility in hours worked, the availability
of social security benefits, or the preference to pay for such social security services (through a
deduction from the worker’s wage).
We assume that once workers decide which sector they want to work in, they apply for a job in
that sector. If they choose the informal sector, they immediately obtain the job they asked for. In
3According to the literature, self-selection into the formal or informal sector is a relevant source of endogeneity
(Magnac, 1991; Duval and Smith, 2011; Pratap and Quintin, 2006).
3
contrast, we assume that there is a barrier to entry to the formal sector, so that if they choose this
sector, there is a probability δthat they are hired. With probability 1-δthey cannot get the job,
and they are forced to take one in the informal sector (involuntary informal workers). We call vol-
untary informal workers those who self-selected into the informal sector given their characteristics.
Formally, we assume that for a person i, the unobserved utility of being a formal worker is given
by
u
i=Xiβ+εi, εiN(0,1) (1)
where Xiis a matrix of observable characteristics for individual ithat determine the utility of being
a formal worker. These include socio-demographic characteristics of the worker and his household.
Whenever u
i>0, the worker will prefer to work in the formal sector. Given that once the worker
decides to work in the formal sector he is hired with probability δ, a worker will have a job in the
formal sector if u
i>0 and he is hired. Similarly, the worker will take a job in the informal sector
if u
i0, but also if he wanted a job in the formal sector and did not get one, that is, if u
i>0
and he is not hired. This is summarized as follows:
Worker’s observed sector = (formal if u>0 and is hired
informal if u>0 and is not hired or u0
As can be noticed, this model is very close to the usual self-selection model, except that not all
workers who would prefer a formal job can obtain one and are therefore displaced into the informal
sector. We estimate the parameters of the model by maximum likelihood to determine the fraction
of informal workers who would have preferred a formal job but could not obtain one. With this
purpose, we first determine the probability of observing a worker in the formal or in the informal
sector. These probabilities are given by:
pi(formal) = P(u
i>0and is hired) = δΦ(Xiβ) (2)
4
pi(informal) = P[(u
i>0and is not hired)or (u
i0)]
=P(u
i>0and is not hired) + P(u
i0)
= (1 δ) Φ (Xiβ) + Φ (-Xiβ)
= 1 δΦ (Xiβ) (3)
In the expressions above, Φ represents the cumulative density of the normal distribution. Based
on these probabilities, the likelihood function is defined in the following way:
L=Y
formal
δΦ(Xiβ)·Y
informal
[1 - δΦ(Xiβ)] (4)
It is important to note that δdoes not depend on the workers’ preferences or characteristics, it
depends only on the institutional framework of the economy. Once we obtain an estimate for δwe
can derive the proportion of informal workers who are employed involuntarily in that sector. Let F
be the number of observed formal workers and fthe proportion they represent among all workers.
Additionally, let Tbe the total number of workers, and Mthe number of workers who prefer to be
formal (u
i>0). Using the fact that F= δM, then,
involuntary informal workers
informal workers =(1 - δ)M
T-F =(1 - δ)1
δ
1
f-1 (5)
It is important to note that we allow workers to self-select into the formal or informal sectors and
at the same time introduce a barrier to entry into the formal sector. Furthermore, we use workers’
characteristics both directly and indirectly linked to wages to model self-selection. This way we
try to capture that depending on their characteristics, workers can be attracted to diverse types of
jobs. For example, workers, depending on their socioeconomics, may have different valuations for
non-monetary benefits associated to some job and take that into account when self-selecting into
the formal or informal sector. Indeed, apart from wages, non-monetary characteristics of the jobs
are also important when workers decide about the job they want to seek (e.g. Maloney, 2004).
Some caveats of the model should be pointed out. In first place, we left aside the participation
decision. For the empirical part, we focus only on male workers aged 23 to 60 whose participation
is very high. Additionally, we do not allow for changes between sectors and we assume a one-time
decision.
5
3 Informality in Mexico and Data Source
We estimate the parameters of the model presented in the previous section using employment
information for Mexico. We use data from the Mexican employment survey, Encuesta Nacional de
Ocupaci´on y Empleo (ENOE), conducted by the Mexican statistics office, INEGI. This is a quar-
terly household survey at the national level designed to collect data on the employment situation
of Mexicans in rural and urban areas.
The survey classifies workers according to whether they hold a formal or an informal job. The
definition of informality follows the criteria proposed by the International Labour Organization
(ILO 2003). Informal workers are assumed to be those who are not employed according to the
labor regulations. More precisely, employees or wage earners are classified as informal if their job
does not provide them with access to social security benefits.4Not having access to social security
is regarded as an indicator that the worker is not hired following the labor regulation and therefore
that is working informally. We should point out that informal workers can be working for a formal
firm, that is, one that is legally registered in terms of tax obligations. All workers without pay-
ment, employees in the agricultural sector, and domestic workers without access to social security
institutions are also considered informal. On the other hand, self-employed workers or employers
are classified as informal if the businesses they run do not follow regulations in terms of registering
their business to pay taxes. These businesses typically do not have a formal accounting method
that allows for a separation between production activities and other activities of the owners (like
regular household income or expenditures).
We consider that informality is an urban phenomenon, and as such for this document we fo-
cus on workers living in localities with 15,000 or more inhabitants. In Table 1, we present the
percentage of urban workers classified as formal or informal by working condition (wage earner or
self-employed/employer) with data for the fourth quarter of 2014.5The Table shows that among
wage earners (which represent around 68 percent of all workers), 37.4 percent were classified as
informal. On the other hand, for self-employed workers or employers (which represent 26 percent
of all workers), we obtained that 81 percent are considered informal. Overall, around 46 percent of
workers were informal in 2014-IV.6
4The employment survey labels wage earners as “Trabajadores subordinardos y remunerados”. It is important to
note that some workers may have access to health services in social security institutes through their spouses. This
information is not used to classify the worker into formal or informal, because it is the provision of social security
through the job of the worker that matters.
5We exclude from the analysis workers who declare to have a job without a monetary payment for their work. Around
6% of workers fall in this category.
6The 46% of informal workers reported in this section is computed considering the described restrictions to the
6
In order to provide a broader description of informality in Mexico, we first depict in Figure
1 the evolution of informality in the last ten years. It can be noted that the informality rate
increased after the most recent economic crisis. Additionally, in Table 2, we show the prevalence
of informality across different demographic groups of the population. As can be observed, 47.7
percent of employed women are informal, whereas 44.5 percent of men are. The Table also shows
that some sectors have a high prevalence of informal workers, such as restaurants, various services
and construction, as opposed to mining, manufactures and social services, where most workers are
formal.
In Table 3 we compare the socio-demographic characteristics of informal vs formal workers. It
can be observed that there does not seem to be an important difference on the mean age of informal
and formal workers. However, on average, informal workers are less educated than formal workers.
In this context, it is relevant to keep in mind that wage differentials between formal and informal
workers may reflect endogenous decisions by workers relating the sector they prefer to work in
(Alcaraz et al., 2008).
4 Empirical analysis
Having identified informal workers in the Mexican employment survey, we estimate the param-
eters of the model presented in Section 2 for a sample of male workers aged 23 to 60, declaring to
receive a monetary payment for their job and living in localities of more than 15,000 inhabitants,
in the last quarter of 2014.7As mentioned before, we restrict the sample to male workers to avoid
possible selection problems due to participation. For the estimation of the model, we include vari-
ables that would directly affect the worker’s labor income: age, geographic region, and schooling
dummies. We also consider variables that are not directly related to labor income, but that could
play a role in the choice of sector: marital status, being head of household, number of males in
the household, number of household members, number of household members under 5 years of age,
number of household members older than 60 years, and the average education of women in the
household. Another variable that could affect the individual’s decision of which sector to choose
is whether a household member, other than himself, has access to social security institutions. If a
sample. This number differs from the 58% mentioned in the introduction that was computed without restricting
the sample.
7For all exercises except a sensitivity analysis using different samples of workers (in particular the last panel in Table
6), we also drop workers who do not report labor income or report an income of zero and those with income in the
top and bottom 1 percent of the labor income distribution.
7
worker has a formal job, he can extend social security benefits to his dependents (spouse, children,
and parents living in the household). Therefore, if someone in the household already has access
to these institutions, a worker could be more inclined to self-select into an informal job. However,
this variable may be endogenous to the decision of which type of job to choose. We do not include
an income variable because of the risk of facing endogeneity problems.
We present summary statistics of these variables in Table 4, comparing formal to informal work-
ers from our selected sample. As can be noted, we do not find an important difference in average
age between formal and informal workers, whereas formal workers have more years of schooling.
The same is true for the average household education, as the women in formal households have, on
average, 10.7 years of schooling, while they only have 8.8 years of schooling in informal households.
Although on average formal workers are more likely to live in a household where another member
has access to social security, it is important to highlight that only 43 percent of formal workers live
in a household with this characteristic (25.6 percent for informal workers). Turning to household
composition, the most salient finding is that informal households seem to be slightly larger.
We now turn to the estimation of the parameters of the model using a maximum likelihood
methodology. The results are presented in Table 5. Each column refers to an estimation of the
model that includes a different set of control variables (Xi) that are assumed to affect the decision
of whether to hold a formal or an informal job. At the bottom of the Table we report the estimated
probability that the worker is hired in the formal sector if he decides to look for a formal job (δ),
the probability that he is not hired if he chooses this sector (1-δ), and the last row presents the
estimated proportion of informal workers who would have liked to hold a formal job, that is, the
percentage of involuntary informal workers among informal workers.
In Column 1 we include only variables that would directly affect the worker’s labor income.
In Column 2 we add variables that could be directly related to the choice of sector and not di-
rectly linked to labor income. The results adding average education of women in the household
are presented in Column 3. In Column 4 we show the results of the estimation considering the
variable that indicates access to social security institutions from other members of the household,
but excluding the average education of women in the household. Finally, in Column 5 we present
the estimation with the full set of control variables. All estimations include regional dummies for
the five main geographical regions of Mexico. As can be observed, the estimated probability of
acquiring a formal job for those workers who would like to have one is around 90 percent. More
importantly, the probability of not being able to obtain a job in the formal sector given that the
worker applied for one (1-δ) is statistically different from zero in all specifications. This should be
8
interpreted as evidence of barriers to entry into the formal sector. In other words, we reject the
null of inexistence of segmentation in the Mexican labor market. Additionally, to respond to the
question of whether informal workers are voluntary or involuntary, we also report the estimated
percentage of informal workers who would have liked to have a formal job. For the estimation in
Column 3, which includes all socio-demographic variables and average education of women in the
household, the percentage of involuntary informal workers is 11.8 percent, and it is statistically
significant. Once we include the full set of variables, in Column 5, the percentage increases to 16.6
percent.8
Specific groups of workers may be relatively more restricted by labor market rigidities than
others in terms of formal sector entry barriers. For example, salaried and full time workers may be
more willing to have a formal job than other workers. On the other hand, self-employed workers
and part time workers may be more willing to self-select into the informal sector in order to take
advantage of its flexibility. We therefore estimate the model for different subsamples of workers.
Table 6 reports the results of the same five specifications used above (that differ on the characteris-
tics of the workers included as controls). The first panel presents, for comparison, the results of the
full sample also reported in Table 5. The second panel reports the results using a sample restricted
to wage-earners (i.e. not self-employed), and we do not find very different results from the baseline
sample. However, we do find important differences in third and fourth panels, where we restrict
the sample to workers who work for more than 30 and 35 hours a week, respectively. In this case,
the proportion of involuntary informal workers rises to around 18 percent. This may be reflecting
that part-time workers cannot find jobs in the formal sector that are as flexible as they require.
Finally, the fifth panel shows the results in which we add to the main sample male workers who
report not receiving a monetary payment for their job. In this case, the estimated proportion of
involuntary informal workers is below the baseline estimates, probably reflecting that these persons
may be working for their families and are therefore not looking a job in the formal sector.
8The variables included in the model generally show patterns that seem to be consistent with prior expectations.
Older, more educated, married and head of household workers are more likely to be willing to be formal. It seems
that the number of household members has a negative effect on the probability of being formal. This variable could
be capturing the fact that poorer households tend to have more children. In Column 3, also as expected, higher
mean education of women has a positive effect on the decision to be formal. However, not as intuitive is the result
(Column 4) that access to social security by someone in the household has a positive effect on choosing a formal
job, but this could be due to the possibility that social security access may be capturing some income effect or that
family preferences for formality may be playing a role. Column 5 tries to control for the possible income effect by
including education of women in the household, but although the magnitude of the effect decreases slighlty, the
direction of the results remains unchanged.
9
The percentage of involuntary informal workers may change with economic conditions, possibly
increasing during an economic downturn. Figure 2 shows the evolution from 2005 to 2015 of the
estimated fraction of involuntary informal workers using the specification in Column 5 of Table
5. Although the estimations are quite noisy, the graph shows a clear increase in the fraction of
involuntary informal workers in the post-crisis period that began to decrease in the early 2013.
The large confidence intervals do not allow us to give a precise conclusion about a possible change
in the segmentation in the Mexican labor market in that period. However, while the estimated
fraction of involuntary informal workers between 2007-I and 2009-IV was on average 12.8 percent,
the fraction increased to an average of 16.8 percent between 2011-I and 2013-IV. It is important to
have in mind that an increase of 4 percentage points is quite sizable, since the number of informal
workers is very large. 9
The results presented in this section point to a sizable fraction of informal workers who have
self-selected into this type of job. This suggests that there are certain characteristics that the for-
mal sector lacks to attract more workers. These could include more flexibility in hours worked or
unbundled social security benefits. On the other hand, the results point at an important fraction of
informal workers who could not access a formal job. This indicates that the Mexican labor market
suffers from barriers to the creation of formal jobs, which could include high costs of hiring or firing
workers.
9According to ENOE, in 2014-IV there were 11,316,527 urban workers in the informal sector.
10
5 Final Remarks
Informal labor is a widespread phenomenon among developing economies. Several studies have
highlighted the importance of reducing informal work to increase long term productivity (Perry
et al., 2007; Levy, 2007; Alcaraz et al., 2008, for example). In order to implement effective policies
aimed at reducing informal labor, it is crucial to consider the heterogeneity of the informal labor
market in each specific country. In this sense, if the labor market is characterized by entry barriers
to the formal sector that derive in labor market segmentation, suitable policies to reduce informal
labor could include modifying the regulation regarding labor unions and increasing labor market
flexibility, in other words, eliminating regulations that hamper labor mobility. In contrast, if
informal labor in a given country is voluntary and there are no entry barriers to the formal sector,
other types of policies need to be implemented. In this case, reforms that reduce the relative
cost of formality, such as decreasing labor taxes and social security contributions, could be more
appropriate. If the two sources of informality coexist in an economy, a combination of both types
of policies would be required to address the problem. Given the evidence provided in this paper
that indicates that for the case of Mexico barriers to entry into the formal sector coexist with an
important fraction of workers voluntarily self-selecting into the informal sector, in order to reduce
informal labor in Mexico, a combination of policies should be implemented: measures to reduce
entry barriers to the formal sector along with measures to increase the relative value of formal
labor.
11
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13
Table 1
Informality by working condition
Source: ENOE, INEGI, fourth quarter of 2014. The sample is restricted to urban workers who live in localities with
15,000 or more inhabitants and declare receiving a monetary payment for their job. See Section 3 for the definition
of informality.
14
Table 2
Informality by gender, age, sector of activity and working hours among urban workers
Source: ENOE, INEGI, fourth quarter of 2014. The sample is restricted to urban workers who live in localities with
15,000 or more inhabitants and declare receiving a monetary payment for their job. See Section 3 for the definition
of informality.
15
Table 3
Characteristics of urban workers
Source: ENOE, INEGI, fourth quarter of 2014. The sample is restricted to urban workers
who live in localities with 15,000 or more inhabitants and declare receiving a monetary
payment for their job. See Section 3 for the definition of informality.
16
Table 4
Characteristics of urban male workers in the selected sample
Source: ENOE, INEGI, fourth quarter of 2014. Standard deviation in parenthesis. The sample is restricted to male
urban workers aged 23 to 60, who live in localities of 15,000 or more inhabitants and declare receiving a monetary
payment for their job. The sample excludes workers who do not report income, those that report an income of zero,
and the top and bottom 1 percent of the labor income distribution. See Section 3 for the definition of informality.
The dummy variable “Access to social security institutions” indicates if the individual lives in a household where
at least one member, other than himself, has access to social security institutions as labor benefit.
17
Table 5
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results
Model of self-selection into the formal (vs. informal) sector with an entry barrier
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis. Source: ENOE, INEGI, fourth quarter of 2014.
The sample is restricted to male urban workers aged 23 to 60, who live in localities of 15,000 or more inhabitants and
declare receiving a monetary payment for their job. The sample excludes workers who do not report income, those
that report an income of zero, and the top and bottom 1 percent of the labor income distribution. See Section 3 for
the definition of informality. The dummy variable “Access to social security institutions” indicates if the individual
lives in a household where at least one member, other than himself, has access to social security institutions as labor
benefit. The coefficients represent the effect of each variable in the individual’s preference for the formal sector. δ
is the probability of obtaining a formal job for a worker who prefers a job in the formal sector.
18
Table 6
Estimated Percentage of Involuntary Informal Workers
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis. Source: ENOE, INEGI, fourth quarter of 2014.
The columns in this Table correspond to the specifications shown in Table 5. The sample is restricted to male urban
workers aged 23 to 60, who live in localities of 15,000 or more inhabitants and declare receiving a monetary payment
for their job (except for the last panel where we include those that specifically reported not receiving monetary
income). In all cases the sample excludes workers who, although they declare receiving a monetary payment for
their job, do not report income or report an income of zero, and the top and bottom 1 percent of the labor income
distribution. See Section 3 for the definition of informality.
19
Figure 1
Urban Informality Rate
Source: ENOE, INEGI, 2005-2015. The sample is restricted to urban workers who live in
localities of 15,000 or more inhabitants and declare receiving a monetary payment for their
job. See Section 3 for the definition of informality.
20
Figure 2
Estimated Fraction of Involuntary Informal Workers
Source: ENOE, INEGI, 2005-2015. The sample for each period is restricted to male urban
workers aged 23 to 60, who live in localities of 15,000 or more inhabitants and declare receiving
a monetary payment for their job. The sample for each period excludes workers who do not
report income, those that report an income of zero, and the top and bottom 1 percent of
the labor income distribution. The graph shows the evolution of the estimated fraction
of involuntary informal workers to informal workers that corresponds to the estimation of
column 5 in 5 for each period. See Section 3 for the definition of informality.
21
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