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Concerning the Ultimate Foundation of the Distinction of the Directions in Space
... Here it is important to note the difference between the mirror image as an image (reflection) of an object, in which case it is identical with an object as any image, is a part of an object and mirror image as a different object in which case they are not identical. Chirality as an argument was one of the major points raised by Imanuel Kant (Kant 1999) in disagreement with Leibniz's relationism of space and time. In regard to chirality we can see an interesting thing -it disappears when changing in dimensionality of space. ...
While we often talk about different types of identity, logical, ontological, or Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernibles, we often tend to overlook that any question regarding “What is identical?” or “How is it identical?” depends upon “When is it identical?” or “Where is it identical?” Therefore, identity cannot be understood without spacio-temporal reference. Also, as any object can be described as an event or to make it stricter - any object is an event, thus anything considered to be simultaneous also must be considered as identical in time. However, while simultaneous objects (events) are considered to be identical in time, not all identical objects (events) are considered to be simultaneous. Following this consideration, four possible types of spacio-temporal identity are analysed. Any object (event) can be identical: A) In Time and Space; B) In Time but not in Space; Γ) In Space but not in Time; Δ) Neither in Space nor in Time. Therefore, all objects (events) that are considered as being identical fall into one of these four spatio-temporal types. This is true whether we have properties, features, qualities or any other factors which let us consider objects (events) as identical. As we can see, only cases A and B apply to the notion of simultaneity, where objects (events) are considered to be identical in time. We also know that simultaneity is relative and depends upon a system of reference. Therefore, we may expect that the same applies to identity thus forming an idea of relativity of identity in those types that depend on time.
... Vis dėlto, nors ir plačiai žinoma bei dažnai klaidingai interpretuojama, tai nėra vienintelė Kanto erdvės ir laiko koncepcija. Svarbus antireliacionistinis argumentas pateikiamas ir ankstesniame 1768 metų Kanto darbe "Apie esminius erdvės regionų skirtumo pagrindus" (Kant 1999). Jame teigiama, kad, pripažinus reliacionistinę teoriją, nebūtų jokio skirtumo tarp kairės ir dešinės, priekio ir nugaros, viršaus ir apačios. ...
Straipsnyje nagrinėjama absoliutistinės ir reliacionistinės erdvės ir laiko koncepcijų kontroversija. Lyginamos Newtono ir Leibnizo teorijos, pateikiami kitų diskusijoje dalyvavusių filosofų požiūriai. Atskleidžiami abiejų teorijų argumentacijų trūkumai ir privalumai. Straipsniu nesiekiama atstovauti kuriai nors pozicijai, lyginamoji abiejų požiūrių analizė leidžia skaitytojui susidaryti nešališką vertinimą. Teigiama, kad abiejų erdvės ir laiko sampratų prielaidos yra greičiau metafizinės nei fizikinės. Nurodoma, kad klasikinė diskusija yra vis dar aktuali šiuolaikiniame moksliniame kontekste.
... But the freedom of movement must already presuppose a basic orientation in space. This is a particular capability which is manifested as the ability to generate direction, which, as Kant noted, is egocentric by necessity:Since we know nothing external to us through the senses, except in so far as it stands in relation to ourselves, it is no wonder that we derive from the relation of these intersecting surfaces to our body the ultimate foundation of generating the concept of regions in space(Kant [1968], p. 38). ...
The aim of this book is to describe human rights in philosophical
categories and to compare their functions from the perspective of
political realism and idealism. In this way we intend to show human
rights (within the state as well as in the international relations), in
conflict with civil rights and sovereignty of state. The conflict results
from the universality and non-territoriality of human rights and
territoriality of civil rights. The spatiality and finiteness of civil rights
clash with postulated universalism and globalism of human rights.
Lefebvre famously had asked how "éspace" and "spacialité" contribute to the constitution of societal order. In this paper we want to propose an answer to this question by sketching a new social theory in the making. On this basis we address the recent societal transformations, as they are indicated by empirical research, in terms of the re-figuration of spaces. Finally, we want to provide some preliminary specifications of what we mean by the re-figuration of space with reference to the processes of polycontexturalization, mediatization and translocalization. By polycontexturalization we mean that increasingly there are arrangements of space and multiple references to hitherto different spatial scales and dimensions which take effect or are put into effect simultaneously. Individual and collective actors are confronted with the challenge of following different spatial logics at the same time. By mediatization we refer to the fact that the constitution of space takes place in mediated forms spurred by advances in digital communication technologies. Proactive and reflexive communicative acts on different scales and levels, at once digital and face-to-face, are thus made possible or become inevitable. As a result of mediatization and multiple processes of circulation involving human beings, things and technologies, polycontexturalization implies what has come to be called translocalization, i.e. a continual coupling of different locations in conjunction with an increase in relevance of the individual location.
It is commonly accepted that “actual” (not astronomically too large or sub-microscopically too small) geometrical properties and relations of physical objects follow the axioms and theorems of the three-dimensional Euclidean geometry. But what about perceptions (and related judgments) that concern these geometrical relations and properties of physical objects?
The aim of this paper is to explore why Deleuze takes up Hamlet's claim that ‘time is out of joint’. In the first part of this paper, I explore this claim by looking at how Deleuze relates it to Plato's Timaeus and its conception of the relationship between movement and time. Once we have seen how time functions when it is ‘in joint’, I explore what it would mean for time to no longer be understood in terms of an underlying rational structure. The claim can be understood as about a relationship between time and action. In the second part of this paper, I want to relate this new understanding of time to Hamlet itself, in order to see how temporality operates within the play. I will conclude by relating these two different conceptions of time out of joint to one another through Nietzsche's eternal return.
Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts for substantival space is examined; it is concluded that the argument has no force against a relationist. The argument does suggest that a relationist cannot give an account of enantiomorphism, incongruent counterparts and orientability. The prospects for a relationist account of these notions are assessed, and it is found that they are good provided the relationist is some kind of modal relationist. An illustration and interpretation of these modal commitments is given.
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