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An Economic Interpretation of the Medieval Crusades
... Unlike Anderson et al. (1992a and1992b), Davidson and Ekelund (1997) and Ekelund et al. (1989Ekelund et al. ( , 1992Ekelund et al. ( and 1996, then Iannaccone (1992 and1998) and Zdeski and Zech (1992) who put forward the maximization of the profit or well-being of the members of the church, we first consider that the household-pastor maximizes satisfaction. Thus, the preferences of the household-pastor are described by a concave utility function, differentiable twice: ...
... Unlike Anderson et al. (1992a and1992b), Davidson and Ekelund (1997) and Ekelund et al. (1989Ekelund et al. ( , 1992Ekelund et al. ( and 1996, then Iannaccone (1992 and1998) and Zdeski and Zech (1992) who put forward the maximization of the profit or well-being of the members of the church, we first consider that the household-pastor maximizes satisfaction. Thus, the preferences of the household-pastor are described by a concave utility function, differentiable twice: ...
... A religião não se apresenta como um empecilho para o desenvolvimento econômico, mas, na história recente da China, a religião foi considerada uma instituição que inibia o crescimento econômico. Law (2005) Os estudos de Anderson et al. (1992), Davidson e Ekelund (1997), Ekelund et al. (1989;1992; ...
This article carries out a review of institutional relations, focusing primarily on religion and economic development and with special emphasis on China. The case of China is especially interesting, since after decades of prohibition and attempts to completely eradicate religion, to ultimately create a fully atheist society, religion has now been granted total freedom and even been encouraged by the government. A unique moment has thus presented itself: enabling us to analyse the transformation of institutions and the impact this can have on society and the economy, and especially on the formation of the market and public policies. The importance of this analysis lies in the definition of the bases of Confucianism and Bud-dhism on the formation of social institutions and the Chinese market, which are different from the western concept of a market. The differences that emerged suggested a certain du-ality: there are characteristics of Buddhism and of Confucianism that benefit the market, like their encouragement of study and education, dedication to one's work, as well as the acceptance of hierarchies and the alignment of individual interests to common interests. These religions, however, condemn consumerism and encourage an ethic of respect for the environment , ideas that are contrary to those adopted as part of the current growth of the country. RESUMO Este artigo faz uma revisão sobre a relação entre instituições, com destaque para a reli-gião e o desenvolvimento econômico, com ênfase na China. O caso chinês é particular-mente interessante, pois depois de décadas de proibição e da tentativa de erradicação da religião, com formação de uma sociedade ateísta, a religião ganha liberdade e até mes-mo incentivo do governo. Aqui surge um momento único: a análise da transformação das instituições e seu impacto sobre a socie-dade e a economia, particularmente sobre a formação do mercado e das políticas públi-cas. O destaque da análise se encontra na de-finição das bases do confucionismo e do bu-dismo sobre a formação das instituições sociais e do mercado chinês, que são diferen-tes do conceito ocidental de mercado. As di-ferenças encontradas apontam para uma du-alidade: existem características do budismo e do confucionismo que são benéficas ao mercado, como o incentivo ao estudo, a de-dicação ao trabalho, além da aceitação de hierarquias e o alinhamento do interesse individual ao interesse comum. Essas religiões, no entanto, condenam o consumismo e pro-movem uma ética de respeito ao meio am-biente, o que vai na direção oposta do atual crescimento do país.
... Previous studies have analyzed particular doctrines and policies in this light. Regulations on usury (Ekelund et al., 1989), the invention of Purgatory , monastic development (Davidson, 1995) and Crusading policies (Anderson et al., 1992) have all been analyzed as devices to enhance the power and the ability of the medieval Church to develop and produce profit or rent streams through doctrinal and policy manipulations. ...
This paper addresses the medieval Roman Catholic Church's attempts to monopolize the marriage market and to wrest control over the institution from secular authority. In particular, the paper highlights specific doctrinal innovations and evolving rules and regulations. Rules surrounding endogamy, the definition of a valid marriages, and the escape clauses established by the Church are the principal features of the argument as is the place of these manipulations in the overall monopoly of the Church.
... Two, it has been suggested that tolerating freeriding might be necessary for the growth of a religious organization (Clain and Zech 1999: 925-926 and McBride 2007a: passim, also 2007b also see Hutchison 1977, Wallis 1991: passim, Lipford 1992, and Schlicht 1995: 136, Miller 2002: 445, Leathers and Raines 2008) and that social structures in which an organization is embedded might inhibit freeriding (Baron and Hannan 1994: 1136). Finally, Tullock (1996) suggests that since people have a full information contract with god there should be no incentive to freeride (also see Anderson and Tollison 1992, Klick 2006, Ekelund et al 2006, Richardson and McBride 2007, Ferrero 2008a for related arguments). Following Coşgel and Minkler (2004 a, b) we can suggest that religious individuals who identify themselves with a group might commit themselves not to freeride. ...
This study explores the ways in which information about other individual's action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient's within-game reputation on the dictator's decision: Reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives is an important step in trying to understand how impulses towards selfish or generous behavior arise. The statistical analysis of experimental data reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators' actions than the social influence and identification.
Religious institutions, which played a key role in the creation of inequality, also played a key role in the creation of relations of dominance, which enabled the consolidation and perpetuation of inequality. There are many types of relations of dominance. We start with the oldest and most basic of all, the dominance of men over women—and President Jimmy Carter’s response to this ancient and deep-rooted practice.
Along with other reasons, (such as the absence of corporations, ban on interest and speculation, absence of banking institutions, inheritance laws that led to the breaking up of estates and the reliance of rulers on the clerical establishments for legitimation), absence of monasticism (with monks innovating, producing but abstaining from consumption and with monasteries networking across borders and asserting their rights against rulers), played a key role in the economic underdevelopment of Islamic countries vis-a-vis the West.
The ideology of crusade did not suddenly appear with Pope Urban II’s appeal at Clermont in November 1095. Scholars now acknowledge that it resulted from a slow evolution that, in the course of one millennium, led the Church from its original pacifism preached by Jesus of Nazareth to the concept of holy war that blossomed before the end of the eleventh century. Pope Urban II, however, added to this ideology a new sacral dimension which derived from the distinctive objectives of the crusade, the liberation of Jerusalem and the holy places. This new dimension explains its immense success. It transformed the former ‘ordinary’ holy war into a ‘most holy’ war, the crusade, whose ideology would dominate the western mind for several centuries, reactivate the jihād in the Muslim Near East and, in its turn, arouse other ideologies against it, which would lead on the one hand to the Protestant Reformation and on the other to the birth of secular thought.
RESUMO Este artigo considera o papel atual do confucionismo e do budismo no desenvolvimento econômico chinês a partir da análise da Economia da Religião. O debate apresentado neste artigo identifica que os valores Confucionistas se aproximam da lógica do Espírito Protestante de Weber sobre o capitalismo ocidental e o papel fundamental da religião protestante no processo de desenvolvimento econômico. Percebe-se igualmente que o Budismo apresenta conceitos de comportamento que são contrários aos valores ocidentais de mercado, como a defesa do consumo necessário e uma severa preservação ambiental.
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