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Citizenship and free movement
Abstract
As a set of institutional norms and political beliefs liberal democracy has no serious contemporary rivals.1 But, as many have noted, there are tensions between the two elements of this compound. One of these tensions concerns freedom of movement. For liberalism, this is a very important value, and political authorities that restrict free movement must have strong reasons to do so. From a democratic perspective, the strongest one is that states must have the power to control immigration in order to maintain the conditions for self-government and equal citizenship. Immigration controls are often defended by other reasons that aim at maximizing economic utility for the destination country or at preserving its cultural homogeneity. From a liberal perspective these arguments are suspicious because of their obvious partiality or their incompatibility with a commitment to pluralism. For those who value freedom and equality and who believe that democracy is the best way to promote these values, the argument from citizenship is the most powerful one. But democratic polities that are liberal must at the same time strive toward expanding freedom of movement whenever the reasons for restricting it are attenuated. In this essay I explore how the tension could be made productive for this liberal goal by considering citizenship as an argument not only for closing borders but also for opening them. I regard the citizenship argument for controlling immigration as indeed quite strong and I will endorse it against the two main arguments for global freedom of movement, which refer to positive duties of global social justice and to negative duties of states to refrain from restricting basic liberties respectively. This controversy has been going on for quite some time,2 and it is hard to say anything new and original. Several protagonists have recently suggested sophisticated approaches that attempt to reconcile some of the conflicting values.3 I will comment on these only briefly. My main goal is to explore whether both normative defenses and critiques of immigration controls may have misconstrued the citizenship argument. Many theorists accept that a democratic conception of citizenship provides reasons for legitimate immigration control as well as for more generous admissions compared with current state practices.4 I want to take this approach a step further by showing that citizenship not only supports admission priorities within regimes of general immigration control but may also become a reason for expanding general rights and spaces of free movement beyond state borders. If my argument succeeds, then liberal and democratic norms concerning free movement can be reconciled, at least under favorable conditions and in the long run. The second section provides some empirical groundwork by demonstrating that free movement rights across international borders are currently attached to multiple citizenship in a broad sense, which exists both in a vertically nested constellation in the European Union and in horizontally overlapping constellations between states linked through migration. In the following section I suggest a typology of territorial and personal scopes of free movement rights. The fourth section considers the two arguments for global freedom of movement. The following section discusses citizenshipbased defenses of immigration control, while the sixth section shows how the same perspective supports territorial admission of specific categories of persons and general freedom of movement within regional unions of independent states. The final section discusses how these partial regimes of free movement could be expanded. Copyright
... This makes it possible for migrants to retain official and political links with their home countries, while they can also acquire citizenship in the country of residence (ibid.). Dual citizenship is the formal equivalent of the idea that one can fully function in the country of residence, without this having to imply that one is forced to become a member of a particular cultural community or that one is forced to leave behind the cultural practices and bonds of another country (ibid.: 19; see also Bauboeck 2009Bauboeck , 2011. ...
... Such a transnationalism will not pit de-ethnicised, either territorial or Republican, conceptions of citizenship against ethnic ones, or stay within the confines of the nation-state of residence. Instead of replacing ethnic citizenship with de-ethnicised citizenship, transnationalism seeks to differentiate citizenship itself, acknowledging its residential, cultural (ethnic or national) and political (Republican) aspects (Bauboeck 1998a(Bauboeck , 2009(Bauboeck , 2011. ...
... After the so called "refugee crisis" in 2015, a heated debate about the welcoming of refugees, the right to stay, and political membership emerged in Europe. Conversely, this debate is not new and there exists a rich body of literature about questions on immigration, states´ obligation to include refugees, and the allocation of citizenship (Bader 2005;Seglow 2005;Bauböck 2011 a;Smith 2011;Carens 2013;Fine & Ypi 2016;Grundmann & Stephan 2016). Therefore, several scholars have already discussed the exclusion of non-members in the national context (Miller 2005;Wellmann 2008, Wellmann & Cole 2011, while the connection between the principle of allocating political membership by birth and its global consequences yet remained unexplored. ...
... In the present time, migrants need to pay vast sums to human traffickers, who smuggle them illegally into the destination country. For the world´s poorest, this is absolutely no option, since they do not have sufficient financial resources to pay human traffickers (Bader 2005;Bauböck 2011a). Under these circumstances, individuals who suffer most from the birthright lottery are the ones who do not gain from Ius Nexi at all. ...
In her book The Birthright Lottery, Ayelet Shachar (2009) offers convincing arguments regarding the connection between birthright citizenship and global inequalities. If bestowing citizenship upon birth leads to the perpetuation of privileges in wealthy states, new approaches to the granting of political membership need to be considered. Hence, Shachar introduces two concepts, the Birthright Privilege Levy and Ius Nexi, to resolve the injustices created by the birthright lottery. A critical analysis of her approach might reveal substantial weaknesses in her theory. Indeed, important ramifications concerning capitalism, migration and restricted mobility remain unresolved in the conception of her ideas. This paper argues that only a stringent conjunction of her concepts might fulfil Shachar´s aim, to coherently link political membership with global justice. The revision and extension of her theory might hold important implications for migration studies, since it raises essential questions on how to achieve a world with relatively open borders, in which mobility is an expression of individual´s autonomy.
... Otherwise put it, the host society must not keep individuals in a permanent status which implies enjoying no rights (illegal status) or enjoying only civil and social, but not political rights (permanent partial citizenship, or permanent residency without the possibility to acquire full citizenship rights). The argument for this requirement is a strong one: a permanent status of 'in-betweenness' (Schuck 1998) would transform them in 'second-class citizens' (Bosniak 2006), since they would be subjects to the coercion of a political decision-making system in which they have no share (in which they have not been represented) (Walzer 1983, Brubaker 1989, Bauböck 2010b. But if long-term residence automatically implies access to political membership, then this is a reason for the state not to regularize undocumented migrants in the first place: their presence on the territory is not legal, so the best policy would be to deport irregulars before the length of stay would qualify them to acquire citizenship. ...
... The second cluster refers to the protection of the ethno-national culture from enforced and rapid change (Bader 2005). The third has to do with economic considerations: restrictions are permitted if immigration threatens state's ability to guarantee social rights and to maintain the welfare system (Bauböck 2009a, Bauböck 2010b). Finally, border and membership controls are legitimate for reasons connected to national sovereignty, democratic selfdetermination, and the priority citizens owe to their compatriots (Bader 2005, Altman andWellman 2009). ...
... Interestingly, this article also shows that state interests not only affect the entry and settlement rights of EU citizens but also their exit rights. Even though freedom of movement consists of the right to entry, settlement and exit (Bauböck 2011), most analysis on freedom of movement to date has focused mainly on the right to entry and to settlement and the corresponding access to social rights. However, the use of prior authorisation to regulate patients' access to other countries' healthcare regimes suggests that national governments and their administrations can try to limit freedom of movement, exerting a subtle control on the right of exit. ...
EU citizens’ access to social rights has become a contentious issue in the EU in the past decade. This article aims to reverse the North–South perspective on intra‐EU mobility and welfare by shifting the research emphasis from the labour‐oriented mobility of young Southern Europeans in Northern Europe to the non‐labour‐motivated mobility of Northern EU citizens in Southern Europe. To do so, this analysis addresses the provision of healthcare assistance regulated by European legislation for European retirees and patients in Spain. The analysis shows that retirement migration has been perceived as a state burden, yet patients’ mobility has tended to be seen by the Spanish government as a market opportunity. However, the study also indicates that efforts to deal with these two different types of mobility are embedded in structural constraints that go beyond governments’ intentions, which adds a new complexity to the limits of freedom of
movement and EU citizenship
... However, after an initial period of stay of three months, during which the host country is not obliged to grant social assistance to those EU citizens who do not qualify as workers, only the right to entry and exit remain unconditional for everyone. On the contrary, the right to continuous residence and to access welfare and healthcare benefits becomes conditional on regular economic activity (Bauböck 2011). ...
Although Member states have increasingly relied on welfare policies to control intra-EU migration in the last decade, they often grant additional social rights to EU citizens who do not comply with residency requirements set by EU law, revealing a gap between declared restrictive aims and actual inclusive measures. Based on document analysis and semi-structured interviews in Belgium, this article analyses the interests and logics of the plurality of institutional and civil society actors on the welfare-EU migration nexus, suggesting that policy inconsistency resulted from the struggle of these – conflictive – logics. In doing so, the paper also reveals how the category of ‘illegal EU migrants’ has been institutionally produced ‘from below’, with healthcare providers, welfare bureaucracies and pro-immigrant organisations – rather than ‘the State’ – taking the lead in that process.
... 26 Perhaps the most effective way to advance this might be to promote the adoption of new and extension of existing reciprocial visa-free travel agreements, both bilaterally (such as those already in place between most developed countries) and in the multilateral context of regional organisations such as the European Union. Such a strategy would be analogous to Rainer Bauböck's proposal to advance immigration possibilities through reciprocal mobility regimes between states (Bauböck 2011). The core of his argument lies in the notion that pairs or groups of states have a reciprocal duty to open their borders for each other's citizens if this does not conflict with the other duties they have towards their own citizens (for instance with regard to social welfare rights). ...
An estimated 1.2 billion international tourist visits are made annually. Yet, while normative political theorists have written extensively about the justifiability of migration control, little attention has been paid to the justifiability of entry policies for short-term visitors. This paper addresses this neglect and makes the case for a prima facie moral right to visit countries on temporary, non-labour visas. The argument is made in four parts. First, the paper shows that none of the arguments which can convincingly be put forth in defence of states' presumptive right of control over immigration are applicable to similarly extensive discretionary control over short-term entries, as these arguments rely on the potential negative economic, cultural or political effects of foreigners' medium-term or long-term settlement. Second, it explores two positive ways to ground a right to enter foreign countries as a visitor, one using the Kantian notion of humanity's original common ownership of the earth to defend a general liberty right to travel across its entire surface, the other on the specific interests which individuals may have in entering. The paper argues that the latter strategy is more convincing, and explores what interests may be at stake. Third, it discusses and rejects four objections which might be levelled specifically against the idea that states must generally open their borders to short-term visitors: that restricting short-term access is necessary to prevent longer-term settlement; that large-scale tourism itself can have negative economic and cultural effects which warrants giving states a discretionary right to regulate it; that it must be restricted to protect public security; and that a focus on extending the rights of short-term entry and stay at the expense of the more important rights of permanent migration is imprudent. Fourth and last, it examines the real-world institutional implications of this argument for more open borders for temporary visitors, including whether a 'right to visit' should be codified in international law.
... Full membership is defined as a profound link between an individual and a state [98]. Full members' choices are affected by the state' laws and most of the actions of the latter occur within the physical space delimited by the state's territory. ...
... It means that communities -which are important for the authorities too -exists not only along the ethnical background but on the basis of the common cultural values as well. This communities are firstly important from the point of view of the political participation when the government takes steps -or introduce new legal rules -with special attention to the existence of such communities of either ethnical or cultural groups (Bauböck 2011). On the other hand, communities can function as a relevant channel of communication with the political area, developing consultation structures or lobbying actions. ...
The increasing integration of the Internet of Everything into the industrial value chain has
built the foundation for the next industrial revolution called Industry 4.0. Industry 4.0 is
currently a top priority for many companies, research centres, and universities and is a part of fast changing business environment. Therefore it must be clearly focused on the future trends since fast changing environment forces companies to be flexible and to adapt quickly. New trends in logistics as well as in the field of legislation and demand for greener products and sustainable solutions will undoubtfully shape the future of industry 4.0. This paper is therefore focused on development of industry 4.0 in relation with megatrends in logistics as well as with development of legislation related especially with environmental protection.
... Rainer Bauböck (2011) has argued that freedom of movement consists of three separate rights: exit, entry and settlement. Our analysis of the legal and substantive social rights of EU migrant citizens clearly demonstrates that classifying EU citizens as a homogenous migrant category with more or less the same social rights as nationals can be misleading. ...
Existing accounts of the relationship between type of welfare state and generosity of welfare rights granted to immigrants tend to be based on broad analytical categories, overlooking the specific intricacies of welfare rights access and generosity within specific policy domains. It is often assumed that EU citizens have the same access to social rights as national citizens, failing to acknowledge the economically and geographically stratified nature of EU citizenship. Furthermore, differences in national social protection systems of Member States can translate into differences in social rights for EU citizens migrating to other Member States. This paper provides an analysis of EU citizens' legal and substantive rights, with a special focus on unemployment benefits, pensions and family benefits. It demonstrates how EU citizens' social rights are legally differentiated according to economic status and substantively differentiated according to Member State of origin and destination. Finally, the
En este capítulo no me es imposible desarrollar un concepto normativo que nos diga exhaustivamente qué son las fronteras internacionales. Una teoría de este tipo va más allá de los objetivos de un capítulo de libro porque parece requerir la elaboración de novo de una teoría normativa de las fronteras internacionales. Antes bien, de manera más modesta, trataré de perfilar el tipo de aproximación que pueda usarse para dar cuenta de la naturaleza, significado práctico y fundamentos de las fronteras internacionales apropiadas para Estados que tengan un carácter moral sustantivo. Para poder hacer esto de manera más o menos económica, intentare justificar una suerte de desiderata que identifique el núcleo teórico básico de lo que las fronteras deberían ser para el caso de las democracias liberales. La desiderata constituye una suerte de rúbrica que nos dice cómo debería verse una teoría mínima del diseño de fronteras internacionales y que por ello nos permitirá evaluar y comparar de manera preliminar distintos conceptos de fronteras.
In this chapter, we present the main areas of empirical research and theoretical thought in political science related to need-based distributive justice. From the perspective of positive political research, we discuss how need is conceptualized as a motive for political action in the theory of post-materialism, how different strands of political economy study processes of need-based redistribution in democratic states, and how studies on poverty reduction constitute the starting point for the use of the ‘need’-terminology. Furthermore, a closer look at several fields of public policy shows how need functions as a central category in empirical decision-making processes. From the perspective of normative political theory, we show how need is conceptualized as a contested concept in political discourse, how it served as a core idea in justifications of the welfare state in the 1980s and early 1990s, and why the idea of “basic human needs” became a core maxim in international politics in the 1970’s and was later replaced by the concept of capabilities. Finally, we demonstrate how the concept of need continues to play an important role in the literature on global justice.
Citizenship is defined in terms of national contexts, institutions, or practices. Apart from noting one’s membership in a certain polity, citizenship can be understood to have – at least – three meanings as follows: it can signify access , identification , and practice. This article examines these three dimensions based on the experiences of highly skilled Finns living in other European Union member states. Do they adopt the legal citizenship of the new country to gain access to legal and civic rights? Do they begin to identify with and assimilate to their new home country? Is citizenship played out in the everyday life as practice? The article concludes that thanks to European citizenship, all three interpretations are present at the same time.
This article stresses the need to study how EU member states define and implement the concept of habitual residence to assess boundaries of welfare in the EU, and EU migrant citizens’ social rights specifically. It draws on comparative qualitative research on two EU member states – Germany and Sweden. The article first clarifies the differences between legal and habitual residence, and distinguishes between legal definitions of habitual residence and administrative formalities tied to such definitions. After examining legal definitions at the EU level, it goes on to consider additional definitions found in each member state case and administrative formalities attached to these definitions. Following this, implications for EU migrant citizens’ social rights in each country are assessed. The analysis reveals how administrative processes of residence registration shape conditionality. In this way, administrative aspects of habitual residence can have far-reaching exclusive effects on EU migrant citizens’ access to social benefits and services in the destination member state, as well as inhibit their ability to enjoy their right to freedom of movement. The article thus illustrates the inherent tension between free movement and residence based social rights in a Union with devolved social provision.
Liberal democratic states have three kinds of duties towards migrants and refugees. First, they should enhance their own citizens opportunities of free movement through entering reciprocity-based agreements with other states that are sufficiently similar or with whom they share a political union. Second, they should admit economic migrants if there are expected benefits for the receiving country, the sending country and the migrants themselves. Third, they have to allow for family reunification and to contribute to refugees protection because of their commitments to universal human rights. States can contribute to the latter goal by taking in refugees or by supporting other states that do so. In the international state system, a fair distribution of both types of burdens among all states cannot be secured. In the European Union, however, the principle of sincere cooperation and the need for coordination of refugee flows in the Schengen area of internally open borders combine a normative commitment with self-interests of states to overcome this prisoners’ dilemma. All the more tragic is the blocking of European solutions by unwilling member states who are ready to sacrifice European integration because they are not ready to accept their duties towards refugees.
Differences in member states' economic development and national social protection systems can translate into significant differences in the substantive social rights of EU migrant citizens. The substantive rights of economically inactive EU migrant citizens are dependent on the 'export' of social rights from their country of origin to the member state of destination, in particular during the initial phase of their residence in a new member state as a jobseeker or a pensioner. This paper demonstrates that EU citizens' social rights are substantively stratified, not only by economic status, but also according to the member states of origin and destination. Stratified social rights, it is argued, generate unequal opportunities to free movement and eo ipso challenge the very concept of EU citizenship. The paper concludes with a proposal for a European Minimum Income Scheme to at least partially overcome the shortcomings of existing EU citizenship. 2
In a very influential paper of 1990, William Rogers Brubaker laid out the characteristics of the ideal typical model of nation-state membership: “egalitarian, sacred, national, democratic, unique, and socially consequential”. Egalitarian because there should be no gradations of membership among citizens and the relation to the state granting membership should be unmediated. Sacred because citizens should consider the nation-state to which they belong as an entity regarding which calculations of advantage are inappropriate. National because membership should refer to a community distinctly differentiated from others in cultural, linguistic, traditional terms. Unique in the sense it must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive, and socially consequential, meaning it must entail that certain privileges are reserved for the well-being of the members. Finally, Brubaker explained what the “democratic” adjective—the one that holds most ancestry and authority among all others—meant in terms of a concrete imperative: full membership should carry the duties and rights of participation in the polity and in the long run residence and citizenship must coincide.
This chapter illustrates the discrepancies between citizenship as a universal discourse of equal rights and the realities of socio-economic marginalisation for certain groups of citizens. This point is illustrated by exploring the transnational citizenship practices of diaspora Somalis in Kenya, Egypt, Europe and the United States. Horst and Al-Sharmani argues that these discrepancies are caused by the fact that ‘belonging’ is a crucial element of in understandings of who is a citizen or not. The chapter explores how diaspora Somalis look for alternative discourses and experiences of citizenship. Obtaining the right type of citizenship is an important aspect of their strategies, but diaspora Somalis then realize that does not provide them with the rights they had hoped for. Instead, they develop a transnational sense of citizenship, which in many ways questions how citizenship is experienced and used by marginalized citizens and non-citizen residents.
This article deals with the territorial categories of cultural belongings of community members. First, Ahponen discusses the feelings of home and familiarity as the local basis of cultural identity. This aspect is followed by contemplations on how people are located and dislocated, both concretely and symbolically, when they move across regional, national and continental borders and adopt the identities of border-crossers in cosmopolitan conditions. The basic question concerns cultural political reasoning of the sense of togetherness in the transition of local dwellers to global citizens. This problem is exemplified by personal experiences.
Ahponen also points out that transculturally mobile denizens are exposed to the feelings of being disconnected from their fixed identities. Global citizens are imagined to be at home everywhere with anybody. Nevertheless, without learning how to become cosmopolitan locals, they continue to be either dislocated locals or alienated cosmopolitans, missing the trustful and satisfying social interactions that would guarantee their own existence.
Public debates about the terms of membership and inclusion have intensified as developed economies increasingly rely on temporary migrant labour. While most agree that temporary migrant workers are entitled to the general protection of employment laws, temporary migrants have, by definition, restricted rights to residence, full social protections and often to occupational and geographic mobility. This book raises important ethical questions about the differential treatment of temporary and unauthorised migrant workers, and permanent residents, and where the line should be drawn between exploitation and legitimate employment. Taking the regulatory reforms of Australia as a key case study, Laurie Berg explores how the influence of immigration law extends beyond its functions in regulating admission to and exclusion from a country. Berg examines the ways in which immigration law and enforcement reconfigure the relationships between migrant workers and employers, producing uncertain and coercive working conditions. In presenting an analytical approach to issues of temporary labour migration, the book develops a unique theoretical framework, contending that the concept of precariousness is a more fruitful way than equality or vulnerability to evaluate and address issues of temporary migrant labour. The book will be of great interest to scholars and practitioners of immigration law and employment law and policy.
The right to vote has always been the central privilege of citizenship. Its extension to resident migrants holds a promise of democratizing citizenship by bringing it closer to principles with deep roots in liberal and republican traditions, and further away from particularistic understandings that reduce citizenship to nationality. This article's main contribution is a systematic and policy-relevant discussion of the kind of enfranchisement that can realize that potential, approached in three steps: first, a demarcation of citizenship policy within migration policy substantiates the need to employ a normative perspective; second, a description of the trend of enfranchisement of non-citizens provides the normative paper with a sound empirical base for a non-ideal discussion; third, a discussion of different kinds of enfranchisement tackles the controversial issues related to it and delineates the specific requisites to realize its potential.
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