After 9/11: British South Asian Muslims, Islamophobia, Multiculturalism, and the State

Abstract

In light of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent actions and reactions on the part of nation-states in the West and “terrorists” in the East, this paper discusses the concepts of Islamophobia (political and media-manufactured) and multiculturalism in the British context. Rising Islamophobia, state actions, and media reactions to 9/11 have led to changing definitions of the “good multicultural society.” British Muslims are caught in a quagmire: Their loyalties are questioned by a society and polity that is still in the processes of establishing its “Englishness” from its “Britishness,” while growing Islamic political radicalism undermines the already precarious relations between British Muslims and the state.

Full text

After 9/11: British South Asian Muslims,
Islamophobia, Multiculturalism,
and the State
Tahir Abbas
Abstract
In light of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent actions and
reactions on the part of nation-states in the West and “terrorists”
in the East, this paper discusses the concepts of Islamophobia
(political and media-manufactured) and multiculturalism in the
British context. Rising Islamophobia, state actions, and media
reactions to 9/11 have led to changing definitions of the “good
multicultural society.” British Muslims are caught in a quag-
mire: Their loyalties are questioned by a society and polity that
is still in the processes of establishing its “Englishness” from its
“Britishness,” while growing Islamic political radicalism under-
mines the already precarious relations between British Muslims
and the state.
Introduction
There has been a Muslim presence in Britain since the beginning of the
nineteenth century, when Muslim seamen and traders from the Middle East
began settling around the major British ports.1Muslims from the British Raj
Tahir Abbas has a B.Sc. (Econ), M.Soc.Sc., and Ph.D. He is a lecturer and director, Centre
for the Study of Ethnicity and Culture, University of Birmingham; editor of Muslim Britain:
Communities under Pressure (Zed: 2004); and author of The Education of British South
Asians: Ethnicity, Capital and Class Structure (Palgrave: 2004) and British Islam: Identity,
Action and Social Construction (forthcoming). This paper was originally presented to the
Annual British Sociological Association Conference, “Sociological Challenges: Conflict,
Anxiety and Discontent,” University of York, 22-24 March 2004 as “The New Sociology of
Ethnic and Cultural Studies: The Experience of British South Asian Muslims.” The author
would like to thank the anonymous referees and editors for making valuable comments on
an earlier version of this paper.

in India also came to England to study or trade. The community’s major
growth, however, dates from the post-Second World War immigration of
Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Indians to fill specific labor demands in
declining industrial cities in the southeast, the Midlands, and the north.2In
the 1990s, there was an intake of eastern European and Middle Eastern
Muslim refugees emanating from such places as Bosnia and Kosovo,
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Iraq.
Although conceptual overlaps exist, the British discourse on racialized
minorities has been transformed from “color” in the 1950s and 1960s3; to
“race” in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s4; to “ethnicity” in the 1990s5; and to
“religion” in the present climate.6Here, Islam has the greatest profile. British
popular discourse has shifted from seeing minorities as homogenous entities
to discerning differences within and between “Blacks” and Asians; then,
within South Asians, to differences among Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangla-
deshis; and finally among Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs. Religion has
emerged as a major social signifier.
In Britain, the burgeoning interest in religion has come from both an
awareness within the ethnic minority population of Islam and from its
heightened international profile. Comprehensive demographic data on
British Muslims became available only after a question on religion was
included in the 2001 Census of the United Kingdom. Indeed, the vast
majority of Britain’s 1.6 million Muslims are from South Asia (around 1
million, two-thirds of whom are from Pakistan, less than one-third from
Bangladesh, and the remainder from India). The residual Muslim popula-
tion is from North Africa, eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia. Around one-
third of all British Muslims are under the age of fourteen. In addition, the
Muslims remain concentrated in older post-industrial cities and conurba-
tions in the southeast, the Midlands, and the north. Their population has
grown from about 21,000 in 1951 to 1.6 million at present.7
Today, these Muslim groups are more likely to be living in some of the
most inferior housing stock, have the poorest health, tend to significantly
underachieve in education, and are underemployed or, more likely, to be
unemployed in the labor market when compared with their non-Muslim
South Asian peers. Many of them, specifically those from the rural areas of
Azad Kashmir (Pakistan) and Sylhet (northwest Bangladesh), are working
in the declining or highly competitive manufacturing, textile, and catering
sectors; living in inner city housing built at the turn of the twentieth century
(which often needs substantial repairs and maintenance); and live as joint
and extended families in restricted zones of ethnic and cultural maintenance.
Abbas: After 9/11 27

They remain close to kith and kin, extending their religious and cultural
manifestations of life, and thus help to shape their presence in Britain.8
The present is also a period in which subsequent generations of British
South Asian Muslims have begun to question their parents’ religious and
cultural values. Furthermore, the increasing link between local and global
capitalism is an important phenomenon to consider. Deindustrialization,
technological innovation, and the internationalization of capital and labor
have helped to ensure that many of them remain at the bottom of society.
These patterns emerged early on in their immigration and settlement from
the late 1950s right through to the early 1980s. However, these social divi-
sions remain very much alive today – largely as a function of pernicious
structural and cultural racism as well as the fact of increasingly competitive
labor, education, housing, and health markets.9
In terms of anti-discrimination legislation, British state policy toward
Muslims has been inconsistent at best and patchy at worst. They are also
becoming increasingly overrepresented in prisons. On the whole, Muslims
from South Asia have come to represent a minimal contributory role with-
in the socioeconomic and sociopolitical milieu of British society.
Nevertheless, several positive elements have materialized, and it is impor-
tant to build upon them: the provision of halalfood and more sensitive
dress codes in the army, and female members of London’s Metropolitan
Police Service can wear the hijab (headscarf).10
Islamophobia: Definitions, Media, and Politics
In Britain, notions of cultural and social identifications of the “Other” stem
from an understanding and experience of imperialism and colonialism.11
Islamophobia is defined as the fear or dread of Islam or Muslims. Although
the term is of relatively recent coinage, the idea is a well-established tradi-
tion in history. Since the genesis of Islam in 622, Europe’s awareness of
Muslims has been overwhelmingly negative. During this long contact, the
established European powers have found it convenient to portray Islam and
Muslims in the worst possible light, so as to prevent conversion and to
encourage European resistance to Muslim forces on the borders. Although
there have been periods of learning and understanding on the part of the
English, there has also been ignorance, conflict, and the demonization of
Islam.12 Muslims have been portrayed as barbaric, ignorant, closed-minded
semi-citizens, maddened terrorists, or intolerant religious zealots.13 Such
negative characterizations are still present today, as seen in the negative
28 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3

representation and treatment of the Muslim “Other,” which are designed to
aggrandize the established powers and thereby legitimize existing systems
of domination and subordination.
Just as present-day Islamophobia relies on history to fill in the substance
of its stereotypes, the contemporary fear of Muslims has it own idiosyn-
cratic features connecting it with the more recent experiences of colonial-
ism, decolonization, immigration, and racism. The Runnymede Trust14 stated
that Islamophobia is created analogously to xenophobia, the disdain or dis-
like of all things “foreign.” Seven features of Islamophobia were identified:
Muslim cultures are seen as monolithic, Islamic cultures are substantially
different from other cultures, Islam is perceived as implacably threatening,
Islam’s adherents use their faith to gain political or military advantage,
Muslim criticism of western cultures and societies is rejected out of hand,
the fear of Islam is mixed with racist hostility to immigration, and
Islamophobia is assumed to be natural and unproblematic.
However, it is important not to treat Muslims as an undifferentiated mass,
for there are many ethnic, cultural, social, economic, and political differences
between individuals and groups. This taxonomy of Islamophobia is very rel-
evant today. But while racism on the basis of “race” continues, the anti-
Muslim shift suggests markers of difference of a social and religiocultural
nature. Furthermore, while traditional markers of “race” have been afforded
legislative protection, the same does not hold for “religious” markers, where
protection is restricted only to ethnically defined religious communities
through case law, namely, members of the ethnic Jewish and ethnic Sikh
communities in Britain. (However, it is understood that inciting religious
hatred has been legislatively addressed, and a European directorate outlaw-
ing religious discrimination in employment took effect in December 2003.)
Despite Muslims being targeted by right-wing groups with “more sub-
tle forms of racist prejudice and hatred” after 9/11, they nevertheless remain
outside the domain of anti-racist legislation.15 Concurrently, recent events
have also seen Muslims represented in a range of different media that have
worked collectively to reinforce negative beliefs and perceptions. The social
and religious foundations of Islam, as well as Muslims in general, have
attained such a degree of notoriety that their “visibility” is immediately rec-
ognizable in entirely negative and detrimental frames of reference. Since
9/11, the situation has both deteriorated and intensified. Islamophobia has
gained such a discursive prevalence that western European society is
becoming even more uncritically receptive to an array of negative images
and perceptions about Islam and Muslims.
Abbas: After 9/11 29

Muslims in Britain feel that part of the reason for their continued exis-
tence as an unaccepted and often despised minority is based on the presence
of the “evil demon”: the media.17 The charge of media bias needs to be
taken seriously, as the coverage of “extremist groups” and “Islamic terror-
ism” has increased dramatically in recent periods. The language used to
describe Muslims is often violent, thereby inferring that their movements
are also violent. Arabic words have been appropriated into universal jour-
nalistic vocabulary and invested with new meaning, one that is generally
extremist and aggressive. For example, jihad now signifies a military war
waged by Islamists against the West, whereas its true Qur’anic meaning is,
in fact, far broader and refers more to the idea of struggle. Words such as
fundamentalist, extremist, and radical are regularly used in apocalyptic
headlines across all sectors of the British press.
Indeed, the current portrayal of British Muslims is part of a “new racist
discourse.”18 This “new” racism differs from the “old” racism in that it is
more subtle but, at the same time, explicit in the direction it has taken. In
the post-9/11 era, politicians have used the people’s fear of Islam for their
own ends. By focusing on the “war on terror” instead of Islam, politicians
use the existing anti-Muslim frame of reference but replace it with the idea
of “terror.”19 This reporting is compounded by its focus on the “enemy with-
in” or the loyalty of British Muslims to Britain. Reasons for the increased
presence of these themes in newspaper reporting are symptomatic of the
increased fear of the “Islamic terrorist” since the 9/11 attacks (and, subse-
quently, the bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004).
Islamophobia is also present in British politics. In the summer of 2001,
Britain witnessed some of its worst inner-city disturbances in nearly two
decades. Young British South Asian Muslims, living in the deprived inner
cities of Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley, clashed violently with local
police. Their pent-up fury was a result of generations of socioeconomic
exclusion, as well as a clever targeting of sensitized areas by right-wing
groups working to manufacture ethno-religious tension. However, it was
the government’s responses to the disturbances, in reports published soon
after 9/11, which must be considered.
For example, an illustration of Islamophobia in politics can be seen in
New Labour’s idea of “community cohesion.”20 In keeping with New
Labour’s rhetoric of inclusion, this idea masks what is effectively a case of
“blaming the victim.” Home Secretary David Blunkett MP, while promot-
ing this idea, announced a test of allegiance. He referred to the problems of
the “excess of cultural diversity and moral relativism” that prevents posi-
30 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3

tive change, and also referred to English language issues and female cir-
cumcision in speeches soon after 9/11. In other words, he conflated many
different behaviors and cultures with that of the South Asian Muslim com-
munity in northwest England. Although these are important issues in their
own right, as well as part of a process of making civil society more demo-
cratically functional, these were not the factors behind the “riots.”
This segregation is thought to be self-imposed and the cause of racism,
rather than a result of it. Alhough economically disadvantaged and socially
marginalized they are, on the whole, willing to participate in society.21 Seg-
regation is the result of racism and discrimination. But at the same time, iden-
tification with Islam is the reason given for segregation. It is relatively easy
to blame people and their values while ignoring processes, institutions, and
wider local area dynamics (though it is recognized that Muslim communities
can mobilize class and ethnic resources to develop religiocultural, social, and
economic infrastructures to support their existence).
As New Labour makes preparations for reelection in June 2005 and an
unprecedented third term in power, and although there have been genuine
shifts in its approach to multiculturalism, citizenship, and social justice, dur-
ing its second term, the policy of assimilation has been rejuvenated.22 Blair’s
Britain is defining a new ethnicity – Englishness as opposed to Britishness
– in an era of globalization and devolution. Eager to embrace the capitalist
project, New Labour is also at pains to offer answers to the economic, polit-
ical, and social anxieties and tensions faced by Britain’s poor, many of
whom are members of various ethnic minorities and Muslim.23 The young
South Asian Muslim men of Oldham, Bradford, and Burnley who confront-
ed the police in such dramatic scenes during the summer of 2001 do not suf-
fer the problems of being “under-assimilated.” Indeed, their predicament is
that of a society divided by racism, discrimination, and Islamophobia.
Lessons from History and 9/11’s Impact
Ever since the Iranian revolution of 1979, Muslims have become a focus of
attention.24 Pictures of 3 million men and women on the streets of Tehran,
shown on television screens all over the world, shocked many in western
Europe. The Salman Rushdie affair of 1989 highlighted the extent to which
the media and British Muslims (who vociferously opposed the book’s pub-
lication) became “emotionally unhinged” over the issue, and how Britain’s
South Asian Muslims were shown to be weak and intolerant when, in fact,
they were merely expressing their opinions on The Satanic Verses.25 This
Abbas: After 9/11 31

piece of fiction, which deeply offended Muslims, gave rise to discussions
of freedom of speech, blasphemy laws, and the protection of non-Christian
religions in Britain.
In addition, the first Gulf War (1990-91), the genocide in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (1993-96), the Oklahoma bombing (1995), the Taliban in
Afghanistan (1997-2002), Grozny and Kosovo (1999), the recent Palestin-
ian Intifda (since September 2000), and the war on Iraq (2003) have all
played a part in creating a transnational Muslim solidarity; a genuine and
conscious identification with others of the same religion. Samuel Hunting-
ton’s “clash of civilizations” thesis26 – positioning East and West, as well as
Islam and Christianity, as diametrically opposed and irreconcilable has only
served to build upon growing anti-American sentiment and increased
Orientalism through oversimplification and generalization.
Nothing, however, could have prepared the world for the 9/11 attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Reactions were swift, and associ-
ations between Islam, terrorism, and the notion of a “Christian versus
Islamic” conflict only served to further fuel anti-Islamic and anti-American
sentiment. It gave rise to the efforts of British far-right groups to paint
Muslims as epitomizing unwanted difference, and almost excused anti-
Islamic violence. In the days following the attack, an Afghan taxi driver was
attacked and left paralyzed in London. To the murderers, his beard and attire
resembled those of Osama bin Laden – the man thought to be behind the
9/11 attacks. Since then, books and television programs about Islam, the
Qur’an, jihad, international terrorism, international security, political Islam,
radical Islam, and Islamic militancy have been published to explore and dis-
cuss the many elaborated – and often conflated – debates on Muslims and
Islam. There appears to be genuine desire to learn more and deliberate the
issues in relation to a religion that, for many, has remained relatively unfa-
miliar, although this is not always carried out without a value-, power-, or
honor-free agenda.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Prime Minister Tony Blair MP was
keen to present the imminent action against al-Qa’ida as not a war on Islam
(although President Bush’s comment that the war on terror would be a “cru-
sade” left little doubt in the minds of British Muslims that political Islam
was his main target). Blair’s dilemma was how “to balance the bombing of
Muslims abroad with wooing them at home.”27 On 28 September 2001, a
few hours after the attack on Afghanistan, a delegation from the Muslim
Council of Britain (MCB), Britain’s largest single Muslim pressure group
(formalized by New Labour in 1999), was invited to Downing Street.
32 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3

Paraded to the media were smiles and shaking hands. On 9 October 2001,
the MCB issued a press release strongly denouncing the war, an action that
incensed New Labour. Although the MCB did not support the anti-war
demonstrations, it clearly did not want to further alienate the government –
an important trade-off was taking place with politicians that would ulti-
mately gain the upper hand. This led to the beginning of the end of MCB’s
cozy relationship with Number Ten.
Furthermore, at the time, pressure was applied to the five British
Muslim parliamentarians (namely, MPs Khalid Mahmood and Mohammed
Sarwar, and the peers Lord Ahmed, Lord Patel, and Baroness Uddin) who
apparently were “encouraged” to sign a letter denouncing the events of 9/11
and partly justifying the retaliatory bombings (Guardian, 13 November
2001). Khalid Mahmood MP soon denied, however, that he had signed any
such letter (Guardian, 16 November 2001).28 Regardless of the accuracy of
these claims, it is clear that challenging struggles are taking place over
issues of consultation, dialogue, and the maintenance of the Muslim pres-
ence within New Labour.
Both external and internal forces affected the positions of British
Muslims before the 9/11 events. After this tragedy, both external and inter-
nal factors have been exacerbated. Externally, the international agenda now
dominates domestic politics, security and anti-terrorist measures have been
tightened, and citizenship tests are required for new immigrants. It is also
important to consider the disturbances in the north in 2001, as the govern-
ment’s reaction to them has had direct implications for British South Asian
Muslims. Internally, young Muslims are increasingly found in the precari-
ous position of having to choose between one set of loyalties in relation to
“the other” (Islamic verses British; liberal verses radical), and being
impacted by radical Islamic politics on the one hand and developments
related to British multicultural citizenship on the other. This creates ten-
sions and issues, which encourage some to take up the “struggle” more vig-
orously, while others seek to adopt more western values, for example.
Although a simplistic distinction, this observation does have a genuine
value in the current climate. Further research is needed to help distinguish
the depth and breadth of the issues involved here.
British multiculturalism is a distinctive philosophy that legitimizes
demands upon unity and diversity, seeks to achieve political unity without
cultural uniformity, and cultivates among its citizens both a common sense
of belonging and a willingness to respect and cherish deep cultural differ-
ences. Although this is an admirable ambition, it is not easily achieved. In
Abbas: After 9/11 33

fact, there are few examples one can use to verify its success. The New
Labour experiment has had both high successes and low failures – the Race
Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, the Human Rights Act 1998, the
Stephen Lawrence Report (1999). But as a result of 9/11 and the northern
“riots,” public policy has focused on domestic security and the war against
terrorism.
Both of these have significant impacts on British Muslims. The impor-
tant point to emphasize here is that the complicated story of integration and
exclusion cannot be understood in the terms set by Home Secretary David
Blunkett MP around “assimilation” and “integration.” Multiculturalism has
strong limitations, because it rejects “cultures” that do not correspond to
nation-states. Cultural nationalism is about present politics, not ancient mem-
ory, although that memory is used as an instrument. Developments to this
philosophy suggest that while the categories of “British” and “English” are
being formed and re-formed, Muslims in Britain are considered by their reli-
gion first and foremost. At the same time, many of them are disempowered,
disenfranchised, disenchanted, and disaffected groups existing at the margins
of Britain’s economy, society, and polity. Furthermore, there are issues at the
inter-generational level, particularly in the current climate of globalization,
that relate to how Islam (and Muslims) is currently being recognized, treated,
and appreciated. In the post-9/11 climate, British Muslims are at the forefront
of questions in relation to what it means to be British or English. The basis of
this rests in issues on the global agenda as well as local area concerns in rela-
tion to community cohesion, citizenship, and multicultural philosophy.
Concluding Thoughts: A New Multicultural Citizenship
The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent reactions seem to have permeated many
areas of everyday life for Muslims everywhere, and no less so than in
Britain. As an event, it has implications that go far beyond merely “interna-
tional terrorism.” In fact, these implications are linked to politics, religion,
and issues of cultural differences in an effort to maintain harmonious soci-
eties and democracies in the West, which contain a significant number of
Muslims (approximately 25 million). In the Middle East, as revealed in the
aftermath of the war on Iraq, further unrest, political turmoil, and violent
action and reaction are the main features of the current climate. In the near
future, as western targets may well become increasingly targeted by extrem-
ist groups, relations between Muslims and their western hosts will continue
to remain problematical, with discussions focusing on citizenship, civil soci-
34 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3

ety, multiculturalism, and political representation and participation (as com-
ponents of democracy), and identity, gender, inter-generational develop-
ment, radicalism versus liberalism (as components of the individual).
Given that British South Asian Muslims have reached the third genera-
tion, issues of concern have shifted from cultural assimilation and social
integration to religious identity and discrimination. The study of Islam and
Muslims has become more vigorous, and greater emphasis is being placed
on understanding the nature and orientation of British Muslims in more
anthropological, sociological, theological, and political science perspectives.
Indeed, the first generation of South Asian Muslims kept their religious prac-
tices and expressions well within private or community spheres. Subsequent
generations have struggled with issues of integration and racism in the cli-
mate of the early 1960s; cultural pluralism in the 1970s; free-market eco-
nomic determinism and the rolling back of the state’s frontiers in Thatcher’s
and Major’s Britain from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s; and through to
the “third way” center-left politics of assimilationist New Labour ever since
then. At the same time, identification with Islam is gaining strength among
some members of this latest generation, both as a reaction to racist hostility
as well as a desire to understand Islam in more precise detail.
Distinguishing the multiplicity, fragility, and diversity of diaspora iden-
tities, and here both as South Asian and Muslim, it is important to appreci-
ate that such a citizenship is not so unsophisticated. To many white British
people, participating in this society as citizens is an uncomplicated fact, “a
set of clothing that fits like a glove, put on at birth, taken off at death,
viewed uncritically and unchallenged.” British Muslims have to address
citizenship not only within the framework of their host country’s legal and
political structures, with its emphasis on democracy, secularism, individual
rights, and pluralism, but also decide how to negotiate and harmonize all of
these in terms of Shari`ah law and various interpretations of and practices
in the Islamic state discourse. They have had to discover how to be “good
Muslims” in a secular society and how to develop appropriate strategies for
living as a minority in a non-Muslim society.
This task has not been easy, given the local, national, and international
focus of attention since 9/11. In reality, it has been necessary to reconcile
religion-based identity and citizenship, as well as individual rights and
community rights, in a setting where the beliefs of others have dominated,
without retreating into isolationism. Perhaps above all, they have needed to
discover how to “participate in a society which has no need for Islam in its
public life.” In addition, British South Asian Muslims have inherited the
Abbas: After 9/11 35

colonial history of past relations with Britain. Combined with racism,
which is endemic, this creates an atmosphere of mistrust.29 The recent “war
on terror,” however, is not going to wither away, because it is a war that has
no singularly defined enemy; only a set of ideologies, falsely appropriated
and actualized by the “clash of fundamentalisms” thesis.30
But this global picture is only part of the experience of Islam and
Muslims here in Britain. More immediate are the everyday realities (i.e.,
poor housing, jobs, health, and education). Once many more British South
Asian Muslims have a more determined economic and social presence in
society, only then will their demands, needs, and requests be met. But to be
in a viable position to reach this objective, the elimination of pernicious
structural and cultural racism is crucial. The nature and orientation of
British multiculturalism is undergoing a severe test, and it will be important
to observe closely how Muslims experience it over the next few years.
What is apparent, however, is that 9/11 has changed the world, and, along
with it, how Muslims will be regarded, considered, and treated for the fore-
seeable future – possibly for the remainder of the twenty-first century, as
Akbar S. Ahmed has argued recently.31
What direction this will take is a function of nation-states and their poli-
cies toward different Muslim migrants, minorities, and citizens, as well as
how Muslims work to adapt to a non-Muslim majority society by closely
adopting some of its more central norms and values while challenging oth-
ers to make their new home a more peaceful, interdependent, and secure
place. British society has become even more sensitive to the threat of
“Islamic terrorism,” while, at the same time, wider events in the world,
including the “war on terror,” continue to shape the government’s attitude
toward Muslim citizens as well as to serve as important foci for political,
social, and policymaking discussions.
British South Asian Muslims are at a crossroads in their history of
immigration to and settlement in Britain. At the same time, one striking fea-
ture of their structural experiences is their socioeconomic position. This
group constitutes one of the most marginalized, alienated, isolated, dis-
criminated against, and misunderstood groups in society (although there is
a small but burgeoning British Muslim elite). They are negotiating a set of
identities and realities that are constantly changing, and it will be important
to see how they develop in the near future. As research questions continue
in the areas of race, ethnicity, religion, and culture, as well as public policy
concerns at the local, national, and international levels, the study of British
Muslims will provide important and useful findings.
36 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3

Notes
1. Fred Halliday, Arabs in Exile: Yemeni Migrants in Urban Britain (London:
IB Tauris, 1992); Humayun Ansari, The Infidel Within: The History of
Muslims in Britain, from 1800 to the Present (London: Hurst, 2004).
2. Ali Mohmmed Kettani, Muslim Minorities in the World Today (London:
Mansell, 1986); Muhmmad Anwar, “Muslims in Britain: Demographic and
Social Characteristics,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 14, nos. 1&2,
(1994).
3. Michael Banton, The Coloured Quarter (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955); E.
Rose et al., Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations
(London: Institute of Race Relations and Oxford University Press,1969).
4. John Rex and Robert Moore, Race, Community and Conflict: A Study of
Sparkbrook (London: Institute of Race Relations and Oxford University
Press, 1967); John Rex and Sally Tomlinson, Colonial Immigrants in a
British City: A Class Analysis (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).
5. T. Modood et al., Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage
(London: Policy Studies Institute, 1997); Stuart Hall, “The Question of
Cultural Identity,” in Modernity and Its Futures, eds. S. Hall et al. (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1992).
6. Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All (London:
Runnymede Trust, 1997); Tahir Abbas, ed., Muslim Britain: Communities
under Pressure (London: Zed, 2004).
7. Ceri Peach, “Muslims in the UK,” in Abbas, Muslim Britain.
8. Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity among British
Muslims (London: IB Tauris, 2002).
9. Mark Brown, “Religion and Economic Activity in the South Asian
Population,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, no. 6 (2000); J. Lindley, “Race or
Religion? The Impact of Religion on the Employment and Earnings of
Britain’s Ethnic Communities,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28,
no. 3 (2002); Strategy Unit, Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market: Final
Report (London: Cabinet Office, 2003).
10. Muhmmad Anwar and Qadir Bakhsh, British Muslims and State Policies
(UK: Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick, 2003).
11. Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1979); Edward Said, Culture
and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1994), reprint edition.
12. Clinton Bennett, Victorian Images of Islam (London: Grey Seal, 1992).
13. John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002); Akbar S. Ahmed, Islam under Siege (Cambridge:
Polity, 2003).
14. Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia.
15. Chris Allen, “From Race to Religion: The New Face of Discrimination,” in
Muslim Britain, ed. Tahir Abbas.
Abbas: After 9/11 37

16. Chris Allen and Jorgen S. Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the
EU after 11 September 2001 (Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on
Racism and Xenophobia, 2002).
17. Tahir Abbas, “Images of Islam,” Index on Censorship 29, no. 5 (2000); Tahir
Abbas, “Media Capital and the Representation of South Asian Muslims in the
British Press: An Ideological Analysis,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs
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19. Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam (London: IB Tauris, 2002).
20. Cantle Report, Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review
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21. Maria O’Beirne, Religion in England and Wales: Findings from the 2001
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22. L. Back et al. “The Return of Assimilationism: Race, Multiculturalism and
New Labour,” Sociological Research Online7, no. 2 (2002). Online at: www.
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23. Arun Kundnani, “‘Stumbling On’: Race, Class and England,” Race & Class
41, no. 4 (2000); Arun Kundnani, “From Oldham to Bradford: The Violence
of the Violated,” Race and Class 43, no. 2 (2001).
24. Talal Asad, “Multiculturalism in the Wake of the Rushdie Affair,” Politics and
Society 18, no. 4 (1990).
25. Tariq Modood, “British Muslims and the Rushdie Affair,” Political Quarterly
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26. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order (New York: Free Press, 2002).
27. Gita Sahgal, “Blair’s Jihad, Blunkett’s Crusade: The Battle for the Hearts and
Minds of Britain’s Muslims,” Radical Philosophy 112 (2002).
28. Jonathon Birt, “Lobbying and Marching: British Muslims and the State,” in
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29. Ronald Geaves, “Negotiating British Citizenship and Muslim Identity,” in Ibid.
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31. Ahmed, Islam under Siege.
38 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3