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$)&) Late 19th century (pre-welfare state) development
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2.4. Service provision under the impact of neo-liberal market
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2.5. The provision of public and social services in Central
Eastern European (CEE) countries in the wake of post-
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2.6. Since the mid-2000 diverse trajectories in the
institutionalization of service provision
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The comeback of the public/municipal sector has unfolded along two tracks.
Municipal companies have been established anew or have expanded, also by
merging and by forming intermunicipal companies. Moreover, municipalities
have proceeded to remuncipalize facilities and services by re-purchasing shares
previously sold to private companies or by re-insourcing previously outsourced
(contracted out) services after the expiration of the respective concession
contracts.
Germany is exemplar particularly in the energy sector. After, during the 1980’s,
the municipal companies (Stadtwerke) had lost ground to the Big Four private
sector energy giants they have, in the meantime, regained strength and market
share in operating local energy grids and supplying as well as generating
(renewable) energy themselves (see Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, 202,
Wollmann et al. 2010, 177 ; Bönker et al. 2016, 91). Similarly in Italy the
municipal energy companies have significantly enlarged their market share (see
Wollmann et al. 2010: 182; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, 201). In France,
while the still largely state-owned energy giant continues to dominate the
country’s electricity market, municipal energy companies have recently made
moderate advances particularly in renewable energy generation (see Alleman et
al. 2016, 238). In the U.K. the conservative-liberal coalition government formed
in 2010 explicitly urged the local authorities to engage themselves in local
renewable energy activities (see Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, 204).
Similarly remunicipalization has progressed in the water sector in countries
where during the 1980s private water companies, particularly the international
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big players, such as the French Veolia and Suez, expanded in local water
markets. In the meantime, municipalities have proceeded to re-purchase or to re-
insource water provision (see Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, 204 , Lieberherr
et al. 2016, Hall 2012). (For other service sectors, such as waste management,
see Hall 2012, Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, 206, Bönker et al. 2016, 80).
However, in order to realistically and cautiously assessing the potential of
further remunicipalization some hurdles should be called to mind. So, when
considering to remunicipalize once the concession expired the municipalities
typically face difficult negotiations (about compensations etc.) with the outgoing
private provider. Moreover, they often lack skilled personnel to take the
operation back in their own hands. Tellingly, for instance in Germany only in a
small percentage of expired concessions the municipalities have chosen to
remunicipalize the service provision, while in most cases deciding to renew the
expired contracts (see Grossi and Reichard 2016, 303).
/Re-) Emergence of the third sector?
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In the provision of public utilities recently energy cooperatives have made
remarkable advances. Founded typically by local citizens they join the
cooperative movement which, historically dating back to the 19th century, is
made up of a multitude of (economically often quite powerful) organizations
that primarily focus on agricultural, housing, banking and consumer matters (for
an overview and data see Cooperatives Europe 2015).
In Germany, since the late 1990s, the founding of energy cooperatives has been
prompted by the growing environmental (‘green’) engagement of citizens and
has been incentivised by the Federal Renewable Energy Act of 2000 that
guarantees fixed feed-in tariffs for anyone generating renewable power for a 20-
year period (see Bönker et al. 2016, 80; DGRV 2016). The, as of now, some
1.000 energy cooperatives (out of a total of some 7.500 cooperatives) typically
operate solar parks and wind turbines, have some 200.000 members and
generate electricity for some 160.000 households (see Borchert 2015,
Cooperatives Europe 2016). It is worth recalling that energy cooperatives sprang
up in Germany first in the late 19th century when rural dwellers founded
cooperatives typically in self-help initiatives as the private sector electricity
companies refused to connect such remote areas. Since then, however, ‘energy
cooperatives’ have disappeared until their recent revival.
In a similar vein, in France, since 2005 some 10 energy cooperatives have been
established (see http://www.enercoop.fr/les-cooperatives) as well as
in the U.K. (see Co-operatives UK 2016). In 2011 a EU Network of Energy
Cooperatives has been founded with 20 members from 12 EU countries.
While the emergence of energy cooperatives is, no doubt, a remarkable example
of a ‘societal’ initiative which, in view of the growing importance of local level
renewable energy generation and supply is likely to have further growth
potential. However such forecast needs to be cautioned since until now the
overall quantitative contribution of cooperatives to the overall energy generation
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is quite scanty. In Germany, for instance, where so far, in international
comparison, the largest number of energy cooperatives has been founded the
electricity generated by them amounts to just 0.5 percent (!) of the country’s
total electricity production. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the
existence of energy cooperatives until now depends markedly on tax benefits
and the guarantee of feed-it tariffs.
Social services, care for the needy
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Sector Provision – and Reverse?”, Pp. 49-76, in Nunes C. and Bucek J. (eds.) Fiscal Austerity and
Innovation in Local Governance in Europe. Ashgate, Farnham.
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