Judge-Made Standards of National Procedure in the Post-Lisbon Constitutional Framework

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Unlike remedies enabling the enforcement of EU rights, national procedural rules have so far largely remained within the province of Member State autonomy. Recent judgments nevertheless indicate that the Court of Justice is now more than ever willing directly to shape national procedural mechanisms as part of an emerging EU procedural standards framework. Judicially established "standards of national procedure" impose positive obligations on Member States' legal orders and provide an EU-wide alternative to inadequate national procedural provisions. This contribution outlines the Court's standard-setting approach and identifies the constitutional mandate enabling its development. © 2012 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors.

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H πρόσβαση στην δικαιοσύνη για παραβιάσεις της περιβαλλοντικής νομοθεσίας από τους θιγομένους συνιστά έναν πολύ αποτελεσματικό μηχανισμό ελέγχου για την εφαρμογή της περιβαλλοντικής νομοθεσίας και την προστασία των συλλογικών περιβαλλοντικών αγαθών. Έχει δε ιδιαίτερη σημασία ότι τόσο σε υπερεθνικό επίπεδο (Σύμβαση Aarhus) όσο και σε ενωσιακό επίπεδο έχουν θεσπιστεί κανόνες για την πρόσβαση στην δικαιοσύνη για περιβαλλοντικά θέματα. Επιπροσθέτως, η κατοχύρωση των δικαιωμάτων για δίκαιη δίκη και την πρόσβαση σε αποτελεσματικό ένδικο βοήθημα σε Περιφερειακές Συμβάσεις Προστασίας Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων (ΕΣΔΑ), καθώς και του δικαιώματος αποτελεσματικής δικαστικής προστασίας στον Χάρτη Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμάτων της ΕΕ ασκούν επιρροή στους συναφείς εθνικούς δικονομικούς κανόνες. Υπό το πρίσμα των ανωτέρω, το κεντρικό ερώτημα, το οποίο επιχειρείται να απαντηθεί συνίσταται στο εάν η επιρροή που ασκείται στα εθνικά δικονομικά συστήματα κυρίως στο πεδίο της διοικητικής δικαιοσύνης είναι καθοριστική, προκειμένου να οδηγήσει σε ένα βαθμό «σύγκλισης» των εφαρμοζόμενων εθνικών δικονομικών κανόνων, με σκοπό την διασφάλιση αποτελεσματικής δικαστικής προστασίας, λόγω και της φύσης των διαφορών αυτών. Το κεντρικό συμπέρασμα, στο οποίο καταλήγει η μονογραφία, συνίσταται στο ότι παρά την σημαντική επιρροή που έχουν ασκήσει οι «εξωγενείς» επιρροές στα εθνικά δικονομικά συστήματα και οι οποίες έχουν οδηγήσει σε κάποιες σημαντικές αλλαγές στην διαμόρφωση των εθνικών δικονομικών κανόνων, οι αλλαγές αυτές δεν είναι τέτοιας εμβέλειας, ώστε να γίνεται λόγος για «σύγκλιση» των εφαρμοζόμενων εθνικών δικονομικών κανόνων των κρατών-μελών της ΕΕ στο πεδίο των περιβαλλοντικών διαφορών.
StreszczenieCelem artykułu było ustalenie, czy dla NSA rozpoznającego sprawę w granicach skargi kasacyjnej, może w określonych przypadkach powstać obowiązek uwzględnienia z urzędu prawa UE, na podstawie zasady skuteczności, która wynika z prawa UE. Artykuł obejmuje trzy części. W pierwszej scharakteryzowano podstawy kasacyjne i zasadę związania NSA granicami skargi kasacyjnej. Druga dotyczy treści zasady skuteczności i sposobu korzystania z niej w odniesieniu do krajowych reguł procesowych. W ostatniej części zbadano trzy warunki konstrukcji podstawy kasacyjnej pod kątem zasady skuteczności. Wnioski są następujące. Z jednej strony, obowiązek uwzględnienia przez NSA z urzędu prawa UE nie powstaje wtedy, gdy w skardze kasacyjnej w ogóle nie sformułowano podstawy kasacyjnej dotyczącej naruszenia prawa UE, jak również gdy sformułowano ją nieprawidłowo, bez wskazania konkretnego przepisu prawa UE. Z drugiej strony, obowiązek ten wchodzi w grę przy ponownej skardze kasacyjnej wniesionej w tej samej sprawie gdy okaże się, że wykładnia prawa UE ustalona we wcześniejszym orzeczeniu NSA, jest niezgodna z wyrokiem prejudycjalnym TSUE.
Direct taxation in cross-border situations is the core of this article. The lack of Union competence in the sphere of direct taxation may cause problems of interpretation, if the national taxes distort competition and cause discriminatory effects in the internal market. At least the following questions are relevant: how do the national tax systems restrict EU citizens from moving to other Member States and how has the development in the field of EU citizenship affected taxation? For example, exit taxes and tax advantages will be studied on the basis of the case-law of the European Court of Justice.
Article EU law on judicial protection before Member State courts plays an essential role as to the practical significance of EU law. This article studies the so-called procedural autonomy case law of the Court of Justice of the EU by examining formulations of rulings, focusing on requirements for national remedial and procedural law and for national judgments. Judicial protection and related Member State obligations are manifold issues. In addition to the conundrum relating to the principle of, and right to, efficient judicial protection and their relationship to “Member State procedural autonomy” principles of effectiveness and equivalence, nuances are visible in the conclusions of procedural autonomy reasoning itself. Aiming for effective application of EU law appears to lead to full effect-focused demands for national treatment so that interventions by the Court of Justice cannot be fully explained by the basic wording of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. The requirement of “adequate judicial protection,” which at times seems to be a facet of the principle of effectiveness in particular but which may also “extend” the twin principles, complexifies EU law on national enforcement. This study illustrates how the reasoning of the Court of Justice may contain varying meanings regardless of taking superficially similar basic requirements as starting points. Instances where more stringent demands on national systems are relevant, as well as the detailed effects, are difficult to discern. This results in lack of clarity as to how national courts should treat future cases and, for parties bringing claims, as to what kind of results to expect. The contribution ends with suggestions for clarifying EU law requirements.
The United States has long embraced the concept of regulatory litigation, whereby individual litigants, often termed “private attorneys general,” are allowed to enforce certain public laws as a matter of institutional design. Although several types of regulatory litigation exist, the U.S. class action is often considered the paradigmatic model for this type of private regulation.For years, the United States appeared to be the sole proponent of both regulatory litigation and large-scale litigation. However, in February 2012, the European Union dramatically reversed its existing policies toward mass claims resolution when the European Parliament adopted a resolution proposing to create a coherent European approach to cross-border collective redress. Given certain conceptual similarities between cross-border collective redress and global class actions, the question logically arises as to whether the European Union is in the process of embracing a form of regulatory litigation. This issue is of great importance not only to European audiences who may have to recalibrate their thinking about what constitutes “regulation” within the European sphere, but also to American audiences who will have to consider how the new European procedures affect the ability of U.S. courts to bring European parties into global class actions. Although many of the issues may appear to be procedural in nature, the more interesting – and challenging – analyses arise as a matter of regulatory law. This Article is the first to consider the European resolution from a regulatory perspective, using a combination of new governance theory and equivalence functionalism to determine whether the European Union has adopted or is in the process of adopting a form of regulatory litigation. In so doing, the Article considers a number of issues, including the basic definition of regulatory litigation, how class and collective relief can act as a regulatory mechanism and the special problems that arise when regulatory litigation is used in the transnational context. The Article also includes a normative element, providing a number of suggestions on how European authorities – who are still in the early stages of drafting the relevant procedures – can better achieve the regulatory and other objectives set forth in the resolution. Through these means, the Article makes a significant contribution not only to the domestic understanding of regulatory law, but also to the increasingly important field of transnational regulation. Audiences in both the United States and the European Union, as well as readers from other countries, can benefit greatly from this analysis.
In the polycentric judicial architecture of the Community, there is a rich, constant interplay between national procedural rules and European interventions. In the making of the European legal order, EC law depends on national procedural law and therefore, substantive EC supremacy depends, existentially, on procedure. In this context, the author argues that the traditional sharply defined dichotomy of national procedural autonomy versus Community law effectiveness no longer reflects the implicit course of action laid down by the Court of Justice. Instead, the European legal order has moved, as a praxis, from national procedural autonomy to a more subtle combination of national procedural competence and European procedural primacy. The rationale behind this trend testifies both to the importance of the interrelationship between procedure and substantive law in the making of Europe and to the flexibility of procedural law; EC law depends on procedural law and procedure readily submits to the demands of a new legal order. In doing so, it also creates new choices and venues for European supremacy.