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Israel Affairs
ISSN: 1353-7121 (Print) 1743-9086 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fisa20
Rethinking reverence for Stalinism in the kibbutz
movement
Reuven Shapira
To cite this article: Reuven Shapira (2016) Rethinking reverence for Stalinism in the kibbutz
movement, Israel Affairs, 22:1, 20-44, DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2015.1111640
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2015.1111640
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ISRAEL AFFAIRS, 2016
VOL. 22, NO. 1, 20–44
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2015.1111640
© 2016 Taylor & Francis
Rethinking reverence for Stalinism in the kibbutz
movement
Reuven Shapira
Anthropology, Sociology, and Management, Western Galilee Academic College, Akko, Israel
KEYWORDS Inter-kibbutz organizations; reverence for Stalinism; dysfunctional leaders; oligarchy;
dominant scientific coalition; co-opted functionalist researchers
Introduction
e complexity of large organizational systems helps leaders mask the self-
perpetuation of their dysfunctional domination. If researchers do not penetrate
this complexity and untangle the changes in leaders’ practices from their early
eectiveness, they are bound to make major mistakes. e one exposed in this
article is a major ideological change, the etiology of which was missed by both
co-opted functionalist social scientists who lacked a historical perspective and
by historians who lacked sociological theory.
Such a major failure seems strange in the case of kibbutzim, very likely the
most studied of small societies. However, social scientists have found plausi-
ble reasons for such failures. Ethnographers found managers concealing or
camouaging the truth about their mistakes, misdeeds, and failures, while
ABSTRACT
The reverence for Stalinism by the main kibbutz movements, which through
revolutionary rhetoric helped perpetuate leaders who had reached the
dysfunctional phase, was wrongly interpreted. Historians missed leaders’ eorts to
induce reverence and its use for their domination, while social researchers missed
its enhancement of oligarchic rule. These are explained by the suppression of
critics at the hands of a co-opted functionalist scientic coalition, by ethnographers
missing the impact of inter-kibbutz organizations, and by the dierentiation of
disciplines. Multiple ethnographies of kibbutzim (pl. of kibbutz) and inter-kibbutz
organizations and the integration of various ndings by a good theory exposed
these failures. They point to the required integration of disciplines and to the
need for reform of scientic publication decision-making aimed at preventing
such failures.
CONTACT Reuven Shapira shapi_ra@gan.org.il
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ISRAEL AFFAIRS 21
Goman revealed how positive façades were craed.1 Berger pointed out that
understanding a society is possible only if its formal facade is penetrated.2
However, penetration might fail if such a facade has been craed by powerful
tenured leaders and is defended by their loyal heirs. Since Machiavelli’s days it
is known that leaders oen rule by ruse, camouaging reality and masking the
stratagems with which their positive images are created and as Foucault has
proved by control of societal knowledge they defend such images.3 Might it be
that social scientists failed to penetrate the egalitarian and democratic facade of
the kibbutz system, lacking the historical perspective of the old-guard leaders’
change from democracy to oligarchy? Did kibbutz leaders carry out, early on, a
camouaged ideological change that enhanced their power and oligarchic rule
and did researchers miss both the change and its signicance? Where oligarchic
rule survives for decades, criticism is rare since radicals and critics are censored,
suppressed, and eliminated by denying them rights, rewards, and promotion,
until they either exit or become loyalists or turn mute.4 If some 80‒84% of kib-
butz members le, including most of the critics of kibbutz leaders,
5
it is possible
that dominant researchers did not meet critics of the oligarchic rulers, and
particularly not those who opposed the ideological changes enacted decades
before to perpetuate the leaders’ dominance.
An ideological change can be decisive when a successful leader of a radi-
cal egalitarian and democratic movement reaches the dysfunctional phase.6
In that phase, the leader loses prestige and power due to mounting unsolved
problems and his weak position oen invites competing leaders to try and
replace him (masculine language is used because all leaders studied were male).
If the latter threaten his primacy he can use autocratic practices: centralizing
control, weakening of democracy, promoting only his loyalists, censorship of
publications, and privileging himself and sta, in accord with Michels’ ‘Iron
Law of Oligarchy’.7 en he can adopt revolutionary rhetoric that creates a
radical image and masks conservative oligarchic practices. Although oligarchic
practices ruin mutual trust with activists as they lose trust-creating discre-
tion, the revolutionary rhetoric may make up for the loss of trust.8 Autocratic
conservative rule tends to deter joiners and harm adaptability, but in a com-
munal movement the autonomy of communes may retain local critical think-
ers and innovators who solve problems and adapt the communes to internal
and external changes.9 e leader’s dysfunction creates a leadership vacuum
which innovative mid-level ocers may enter, solve major problems, innovate,
and lead to prosperity.10 Prosperity may lead to factionalism,11 but also to the
leader’s empowerment and hence to using powers to mask a self-perpetuating
ideological change.
Even ethnographers oen nd it hard to penetrate such a mask, as a major
diculty of ethnography is to ‘perceive the context of phenomena, as it is
oen seen as a self-explanatory … it is spoken of only in hints’.12 e kibbutz
is a complex system: in 1985, at the peak of success, there were some 128,000
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22 R. SHAPIRA
people in 269 communes with many thousands of hired employees and 250‒300
inter-kibbutz organizations (I-KOs) with 15‒18,000 hired employees admin-
istered by 4‒4500 kibbutz members called pe’ilim (i.e. activists; numbers are
inexact due to a lack of research; see below).13 e two main kibbutz feder-
ations called the Movements had 2400 pe’ilim with some 800 company cars,
while 11 regional I-KOs had about 1200 pe’ilim with some 1100 cars. In other
I-KOs a few pe’ilim administered many hired employees; the two largest had
approximately 3500 and 1400 hired employees.
14
All I-KOs used non-egalitarian
and undemocratic practices, mostly led by tenured oligarchic heads, but even
ethnographers who alluded to the conformist practices of pe’ilim missed their
roots in oligarchic I-KOs, which they did not study, while historians who stud-
ied I-KOs ignored their oligarchic practices.15 e ri helped missing leaders’
use of extreme ideology to camouage conservative dysfunction and legitimize
self-perpetuating autocratic measures.
Leaders in dysfunctional phase shifted to reverence for Stalinism
e extremism under study, known as leism, consisted of the veneration of
Stalinism by the two major Movements, the Kibbutz Mechad (KM) and the
Kibbutz Artzi (KA), which comprised some 80% of the kibbutzim and their
members at the time.16 e two were innovative at rst, and established I-KOs
that enhanced the kibbutz cause: youth organizations in Europe that educated
for kibbutz pioneering, teacher’s colleges, publishing houses, daily and weekly
newspapers, journals, printing presses, nancial rms, and more.
17
eir heads,
KM’s Yitzhak Tabenkin and KA’s Me’ir Yaari, initiated leism in 1937 and 1939,
aer 14 and 12 years in power respectively, as their powers were threatened (see
below). However, at that time the two Movements were radically social demo-
cratic, in accord with the radical egalitarian ethos and culture of kibbutzim, and
they had used Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, though not its practices, to prevent
absorption by oligarchic social-democratic Mapai led by David Ben-Gurion
and Berl Katzenlson.18
While the thesis presented here is novel, students agree that leism was a
major mistake and caused the political and social isolation of the KM and KA,
harming their leading societal role, and causing crises, splits, and dissolutions
which greatly weakened them.19 While the KM and KA played major roles in
the establishment of the State of Israel, they remained in political opposition
during its formative years due, to a great extent, to their leism and to a belief
that Ben-Gurion’s government was doomed without them so that he would
soon ask them to join on their own terms.20 ey were proved wrong, and
Mapai coalitions with religious and rightist parties enabled Ben-Gurion’s con-
tinued oligarchic dominance while weakening the KM and KA, which aer six
years in the opposition joined the government on Ben-Gurion’s terms.21 us,
leism is signicant beyond kibbutz society and culture, and helps to explain
oligarchization of Israeli politics.22
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ISRAEL AFFAIRS 23
Leism contradicted radical democratic socialism practised by the early
kibbutzim. e latter was rational and critical of capitalism, trying to create a
better and more just society by adopting the principles of collectivism, democ-
racy, and egalitarianism.23 Up to the mid-1930s, both KM and KA had been
truly democratic: Major Movement decisions were reached by regular coun-
cils, three to four a year, of kibbutz representatives chosen by each kibbutz,
aer kibbutz assemblies discussed the issues to be decided by the council.24
Representatives convened with leaders and pe’ilim at one of the kibbutzim in
large gatherings that also involved locals and members of adjacent kibbutzim.
At that time the higher status of leaders and pe’ilim was not symbolized by
any privilege, insignia, or special title; many pe’ilim were rotated back to their
kibbutz aer a few years of service;
25
and Stalinists were suppressed and ousted.
Tabenkin and Kibbutz Ein Harod Artzi, KM’s predecessor federation (estab-
lished 1923), fought leists of the Gdud Haavoda Movement in 1926‒1927.26
e KA was established by graduates of Hashomer Hatzair youth movement;
its struggle against leists in the Warsaw branch in the mid-1920s ended in
the expulsion of about 40 members, while such struggles in some young KA
kibbutzim in the early 1930s ended in the exit or expulsion of many, and splits
in kibbutzim.27 In 1934 Hazan called the USSR ‘a destructive force within the
working class’, and in 1937 the KA called for an international investigation of
the Moscow trials, a clear anti-Stalinist move.28 ereaer Tabenkin and Yaari
needed almost a decade of leward pushing to induce leism, and only aer
the reversal of Stalin’s anti-Zionism in 1947 did their push win the support of
KM and KA secretariats. Even then, KM’s ex-Secretary-General Yisrael Idelson
(later Bar-Yehuda) opposed leism ‘as a most prominent member of the [KM]
leadership’, representing it in the headquarters of the clandestine Resistance
Movement, and ‘the assumption that KA members were leists proved wrong …
most kibbutzim (and especially the veterans [larger kibbutzim]) were rightists’.29
Tabenkin’s leism commenced in 1937: everyone was criticizing Stalin’s show
trials including the KA secretariat, as cited, except for Tabenkin and most of his
students in the KM’s activist seminar.30 In 1939, the Molotov‒Ribbentrop Pact
was censured by all KM leaders except for Tabenkin and one deputy, while in
the KA it was censured by most leaders including Yaari’s partner Hazan, but
supported by Yaari who prevailed aer a debate of some months.31 In 1940,
aer the imperialist nature of the Pact was exposed by USSR invasions of its
neighbours, Tabenkin reversed his reverence and criticized USSR’s ‘imperialistic
socialism’, while Yaari criticized it as ‘Machiavellian’.32
In 1942 the two leaders renewed leist preaching,33 while Mapai sought
Soviet support for the Zionist struggle against Great Britain and invited Soviet
diplomats, who met Yishuv leaders. In a meeting with them Yaari proclaimed:
‘We will not achieve full national and social redemption without … an alli-
ance with the forces of the World of Tomorrow’, i.e. the USSR.34 In 1943‒1944
the diplomatic romance advanced, the Soviet Union promised help for Jewish
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24 R. SHAPIRA
immigration to Palestine and its representative in London proposed that ‘the
Jewish nation should be allowed to continue building the Land of Israel as its
national homeland’.35 en Tabenkin presented Stalin’s murderous collectiv-
ization in a positive light, and depicted it as an ‘alliance between Stalin and
the peasantry’.36 Stalin was vindicated in KM’s youth movement seminar, and
growing reverence for the USSR led to a split between KM and Mapai sup-
porters.37 Soon survivors arrived from the partisan war in Eastern Europe and
their memoirs exposed the brutal anti-Semitism and chauvinism of Stalin’s
commissars, but Yaari and Hazan censored out these chapters of survivors’
books which the KA published.38
Leism won wide support only in 1947, aer Stalin shied to support the
UN Palestine partition plan which buried KM’s and KA’s unrealistic ideas.
e political distress caused by the victory of Mapai’s realistic approach drew
the KA and the KM closer, and in January 1948 they combined into the Mapam
party which identied itself with the USSR and the Soviet bloc.39 is was a
terrible political mistake which greatly harmed them, and alienated them from
most Israelis, who rejected Stalinism.40 Even more serious, it played into the
hands of their rival Ben-Gurion: He cast doubt on their national loyalty and
overcame opposition in Mapai to the dismissal of their members from high
oces. e Palmah, the democratic and egalitarian army which the KM had
established and which kibbutzim had nurtured, was disbanded, the best of the
1948 war commanders who leaned towards Mapam were side-lined and dis-
charged, Mapam was pushed into the opposition, and the Histadrut educational
system ‒ in which Mapam had a large stake ‒ was dissolved.
41
Tabenkin’s deputy
Ben-Aharon has said: ‘ere was not one trap which Ben-Gurion set for us that
we did not get caught in’, while historian Near concluded: ‘KM and KA leaders
managed a policy ... fundamentally mistaken. ey caused irreparable ri in
one movement, ruined the life of many members, and barred development of
tens of kibbutz communities’.42
Historians’ explanations do not stand up to close scrutiny
Historians noticed these failures, but their explanations belittled leaders’ abili-
ties, failing to explain how such experienced, astute leaders had fallen into these
traps. For historians, leism had not been a deliberate move but rather leaders
had dried into it to extricate the Movements from ideological and political
complications created by Marxist ideas which they used against Mapai’s uni-
cation pressures, and because they were swept away by the glory of the USSR
victories and by its increasing support for Zionism.
No doubt the above did facilitate leism, but neither the timing of the two
leaders’ switch to leism nor other facts support historians’ explanation of
dri. Tabenkin became leist in 1937 and Yaari in 1939, six and four years
before the Stalingrad victory when the Moscow trials and the pact with Hitler
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ISRAEL AFFAIRS 25
were exposing Stalin’s dictatorship at its ugliest, when Yaari’s KA secretariat
demanded international socialist investigation of the trials.43 Secondly, le-
ism might have solved some complications but, very experienced of Stalin’s
cynical and horric policies, they dened his regime as ‘imperialistic’ and
‘Machiavellian’, and were cognisant of ‘how deeply rooted anti-Zionist policy
was among the USSR and its allies in international communism’.44
Leism has been presented as a gradual and natural outcome of the Marxist
approach, but if this is so, why did almost all deputies, likewise Marxists, not
support it until 1947, why did KM’s General Secretary Idelson continue oppos-
ing it, and why did most KA members reject it in 1953?45 All the above facts
prove that Stalinism was neither a gradual nor a natural move and aroused
continuous opposition which was defeated in 1948 but resurrected in the early
1950s. Tzachor has asserted that in the 1930s Hazan was brought to ‘a growing
admiration for the USSR … [leading] to an almost blind support of Stalin’,46
but, as has been mentioned, in 1939 he opposed the Stalin‒Hitler pact. In 1942
Yaari had resumed leism and published a leist book, then Hazan quickly
published a competing book, writing: ‘e shadows of USSR dictatorship are
many; it imposes a heavy yoke, it maintains rule with a heavy hand’ and ‘its
rulers … are always endangered by corruption’.47 His book failed and he also
failed in opposing Yaari’s motion to establish KA’s party (see below), so that
aer the Stalingrad victory he surrendered and joined Yaari. However, even
aer Hazan had joined Yaari’s version of leism, most of their deputies still
opposed it and so they became mute.48
us, Tabenkin and Yaari needed great eort, tactical retreats, and a turna-
round in USSR policy to impose leism. is long and intensive struggle was
inexplicable as simply an eort to disentangle themselves from the ideological
complications with which they had, up to then, coped quite adequately. Instead,
the advance of the oligarchic process from the mid-1930s explains leism as
an eort at self-perpetuation by dysfunctional leaders.
The oligarchic process in KM and KA leadership from the mid-
1930s
Kibbutz social scientists have evaded signs of oligarchy in KM and KA
leaderships, just as they ignored the study of I-KOs (hence the minimal data),
concealing their anti-kibbutz principles and the thousands of privileged I-KO
pe’ilim whose exposure would have ruined the egalitarian and democratic
image of kibbutzim.49 is evasion commenced early on: in 1944 KM lead-
ers vehemently rejected Landshut’s seminal study because of his critique of a
KM policy.50 en Professor Buber, head of the Hebrew University’s Sociology
Department, published a functionalist book in 1947 (English translation 1958),
in which he mentioned I-KOs in only two neutral sentences, ignoring I-KOs’
violations of kibbutz principles:51 prolonged oligarchic tenures for leaders and
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26 R. SHAPIRA
deputies, weakened democracy, centralization, conservative dysfunction, rever-
ence for a dictatorship, censorship of publications, and privileges to leaders and
sta (see below).
52
Buber’s book was celebrated by kibbutz leaders, who made it
a must-read in kibbutzim as it legitimized avoidance of study of I-KOs by later
students. Until Tabenkin and Yaari vanished in the early 1970s no one exposed
I-KOs’ anti-kibbutz cultures and their leaders’ dysfunction and suppression of
critics and innovators.53
Only in 1984 did Beilin reveal how Yaari and Hazan suppressed a group of
young KA leaders who, beginning in 1953, criticized their leism and conserva-
tism. Criticism of Yaari and Hazan and the ensuing inuence of the group were
enhanced in 1956, as Khrushchev exposed Stalin’s crimes, and as Hungarian
democracy was brutally suppressed. en Yaari resorted to a Machiavellian
tactic, and Hazan, who had nurtured some of the group members, eventu-
ally surrendered and supported him. ey destroyed the group’s solidarity by
obligating them to accept several leists who initiated discussions on ‘USSR
socialism’, which curtailed the group’s inuence in kibbutzim while suppressing
its critical and innovative members, especially the gied radical leader Efraim
Reiner, who subsequently le.54
In 1989 Kynan exposed KA leaders’ earlier dysfunction: in 1949‒1950 they
rejected all new proposals put forth by kibbutz managers for new methods of
immigrant absorption, although this was Israel’s main problem. Ben-Gurion
attacked the kibbutzim for not helping solve it, while initiatives by the moshavim
absorbed many immigrants.55 Ultimately, kibbutzim stuck with a problematic,
old, and limited method, called Hevrot Noar (youth groups), and when Kibbutz
Gan Shmuel solved the main problem of this method, the Hevrot Noar discrim-
ination versus kibbutz youth, Yaari and Hazan’s negative attitude prevented
other kibbutzim from following suit.56
Tabenkin’s dysfunction was no dierent: Although he agreed to two innova-
tions, they largely failed, due to his conservative rejection of any change which
would have enhanced immigrant absorption. Historian Kaa wrote:
At the KM Convention social realities in kibbutzim were not discussed at all…
the objective realities did not interest Tabenkin, and so he did not invest any eort
in nding solutions or carrying out reforms … [KM’s secretariat] proposals were
impractical and contradictory.57
Even earlier, Tabenkin’s deputies ‘lost patience, trying to steer through the
maze of his conicting proposals’; some were illogical, and others were clearly
unrealistic and ignored.58
In accord with oligarchy theory, in 1951 Yaari identied himself with the KA
and Mapam, declaring at the KA Central Committee: ‘I, Meir, am Mapam. I am
Hashomer Hatzair. I express the historic trajectory of Hashomer Hatzair’, while
encouraging a cult of personality among his supporters.59 ough Mapam was
a parity union of KA and KM, Yaari’s intoxication with power led KA Stalinists
to dominate its activity, causing a series of crises and failures until its split in
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ISRAEL AFFAIRS 27
1954.60 is was true of Tabenkin as well: a deputy who criticized his decision
to split Mapam resigned and did not answer his letters. Tabenkin came to his
kibbutz, angrily broke into his house, took a chair and, banging it on the oor,
broke it, shouting: ‘What do you think I am [more] important to our Movement
than Lenin was to Russia!’61
Oligarchy theory predicts centralization of control and decline of democ-
racy. At rst major decisions were made in frequent democratic councils
of kibbutz delegates, but from the mid-1930s such meetings were deferred
for a year or so and leader-nominated councils replaced them, while inter-
vals of Movement conventions stretched into 3‒7 years.62 e theory pre-
dicts increasing privileges appropriated by the leader and his ocers. In
the 1920s‒1930s, only a few KM and KA activists had privileges: those who
held high oces in the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut (federation of labour
unions and socialist movements), and its subsidiaries.63 However, in the 1940s
Movement executives were also privileged, receiving monetary allowances
and company cars which kibbutz members could not use when they stood
idle. In the early 1950s Yaari and Hazan obtained large and fancy chauf-
feured American cars, similar to Cabinet ministers; Tabenkin’s was smaller
but he kept this privilege aer formal retirement in 1961.
64
Such was the case
with leaders’ private telephones and other privileges that contradicted their
preaching on modesty.65
Leader dysfunction and suppression of creative deputies
Oligarchization is clear, as is its contradiction to kibbutzim’s radical ethos. But
oligarchy is conservative, while leism was a change. Is there not a contradiction?
Not at all, as leism did not change any kibbutz practice except its ideology
and politics, while camouaging the conservatism of dysfunctional leaders
who opposed new, creative solutions to problems. As found in other large and
successful cooperatives,66 the fast-growing kibbutz system required creative
solutions to maintain democracy and egalitarianism, but as leaders suppressed
critics and innovators, conservative capitalist practices crept in:
1. Capitalist-like I-KOs: New I-KOs were established in the cities rather
than in kibbutzim as in the past, and surrounding norms were adopted.
e leaders did not object, and soon transferred Movement headquar-
ters to Tel Aviv. In Tel Aviv, at rst ocials had no privileges, but grad-
ually more and more privileges appeared.67
2. Capitalist-like industry: From 1940, many kibbutzim established work-
shops and plants with capitalist practices: hired labour, autocratic man-
agement, privileges for managers, and more. e leaders denounced
hired labour but not other capitalist practices which they themselves
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28 R. SHAPIRA
used; only from the 1960s did local innovators instil kibbutz principles
in many factories, while a few I-KO innovators led the provision of the
necessary funding.68
3. Declining collectivism and egalitarianism in kibbutzim: In addition to
I-KOs and the industry breach of these principles, breached egalitari-
anism the salaries of thousands who had served in the British army, the
personal possessions beyond the kibbutz level of urban middle-class
joiners, and more. Previous solutions were insucient and signicant
gaps appeared,69 but the leaders suppressed creative problem-solving.
Worse still, heads of economic I-KOs legitimized inequality by instilling
capitalist values.70
4. Diminishing democracy in kibbutzim: In addition to the Movements’
centralization and the weakening of democracy, the size and complexity
of kibbutzim and I-KOs impaired direct democracy. Serious problems
emerged: low attendance at general assemblies, a minority of attendees
voting, repeated debates, no respect for decisions and their violation,
and domination by cliques.71 e leaders evaded these problems, which
pointed to the need to return power to kibbutzim which leaders had
taken away by centralization and weakening of democracy. Worse still,
local kibbutz leaderships declined through the promotion of successful
and talented ocers to I-KOs and their replacement by inferior ones;
this served the leaders’ interests: the promoted became their loyalists
and subdued the inferior replacements, defeating their eorts to solve
problems innovatively.72
Leaders’ dysfunction was clear. It may be argued that they did not solve prob-
lems, being too busy with rapid growth, but this was not convincing aer 1939,
when problems mounted while growth slowed due to a lack of immigration
from Europe: in 1933‒1939 the number of kibbutzim increased by 122% versus
77% from 1939‒1945.73 Moreover, if they were busy, why would they suppress
creative innovators instead of letting them solve problems? Clearly, successes
by the latter would have accentuated their own ineptitude and diminished their
authority. In the 1920s to early 1930s innovation was encouraged, but already in
1935 Tabenkin suppressed Ein Harod innovator Gershon Ostrovski, who was
one of KM’s founding leaders and headed its delegation to Poland. In Poland
he had successfully and innovatively led the Halutz Movement that doubled
the KM in two years; he ‘stood up against the heavy pressure of Jews who tried
to emigrate … one who had to improvise solutions so that the ood of people
into the Halutz would not ruin the system’.74 Naturally, he expected another
high oce, but aer returning in 1935 he criticized Tabenkin and his loyalists
for violating egalitarianism and democracy; he was sent back to the ranks and
later le.75 His close friend David Maletz remained and the KM publishing
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ISRAEL AFFAIRS 29
house refused to publish his novel Cycles (published by Am Oved, 1945), which
inter alia criticized Tabenkin’s privileges.76
Yaari similarly suppressed Mordechay Shenhabi, whose innovations
enhanced the success of many KA kibbutzim. Until 1942 Shenhabi helped by
Hazan repeatedly overcame Yaari’s eorts to impede his eorts at innovation,
but in 1942 he gave up as Hazan stopped support in order to spare himself one
conict with Yaari to help overcoming his leism, and Shenhabi proceeded to
found the National Holocaust Memorial Museum ‘Yad Vashem’ in Jerusalem.
77
Dysfunctional leaders only solved a few national problems up to
1942
Oligarchization is a process, and a leader may turn conservative in one sector
but not in another where he can enhance his power. In 1937, Hazan helped
Shlomo Gur of Kibbutz Tel Amal to create the ‘Tower and Stockade’ system
which enabled 53 Jewish settlements to be established despite Arab resistance.
78
In 1939, Hazan initiated KA alignment with the Shlonsky group of anti-Stalinist
urban authors and poets, gave them a literary section in KA’s weekly journal,
and employed them in its publishing house. ese authors had no previous
connection with the KA, but as they opposed the literary establishment headed
by Bialik, whom Mapai had adopted, an opposing alliance was benecial to
both sides.79 In 1942, Tabenkin renewed the Palmah, which the British had
set up in 1941 but disbanded, as a kibbutz-based, underground Hagana and
Yishuv army. In return for the soldiers’ work, kibbutzim provided sustenance,
hid weapons and arms production plants, and their youth movement graduates
lled the army’s ranks.80
Leaders’ dysfunction in the national arena commenced earlier on other sub-
jects. In 1937 they faced a challenge: the British Peel Commission proposed
the division of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, and most Zionist leaders
adopted this solution. Tabenkin opposed it irrationally; at rst, he ‘found him-
self holding and discarding various solutions, up to contradiction’, and then
he proposed an international mandate, although this alternative had never
previously existed.81 Yaari proposed a bi-national state, which also had never
succeeded anywhere before, while Hazan supported him without believing in
it.82 KM’s urban political partner, Faction B, opposed Tabenkin’s idea,83 and
it seemed that, like Hazan, most members did not believe in the proposals of
the two leaders but did not actively oppose them. However, even more clearly
dysfunctional was Tabenkin when facing in 1942 the challenge of Ben-Gurion
ousting the KM from Mapai. en Tabenkin became paralysed, ‘let Ben-Gurion
do whatever he pleased’, was ‘dysfunctional … [and] inuencing [likewise] those
around him’; in 1943 ‘the paralysis he suered … continued’ until he decided
on a counter-move in 1944.84
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30 R. SHAPIRA
How did the turn to leftism serve leaders’ survival?
While it was clear that leaders’ growing dysfunction paralleled eorts to induce
leism, how exactly did leism serve their power?
First, revolutionary rhetoric suited their specialization in oral and written
discourse, masked their conservatism, and presented them as devotees of radi-
cal socialism. Secondly, leism swept the KM and KA away from Ben-Gurion’s
Mapai, and negated its unication eort aimed at absorbing them. irdly, it
strengthened leaders by Stalinism legitimizing autocracy, centralization, weaken-
ing of democracy, power continuity, censorship of publications, and privileges. But
according to Wolf’s analysis, it served them even more by radically changing the
cosmic world view so that their superiority became independent of their deeds.
Wolf studied extreme ideologies and concluded that it is better to deal with such
foundational ideas in terms of their functions in society. ey can be shown to be
legitimate and justify forms of rulership. At the same time, these functions anchor
rulership in a cultural structure of imagining, which … postulates cosmologies;
cosmologies in turn, articulate ideologies that assign the wielders of power the
role of mediators or executors on behalf of the larger cosmic forces and grant
them ‘natural’ rights to dominate society as delegates of the cosmic order.85
In the leist cosmic order, Stalin was the ‘sun of the Nations’ and the USSR
was the centre of socialism and its highest form, the yardstick of kibbutz com-
munism, rather than kibbutz successes compared to other communities; it
demoted both kibbutz successes and unsolved problems to secondary impor-
tance. Leaders’ authority was no longer harmed by dysfunction, as it was
based on their ‘role as mediators or executors representing the greater cosmic
powers which grant them “natural rights” to prevail in society’, as Wolf stated.
ey were likened to Admors (acronym of ‘our lord, teacher, and Rabbi’) in
Hassidic courts, spiritual leaders, and prophets of Leninist deceptions ‒ such as
Tabenkin’s assertion that faith was more important than knowing the truth.86
is status was independent of election, and a Bolshevist ‘guided democracy’
enhanced their rule and legitimized autocratic practices.87 ey were suppos-
edly above mundane Movement problems, though, in practice, they made every
major decision and interfered in minor ones as well. In accord with Hughes,
they assigned low-prestige, problematic tasks to aides whose failures did not
harm their positive image, while strengthening their status and power.
88
Hazan
opposed this, but submitted to Yaari.89 Tabenkin ‘threw out ideas which others
[had] to implement’, proposing to set up an ‘alliance of the Kibbutz Movement’;
and notwithstanding objections to the idea, it failed primarily due to Tabenkin’s
lack of eort at implementation.90
The political situation encouraged Tabenkin’s Stalinism
Now let us examine the political situation that encouraged leism and explain
its timing. e dominance of both leaders was being menaced by the success
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ISRAEL AFFAIRS 31
of competing leaders, while their dysfunction diminished followers’ trust,
making their authority vulnerable; this made the threat to their supremacy
real, encouraging the leist solution.
e campaign for unication of the kibbutz movement which Katznelson
had started in 1935, threatened Tabenkin’s KM leadership. As the KA rmly
opposed the idea, the only real partners were the two Mapai-leaning Movements:
the KM, in which Tabenkin’s supporters were 60‒65%, and the smaller Hever
Hakvutzot, in which Tabenkin had no supporters.91 us, Katznelson aimed
at dethroning Tabenkin, turning his KM majority into a minority in a united
Movement. e idea of unication had much appeal among the rank and le;
hence, the KM secretariat, consisting of Tabenkin loyalists, tried to prevent its
discussion at the 1936 Yagur Convention but failed, and one-third of the del-
egates supported it.92 Subsequently, support gained momentum, so Tabenkin
instead proposed an ‘Alliance of Kibbutz Movements’ to unify only some func-
tions of the Movements. But as ‘everyone understood why Tabenkin suddenly
needed this “alliance”’ ‒ that it was due to his Yagur defeat ‒ it failed.93 en he
initiated the 1937 leist seminar for activists, mentioned above, in which the
KM was likened to the USSR: both were governed by ‘centralized democracy’,
had been ‘a society built on rule from above’, and if that of the USSR was wrong,
that of KM would have to be as well. e ‘cruelty’ of the KM to its pioneers,
such as the poor conditions in work training camps in Poland, was compared
to the cruelty of the USSR, but without a word about the fate of its victims.
For example, the USSR was not a dictatorship, free speech reigned there, and
more such deceit.94
Such deceptions are not needed by an eective leader who is fully trusted
by followers since his decisions have proven successful and have solved major
problems, and his high morality and vision give them inspiration for further
eorts and solutions;95 they are needed by a leader who has been weakened by
dysfunction and whose status is in danger. Tabenkin’s defeats in Yagur 1936
and the ‘alliance’ of 1937 threatened his power, and this explains his adoption
of leism at the height of Stalin’s despised show trials. Alas, his opponents won
by a small margin at the 1939 Naan Convention, despite Tabenkin’s four-hour
speech. He then used his last resort, a resignation that regained him the upper
hand since almost all KM pe’ilim were his loyalists who called him back, as the
opposition had no candidate to succeed him; the only one of his calibre, Eliezer
Livenshtein (Livne), had already le aer his suppression similar to Ostrovski.
96
Tabenkin was also weakened by the KM’s specic unsolved problems, in
addition to the common kibbutz problems. Rapid growth had for years caused
a lack of housing for a third or more of the members. Turnover was problematic;
there was mass inux and some half of the newcomers exited aer a short period.
is made managerial planning dicult and caused a lack of worker prociency.
Heterogeneity was a problem; for instance, some newcomers wanted a semi-
religious, semi-secular kibbutz.97 e heterogeneous KM had a homogeneous
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32 R. SHAPIRA
leadership and centralist economic decision-making which preferred growth
over minimal human needs,
98
causing considerable distrust of the dysfunctional
Tabenkin, as his failures at the two KM conventions signalled.99 His resignation
and return saved his power; then Katznelson’s unication campaign died out,
the KM was ousted from Mapai, and aer two years of Tabenkin’s paralysis the
KM founded an unsuccessful party.100 However, Tabenkin’s power beneted
from Palmah successes and thereaer no one challenged his primacy.
Hazan opposed Yaari’s leftism, failed and surrendered
Yaari also used leism due to weakening, in his case caused by the success of
co-leader Hazan. Tzachor described their twin leadership as ‘an alliance … with
an ever-present element of disagreement’.101 Yaari had been KA leader since its
inception in 1927. Hazan had been a deputy who became co-leader from 1932
when Yaari, a successful ideologue, failed to manage the growing KA and called
Hazan to help. He succeeded as an organizer and popularizer of ideas, but the
two disagreed on a major strategic issue: Yaari aspired to an independent KA
party, while Hazan envisioned that such a party would have to be leist to attract
disenchanted Mapai supporters, and therefore sought a truce or even a merger
with Mapai.102 He was more critical of KA leist leaders than Yaari and tried to
suppress them, but Yaari retained their status aer they had rebelled, failed, and
become docile.103 ey served Yaari’s rule: With them he cultivated the image
of being the only one who could steer the KA without falling into either leism
or rightism, becoming a supposedly indispensable leader in accord with Ansell
and Fish’s explanation that a leader becomes indispensable if he symbolizes
the movement and his authority seems essential for its survival and success.104
In 1936 KA urban supporters established the Socialist League and the KA
aligned itself with it, a partial victory for Yaari. However, the terrorist cam-
paign of the Arabs radicalized the Yishuv against them and damaged the KA’s
position as it had sought compromise with the Arabs. Yaari was more seriously
harmed, as Hazan was more militant towards Arab terrorism, while Yaari’s
preaching seemed misplaced.105 Hazan was also strengthened by the success
of the ‘Tower and Stockade’ innovation that he helped invent, and by using
the bi-national state idea to attack Mapai.106 en, by the 1939 leist support
for the Molotov‒Ribbentrop Pact which Mapai had denounced, Yaari took the
lead in the struggle against Mapai and achieved supremacy by defeating Hazan’s
critique of the Pact. In 1940 he tactically retreated (‘USSR was Machiavellian’),
appeasing Hazan and other opponent;, but in 1942 leism was renewed, as has
been noted, and in addition to Hazan’s book failure, he failed to oppose Yaari’s
motion to establish the KA’s party.107
us, Hazan adopted leism in 1943 because of repeated failures in the
struggles against Yaari in 1939 (Molotov‒Ribbentrop Pact), 1942 (the party),
and 1943 (the book). Yaari proved to be unbeatable and Hazan surrendered;
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ISRAEL AFFAIRS 33
further conict with Yaari would have endangered his status, Yaari could have
demoted him. He preferred to retain status and wait for a political change,
which came in the early 1950s: he led the expulsion of leists who had sup-
ported the anti-Zionist Prague trial and nurtured Reiner and his colleagues who
were criticizing leism, until he gave in to Yaari and helped to crush them, as
has been noted. He gradually succeeded Yaari from the late 1960s but never
admitted that the past leism was wrong.108
Why Mapai was not attacked from a socialistic-democratic
standpoint
An additional question which should be asked is why Tabenkin and Yaari turned
to leism instead of attacking Ben-Gurion’s undemocratic rule through the oli-
garchic Histadrut (the federation of labour unions and socialist movements)
which employed Mapai pe’ilim in privileged jobs.109 As this negated socialist
ethos, Tabenkin and Yaari could have demanded the abolition of privileges as
a precondition for unication, damaging the appeal of Katznelson’s campaign.
Moreover, this would have enabled them to better align with Mapai’s internal
urban opposition, Faction B, which opposed Ben-Gurion’s rule; in 1935 they
had aligned with it and had defeated Ben-Gurion in a Histadrut referendum.
110
Why did they not choose this direction again?
e answer once again stems from oligarchic dysfunction. is direction
would have been credible only if Tabenkin had democratized the KM in accord
with the Livenshtein and Ostrovski critique and demands, and if KM pe’ilim
in the Histadrut and Jewish Agency had refused privileges. Mapai had tried
to co-opt opposition of KA in the Histadrut by giving out privileged oces
to leaders’ deputies, as in Zionist organs; for instance, Hazan was a director of
the Jewish National Fund.111 e KM had more such jobs, and Tabenkin and
Yaari themselves travelled bi-yearly to Zionist Congresses in Europe as a part of
Histadrut delegations.
112
Additional obstacles to critique were I-KOs and kibbutz
industry’s capitalist practices. us, a critique of Mapai from a social-democratic
standpoint would not have been credible unless kibbutz organs had themselves
adopted social-democratic practices. But this would have meant forsaking priv-
ileges by which the two leaders obtained docile deputies and pe’ilim, and, worse
still, allowing critical creative deputies like Ostrovski and Shenhabi to invent
these practices might have gained them prestige and power. Leism, on the
other hand, enabled criticism of Mapai without these ‘troubles’.
How did historians miss the leftist turn and its historical
signicance?
Historians are supposed to expose and analyse historically signicant turn-
ing points, but in this case a decisive turning point was missed. Leism was
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34 R. SHAPIRA
depicted as a continuation of the Marxist approach, and the leaders seemed
to have just been swept away. However, critics exposed oligarchic phenomena
as early as the 1970s.113 So why did students not use their ndings to explain
leism by oligarchy theory? One explanation is illogical but common: the sep-
aration of the social sciences and history.114 Without oligarchy theory the nd-
ings were not integrated into a whole which would accentuate the signicance
and etiology of leism. Historians studied leaders and politics while ignoring
ethnographies that exposed oligarchies in both kibbutzim and I-KOs,
115
missing
how prime leaders served as patrons of these oligarchies, which by loyal support
empowered and retained the leaders.116
Historians have an alibi: Dominant social scientists preceded them
in ignoring I-KOs’ oligarchs, having adopted the research paradigm of
communal societies as if the kibbutz resembled these societies, which do
not have I-KOs.117 Until the 1990s only two sociologists and one ethnogra-
pher ‒ that is myself ‒ studied two types of I-KOs, out of the hundreds that
existed, and these sociologists ignored oligarchic phenomena and other I-KO
violations of kibbutz principles.118 Likewise, kibbutz ethnographers ignored
I-KO jobs which enabled continuity of pe’ilim and their local dominance in
kibbutzim.119
en the Hebrew University’s functionalist sociologists became the domi-
nant scientic coalition in kibbutz research and also ignored I-KOs and the oli-
garchic rule of their heads, so no question was raised concerning their roots.
120
ey ignored or suppressed ethnographies which exposed oligarchies in kibbut-
zim.121 ese either remained unpublished or were published only in Hebrew;
hence, later studies ignored them. For instance, Evens studied Yaari’s Kibbutz
Merchavia, depicting eight status categories, but without citing Yaari’s supreme
status above them all as the oligarchic ruler of the KA.122
Conclusions
For the two leaders, the turn to leism was a striking success, aording extra-
long tenures, dominance, privileges, and ample prestige which was largely faked.
For the kibbutzim, leism was ruinous, as has been partially analysed. Full anal-
ysis has proven that kibbutzim’s oligarchization, enhanced by leism, ruined
cultural uniqueness.123 e interest in how leaders coped with the ideological
complications of leism prevented exposure of how they proted from it. e
simplistic explanation that they had just dried into leism has been disproved
by a detailed study which was prompted by suspicions regarding leaders’ aims
in light of ethnographies which exposed I-KO oligarchies. Critical historians
exposed the oligarchic phenomena in the Movements, but without using oligar-
chy theory and not alluding to oligarchies in other I-KOs and kibbutz industry
they missed the oligarchic process, its timing, its etiology, and its pertinence to
leism. e other main reason for this failure was domination of a co-opted
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ISRAEL AFFAIRS 35
functionalist scientic coalition which evaded I-KOs, according to leaders’
wishes, and failed to penetrate their mask of serving public aims.
However, even critical ethnographers who deed this coalition only par-
tially exposed oligarchization, depicting local kibbutz oligarchs but not alluding
to powerful I-KO heads who nurtured them by promotion to privileged and
prestigious I-KO jobs. Ethnographers’ partiality was explicable by their failure
to ‘perceive the context of phenomena, as it is oen seen as a self-explanatory
… it is spoken of only in hints’,124 and by the dominance of the functionalist
scientic coalition which ignored I-KOs: as ethnographers have not studied
I-KOs, they could not integrate oligarchic signs in senior pe’ilim they met at
kibbutzim with I-KO oligarchies and grasp leism’s support of leaders’ oli-
garchic rule. Without untangling the system’s complexity by ethnographies of
both I-KOs and kibbutzim, ethnographers missed the roots of kibbutzim’s local
oligarchies in oligarchic I-KOs.
Erroneous interpretations of mistaken ideologies are inevitable,125 while the
exposure of the true etiology of leism has ramications beyond the kibbutz
history, explaining dierently the major struggles of the Israeli socialist move-
ment, in the late pre-state era, and the Israeli state. e kibbutz movement
played a decisive role in the pre-state era, and might have played a similar role
in the state’s formative years had democracy replaced leaders when they entered
dysfunction phase. Had this taken place, both leism and leaders’ utopian
solutions to the Arab‒Jewish conict might not have been adopted by KM and
KA; kibbutz principles could have reigned in its industry and I-KOs, as they
did in the Palmah; co-optation eorts by Mapai would not have threatened
leaders, who could have counter-attacked Mapai’s oligarchic leaders from a
social-democratic standpoint. e disbanding of the Palmah and the Histadrut
educational network might have been prevented and leism crises avoided.
Kibbutzim would have initiated new ways to absorb immigrants, as did the
moshavim,126 and would have retained their servant elite status; Israeli history
would have been very dierent if the turn to leism had been prevented by
means of democracy and replacement of dysfunctional leaders.
In 1947 Buber’s book mentioned the lack of kibbutz principles in I-KOs in
two neutral sentences that prompted followers to evade I-KOs’ oligarchic prac-
tices and to miss how leism masked their conservative dysfunction. Leism
raised leaders’ status to delegates of a new cosmic order heralded by the USSR,
demoting kibbutz problems to secondary importance and legitimizing leaders’
extra powers, continuity, and privileges. Leism enhanced the suppression of
creative radicals who then le or turned to outside careers and/or became mute.
By studying radicals’ failing careers, ethnographers could have learned about
their suppression by local conservative oligarchs and about oligarchic I-KO
heads’ support of suppression. Alas, they did not, although every journalist
knows he must seek the views of critics and those who are subdued and/or
have exited. Leism and oligarchic rule bred mass exit of the disenchanted, but
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36 R. SHAPIRA
ethnographers did not seek them out to hear their suering from both phe-
nomena unlike education student Sabar.127 Hearing them helped me untangle
the system’s complexity, the impact of leaders’ power, and how dysfunctional
leaders’ dominance caused mass exit and Hirschman’s pruning of critics which
deprived students of informative critique.128
An ethnographer of complex organizational systems must consider the
power leaders have to divert or block their eorts, and must seek to overcome
stratagems designed to prevent exposure of the truth about leaders’ functioning
and aims. Informal methods make it easier to evade barriers set up by leaders,
but the danger exists of missing the eects of contexts, and not nding one's
feet in a complex eld to properly interpret cultures.129 Ethnographers must
suspect that, due to leaders’ barriers and camouages, predecessors have missed
a critical sector and events which were problematic for the leaders, and to
study them. is may expose cultural ris which highlight the signicance of
phenomena.130 A home ethnographer who is a part of the studied society may
imagine that they are aware of its contexts, but in a multicultural, fast-changing
and complex system, they may be mistaken.131 For instance, one context that
aected kibbutzim was adjacent ‘development towns’, and to understand their
eects their cultures required ethnography as performed by Marx132 but not
by kibbutz students. Another example is the historical context: the pre-state
Jewish community was an ideological and highly value-laden democracy; thus,
it was alienated by anti-democratic leism. Worse still, Tabenkin and Yaari did
not admit that it was wrong even aer 1956, furthering public alienation to the
detriment of kibbutzim; but this had not been studied.
Wallerstein calls for integration of disciplines by ‘historical social sciences’
and the present case supports it;133 integration is essential but is dicult to
achieve due to dierent academic backgrounds and research methods. In addi-
tion, much history is written in the spirit of the leaders who have shaped it.
us, it is essential to nd the small amount of critical historical material and
integrate it with one’s own ethnographies of dierent parts of the complex
system, as well as with other ndings, and with the help of a good theory, in
accord with psychologist Kurt Lewin’s famous remark about its practicality, one
may penetrate leaders’ masks and camouages. However, the right theory may
be found in another discipline; thus, more interaction and integration among
disciplines by new solutions is called for.
Another problem of social sciences must also be addressed in light of the
suppression of critical kibbutz researchers: Like leaders and their loyalists who
defend the masks, early students tended to defend their ndings against later
critical disproof. In this manner, the kibbutzim’s hegemonic scientic coalition
defended evasion of I-KOs and oligarchic rule, preventing true explanation
of leism. Collins exposed the problem of such hegemonies in 1975,134 but
his exposure did not change publication decision-making norms in the social
sciences: Disagreement among reviewers still leads to rejection; hence, one
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ISRAEL AFFAIRS 37
member of a hegemonic coalition among reviewers can be enough to block
exposure of its mistakes. A reform of this method is required to limit conserv-
ative hegemony of scientic coalitions. is may be done by adoption of the
method of natural sciences: when only one reviewer agrees with an article, it
is not rejected but is reviewed by an additional scholar.
Acknowledgements
e author thanks Haim Shferber, Emanuel Marx, Gideon M. Kressel, Einat Libel,
Naama Kedem-Hadad, Nir Resisi, Sergey Gornosteiev, Barbara Doron, Martin Kett,
Henri Near, Daniel De-Malaach, Uri Izhar and anonymous reviewers of earlier versions
of this article for their helpful comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Dalton, Men Who Manage; Goman, e Presentation of Self; Hughes, Men and
their Work; Mehri, Notes from Toyota-land.
2. Berger, Invitation to Sociology, Ch. 2.
3. Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation, 92; Foucault, Power/Knowledge.
4. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty; Michels, Political Parties.
5. Leviatan, Oliver, and Quarter, Crisis Kibbutz, 163; Sabar, Kibbutz L.A.; Shapira,
Transforming Kibbutz Research, Ch. 14.
6. Hambrick and Fukutomi, “e Seasons.”
7. Michels, Political Parties.
8. Bourdieu, Outline; Fox, Beyond Contract; Sasson-Levy, Muda”ut.
9. Brumann, “e Dominance of One”; Shapira, Transforming, Chs. 15‒16; Stryjan,
Impossible Organizations.
10. Shapira, “Institutional Combination.”
11. Moshkowitz, Likud Bli Likud.
12. Marx, “Hamekhkar hakhevrati-anthropology,” 147.
13. For a brief discussion of I-KOs, see Shapira, Transforming, Ch. 6.
14. Niv and Bar-On. e Dilemma; Shapira, Transforming, Chs. 5‒8.
15. For a similar ri between organizational research disciplines, see Bate,
“Whatever Happened.”
16. Near, e Kibbutz, Vol. II, 364‒71.
17. Dror, Historiya; Niv and Bar-On, e Dilemma of Size; Rosolio, Hashita
Vehamashber; Shapira, Transforming, Ch. 6.
18. Shapiro, “Hashorashim.”
19. Beilin, Banim Betzel Avotam; Kaa, Emet O Emuna; Tzachor, Hazan; Zait,
Khalutzim, 125.
20. Kanari, Tabe n k i n , 615; Tzur, Lo Yu k h lu.
21. Yatziv, Hakhevra Hasectoryalit.
22. Beilin, Banim; Etzioni-Halevy, Kesher Ha”elitot; Shapiro, Elita Bli Mamshikhim;
Shapiro, “Hashorashim.”
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38 R. SHAPIRA
23. Buber, Paths in Utopia; Landshut, e Kvutza; Near, e Kibbutz, Vol. I.
24. Argaman, Hakibbutz Yakhlit; Tzur, Miginzay Haarchion.
25. Kanari, Tabe n k i n ; Near, e Kibbutz, Vol. I; Tzur, Miginzay Haarchion.
26. Near, e Kibbutz, Vol. I, 140‒43.
27. Zertal, Ken Ne”urim, 160‒77. Tzachor, Hazan, 152‒7; Zait, Khalutzim, 261.
28. Hazan, “Le”emdatenu”; Zait, Khalutzim, 120.
29. On the KM: Goren, Yisrael Bar-Yehuda. On the KA: Tzur, Nofey, 237. Also Zait,
Khalutzim, 145, 166.
30. Kaa, Emet, 30.
31. Ibid., 38; Tzachor, Hazan, 163‒4.
32. Kanari, Tabe n k i n , 471, 478; Zait, Khalutzim, 121.
33. Kaa, Emet, 49; Zait, Khalutzim, 123.
34. Zait, Khalutzim, 205.
35. Ibid., 203‒4.
36. Kaa, Emet, 60‒62.
37. Ibid., 66, 72.
38. Porat, Me”ever Lagashmi, 178‒82.
39. Zait, Khalutzim, 237, 259‒60.
40. Ibid., 262; Near, e Kibbutz, Vol. II, 329.
41. Kaa, Emet, 110‒12; Tzachor, Hazan, 188‒97; Yatziv, Hakhevra.
42. Gvirtz, Yeled Bilti Rtzuy, 217; Near, Rak Shvil, 467.
43. Zait, Khalutzim, 120.
44. Ibid., 208.
45. Goren, Israel Bar-Yehuda; Tzur, Nofey, 237.
46. Tzachor, Hazan, 155.
47. Zait, Khalutzim, 123, 205.
48. Ibid., 123.
49. Shapira, “Communal Decline”; Shapira, “Academic Capital”; Shapira, “Becoming
a Triple Stranger”; Shapira, Transforming.
50. Kressel, “Hakdama.”
51. Buber, Paths, 141. On functionalists dominance in Israel: Ram, e Changing
Agenda. On functionalism: Platt, “Functionalism and the Survey.”
52. E.g. Lenski, Power and Privilege; Michels, Political Parties.
53. Tabenkin died in 1971 and Yaari relinquished oce in 1973 due to poor health.
54. Beilin, Banim, Ch. 5; Shapira, Transforming, 185; Personal knowledge as a
member of Reiner’s kibbutz and as his student in KA’s Seminar Center and the
Ruppin College.
55. Ben-Artzi, “Kibbutz or Moshav?”
56. Kynan, “Betzalmnu Kidmutenu.”
57. Kaa, Emet, 125, 127.
58. Kanari, Tabe n k i n , 593, 604‒5, 635‒52.
59. Kynan, “Betzalmnu Kidmutenu”, 190; Halamish, Me” i r Yaa r i, 88.
60. Mapam: Kanari, Tab e n k i n , 640‒77; Intoxication: Kets de Vries, Leaders. Series
of crises: Near, e Kibbutz, Vol. II, Chs. 7‒8; Tzachor, Hazan, 188‒221.
61. Kanari, Tabe n k i n , 745.
62. Kaa, Emet, 35; Near, e Kibbutz, Vol. II, 65; Tzachor, Hazan, 224; Tzur,
Miginzay.
63. As this negated kibbutz egalitarianism, it was never mentioned in print, but
has been told in veterans’ interviews; for instance, in 1990 interview in Kibbutz
Ramat Yohanan with David Kahana, who served as a Histadrut subsidiary
ocial in 1930.
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ISRAEL AFFAIRS 39
64. Kanari, Tabe n k i n , 761; Tzachor, Hazan, 180.
65. Halamish, Me”i r Yaar i , 104.
66. Stryjan, Impossible Organizations.
67. Kanari, Tab e nkin, 476; Shapira, Transforming, 127‒32; Tzachor, Hazan, 171‒80.
68. Rosner, “Ha”avoda Bakibbutz”; Shapira, Klitat; Shapira, “Rotatzia otomatit”;
Shapira, Transforming, Ch. 16; Shapira, “Institutional Combination.”
69. Ben-Horin, Hitporerut Kvutzot, 82; Katzir, Sharsheret Zahav, 76.
70. Cohen, “Khevrat Hyekhidim.”
71. Argaman, Hakibbutz Yakhlit; Ben-Horin, Hitporerut.
72. Shapira, “Rotatzia”; Shapira, “Communal”; Shapira, Transforming, Chs. 12‒15;
Topel, “Livnot.”
73. Near, e Kibbutz, Vol. II, 362‒71.
74. Ibid., respectively, 389, 395, 389‒90.
75. Kanari, Tabe n k i n , 389‒90.
76. Keshet, Makhteret Rukhanit.
77. Shapira, Transforming, 150; Zait, Hakholem Vehamagshim.
78. Interview with Shlomo Gur, Tel Aviv, 1992.
79. Shapira, “Avraham Shlonski”; Shapira, Transforming, 159.
80. Near, e Kibbutz, Vol. II, 13, 24‒31.
81. Ibid., 433, 523.
82. Tzachor, Hazan, 162, 172‒4.
83. Kanari, Tabe n k i n , 441.
84. Ibid., 513‒21.
85. Wolf, Envisioning Power, 283‒4.
86. Kaa, Emet, 27.
87. Porat, Me”ev e r , 181‒2; Tzachor, Hazan, 229.
88. Hughes, Men and eir Work.
89. Tzachor, Hazan, 223‒4.
90. Kanari, Tabe n k i n , 412, 408 respectively.
91. Zait, Khalutzim, 71; Ben-Avram, Khever Hakvutzot.
92. Near, e Kibbutz, Vol. I, 349‒50.
93. Kanari, Tabe n k i n , 408‒9.
94. Kaa, Emet, 27‒30.
95. Giuliani, Leadership; Graham, “Servant-Leadership in Organizations.”
96. Kanari, Tabe n k i n , 390, Ch. 24.
97. Ibid., respectively 395, 374, 386, 371‒2.
98. Landshut, e Kvutza, 80‒92.
99. Kanari, Tabe n k i n , 375.
100. Ibid., 521, 539; Zait, Khalutzim, Chs. 6, 8.
101. Tzachor, Hazan, 91.
102. Ibid., 150‒52, 158‒9.
103. Ibid., 153‒4, 218; Kaa, “Dfusay Manhigut.”
104. Ansell and Fish, “e Art.”
105. Tzachor, Hazan, 156‒60.
106. Ibid., 161‒2.
107. Zait, Khalutzim, 79.
108. Tzachor, Hazan, 251‒69.
109. Shapiro, Elita; Shapiro, “Hashorashim.”
110. Kanari, Laset, 153‒86.
111. Shapiro, “Hashorashim,” 47; Tzachor, Hazan, 224.
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40 R. SHAPIRA
112. Minutes of World Zionist Organization Congresses (Jerusalem: World Zionist
Organization, 1950), 1925‒1935. Congresses No. 14‒19.
113. Adar, “Mechonit Tzmuda”; Bowes, Kibbutz Goshen; Fadida, “Hadinamica”;
Kressel, Rivud; Kressel, Lekol Ekhad; Ron, “Ha”ide”ologya Hakibbutzit”; Shapira,
“Hadinamica”; Shapira, “Academic Capital;” Shapira, Transforming; Topel,
“Livnot.”
114. Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation, 90.
115. See note 113, and Shapira, Anatomya; Shapira, “Rotatzya.”
116. Shapira, “Communal”; Shapira, Transforming.
117. Shapira, Transforming, Ch. 1.
118. Khermesh, “Hashpa”ot Hasviva”; Rosolio, Hamiv ne Ha”ezori.
119. E.g. Rosenfeld, “Social Stratication”; Spiro, Kibbutz; Topel, “Livnot.”
120. Ram, e Changing Agenda. E.g. Collins, Conict Sociology, Ch. 9; Platt,
Realities of Social Research; Platt, “Functionalism and the Survey.”
121. Ben-David, “Bikoret”; Shepher, “Kibbutz Sdom Ve”amorra.”
122. Evens, Two Kinds of Rationality.
123. Shapira, Anatomya; Shapira, “e Voluntary”; Shapira, “Communal”; Shapira,
Transforming.
124. Marx, “Hamekhkar,” 147.
125. Zoloth, “Mistakenness.”
126. Ben-Artzi, “Kibbutz or Moshav?”
127. Sabar, Kibbutz L.A.
128. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.
129. Marx, “Hamekhkar,” 147; Geertz, e Interpretation of Cultures, 13.
130. Hazan, Hasiakh Ha”anthropology, 29.
131. Shapira, “Becoming a Triple.”
132. Marx, e Social Context.
133. Wallerstein, e Uncertainties of Knowledge.
134. Collins, Conict Sociology, Ch. 9.
Notes on contributor
Reuven Shapira is a retired senior lecturer of anthropology, sociology, and management
at the Western Galilee Academic College, Acre, Israel, and a member of Kibbutz Gan
Shmuel.
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