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A Conflict for a Name or a Name for Conflict? An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM (1991-1996)

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Abstract

This article attempts an analysis of the Greek foreign policy during the dispute between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, from its beginnings up until the 1995 interim accord signed between the two countries. It is to a large extent based on the author's personal research in Greek government archives and other unpublished sources, as well as on interviews with leading Greek politicians and diplomats who were immediately involved in the issue. It traces the origins of the controversy and portrays the current dispute as the latest stage in evolution of the Macedonian Question of the past. The diplomatic strategies of the two countries involved are examined for the 1991-1995 period. In addition, the content and significance of the contentious issues of this debate are put under scrutiny. Finally, the factors which contributed to the diplomatic exacerbation of the issue (causing a failure of both parties to secure a resolution to the dispute that they would consider as "positive") are analysed and the general repercussions for the Balkans' geopolitical status quo are outlined.
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Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
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AN ANALYSIS OF GREECE'S DISPUTE WITH FYROM
AN ANALYSIS OF GREECE'S DISPUTE WITH FYROMAN ANALYSIS OF GREECE'S DISPUTE WITH FYROM
AN ANALYSIS OF GREECE'S DISPUTE WITH FYROM 1991
1991 1991
1991-
--
-1996
19961996
1996
Demetrius Andreas Floudas
Demetrius Andreas FloudasDemetrius Andreas Floudas
Demetrius Andreas Floudas
*
**
*
I. Introductory Remarks
I. Introductory RemarksI. Introductory Remarks
I. Introductory Remarks
**
The entanglement between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM),
over the issue of the recognition of the latter and the name under which this recognition would
take place, has served as a potent reminder of the considerable influence that nationalistic
divides have always exerted in the Balkan region. For Greece, this dispute animated passions
and stimulated a nationalist fervour that had been unseen for decades and, being a not fully
resolved issue, it contains a number of elements that could serve as a focus of regional conflict
in the future. For the fledgling FYROM, the entanglement constituted a matter of paramount
importance not merely in defining its external policy but it was also perceived as a matter
influencing both its existence as a nation and its future status in Southeastern Europe.
This article will attempt an analysis of the dispute between Greece and FYROM, from
its beginnings up until the 1995 interim accord. In the first instance, it will trace the origins
of the controversy and portray the current dispute as the latest stage in evolution of the
Macedonian Question of the past. Furthermore, the diplomatic strategies of the two countries
involved will be examined for the 1991-1995 period. In addition, the content and
significance of the contentious issues of this debate will be scrutinised. Finally, the factors
which contributed to the diplomatic exacerbation of the issue and caused a failure of both
countries involved to secure a resolution to the dispute that they would consider 'positive' will
be analysed and the repercussions for the Balkan region's short- and long-term geopolitical
status quo will be outlined.
* Demetrius A. Floudas is an Associate of Hughes Hall, University of Cambridge and Adj. Professorr of Immanuel
Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad
**
Chapters III and IV of this paper are based on a presentation given at Trinity College, University of Cambridge in
May 1994. The author wishes to thank the Legal Office of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Athens, the
Ministry for Macedonia and Thrace in Thessaloniki, the Press and Information Office of the Greek Embassy in
London and particularly Mr. Papademetriou for the material provided; Dr. E. Divani of the University of
Athens and Mr. N. Ziogas of ELIAMEP for their assistance with the sources; Dr. L. Prabhu, Associate of the
BDICFA, for his comments; Dr. H. Tzimitras of the Panteios University, Athens for his feedback on the
version presented at the London School of Economics and Political Science in November 1994; Dr. E. Kofos
for his expert advice; and the former Greek Government Ministers Dr. M. Papakonstantinou, Mr. S.
Papathemelis and Mr. A. Samaras for their time and valuable personal insights into the lesser-publicised aspects
of the issue.
2
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
2
The focus of the article is the dissection and analysis of the Foreign Policy of Athens
regarding the Macedonian question in the post-war period, with particular attention to the
years 1991-1995. As such, its ultimate objective is to provide a contribution to the scholarly
investigation of the factors influencing Greek Foreign Affairs in the 1990s.
II.
II. II.
II.
"Macedonia Nostra"
"Macedonia Nostra""Macedonia Nostra"
"Macedonia Nostra"
:
: :
:
The Historical Background of the Macedonian Question.
The Historical Background of the Macedonian Question.The Historical Background of the Macedonian Question.
The Historical Background of the Macedonian Question.
The geographical term "Macedonia" is a Greek word and was used in antiquity to
designate the area inhabited by the Macedonians, "the tall ones", apparently on account of the
distinguishing physical height of this tribe.
1
It was thus the inhabitants who gave their name
to the region and not the other way round.
For most of their earlier history, the Macedonians led a relatively peripheral existence
and were accordingly slow to partake in the intellectual, social and cultural progress of
southern Greece.
2
The kingdom of Macedonia reached a peak under Philip II (359-336 BC),
when it was enlarged considerably through a series of successful military campaigns and
included a large part of the southern Balkan peninsula. At the time of death of Philip's son,
Alexander the Great, the Macedonians had created a vast empire in Asia and Africa, after
spearheading an astounding military and ideological crusade against the Persians "on behalf of
all Greeks".
3
The Slavs first appeared in the region in the 6th century A.D. during the great
migrations of the period, whilst in the Middle Ages various other populations started moving
in the area.
4
Under Byzantine and Ottoman rule, the term was used in its geographical sense,
i.e. it covered the boundaries of the former four Roman administrative regions of
"Macedonia".
5
This was in fact larger than "historic Macedonia", the core domain of the 4th
century B.C. Macedonian Kingdom, and was inhabited by a multitude of different Balkan
ethnic groups, Greeks, Turks, Serbians, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Jews and Albanians.
1
The ethnic name is derived from the adjective µακεδνός occurring already in Homer (Odys. η 106). See Andriotes
(History of the Name 'Macedonia) at p. 143. For a discussion of the ethnic origin of the Macedonians see
Andriotes (The Language and Greek Origin of the Ancient Macedonians).
2
The ethnicity of the ancient Macedonians has been a matter of heated debate for some time. Based on Demosthenes’
philippics (where Philip was denounced as an uncouth semi-barbarian) some sources have denied any ethnic
connection between the Macedonians and other Greeks. Nevertheless, it appears that currently most serious
researchers do not seem to question the hellenism of the Macedonians, as members of the Doric tribe. For an
exposé of the argument: Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou, p. 3 et seq.; with detailed discussion, Wardle ; also Sakellariou
pp. 44-47; Martis at p. 20 et seq; cf. also fn 3 infra.
3
See inter alia Martis, pp. 53-71; Ellis & Walbank; but also Pribichevich, pp. 37-64.
4
For more see Libal, p. 15 et seq.; Pribichevich, pp. 65-93; Christophilopoulou; Bucar, p. 8 et seq.
5
The Ottomans never used the name Macedonia as an administrative (or ethnic) appellation; cf. Papazoglou;
3
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
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In the crumbling 19th century Ottoman Empire, the increasing breakdown of central
authority led to growing interest in occupied Macedonia amongst the surrounding Balkan
nation-states. The respective national ideologies of these newly-independent countries, in the
form of accurate or arbitrary historical, ethnological and political claims, began to converge
on the heterogeneous province and the ensuing tension precluded any hope of consensus
when the time to redraw the borders of that "microcosm of Balkan complexities"
6
would come.
The eventual annexation of the largest possible portion of geographic Macedonia became thus
pivotal in the nationalist and irredentist plans of Bulgaria
7
, Greece
8
and Serbia and a
fundamental consideration of their national consciousness. Chronologically, the Macedonian
Problem in its original form may be said to begin with the founding of the Bulgarian Exarchate
in 1870.
9
This was perceived as an initial step to establish a distinct -Bulgarian- national
identity for the Slav-speaking populace and it was further pursued by the founding of schools
and by indulging in vigorous propaganda.
10
The growing activity of the Bulgarians alarmed
Serbia and Greece, which decided in turn to mobilise in this cultural cold war. By 1900
educational indoctrination had given way to more acute measures as the Bulgarian-backed
I.M.R.O.
11
embarked on a campaign of terror against the population by armed bands of
guerrillas, the
komitadjis
.
12
The other two countries responded by organising combatant
groups of their own
13
, and from 1903 to 1908 a ruthless and protracted struggle took place
amongst the Balkan Christians in territory belonging formally to the Turks, who had limited
success -and, arguably, equally limited interest- in containing the conflict.
14
The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 ended the Ottoman rule. After successfully stripping
the Ottoman Empire from almost all her European possessions, the Balkan alliance broke up
and Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece in a clash over the spoils. The Bulgarians were
severely defeated in the Second Balkan War and the Treaty of Bucharest (August 1913)
confirmed the final partitioning of the Macedonian region amongst the Balkan neighbours.
Greece annexed 51.5% of geographic Macedonia
15
, Bulgaria gained 10.1% and the remaining
38.4% became part of the kingdom of Serbia, under the name Southern Serbia.
16
6
Kofos E., (National Heritage and National Identity in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Macedonia), p. 4.
7
E.g. the book byTachiaos.
8
See concluding chapter by Veremis; also Kitromilides; Kofos, (Dilemmas and Orientations of Greek Policy in
Macedonia: 1878-1886).
9
Zotiades at p. 13.
10
See Klok, (De Macedonische Kwestie).
11
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, as the Vatresna Makedonska Revoljucionenna Organizacija (V.M.R.O.) is
internationally known.
12
For a Slav-Macedonian view of IMRO, the 'Macedonian Revolution' and the Macedonian Struggle (cultural and
military), see Pribichevich, pp. 106-135; also Bucar, pp. 90-104.
13
Cf. Koliopoulos; for a chronological account see Papakonstantinou, (I Makedonia meta ton Makedoniko Agona), pp.
38-53.
14
Kofos, (The Fight for Freedom 1830-1912); see also Dakin p. 73 et seq.
15
It must be noted that Greece secured not only the largest part of the geographic region of Macedonia, but also
approximately 90% of the historic core of ancient Macedonia; Voros, (The Macedonian Question of our
Neighbours).
16
Zotiades, p. 29, fn. 73.
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Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
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In the meantime, a curious twist to the original 'Macedonian Question' evolved. Until
that time the term 'Macedonian' had never been used by any of the three countries involved,
17
,
or any segment of the actual population, as anything other than a geographic definition.
18
In
the interwar period however, the term began to be put to use for the first time as an ethnic
description,
19
serving as a fabrication to promote Comintern's aspirations to increased regional
influence.
20
The crucial step was taken in 1944 by the Yugoslav leader Tito, when he implemented
the decision to create a new federal state consisting of six republics. He gave to the
southernmost province, previously known as
Vardarska
Banovina
(i.e. District of [the river]
Vardar), the new name of People's Republic of Macedonia.
21
This republic was made a
constitutive of federal Yugoslavia and its Slavic inhabitants -known until then as ethnic
Bulgarians or Serbs- were recognised as its 'titular nation'
22
under the name
Makedontsi
(Macedonians). Their language, which was until then held to be a western Bulgarian dialect,
was christened 'Macedonian' and became one of Yugoslavia's official languages.
This was a political masterstroke on behalf of Tito. He managed to safeguard for
Yugoslavia a region which had been claimed by Bulgaria ever since the Second Balkan War,
23
and at the same time to create a Piedmont that could facilitate the unification of the remaining
Macedonian territories into the Yugoslavian federation.
24
An extensive 'Macedonisation'
process was initiated so as to instil a distinct national identity in the awareness of the
population; numerous Greek and Bulgarian historical and cultural elements were
appropriated,
25
whilst the younger generations started to be systematically infused with
irredentist views of a Greater Macedonia and of their as yet 'unliberated brothers'. Tito's
immediate plans for annexation of the Bulgarian and the Greek parts of Macedonia were
17
Bulgaria, aligning with the Central Powers in WWI and with the Axis in WWII, occupied Serb and Greek Macedonia
on both occassions; ibid., pp. 72-76; See e.g. Klok, (De tweete Macedonische Kwestie).
18
Recapitulating Voros, (Different uses of the term Macedonia in the Centuries of History).
19
See the article by Kofos, (The Macedonian Question: The Politics of Mutation).
20
"The struggle for a united and independent Macedonian republic of the working people is a worthy cause", Resolution
of the Communist International on the Macedonian Question and the IMRO(United) -1934, in: Kondis B. et al
(eds.), p. 23; see also Papakonstantinou M., (I Makedonia meta ton Makedoniko Agona), p. 13 et seq; Voros,
(Macedonian Question of Neighbours), p. 39 et seq.; but from the Bulgarian point of view, see Misirkov.
21
Zotiades, pp. 77-82; Kofos, (The Making of Yugoslavia's People's Republic of Macedonia).
22
On the notion of 'titular nation', see Bremmer & Taras (eds.), p. 5.
23
Cf. fn 17 supra; about the Macedonian policy of Bulgaria in the period after World War II, see Zotiades, pp. 94-100.
24
"The fighting Piedmont of Macedonia has fiercely proclaimed that it will not stint on support or sacrifice for the
liberation of the other two segments of our nation and for the general unification of the entire Macedonian
people", Report of the Organising Committee of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of
Macedonia (ASNOM) concerning its activity from its foundation to its first session (2.VIII.1994), Kondis et al
(eds.), p. 35; See Zotiades, pp. 83-90; Leontaritis, p. 21; Pribichevich, p. 145 et seq.
25
Kofos, (National Heritage and National Identity), p. 20, comments on the "Yugoslav Macedonian historiographers,
who could labour with equal ease in the annals of history and the world of fantasies".
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Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
5
respectively thwarted by the clash with Moscow in 1948
26
and the termination of the
communist-induced ferocious civil strife in Greece in 1949.
27
At the same time, the reaction of Greece to this attempted provocation was remarkably
lukewarm and remained so for more than four decades. The reasons for this lie in the
following:
a) From 1944 until 1949, the internal situation in Greece was hardly suitable for the
planning and implementation of a coherent foreign policy due to the instability caused by the
civil war that was ravaging the country.
b) In the final phase of the civil strife, Tito's decision to close the Greek-Yugoslav border
and discontinue the aid to the insurgents proved a major factor in ending the conflict in
favour of the Athens-based government. Even though this was not a result of any deference
on Belgrade's part towards the Greek government but for other reasons, the latter had a strong
incentive not to stress the point of the southernmost province's name at the time.
28
c) After Yugoslavia broke with the Eastern Bloc and adopted a non-aligned stance in the
1950s, Greece came under fierce pressure by the U.S.A. to normalise relations with her
northern neighbour and refrain from stirring up mischief in the future, as Yugoslavia was
perceived to be a strategically important buffer state in the soft underbelly of the Warsaw
Pact.
29
d) As the tension with Turkey escalated in the postwar period, it was important for
Greece to secure its 'northern front' in order to focus on the
periculum ex oriente
.
e) Furthermore, as Orthodox Serbia had been the traditionally friendly agent for Greece
in the otherwise insecure Balkan peninsula, a rapprochement with the (Serb-dominated, after
all) Yugoslavia would seem inevitable in order to ensure at least one ally in the area. Thus for
example, Belgrade's positions on the Cyprus issue were always recognised as 'encouraging' by
the Greek side.
f) With the state of war against Albania perpetuated and Bulgaria technically an enemy
country, Greece's only overland connection with mainland Europe passed through the
territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
30
g) "The alien Slav element, as a result of its role during the Occupation and the civil war,
had left [Greece]
en masse
and the prospect of its manipulation by a neighbouring country to
threaten the security and territorial integrity of [Greece] had been removed."
31
26
Zotiades, pp. 91-93.
27
For the influence of the Macedonian Controversy on the Greek civil war, see Kofos, (The Impact of the Macedonian
Question on Civil Conflict on Greece); also Kondis; informative background to be found in Hammond.
28
See Klok, (De tweete...), p. 4.
29
For the Greco-Yugoslav relations in the 1950s, see Zotiades, pp. 101-107.
30
Giakoumis, p. 443.
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Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
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h) Greece could operate as a strategic dyad with Yugoslavia, blocking the approach of
Warsaw Pact troops to the Mediterranean in the event of widespread hostilities, thus manyfold
enhancing the vital bargaining potential of either country individually.
32
Thus, Greek reaction in so far as the new 'Macedonian Question' was concerned
remained, until the end of the 1980s, -at best- restrained, and after 1950 the standard cliché
about the 'traditional friendship' of the two peoples was reiterated at every opportunity by any
public statement or analysis concerning bilateral Greek-Yugoslav relations.
33
Abroad,
however, a major cultural campaign was launched, capitalising on Yugoslavia's privileged
position in the non-aligned movement.
34
A significant programme of translations from
Macedonian into the most important world languages was initiated, along with the
organisation of international conferences and the generous dissemination of S.R.M. books in
prestigious academic institutions,
35
especially in countries with multicultural credos such as
Canada and Australia.
36
Hence, a de facto recognition of a Macedonian ethnic entity had been covertly attained
internationally by 1970 already.
37
And, in spite of the occasional irritated protest from the
Greek public opinion in the late 1980s, the inescapable conclusion was now that this "newly-
established 'Macedonian' nation could rightfully stake a claim to everything Macedonian; i.e.
everything of, or pertaining to the region of Macedonia and its inhabitants."
38
III. Exacerbation and Diplomatic Struggle: 1989
III. Exacerbation and Diplomatic Struggle: 1989III. Exacerbation and Diplomatic Struggle: 1989
III. Exacerbation and Diplomatic Struggle: 1989-
--
-1993
19931993
1993
In the post-Tito Yugoslavia it soon became apparent that the initiative had passed to the
individual republics and the delicate balances that had held the system together for forty years
had been upset. The collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the arising turmoil accelerated
the centrifugal tendencies.
39
On 23 December 1990 a referendum in Slovenia supporting
31
This is a manifestly untrue statement of course but it remained one of the mainstays for Greek propaganda for almost
half a century. It is quoted here as found in the “Statement by the Head of the Greek Delegation” in: Reply of
the Yugoslav Intervention at the Plenary Session of June 22, 1990; C.S.C.E., Conference on Human Dimension,
Offprint, Athens: ELIAMEP, 1991, at p. 355.
32
Kofos, (Greece and the Balkans in the '70s and '80s), p. 8.
33
Ibid., p. 7.
34
Bilateral cultural agreements of third countries with Yugoslavia were sure to include a pro-Macedonia proviso; see
Kofos (National Heritage and National Identity), p. 29.
35
With details, Martis, p. 104 et seq.
36
Kofos, (National Heritage and National Identity), p. 32.
37
An illuminating (albeit disheartening) personal anecdote is mentioned by Martis, at p. 101.
38
Kofos, (Politics of Mutation), at p. 170.
39
An example of the slackening of central control and the consequent unleashing of hitherto latent nationalist trends are
the sharp clashes between the Greek and Yugoslav delegations during the C.S.C.E. conferences on Human
7
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
7
independence, triggered off the chain of events that led to the dissolution of the Federal
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. In a similar referendum on 8 September 1991
40
, a large
majority in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
41
voted in favour of independence and the
Republic duly declared its sovereignty on 17 September 1991.
42
At the same time, it started
seeking international recognition as the 'Republic of Macedonia'. The Greek government had
been expecting this eventuality, after the eruption of fighting in the north of Yugoslavia earlier
in the year had signalled that the federation's days were numbered.
43
But for the Greeks in
general it was a tremendous jolt, as they suddenly realised in 1991 that a new state was about
to appear at their northern frontier with a name which they had thought to be unquestionably
theirs. Greece had spent the last two years entangled in a paralysing internal squabble and
successive general elections that had nurtured severe introspection and had delayed the
readjustment of foreign policy to the novel exigencies of post-iron-curtain realities in Europe.
So, the Greek public opinion arose excitedly in a forceful campaign against the new state
intended to compel it to relinquish all linguistic and symbolic connections with Greek history;
and the 'Macedonian issue' entered a new chapter of its history.
On 16 December 1991, the Council of Ministers of the European Community met to
consider the
de jure
recognition of the breakaway former Yugoslav republics in Brussels. The
Foreign Minister A. Samaras put forward the position of the Greek side concerning FYROM
44
,
centring on objections against the use of the name 'Macedonia', the likelihood of future
territorial claims and the hostile propaganda emanating from certain circles in Skopje.
45
At
the time, with attention focused on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and the convoluted
negotiations regarding the Treaty on European Union
46
, Samaras, at the end of a marathon
session, had little difficulty in persuading the Council to adopt the Greek views and include
them in the resulting declaration.
47
After this initial success, the favourable opinion of the
Dimension (Copenhagen 1990, Moscow 1991) over allegations of maltreatment of the 'Macedonian' minority in
northern Greece; statements by the Head of the Greek delegation in: Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), at pp. 23, 43.
40
For the results of the referendum , ibid., p. 38.
41
In March 1991 the Socialist Republic of Macedonia had dropped the 'Socialist' from its name and remained, as the
'Republic of Macedonia', a part of the Yugoslav federation.
42
Declaration of Independence of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 40.
43
The President of the Republic of Macedonia, the former communist Kiro Gligorov, had been initially favourable to
association within a 'New Yugoslavia', a fact that had seemingly reassured Athens too much.
44
To avoid confusion through the use of varied nomenclature, the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be
subsequently referred to as FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), a name it officially adopted
however only after its recognition by the United Nations in 1993.
45
In the November 1990 elections in FYROM the notoriously nationalistic V.M.R.O. (resurrected I.M.R.O.) emerged as
the largest party in Parliament and, although it remained in the opposition, its stalwart antihellenic outlooks were
to become a notable influence on Skopje's policy.
46
For some of the background of this meeting, see Axt; Alendar, pp. 1009-1011
47
"The Community and its Member States also require a Yugoslav Republic to commit itself, prior to recognition, to
adopt constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims towards a neighbouring
Community State and that it will conduct no hostile propaganda activities versus a neighbouring Community
State, including the use of a denomination which implies territorial claims" (our italics); Extraordinary EPC Ministerial
Meeting: Declaration on Yugoslavia, Brussels, 16.XII.1991, in Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 50.
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Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
8
Badinter Commission -which endorsed FYROM's recognition
48
- was also set aside and a
ferocious diplomatic struggle commenced between Athens and Skopje. Both President
Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Samaras engaged in correspondence with the European
partners outlining Greece's argumentation
49
, whilst north of the border it was realised that this
was going to be a hard fight.
Amidst intensifying Greek passions towards FYROM's unyielding stand, the Foreign
Minister clarified the Greek views at the Lisbon EC Foreign Minister Council on 17 February
1992. The Portuguese EC Presidency that undertook to explore the prospects of resolving the
impasse, came up with a draft deal (the so-called 'Pineiro package'
50
), which was rejected as
there was no agreement on the name ("New Macedonia" had been put forward). Later, at the
Guimaraes Council of Ministers it was decided that the Member States "are willing to
recognise [FYROM] as a sovereign and independent state, within its existing borders, and
under a name that can be accepted by all parties concerned".
51
The zenith of the Greek Foreign Policy’s effectiveness during the dispute with FYROM
was achieved at the European Council of Lisbon on 27 June 1992. The past semester of
intense Greek diplomatic activity had been fruitful and the Community finally formulated a
position whereby it was to recognise FYROM in accordance with the December 1991
declaration and only "under a name which does not include the term Macedonia".
52
In Greece,
public opinion was jubilant, but in Skopje the blow toppled the government. The hardliners
emerged vindicated and during the rest of 1992 the situation was methodically exacerbated by
both sides: in August, FYROM adopted the 16-point Star of Vergina as the emblem on the
national flag and in September, the new school textbooks that were circulated were laden with
irredentist references to "Greater Macedonia" and claims on hellenic cultural heritage; on the
other hand, Greece intensified a selective embargo on fuel and commodities.
53
As the European front appeared unreceptive at the moment, the FYROM government
decided to seek recognition elsewhere and on 30 July 1992 applied directly to the United
Nations for recognition.
54
But time was running against the Greeks now. The European press
was starting to rally clearly in support of the little fledgling state, whilst Skopje was using
every conceivable diplomatic means to curtail Athens' international backing. The EC Member
States were not hiding their uneasiness and possible second thoughts over the 'Macedonian
48
This Commission was to consider the conformity of the individual Yugoslav Republics to the conditions that the
Community had set for recognition; see FYROM's reply to the Badinter Commission questionnaire,
29.XII.1991, ibid., p. 54; Badinter Commission Report No. 6 (Re: FYROM), 11.I.1992, ibid., p. 65.
49
See letters of Karamanlis to the EC Heads of Government, 3.I.1992, ibid., p. 63; and to Italy's PM G. Andreotti,
21.I.1992, ibid., p. 83; letter of Samaras to the EC Foreign Ministers, 17.I.1991, ibid., p. 72.
50
From the name of the Portuguese Foreign Minister who negotiated it; 'Pineiro package', ibid., p. 87.
51
Council of Ministers - Guimaraes decision, ibid., p. 94.
52
Lisbon European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Annex II, 26-27.VI.1992, ibid., p. 100.
53
Cf. Perry (Une crise en Gestation? La Macédoine et ses voisins).
54
See FYROM's Reaction to the Lisbon European Council Decision, 3.VII.1992, in Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 103; and
President Gligorov's Letter to the U.N. Secretary General, ibid., p. 106.
9
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
9
issue' and a break in the solidarity of the EC seemed forthcoming
55
as the Edinburgh European
Council gave a very watered-down assurance of continued support to the Lisbon declaration.
56
The situation was declining rapidly in FYROM, which was facing problems with the large
Albanian minority and dreaded a southward expansion of the war raging in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Besides, the economy was in a dismal state, caught in a stranglehold between
the U.N. sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia to the north and the Greek measures to the
south, and with no hope of securing World Bank/International Monetary Fund aid without
prior recognition. However, these weaknesses were exploited successfully as a bargaining
chip, since the last thing that anyone wanted was an additional crisis in the Balkan region.
57
In anticipation of the United Nations decision on the admission of FYROM, Athens resumed
diplomatic efforts in the final months of 1992, seeing FYROM's U.N. membership as inevitable
but attempting to avert the worst.
58
In January 1993 the Greek Government submitted a 16-
point memorandum to the Security Council
59
, denouncing FYROM's intransigence and
"destabilising influence in the region". It also contained attachments of the 'Greater
Macedonia' maps printed in FYROM, of the Vergina Star on its flag etc. Gligorov's government
duly counter-attacked on 3 February with a memorandum accusing Greece of recalcitrant
behaviour and of "exerting destabilising influence in the region"...
60
The Security Council accepted the new republic's application by resolution 817/1993
and recognised it under the provisional name 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'. For
the first time in the history of the Organisation a state had been admitted under a temporary
name, especially in view of the fact that all the federative states of the former Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia which had recently become independent members had retained the name which
they had within the federations. Greece also managed to hinder the flying of the offensive
FYROM flag at the U.N.
61
and to secure a recommendation that the difference over the name
be resolved "in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in
the region".
62
The decision produced a lot of disapproval in the Greek public opinion and it
55
See e.g. Karamanlis' Letter to the Heads of Government of the EC, 24.X.1992, ibid., p. 108, where he professes his
surprise over "the incomprehensible tendencies within the Community towards a review of the Lisbon
decision."
56
Edinburgh European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Section D -External Relations, 11-12.XII.1992, ibid., p.
123.
57
In December 1992, 1000 UNPROFOR soldiers (including 300 U.S. troops) were moved to FYROM in order to
prevent "possible developments which could undermine confidence and stability in the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia or threaten its territory"; Security Council Resolution 705(1992) of 11.XII.1992,
authorising establishment of an UNPROFOR presence in FYROM.
58
For a behind-the-scenes overview of this mobilisation see the article by the then Foreign Minister Papakonstantinou,
(I Eisdohi ton Skopion ston OIE).
59
Memorandum of Greece concerning the Application of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for Admission
to the United Nations, 25.I.1993, A/47/877 (agenda item 19), S/25158; published with attachments, Athens:
ELIAMEP, 1993.
60
Memorandum regarding the admission of the Republic of Macedonia in the U.N. and the Greek Memorandum trying
to prevent it, 3.II.1993, in: Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 138.
61
Letter of the President of the Security Council to the U.N. Secretary-General, 7.IV.1993, ibid., p. 149.
62
Security Council Resolution 817(1993), S/25855.
10
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
10
was regarded as a failure by the increasingly vociferous nationalists. The Government was
caught in a cul-de-sac trying to abate the national fervour that had been unleashed at home
63
and to improve the by now increasingly tarnished image of the country abroad.
64
In implementation of the 817/1993 resolution, a round of negotiations intended to
devise Confidence Building Measures was initiated by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering
Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, C. Vance and Lord
Owen. On 14 May they submitted a draft plan for an agreement on the contentious issues
(emblems, constitution, propaganda), but this fell through again on account of the suggested
name (Nova Makedonija: unacceptable to both sides).
65
Later the same month, the Greek
Government extended a compromise proposal with the name 'Slavomakedonija', the first time
that the firm position against the use of any compound name to include 'Macedonia' was
waived.
66
This was equally unsuitable for FYROM, since its inhabitants are far from being
homogeneously slavic, and further mediation was deferred until after the Greek elections in
October 1993.
67
IV. In hoc signo disputatur: The elements of contention
IV. In hoc signo disputatur: The elements of contentionIV. In hoc signo disputatur: The elements of contention
IV. In hoc signo disputatur: The elements of contention
An appraisal of the elements of contention between Greece and FYROM can be helpful in
elucidating the extent to which the historical components of the Macedonian question
commingled with current geopolitical and strategic necessities in order to formulate the issues
of the dispute. Both sides had certainly demonstrated few signs of coming to a compromise
over these issues, but often inflamed the situation further instead. Greece had been taking
exception with fluctuating rigour to the use of the Macedonian name and the promulgation of
a 'Macedonian' nation since the end of the war, but it was during the 4 December 1991
meeting of the Government cabinet in Athens that the objections to FYROM's recognition took
their final form.
68
1. The controversial articles of the FYROM Constitution. In November 1991, FYROM
adopted a new constitution containing clauses that Greece found objectionable. The drafting
of the constitution was strongly influenced by the strongest party in the Parliament, the
63
See e.g. Papakonstantinou, (I Eisdohi ton Skopion...), p. 26 et seq.
64
The U.N. recognition of FYROM was one of the factors that contributed significantly to the fall of the Nea
Dimokratia government.
65
Papakonstantinou, (Ellada kai Skopia -Metra Oikodomisis Empistosynis) suggests that this plan would have been a
very positive outcome for Greece at the time; see rejecting letter to the U.N. Secretary-General by Gligorov,
29.V .1993, in: Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 162.
66
Letter of G. Papoulias (re: the Vance-Owen plan), 27.V.1993, S/25855/add. 1.
67
Vance announcement: U.N. Press release SG/SM/5111, 28.IX.1993.
68
Libal, p. 132.
11
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
11
nationalist VMRO, and subscribed to a number of the proclamations in its electoral
manifesto.
69
In particular, the Preamble to the Constitution
70
underlines its ideological affinity
to the principles of the Krushevo Republic (1903)
71
and of the Antifascist Assembly of the
National Liberation of Macedonia (A.S.N.O.M., 1944), regarded as the first steps towards the
creation of an independent 'Macedonian nation'. In these declarations direct reference is
made to the annexation of Macedonian territory belonging to Greece and Bulgaria and to the
resistance of the people against the Balkan imperialists who carved up Macedonia in the early
part of the century.
72
Art. 3 of the Constitution was also a major point of contention.
73
It
originally referred to FYROM's territory as being indivisible and inalienable but, in the
amendments made on 6 January 1992, paragraphs (c) and (d) were added in an effort to
conform to the Badinter Commission's criteria. Paragraph (c) was held by Greece to imply
territorial claims against neighbouring states as, in conjunction with the Preamble, it could
supply the legal basis for the annexation of territories in the future. This however should be
read in light of paragraph (d), which expressly rejected any such claims. Finally, Art. 49 was
seen as nurturing a climate of irredentism in FYROM as well as creating an excuse for the
Republic to interfere with the internal affairs of Greece under the pretext of a constitutional
duty to assist a 'Macedonian' minority.
74
Again, the 1992 amendments explicitly renounced
any such prospect.
To an outside observer, the arguments of Greece as regards the 1991 Constitution did
not appear very convincing. Assuming that there was ground for fear that these expansionist
claims were being harboured by FYROM's basic charter, the 1992 amendments had
adequately removed it, on paper at least. If on the other hand, as the Greek Government
69
Compare the disputed articles of the Constitution with some of the principles contained in the V.M.R.O. manifesto,
November 1990 in: Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 34.
70
" Resting upon the historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood heritage of the Macedonian people and upon its
centuries long struggle for national and social freedom as well as for creation of its own state, and particularly
upon the statehood-legal traditions of the Krushevo Republic and the historical decisions of the Antifascist
Assembly of the People's Liberation of Macedonia and the constitutional-legal continuity of the Macedonian
state as a sovereign republic within Federal Yugoslavia, upon the freely manifested will of the citizens of the
Republic of Macedonia on the referendum of September the 8th, 1991, as well as upon the historical fact that
Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people...", as quoted ibid., p. 47.
71
Cf. the sources in: Bozhinov & Panayotov (eds.), p. 498 et seq.
72
Manifesto issued at the First Session of A.S.N.O.M. to the People of Macedonia, 2.VIII.1944, in Kondis et al (eds.), p.
36; FYROM's President Gligorov has signed the A.S.N.O.M. declarations as a member of the Organisation.
73
" a. The territory of the Republic of Macedonia is indivisible and inalienable.
b. The existing borders of the Republic of Macedonia are inviolable.
c. The borders of the Republic of Macedonia could be changed only in accordance with the Constitution, and based on the principle
of voluntariness and generally accepted international norms.
d. The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial claims against neighbouring states.", Art. 3 of the FYROM Constitution as
quoted in Valinakis & Ntalis (eds), p. 47; the January 1992 amendments are in italics.
74
" a. The Republic takes care of the status and rights of the members of the Macedonian people in neighbouring
countries, as well as of emigrants from Macedonia, assists their cultural advancement and promotes the links
with them. The Republic shall not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states and their internal affairs.
b. The Republic takes care of the cultural, economic, and social rights of the citizens of the Republic abroad",
Art. 49 of the FYROM Constitution as quoted ibid., p. 47; the January 1992 amendments are in italics.
12
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
12
maintained, Balkan politics are hardly straightforward and even an express claim of non-
interference should not be taken at face value, then why bother about constitutional provisions
at all? As long as Athens remained convinced that the malevolent intent of Skopje was going
to manifest itself in the future despite the 'express safeguards' originally introduced by the
1992 amendments, the logic of still pursuing constitutional alterations escaped the outside
observer. This is not to say that it FYROM's undertaking in the 1995 interim agreement to
amend the controversial articles once again was not a significant step forward, but in
retrospect, if Skopje had in a sense managed to create the perception that any claims on
Greece had already been absolved by the 1992 amendments, then the insistence in convoluted
legal-historical arguments effectively weakened the overall Greek position.
2) Symbols and Propaganda. Numerous maps, car stickers and posters had been
circulated in the new Republic, portraying a 'Greater Macedonia', i.e. the whole of geographic
Macedonia stretching south to Mt. Olympus, as the historic homeland of the 'Macedonians' in
FYROM.
75
These had been issued by private or semi-official sources (e.g. the V.M.R.O.) and
were used by Greece as proof of the territorial aspirations against her northern provinces. The
FYROM government authorities however have always disavowed themselves from this and
tried to diffuse the matter as either the work of a few extremists or the direct popular reaction
to Greece's relentless attempts to smother FYROM. More troublesome, because of its official
origin, appeared to be the inclusion of similar maps in the school textbooks of history
published in 1992 and 1993. These created the impression that all Macedonian heritage
belongs rightfully to FYROM and that there exist unliberated territories within the boundaries
of Bulgaria and Greece that have been stolen from the motherland.
76
One of the main weapons in the bilateral propaganda struggle was the vexed issue of the
existence of a Slavic minority in Greek Macedonia. The policy of Athens in the last five
decades has been a staunch denial of the existence of any such minority, however small.
Especially after independence however, FYROM repeatedly raised the matter in international
fora, demanding that Greece respect the fundamental human rights of this long-suffering
minority and recognise its 'Macedonian' status.
77
The existence and the numbers of the Slav
minority in Greece
78
became one of the major issues in the ensuing bedlam,
79
especially as
75
See a collection in "Borders, Symbols, Stability", Athens: Citizens' Movement, 1993.
76
An examination of 12 new textbooks of history and geography is made by Kofos, (The Vision of a 'Greater
Macedonia': Remarks on FYROM's new school textbooks).
77
A history of the Slav-Macedonian minority in Greece after World War I can be found in Bucar, pp. 203-240.
78
The estimates found in the bibliography range from 2,300 in Munuera, at p. 47, fn. 112; 20,000 to 50,000 in Perry, (La
Macédoine et ses voisins), at p. 190; 45,000 "at most" in Libal, at p. 137; more than 50,000 in Bucar, at p. 239;
100,000 in Pribichevich at p. 237.
79
See e.g. "Macedonian Minorities: The Slav Macedonians of Northern Greece and the Treatment of Minorities in the
Republic of Macedonia", Oxford: The British Helsinki Human Rights Group, 1994.
13
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
13
Skopje was fleet to employ the Greek objections to Art. 49 of the Constitution as implied
evidence for the real numerical strength of the minority.
80
Finally in August 1992, the Parliament of FYROM adopted as an emblem on their flag
the Star of Vergina, the symbol of the ancient Macedonian dynasty.
81
This move was not only
historically questionable but was also regarded as a gross national slur by the incensed public
opinion in Greece.
82
It had been suggested at the time that what prompted the adoption of the
Vergina Star was a desire from Skopje's part to advance maximalist objectives in order to
barter with them for other concessions at the negotiating table when the time comes.
83
The
bilateral negotiations that followed the 1995 interim accord justified this view.
3) The use of the name. Undoubtedly, all the above points of friction were accessory and
appurtenant to the crux of the whole dispute, the name of the new state. The bases for the
Greek reasoning were historical, ethnological and geographical and have been broadly
outlined above. Indeed, if strict archaeological and historical exactness is sought, one may
regard as an oxymoron the use of the term 'Macedonian' by a slavic people. Moreover, the
heritage and culture of the much wider geographic region runs the risk of becoming soon
monopolised, even without any further action from FYROM, since it will be almost natural to
associate it with the only country which contains the Macedonian name in the state
denomination.
84
But it would be wrong to assume that the argument exhausted itself there;
what appeared to be at issue was not only national pride but also long-term Greek national
security. This may sound exaggerated in view of the weakness of the new state, but the Greeks
could not easily forget that Balkan politics are notoriously volatile and susceptible to defy
predictions. As Athens saw it, regional powers like Turkey or Bulgaria may seek to take
advantage of this feebleness, with a view to achieving an 'encirclement' that could prove
detrimental for Greece. This could be accompanied by renewed territorial claims on Greek
territory, founded on historical and geographical claims to a 'Greater Macedonia', since by
that time in the future this legacy might be regarded as belonging, partly at least, to FYROM.
85
Foreigners, failing to appreciate the possibility of such a turn of events, tended to misinterpret
Greek security anxieties in relation to the name as originating from fear of future secessionist
movements of the Slav minority in the north of the country.
86
It is imperative to note Skopje's arguments justifying their use of the name: They have
been centred around the view that FYROM is the only state situated integrally in Macedonia,
80
Included in the Memorandum regarding the admission of the Republic of Macedonia in the U.N. and the Greek
Memorandum trying to prevent it, 3.II.1993, in Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 138.
81
Found in 1977 on the lid of the gold larnax attributed to Philip II; with details Andronikos, p. 100 et. seq.
82
See inter alia Coughlin C., "Red Flag is Red Rag to Greeks", The Sunday Telegraph, 27.II.1994
83
Cf. Derala.
84
Thus, Greek arguments in Memorandum of Greece concerning the Application of the FYROM for Admission to the
U.N., point 10; "Macedonia: More than a Difference over a Name", Secretariat General for Press and
Information, Athens, 1994.
85
Klok, (De tweete...), p. 5; Giakoumis, at p. 456.
86
See Perry, (La Macédoine et ses voisins), at p. 190; Munuera, at p. 48.
14
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
14
therefore it is well justified to use this name as far as geographical considerations go. In
parallel, FYROM emphasises that it does not claim for itself a monopoly on the name nor is it
concerned with the Greek province named Macedonia.
87
Their sole objective remains to stop
Athens operating a monopoly over Macedonia and to allow FYROM to exercise its right of self-
determination in the choice of its name. To this effect, FYROM stressed the following points:
that the Greek Consulate in Skopje addressed the authorities using the name Socialist Republic
of Macedonia as late as the beginning of 1992;
88
that for the first time in history a segment of
geographic Macedonia came under Greek administration in 1913;
89
that FYROM was the first
to use the name officially, after 1944, whilst Greece never used it in an official form until
1988, therefore the
prior tempore potior jure
rule must be applied;
90
and that, most
importantly, the change of the Republic's name is against the will of the people and it "will
unconditionally destabilise the country".
91
Nevertheless, whether there was indeed substance
in the claims of FYROM that their citizens feel members of a distinct Macedonian nationality
appeared to go unquestioned in Greece. To answer this appropriately, neither the decades of
persistent indoctrination should be left out of consideration nor Greece's violent struggle since
1991 in contrast to her complacency for the 45 years before this. If it was a common bond for
the people that the government in Skopje wanted, they found it by claiming this name and
rallying the whole population in a united resistance front under a common cause against the
pugnacious Greeks.
92
V.
V. V.
V.
Dénouement
DénouementDénouement
Dénouement
: Recognitions, countermeasures, the European Court of
: Recognitions, countermeasures, the European Court of : Recognitions, countermeasures, the European Court of
: Recognitions, countermeasures, the European Court of
Justice and the 1995 interim accord.
Justice and the 1995 interim accord.Justice and the 1995 interim accord.
Justice and the 1995 interim accord.
The first country to recognise FYROM, under the name 'Republic of Macedonia', was
Bulgaria in January 1992. Sofia preferred an independent state that should be easier to
influence than the previous Yugoslavian federative republic, which had engaged in strong
anti-Bulgarian policies.
93
At the same time however, true to its long-standing position, Sofia
87
Memorandum regarding the admission of the Republic of Macedonia in the U.N. and the Greek Memorandum trying
to prevent it, in Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 138.
88
Ibid.
89
Ibid.; i.e. under administration of the post-independence modern Greek state.
90
Ibid.; this is an untrue statement as it applies to the renaming of the Greek Ministry for Northern Greece to Ministry
of Macedonia-Thrace in that year but disregards the use of the name to denote the administrative area for many
other purposes ever since 1913.
91
Ibid.
92
Further on nationalism as a nation-building force in FYROM, Troebst, (Makedonische Antworten auf die
'Makedonische Frage'); see also Pope H., "Macedonia seeks to evade hawk's claws", Sunday Independent,
27.II.1994.
93
On the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian conflict over Macedonia, see Troebst, (Die bulgarisch-jugoslawische Kontroverse um
Makedonien 1967-1982).
15
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
15
denied the existence of a separate 'Macedonian' nation, choosing to consider FYROM's
population as a close relative instead.
94
Shortly afterwards Turkey recognised FYROM, again
as 'Macedonia', and was the first country to establish full diplomatic relations with Skopje.
Given that FYROM could provide fertile ground for Ankara's moves to extend its influence in
the post-Yugoslavia Balkans and that Greece was vehemently opposed to such a recognition,
this move was hardly surprising.
95
Until its admission in the United Nations in 1993, the only
other countries to recognise the state had been Russia, Slovenia and Croatia. Despite U.N.
membership, the European Union and all major Western countries refrained from formally
recognising FYROM but with 1993 coming to a close it was apparent that this was not going
to last for long, as mass media in the West were increasingly turning against the Greek
positions.
96
The October 10 general elections brought the Socialists to power, and -the
considered as uncooperative- A. Papandreou back to premiership. The new government was
determined to initiate a tougher approach to the Macedonian issue and had repeatedly
confirmed these intentions during the electoral campaign.
97
In a letter to the U.N. Secretary-
General, the new Foreign Minister K. Papoulias stated that Athens was willing to proceed with
the Vance-Owen mediation only as long as FYROM would quit its deliberate procrastination
tactics and acquiesce to some basic Greek demands.
98
This move prompted six EU Member
States (Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, United Kingdom) to accord full
diplomatic recognition to Skopje, only a few days before the semester of the Greek Presidency
of the Community was about to begin.
99
Greece protested against this action on the grounds
that it constituted a breach in the unity of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the
Union, and that it opened the floodgates for a wave of recognitions which would automatically
resolve the issue in FYROM's favour and allow it to be even more inflexible at the bilateral
negotiations. When the United States followed suit in February 1994,
100
Greece replied by
severing diplomatic ties with Skopje and imposing a blockade on FYROM goods moving to and
from the port of Thessaloniki with the exception of humanitarian aid on 16 February.
101
An
unprecedented condemnation followed in the whole of Europe, as the international
community reacted with indignation to what was seen as Greek hysteria. Serious opinion-
makers questioned openly the suitability of Athens running the European Union affairs for the
94
Comment entitled "Bulgarien: Die Anerkennung Makedoniens", Südosteuropa 41 (1992), p. 236; Nelson, p. 53.
95
Mazower; Derala, p. 8.
96
See Barber L. & Hope K., "EC-Greek row over Macedonia worsens", Financial Times, 14.I.1994; Palmer J., "EU
States plan links with Macedonia", The Guardian, 30.XI.1994.
97
Papandreou had stressed that he would never recognise FYROM as 'Macedonia' or with a name containing this term
in several televised interviews, e.g. 28 September and 5 November 1993.
98
This letter is dated 4 November 1994; cf. Reply of the U.N. Secretary-General to the Foreign Minister K. Papoulias,
8.XI.1994 in Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 172.
99
On 16 December 1993; see Perry, (Crisis in the Making? Macedonia and its neighbors), p. 31; Algieri, p. 3.
100
White House Announcement regarding the Recognition of FYROM in: Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 176; see also the
Reply of President Gligorov to president Clinton, ibid., p. 178.
101
Decision of the Cabinet of Ministers to cease the Movement of Goods to and from Skopje, 16.II.1994, ibid., p. 180;
further expounded in (internal) Circular of the Ministry of Economics to the Greek Customs regarding the
Movement of Goods to and from Skopje, 18.II.1994, p. 183.
16
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
16
first semester of 1994 and even suggested the removal of Greece from the Union altogether.
102
In a flurry of tense diplomatic activity, the Greek government tried to explain its position
amidst growing allegations that the countermeasures constituted flagrant breach of the
country's obligations under international law
103
and under European Community law, as a
Member of the E.U.
104
The matter was discussed by the Council at Ioannina, where the Greek
government again came under attack for the measures, but no final decision was reached. On
22 April the Commission brought an action under Art. 225.2 of the EC Treaty, alleging that
the Hellenic Republic had made improper use of Art. 224 of the Treaty in order to justify the
unilateral measures adopted on 16 February. Art. 225 provides for an accelerated procedure
for the Commission to bring a Member State directly before the European Court of Justice for
making improper use of the powers it has under Art. 224 to take emergency measures in the
event of serious internal disturbances, war, threat of war, or for maintaining peace and
international security.
105
The matter caused serious consternation in Greece, with wild
speculation about 'extensive antihellenic conspiracies' becoming rife.
106
At the same time, the Commission filed an application for interim measures under Art.
186 EC, requiring Greece to suspend the trade blockade pending judgement on the main
action. Greek efforts were mobilised and on 24 May 1994 the government submitted a 65-
page document (along with a massive annex) containing its written observations on the
interim relief application. The document consisted of two parts, one outlining the historical
102
For the press reaction to the Greek countermeasures, see inter alia Tett G., "Blockade by Greece puts EU on the
spot", Financial Times, 18.II.1994; "Time for Greece to rethink", The European, 25.II.1994; Mortiner E.,
"Southern Discomfort", Financial Times, 3.III.1994; Theodoracopulos T., "Greece defies its own Great
Legacy", The Wall Street Journal, 21.IV.1994.
103
On the validity of the claims that Greece contravened International Law by denying to landlocked FYROM access to
the port of Thessaloniki, the essay by Syrigos.
104
Outlining, 'Written Observations of the Hellenic Republic regarding the Application for Interim Measures, case C-
120/94 R, Commission v. Hellenic Republic', pp. 18-19 [uncirculated]; see also Argumentation regarding the
adoption of measures by the Hellenic Republic against the Republic of Skopje, 21.II.1994 in: Valinakis & Ntalis
(eds.), p. 185; Letter of J. Delors to A. Papandreou, 22.II.1994, ibid., p. 192; Memorandum of the Greek
Government to the European Commission, 26.II.1994, ibid., p. 194; Letter of J. Delors to A. Papandreou,
21.III.1994, ibid., p. 213.
105
Article 224 EC
Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed to prevent the
functioning of the common market being affected by measures which a Member State may be called upon to
take in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of
war, serious international tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted
for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security.
Article 225 EC
If measures taken in the circumstances referred to in Articles 223 and 224 have the effect of distorting the
conditions of competition in the common market, the Commission shall, together with the State concerned,
examine how these measures can be adjusted to the rules laid down in this Treaty.
By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 169 and 170, the Commission or any Member
State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member State is
making improper use of the powers provided for in Articles 223 and 224. The Court of Justice shall give its
ruling in camera.
106
Cf. "Etsi mas parapempoun se diki oi etairoi mas [Thus bring us to Court our Associates], to Pontiki, 11.V.1994;
Mardas D., "Skopia-embargo: to kostos tis diethnous ypokrisias" [Skopje-embargo: the cost of international
hypocrisy], Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia, 24.VII.1994.
17
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
17
background and the other refuting the Commission's legal claims.
107
The European Court
considered the legal arguments and came up with a carefully worded decision rejecting the
Commission's application for interim measures on the basis of insufficient proof on what
regards the harm caused to Community competition. The Court also underlined the fact that a
number of considerations innate to the matter were of political and not legal nature.
108
The 29
June 1994 decision was welcomed with approval as "Greece's full vindication"
109
.
Even if this was not necessarily the case, the dispute was obviously coming to a close,
one way or the other. The deteriorating situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina further north, meant
that the Greece-FYROM dispute was rapidly becoming demoted to less than a side-show. After
several months of relatively low-level activities -with both sides remaining entrenched in their
former positions- the breakthrough was precipitated by the Advocate-General's opinion on the
legality of the Greek countermeasures, issued in April 1995
110
. In fact, the Advocate-General
was suggesting to the European Court that, under the circumstances of the case in question, a
ruling could not be made by the Court on the essence of the dispute. Although this was far
from vindicating the Greeks for the imposition of trade sanctions, it was certainly one of the
arguments heavily relied upon by the Greek side. In Skopje, a Foreign Ministry statement
described the opinion as "an attempt to exert political pressure" and expressed the hope that
the ECJ would still go on and adopt the "correct" ruling
111
. At the same time however , it was
becoming increasingly clear in FYROM that the embargo was not going to be declared
unlawful by the European Community and thus the only way to avert further damage to the
already reeling economy led to the negotiating table. A summer of intense bilateral diplomatic
activity followed, culminating in an agreement aimed at normalising relations, signed on 13
September 1995 by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries. The essence of the interim
accord was the lifting of the trade sanctions against Skopje in exchange for the FYROM's
undertaking to change its national flag, refrain from using symbols "linked to Greece's cultural
and historical heritage" and amend the 'offending' articles of its Constitution.
112
In response to
the interim accord, the European Commission decided to drop the legal action against Greece,
before the final decision of the Court was due.
113
Nevertheless, the accord did not clarify the
107
'Written Observations of the Hellenic Republic regarding the Application for Interim Measures', a document
provided by the Legal Office of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Athens.
108
Order of the Court in case C-120/94 R, Commission v. Hellenic Republic, 29.VI.1994.
109
A. Papandreou, quoted in "European Court rejects Commission appeal, 'Greece vindicated", Bulletin (Athens News),
30.VI.1994; see also Wolf J., "EC Court declines to move against Greece's Embargo", The Wall Street Journal,
30.VI.1994; Statement by the Government Spokesman E. Venizelos in Brussels, 29.VI.1994, supplied by Press
Office of the Greek Embassy in London; Statement of T. Pangalos in New York, 29.VI.1994, supplied by Press
Office of the Greek Embassy in London.
110
See Greece Information- News from Greece, No. 10, 13.IV. 1995, Greek Embassy London, Press and Information
Office.
111
As quoted ibid.
112
Greece Information- News from Greece, No. 20, 20.IX. 1995, Greek Embassy London, Press and Information
Office. Enlightening is also the report on the debate on the Greek Parliament regarding the interim accord, ibid., No.
24, 10.XI. 1995.
113
For an analysis of the action brought against Greece from a European Community law point of view, see Stefanou &
Xanthaki.
18
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
18
most important of the disputed issues, the name of the new country, stating instead "that the
Parties will continue negotiation under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations with respect to the outstanding difference between them"
114
. The dispute was not over
yet.
115
VI. An analysis of the factors which affected Greek Foreign Policy
VI. An analysis of the factors which affected Greek Foreign Policy VI. An analysis of the factors which affected Greek Foreign Policy
VI. An analysis of the factors which affected Greek Foreign Policy
decisions during the dispute: 16 points.
decisions during the dispute: 16 points.decisions during the dispute: 16 points.
decisions during the dispute: 16 points.
The factors that contributed to the escalation and exacerbation of the dispute between
Greece and FYROM could make a matter for disagreement on themselves. The strategic
planning of the Greek Foreign Policy during the 1989-1995 dispute was influenced by a
variety of different considerations, some of them historical, some practical, some purely
academic and even some attributable to chance. Nevertheless, in an attempt to evaluate
critically the information outlined previously, a number of observations can be made:
1) "There is NO Macedonian issue": if one is looking for the single most important reason
that influenced Greek foreign policy during the dispute with FYROM, this should be it. This
standard, unchanging Greek position for 45 years, immersed the whole issue in silence and
allowed Tito's Yugoslavia to proceed unperturbed. Constant statements from official sources
to the effect that for Greece there is no such thing as a Macedonian Problem, created a
profound ignorance of the Greek points of view in the public opinion internationally (since
there did not seem to exist
any
point of view). Similarly, the treatment of federative Skopje as
a kind of diplomatic juvenile delinquent, against whom no suppressive measures should be
attempted but mild protests to 'parent' Belgrade made instead, demonstrates how mistaken
Greek diplomacy was in assessing and handling the situation. And it was with belated ardour
that Greece started to address the issue abroad and initiate home-spun 'Macedonisation'
schemes.
116
2) As a consequence of Greek apathy, the game of outside impressions had already been
won by FYROM even before the diplomatic struggle for recognition began in 1991. Decades
of Macedonian conferences and volumes of special Macedonian monographs in Institutions,
114
Ibid. On 27 September 1995 FYROM was admitted as a member of the Council of Europe.
115
Lengthy rounds of negotiations followed the interim accord, in order to reach an agreement on the issue of the
name. Both sides agreed that they would be looking towards a single name for FYROM, instead of a double
one, to be used in all occasions both internally and internationally. Moreover, in January 1996, both countries
opened liaison offices in their capitals. Greece Information- News from Greece, No. 29, 23.I. 1996, Greek
Embassy London, Press and Information Office.
116
E.g. the renaming of the Ministry for Northern Greece in 1988, the addition in the name of the Aristotelian
University of Thessaloniki, minting of coins with the Vergina Sun, the creation of the Macedonian Press Agency
in Thessaloniki in 1991, the establishing of the Vergina Star as a Greek national symbol in 1993.
19
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
19
Universities and libraries all over the planet had remained undisputed. Thus, by 1991-1992
when the whole world was hearing that 'Macedonia' wanted to gain independence but Greece
was vehemently denying it recognition because of objections to its name, it was never a
question of
whether
this new state should be called like this but only on
why
the Greeks do not
allow it to be called like this.
3) The inflexible position of Greece over the issue is also a factor that needs further
evaluation. On one hand, the intensity of the public reaction demonstrated that, right or
wrong, the population held adamant views on the subject.
117
On the other hand, the widely-
publicised antagonism between FYROM and a country so much superior economically,
politically and militarily, produced instinctive reactions and allegations that Greece was
intimidating her neighbour. A point of further debate ought to be whether Athens should
have accepted a compromise derivative name once it had become evident that its support in
Europe was ebbing. As it happens, both major political parties in Greece were entangled in
the imbroglio caused by the fierce public reaction and in order to affirm their national
credentials, they had to adopt volens-nolens the position that the term 'Macedonia' would not
be acceptable in any form in FYROM's name, conceding to the views aired publicly by the
Greek socialist MP S. Papathemelis during a 1991-1992 tour of awareness-raising speeches.
118
Certainly, as the dispute progressed, the intransigence of both sides did not permit many face-
saving options.
119
4) Greek foreign policy proved catastrophically unready to stand up to the new
challenges that the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and the redistribution of regional power
demanded. The pre-1990 constant refutation of any Macedonian problem and the content of
the relations with Yugoslavia and S.R.M. indicated that Greece did not consider even remotely
that the possibility of a challenge in the status quo in Macedonia would ever arise. Conceding
that the end of the cold war was certainly not something easily forecast in the eighties,
Greece's preocupation with Turkey did not allow for even basic preparations to ensure a
coherent Balkan policy in the event of a break-up of Yugoslavia, and disregarded the warning
signs that such an eventuality was probable. One should not forget the use of the term (S.R.)
Macedonia by the Greek Consulate to address the Skopje government as late as 1991.
5) Cultural haughtiness and arrogance on behalf of the Greeks contributed to the
unfamiliarity with their positions both at home and abroad.
120
For a long time there was little
117
"Were the two million people who demonstrated in Thessaloniki last month really all hysterical? Or might it not be
that, in light of historical experience, they were articulating fears we do not yet fully appreciate?", Pflueger F., "A
face-saving solution exists", The Wall Street Journal, 21.IV.1994.
118
It appears that a position firmly advanced by diplomatic circles of the Greek Foreign Ministry was to accept the name
"Novamakedonija".
119
Munuera, passim.
120
"The responsible politicians and intellectuals, who had the possibility to know what is happening across the border,
faced the situation phlegmatically and I would say with a certain modicum of arrogance. For the intellectuals, all
these are but gross concoctions, unable to influence the most naive of humans. Why must they occupy
themselves with a worthless fabrication?" Martis, at p. 114.
20
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
20
else for a reaction than a disdainful attitude against both FYROM, for attempting to usurp the
Hellenic heritage of Macedon, and against some 'hapless barbarians' around the world who
could be ignorant enough to give credence to “FYROM’s fabrications”. And this was coupled
with the loftiness of the Greeks being certain of having right in what they claimed, a fact that -
in their eyes- made any need to actually attempt to prove the legitimacy of these assertions
redundant.
121
Even after Athens had embarked in the diplomatic struggle to hinder
recognition, there were hardly any attempts made to use the media in the West to attain a
favourable influence, although in the home front the newspapers were overflowing with
pointless philippics against FYROM.
6) The dispute over Macedonia should not be examined separately from the Yugoslavian
conflict and the countless side-issues and problems that this caused. Greece's wishes and
interests in most aspects of the Yugoslavian crisis ran contrary to the interests of almost all
other Western powers. To start with, Athens was in favour of the preservation of Yugoslavia
(even advocating this as late as 1993), which brought her immediately at odds with Germany,
Italy and Austria, who for historical reasons and in order to increase their regional influence,
sought to dismember Yugoslavia. This of course gave to the individual federative republics the
chance to proclaim their sovereignty and pursue their own policies. Furthermore, Greece's
support for Serbia, her only historical ally in the region, did not exactly enhance its
international reputation, given Serbia's status at the time as an international bully and a pariah
state.
7) The Yugoslavian crisis was a major dent in the prestige of the embryonic Common
Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The federalists' aspiration to create a new
axis of security in the shape of the E.U. was shattered as Europe tried ineffectually to avert the
severest conflict on European soil since W.W. II (a conflict in whose creation it had played a
major role in the first place). Greece's hostility against the poorest of the former Yugoslav
Republics was correctly perceived as a potential threat to its existence and a potential cause for
further expansion of the war southwards. Irrespective of how good or convincing Athens'
arguments were going to be, Europe was not going to allow Greece to exert pressure and
strangulate FYROM, as this could mean facing a new embarrassing failure to safeguard peace
in the region.
122
The Macedonian problem was seen as a pointless aggravation of an already
inflamed situation and respect for Greek sensitivities could not last for long. FYROM also
knew this as well and did a good job of reminding it to anyone listening. Hence, the Union
ultimately broke its solidarity in supporting Greece.
8) Along similar lines can the U.S. involvement and reaction be explained. After the
failure to hinder the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia, America saw FYROM as a way of giving
121
See Millar P., Laying claim to the Legacy of Alexander, The European, 7-13.IX.1995.
122
Cf. Munuera, p. 58 et seq.
21
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
21
"politicians and the voters a feeling of painlessly contributing to the Yugoslav crisis".
123
Not
wanting to be accused of interfering in internal European Union matters, the U.S. waited until
the break in the Union's ranks became manifest in order to recognise FYROM. In addition, as
the Balkans started to be divided into spheres of influence, the U.S. sought to secure one of
these new countries under its wing, i.e. FYROM. This could explain the stationing there of
1000 U.N. blue-helmets, including 300 American soldiers.
124
9) Further to pursuing their own very real interests, a number of European countries
showed a rather superficial appreciation of the real essence of the dispute between Greece and
FYROM, dismissing it often in a high-handed manner as childish hysteria or impenetrable
Balkan peculiarities.
125
In this way, Greece was torn between a need to apply occidental
foreign policy standards so as to display that she is a worthy member of the Western world,
and the insufficiency of these policy measures to bring forth the desired results within the
highly complex Balkan diplomatic theatre.
10) As a consequence, Athens' foreign policy was often oscillating between cultural and
pragmatic arguments. After the realisation that a debate over heritage rights, the ethnicity of
the ancient Macedonians, the concepts of cultural patrimony of mankind etc. would not be
adequate to persuade the world opinion, an attempt was made to formulate a
realpolitik
by
justifying Greek views by means of more 'rational' and interest-oriented arguments.
126
These
however were not necessarily more successful as they presupposed that the listening parties
possessed special knowledge of the Balkan area, its history and its specific idiosyncrasy.
11) The 1992 decision of the Council in Lisbon not to recognise FYROM with a name
containing the term 'Macedonia' was certainly a high point in E.U. solidarity, but it should also
be born in mind that the Europeans were responding in this fashion to the Greek conservative
government's warnings that, in the opposite case, the return to power of 'trouble-making' A.
Papandreou would be very likely.
12) A range of different factors caused the balance to finally turn in favour of FYROM
during the crucial second semester of 1992. Athens rested on the laurels of the Lisbon
declaration and dramatically slackened diplomatic activity during the summer, whilst the
FYROM government was steadily increasing its influence. Skopje augmented its strategic
status because of the need to enforce the U.N. embargo against Serbia and also attracted the
support of islamist and philocroat circles. The change of Council Presidency was also very
positive for the Skopje side, as the British started to systematically undermine the Lisbon
declaration with a view to amending it. The summer of 1992 might have been an opportunity
123
Perry, (Crisis in the making?), at p. 57.
124
Ibid.
125
Rivolta D., "Attenti all' iredentismo macedone", Il Giornale, 31.V.1994; Mazower, passim.; Kofos E., 'Introduction' in:
Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 15.
126
See Marinos, p. 3; Cf. Clogg R., in the London Review of Books, 18.VIII.1994.
22
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
22
for Athens to achieve a favourable outcome at a time when FYROM's situation had come to an
all-time low.
13) FYROM gained international sympathies by projecting an underdog image,
oppressed by its irritable neighbour. Notwithstanding the extent to which this reflected a true
situation, Greek Foreign Policy felt obliged to take into consideration the public opinion’s
disapproval of "the evident tolerance and acceptance displayed by the international
community toward the image of the 'poor underdog' that President Kiro Gligorov likes to apply
to himself and his state. [...] The President of FYROM [is seen] as a Balkan 'Jean Valjean' who
was caught stealing a small loaf of bread -the Sun of Vergina- in order to feed his family: that
is to give his 'oppressed' and 'misunderstood' people a sense of pride. [...] His aim was to cast
Greece in the role of the inhuman 'Javert'."
127
14) The Greek positions suffered from feeble attempts to gain influence in Western mass
media and thus adopt a positive media image. On the other hand, it appears that from 1992
there was a concerted effort in certain European countries to consolidate FYROM's position
through official instructions to newspapers and television channels to adopt an 'antihellenic'
stance. In the meantime, oceans of ink were aimlessly flowing in both FYROM and Greece
preaching to the converted.
128
Finally, even foreigners agree that the Greek lobbying in Europe
was not sufficiently energetic.
129
15) Geopolitical, strategic and sentimental reasons aside, FYROM also became a valid
cause on humanitarian grounds. Realising that it was much easier and far less dangerous to
intervene in FYROM than further north where they were really needed, several individuals
and NGOs stressed the need for immediate action in Skopje's favour, in order to avert a
humanitarian catastrophe. For the same reasons, the Greek countermeasures of February
1994 were seen in a very dim light by the international community. Macedonia had become
"a black stain in the conscience of Europe" as the Danish Foreign minister U. Jenssen said.
130
16) In conclusion it should be noted that apart from the national and international
foreign policies described above, a number of private or semi-official interests also became
entangled in the issue of FYROM's recognition, e.g. Islamic unity organisations and the Soros
Foundation, which tended mostly to support Skopje (and Albania) both materially and by
means of lobbying.
127
Kofos (The vision of Greater Macedonia), at p. 7.
128
See Marinos, at p. 7.
129
"Ció che si puo rimproverare ai greci é di non aver saputo fare la giusta lobby a Bruxelles e Strasburgo", Rivolta D.,
"La Macedonia si salve senza pregiudizi", Il Giornale, 25.VI.1994.
130
Quoted in Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 142.
23
Demetrius Andreas Floudas: "An Analysis of Greece's Dispute with FYROM"
23
VII. Conclusion: Macedonia cuius?
VII. Conclusion: Macedonia cuius?VII. Conclusion: Macedonia cuius?
VII. Conclusion: Macedonia cuius?
After being marginalised in the strategic chessboard of the New World Order because of
the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the end of the cold war, Greece managed to become seriously
isolated internationally in the struggle against FYROM and alienate herself from her most
important allies.
131
Athens was seen as a 'second bully of the Balkans', an accomplice almost of
Serbia and unworthy of European and international support or even, in the extreme cases,
membership. This analysis has shown that the dispute between Greece and FYROM had no
hidden agenda, but -for the Greeks at least- it really revolved around the issue of the name.
Whether the new state emerging from the remnants of Yugoslavia would be named
Macedonia or not was not a side-issue but the crux of the argument. In retrospect, Greece
missed a chance that the power vacuum in the Balkans provided to emerge as a leading
regional power and present a pole of development in the south of Europe. Greek reaction
against FYROM undermined the potentially privileged position that she would have in
influencing the young state
132
allowing Turkey to deploy itself in the peninsula and substitute
Greece as the regional power.
133
At the same time, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, although successful in
avoiding a spill-over of the armed conflict in ex-Yugoslavia towards its own territory, was
obliged to go through the first four years after its independence entangled in a bitter dispute,
one that seemed capable to threaten its very existence. It was with great diplomatic skill and
courage that the complete collapse of the small state was prevented. By the end of 1994 it was
becoming apparent to both sides that the continuing dispute had run out of steam and was
resulting only in further embarrassment and losses.
134
Thus the interim accord of September
1995 did not come as a surprise to many.
It remains important for both parties to realise that they can move ahead by laying the
foundations of good-neighbourly relationships and increasing their cooperation in all spheres.
131
Someritis, p. 8.
132
Munuera, at p. 49.
133
Perry, (Crisis in the making?), at p. 54.
134
See Marakis N., "Strofi tis Athinas sto Makedoniko"[Athens shifts its position over Macedonia], To Vima, 4.IX.1994;
"Syzitame kai Onoma me ta Skopia"[We are also discussing the name issue with Skopje], Kyriakatiki
Eleftherotypia, 11.IX.1994; Diamantis T., "Gligorov: To Onoma ehei kleisei"[Gligorov: the issue of the name
has been settled] Eleftherotypia, 12.X.1994.
... Greece immediately demanded that the Republic of Macedonia change its name and flag and when the latter refused, a dispute flared up between the two nations, culminating in the Greek imposition of a nineteen month trade embargo 56 on its northern neighbour (Floudas 1996). Although relations improved somewhat following an interim accord signed by both parties in 1995, tensions continued to simmer until the Prespa Agreement of 2018. ...
Thesis
This thesis examines the relationship between heritage and borders. It argues that the study of heritage has a tendency to overlook important aspects of the borders of heritage discourses. The dissonance and conflict which occurs at the meeting points of different heritages is well worn academic territory. What is less comprehensively understood are the other products which issue from these meeting points. Taking as its case study the Kalasha, a non-Muslim community of only 4000 members positioned on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border, I demonstrate how in certain settings different heritages can come together in creative combinations. The theoretical underpinnings of my argument are drawn from borderland studies, a discourse which has much to offer the critical discussion of heritage, but which has thus far been underutilised. I also make use of the ecological principal of the ecotone, a methodology which allows me to abstract what I learnt from my case study into a format which is applicable to the wider study of heritage. The thesis makes several novel contributions to the academic discourse. The first is to draw attention to the potential of indeterminate borderlands for advancing critical heritage studies in productive new directions. The second is to produce a methodology for studying the meeting points of different heritages which offers the conceptual space to explore both dissonant and creative outcomes. The final contribution is to argue for a theorisation of heritage narratives as malleable and capable of being combined and in so doing nuance the prevalent understanding of heritage narratives as immutable and immiscible.
... In another statement, Pavlopoulos added that Macedonia will never be able to take place in the EU and other international organisations as long as it continues such claims. Such explanations have continued unchanged from the early 1990s to the present date (Kofos 2001(Kofos , 2009Floudas 1996;Zahariadis 1996;Daskalovski, 2017: 329). Greece claims that its statements related to its history reflect the truth, whereas the Republic of Macedonia has no historical rights to use Macedonia and its Macedonian names. ...
Chapter
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In the early 1990s Greece blocked the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia under that name and is currently blocking accession of this country to NATO and EU demanding name changes, which the government of Skopje refuses to adopt. The Macedonia name dispute is a clash over historical narratives and the right to claim origins of the Macedonian ethnic group and nation today and in the ancient past. For Greece, the key element is winning the argument over the legitimacy of ancient Macedon as a Greek state and not having the name Macedonia used by its northern neighbour. For the Republic, the intricacies of the ancient history are only instrumental to the recognition of the country under its constitutional name and the unblocking of the Euro-Atlantic integration. Consequently, the only way to resolve the seemingly intractable name dispute between Greece and Macedonia is to deal with the historical and identity issues that both sides care most for and ignore those that are not important for the resolution or could be left aside to be disagreed upon without political consequences. A political solution with an agreed international name for the country ‘Republic of Makedonija’ is likely to solve the dispute and improve the relations between the two countries.
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When North Macedonia separated from Yugoslavia and declared its independence in 1991, it chose the Republic of Macedonia as its country name. However, this name was not accepted by Greece because it was the same as a region in northern Greece. Macedonia, on the other hand, argued that its name was a constitutional right, by international law and reflected its national identity. Macedonia was temporarily recognized by the United Nations as the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, but this name was not accepted by Macedonia either. The name issue between the two countries could not be resolved despite various mediation attempts for 27 years. However, in 2018, a new political will emerged between the two countries, and the Prespa Agreement was signed. According to this agreement, the new name of Macedonia was determined as the “Republic of North Macedonia”. The agreement aimed to normalize Greek-Macedonian relations, accelerate North Macedonia’s NATO and EU membership process, and increase stability in the region. In this study, the historical development of the name issue between Greece and Macedonia will be touched upon and the process that resulted in the solution of the problem with the Prespa Agreement will be examined. In addition, by including the views of the supporters and opponents of the agreement between the public opinion of the two countries, which emerged after the agreement came into force in 2019 having been approved by the parliaments of the two countries, the legitimacy, and permanence of the solution will be explained with the arguments defended by constructivism, one of the theories of international relations.
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The article’s objective is to analyse the process of Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy towards North Macedonia. The author has attempted to present the main conceptual assumptions regarding this process, pointing to the multiplicity of definitions and research directions, and has subsequently highlighted the evolution of Greek foreign policy towards North Macedonia in the context of the Europeanisation of Greek diplomacy. In the conclusions, the author has emphasised that this particular Europeanisation is somewhat sinusoidal and is conditioned upon a number of factors, including the nature of relations between the Greek political elites and the society of that country. The article has also highlighted that Greece has gradually been shaping its image as a Europeanised country with a credible and predictable foreign policy.
Chapter
For a variety of historical reasons, Macedonia’s dealings with its neighbours have been difficult. This chapter considers the country’s relations with its immediate neighbours: Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania and Kosovo before focusing on the name dispute with Greece which has hindered Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions throughout the country’s long transition. Relations with Greece have been and remain crucial for the long-term stability and development of the country. Since independence, due to Greek objections, the admission of Macedonia to membership of the United Nations in April 1993 required the new member state to be provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the state. Although the reference was to be used within the United Nations, other international institutions also began referring to Macedonia as a ‘former Yugoslav republic’. Despite reaching a UN-backed interim agreement in 1995 normalising relations between the countries, since 2008 Greece continued to deliberately block Macedonia’s admission to NATO and the beginning of negotiations for EU membership, until the signing of the Prespa Agreement in June 2018. This chapter presents an overview of the dispute and the possible solutions.
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Artykuł jest prezentacją zarysu metodologii krytycznej w odniesieniu do toponomastyki. Badania krytyczne mają na celu odsłonięcie ukrytych ideologii, stanowiących tło formowania bądź zmieniania nazw geograficznych różnych kategorii. W artykule pokazane są tradycje badań toponomastycznych, a na ich tle prezentowane są możliwości uwzględnienia w takich badaniach również perspektywy krytycznej. Pokazane są konkretne przykłady zarówno badań, jak i procesów społecznych, które regulują zmiany nazewnictwa (np. nazw ulic, państw). Nakreślone są w zarysie również perspektywy krytycznych badań toponomastycznych, które mogą zostać podjęte przy modyfikacji zarówno teoretycznych założeń metodologicznych (pojęcie przestrzeni społecznej, przestrzeni kulturowej, władzy symbolicznej, pamięci zbiorowej), jak i zasobów źródłowych (używanie i rejestrowanie nazw przez użytkowników).
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A brief presentation of the context for the membership of the Republic of North Macedonia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the main goal of this article. Systemic elements for the ongoing enlargement of this organization to the Western Balkans are considered in a first step. Thereafter, the article delves into the domestic and international elements shaping the macedonian foreign policy which, since the republic’s independence in 1991, have been persisting obstacles to its autonomous definition.
A problem of Recognition-the controversy about Macedonia
  • D Perry
  • F Algieri
On 16 December 1993; see Perry D., "Crisis in the Making? Macedonia and its neighbors", Sudosteuropa 43 (1994), p. 31; Algieri F., "A problem of Recognition-the controversy about Macedonia", CFSP Forum, 1/1994, p. 3.
For the press reaction to the Greek countermeasures, see inter alia Tett G
For the press reaction to the Greek countermeasures, see inter alia Tett G., "Blockade by Greece puts EU on the spot", Financial Times, 18.II.1994; "Time for Greece to rethink", The European, 25.II.1994;
The Wall Street Journal, 30.VI.1994; Statement by the Government Spokesman E. Venizelos in Brussels, 29.VI.1994, supplied by Press Office of the Greek Embassy in London
  • A Papandreou
A. Papandreou, quoted in "European Court rejects Commission appeal, 'Greece vindicated", Bulletin (Athens News), 30.VI.1994; see also Wolf J., "EC Court declines to move against Greece's Embargo", The Wall Street Journal, 30.VI.1994; Statement by the Government Spokesman E. Venizelos in Brussels, 29.VI.1994, supplied by Press Office of the Greek Embassy in London; Statement of T. Pangalos in New York, 29.VI.1994, supplied by Press Office of the Greek Embassy in London.
Cio che si puo rimproverare ai greci e di non aver saputo fare la giusta lobby a Bruxelles e Strasburgo
  • D Rivolta
"Cio che si puo rimproverare ai greci e di non aver saputo fare la giusta lobby a Bruxelles e Strasburgo", Rivolta D., "La Macedonia si salve senza pregiudizi", Il Giornale, 25.VI.1994.
Greece: Alone at Last!
  • R Someritis
Someritis R., "Greece: Alone at Last!", War Report 3/4 (1994), p. 8.
Athens: KPEE, 1994, suggests that this plan would have been a very positive outcome for Greece at the time; see rejecting letter to the U.N. Secretary-General by Gligorov
  • M Papakonstantinou
  • Ellada Kai Skopia-Metra Oikodomisis
  • Empistosynis
Papakonstantinou M., Ellada kai Skopia-Metra Oikodomisis Empistosynis [Greece and Skopje-Confidence Building Measures]. Athens: KPEE, 1994, suggests that this plan would have been a very positive outcome for Greece at the time; see rejecting letter to the U.N. Secretary-General by Gligorov, 29.V .1993, in Valinakis & Ntalis (eds.), p. 162.
112; 20,000 to 50,000 in Perry, (La Macédoine et ses voisins), at p. 190; 45,000 at most in Libal
  • G Munuera
The estimates found in the bibliography range from 2,300 in Munuera G., "Preventing armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from recent Experience", Paris: Institute for Security Studies WEU, 1994, at p. 47, fn. 112; 20,000 to 50,000 in Perry, (La Macédoine et ses voisins), at p. 190; 45,000 at most in Libal, at p. 137; more than 50,000 in Bucar, at p. 239; 100,000 in Pribichevich at p. 237.
Red Flag is Red Rag to Greeks
  • See Inter Alia Coughlin
See inter alia Coughlin C., "Red Flag is Red Rag to Greeks", The Sunday Telegraph, 27.II.1994
Macedonia at the Crossroads
  • Cf
  • J Derala
Cf. Derala J., "Macedonia at the Crossroads", War Report 3/4 (1994), p. 8.