Cyberspace and International Relations: Theory, Prospects and Challenges
Abstract
Cyberspace is everywhere in today's world and has significant implications not only for global economic activity, but also for international politics and transnational social relations. This compilation addresses for the first time the "cyberization" of international relations - the growing dependence of actors in IR on the infrastructure and instruments of the internet, and the penetration of cyberspace into all fields of their activities. The volume approaches this topical issue in a comprehensive and interdisciplinary fashion, bringing together scholars from disciplines such as IR, security studies, ICT studies and philosophy as well as experts from everyday cyber-practice. In the first part, concepts and theories are presented to shed light on the relationship between cyberspace and international relations, discussing implications for the discipline and presenting fresh and innovative theoretical approaches. Contributions in the second part focus on specific empirical fields of activity (security, economy, diplomacy, cultural activity, transnational communication, critical infrastructure, cyber espionage, social media, and more) and address emerging challenges and prospects for international politics and relations. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014. All rights are reserved.
Chapters (15)
While escaping consistent theoretization so far, the impact of 'cyberization' on the conduct of international relations can be more thoroughly grasped by studying the reconfiguration of global governance techniques brought about by the virtual mediums. The cyberspace remains a highly contested arena for policy-making, and its current institutional architecture is dominated by a multiplicity of tensions over who is entitled to decide on issues that go beyond the traditional functions of the state and what practices of governing are most appropriate in this context. By applying the Foucauldian concept of governmentality to investigate the global discourses of security in the cyberspace, this chapter sheds light on a shift in the rationality of governing, and brings empirical evidence of the dominant discourse(s) of security in the cyberspace in the United Nations (UN) ambit. It reveals that, despite the common acknowledgement of cyber dangers as imminent, transnational and very diffuse, an inclusive and dialectical approach to cybersecurity is not yet in place. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014. All rights are reserved.
Warfare in the future will be different from warfare in the past, but are the classic theorists still viable capable of providing insight into the nature of war, conflict, and policy within the realm of cyber war? While a significant amount of work has been directed towards the possibility of cyber war and explaining what it might look like, there is a limited focus on strategic options which states might select in this emerging field. The chapter first offers a typology to view issues of cyber conflict. Second it offers an examination of possible strategic choices for policy makers based on classic strategic thought. The ideas of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, along with more modern theorists such as Douhet and Warden are applied to the ideas of cyber war. The possible ramifications of the application of these strategic options in the cyber realm are then discussed. Classic strategic theorists can provide options for policy makers but significant work still remains to be done. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014. All rights are reserved.
States and enterprises are increasingly faced with newly emerging threats made possible by interconnected digital infrastructures. These threats pose great risks to states and their populations and can result in shifts in power. The inherent interdependent character of the digital infrastructure and its growing importance for economies, public safety and our society in general make controlling and countering these threats a demanding and critical challenge for both enterprises and governments. This chapter identifies the different types of stakeholders, their actions and respective motives in the context of cyber security and introduces the so called SAM-framework for the analysis of cyber security. Building on that, the implications for governments will be discussed including the resulting threats and responsibilities. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014. All rights are reserved.
Deterrence theory states that world stability can be maintained if the costs of war far out-weigh its benefits. Weapons and strategies that make defense cheaper and offense more costly decrease the likelihood of conflict. Nuclear weapons may have thereby helped create the stability of the Cold War via the costs associated with launching first; according to this argument, war between the US and USSR never occurred because the price of war (i.e. mutual destruction) was too high. This theoretical paper will extend this argument to cyber-attacks and suggest that in order to maintain the security of a nation's information technology, cyber-defense systems that correspond with Deterrence theory must be introduced. Cyber-attacks can be deterred if the proper system, a virus wall, is in place to counter any infiltration of a nation's defense systems. This proposed virus wall would be a way to achieve stability from nation state cyber-attacks. Theoretical advancements of International Relations will also be proposed, specifically considering the area of Security Studies. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014. All rights are reserved.
The revelation of Stuxnet in 2010 as the world's first cyber weapon of its own kind that attacked Iranian enrichment facility has led to an extensive debate on the issue of cyber security. In every cyber attack, the attacker may risk of handing over the ammunition to the enemy as a blueprint for the latter to develop a cyber weapon of its own. In cyber warfare, there is possibility that victims of cyber attack develop their own cyber weapon resulting into proliferation of cyber weapons, which is going to be awfully perilous for the security of international system given the complex interconnectivity of computer networks and internet across the world. Since, until now the cyber weapons are used in an offensive mode; therefore, the probability of more states developing offensive cyber weapons is increasing. The chapter argues that the offensive nature of cyber weapons without having an adequate defensive character is destabilizing for the international security system. In this regard, this chapter examines the offense-defense balance in the cyber warfare, and how does offense has the advantage in the cyber warfare that can destabilize the security. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014. All rights are reserved.
This chapter links power relations in the technologically dominated context of cyberspace to Hannah Arendt’s theoretical considerations of power and violence. Even if her work is often marked by skepticism on the technological domination of the human world, some of Arendt’s most important works provide a surprisingly rich framework to conceptualize the structure and character of cyberspace. It is argued here that the structure of power and violence in cyberspace can abstractly be captured by dividing cyberspace into two parts that refer to Arendt’s conceptions of power as power to and violence as power over. Cyberspace is thus both, a modern space of appearance and political freedom and an unexplored context for Arendt’s conception of power as well as an anti-space of appearance, a space filled with Arendt’s conception of violence that denies the positive attributes of a space of appearance when filtering and control techniques are implemented. The empirical cases of the Arab Spring protests, Weibo and the Fifty Cent Party as well as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks during elections or inter-state conflicts will underline this argumentation.
Discovery of the Stuxnet computer worm has brought to the fore ongoing discussions concerning the classification of cyber attacks as “acts of war”. In the aftermath of its detection, experts and media personnel alike were quick in putting the implicative tag ‘act of war’ onto the use of the malicious program, although no competent justification for such labelling was offered. The following chapter aims to clarify the international debate by presenting definitional criteria for an act of war in cyberspace and applying it to the empirical case of Stuxnet.
There are numerous discussions on both the reality and impact of cyberwar. Most of the critics are based on the Clausewitzian perspective of war in which its political nature must exist, an act of war has to be characteristically violent and has instrumental purposefulness. Therefore cyberwar is generally regarded as a conduct of action that simply doesn’t match with these Clausewitzian criteria of war. However during the last two decades, with the advancement of information technology and widening connecters of the world, many incidents such as Estonian and Georgian cases of cyberattacks, Stuxnet worms, and many other politically motivated cyberattacks, show us that we need to think carefully about the terminology that being used by scholars, experts and policy makers. In this chapter, I aim to discuss about the term “cyberwar” within a broader theory of war in International Relations studies. In doing so, my aim is to bring together related International Relations Theories and the contemporary cyberwar discussion and discuss the issue within a theoretical perspective.
Since the Cold War, peacekeeping has evolved from first-generation peacekeeping that focused on monitoring peace agreements, to third-generation multidimensional peacekeeping operations tasked with rebuilding states and their institutions during and after conflict. However, peacekeeping today is lagging behind the changes marking our time. Big Data, including social media, and the many actors in the field may provide peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations with information and tools to enable them to respond better, faster and more effectively, saving lives and building states. These tools are already well known in the areas of humanitarian action, social activism, and development. Also the United Nations, through the Global Pulse initiative, has begun to discover the potential of " Big Data for Development, " which may in time help prevent violent conflict. However, less has been done in the area of peacekeeping. UN member states should push for change so that the world organization and other multilateral actors can get their act together, mounting a fourth generation of peacekeeping operations that can utilize the potentials of Big Data, social media and modern technology – " Peacekeeping 4.0. " The chapter details some of the initiatives that can be harnessed and further developed, and offers policy recommendations for member states, the UN Security Council, and UN peacekeeping at UN headquarters and at field levels.
This chapter examines US cyber security policy in light of transnational cyber security, deterrence theory, and hegemonic stability theory. Recent work on US cyber security policy has argued for or against deterrence theory as a basis for US cyber security policy. Deterrence theory, as a state level theory of national security, focuses attention on strategic choice enabling policymakers to manage state level responses to perceived threats. The problem is that the Internet is a transnational medium and, increasingly, an important global medium for economic exchange, being treated as a duty free zone under WTO agreements. Thinking about cyber security at the level of the state elides threats to the Internet as a global commercial medium. Framing cyber security as a transnational security issue may assist in developing a comprehensive US cyber security policy that incorporates deterrence and US leadership. The role of the US in the global economic order is to provide leadership ensuring stability necessary or economic and information exchange to occur. From the standpoint of transnational security, the US should fulfill its role as leader of collective hegemony, by leading cyber space stakeholders to develop norms and rules for global cyber security governance regimes and institutions that will teach states the norms and rules necessary for a stable and secure cyber domain through which global information and economic exchange will continue to flourish.
Networked governance is the default modus operandi in Internet governance. Even the provisioning of Internet security heavily relies on non-hierarchical, networked forms of organisation. Responses to a large-scale botnets show the prevalence of networked governance on the Internet and provide insight into its strengths and limitations. Networked governance can be defined as a semi-permanent, voluntary negotiation system that allows interdependent actors to opt for collaboration or unilateral action in the absence of an overarching authority. This chapter analyses the ability of traditional powerful actors such as state authorities and large enterprises to provide Internet security and exert power in the cyber-domain. The chapter outlines potential anchor points for traditional powerful actors to introduce more elements of hierarchy and control into Internet security provisioning networks. Empirically, the chapter describes emerging hybrids of networks and hierarchies in Internet security provisioning.
In 2010 economic cyber-espionage emerged as a top national security threat for the US government. Analysis suggests that the government's swift mobilization of resources to block the problem stems from a major event in January 2010: Google's announcement that hackers in China had penetrated its computer systems. Following that incident, the government's threat perception of economic cyber-espionage changed and led to new efforts to counter the problem. This argument is substantiated in two main steps. In step one, it is shown how the American government conceptualized the threat of economic cyber-espionage before and after the announcement. In step two, we trace how this perception-shift led to a series of countermeasures. During both steps, we adopt an analytical framework called threat politics, which maintains that influential actors in and around government play a crucial role in convincing key policymakers how to perceive and respond to threats. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014. All rights are reserved.
States have accentuated efforts to build cybersecurity strategies and offensive and defensive capabilities in the last two decades. While states have balanced efforts to promote mobility of capital, people, and goods and services with security measures to protect fixed investment and national assets, these efforts suggest a shift in the mix of openness and control. While this balance has long been a part of states' foreign policy and international relations, the promotion of network security highlights some core tensions between international conflict and cooperation in promoting cybersecurity. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) have emphasized cooperation among participants in preventing harm to the network and in enhancing a culture of security. The ITU has a longstanding principle of preventing harm to the network, and Anthony Rutkowski argues that this extends to new online networks and services. These international efforts aim to build a broad international community of participants promoting the security of physical networks, applications and uses, content, and data about individuals. The chapter examines these international efforts to advance cooperative approaches to network security and cybersecurity. It assesses these multilateral efforts in light of recent moves by states to advance more strategic national approaches to network security. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014. All rights are reserved.
This chapter will examine a fundamental dichotomy that has developed within the academic, technical and policy communities when it comes to understanding, advancing, and communicating work on cyberspace within global affairs. This distinct tendency today has technical cyber scholarship partially blind and deaf to important political ramifications while political cyber work remains partially illiterate and mute on cyberspace's technical complexity. This dichotomy not only exists as an intellectual barrier between scholars of the hard and social sciences, it impinges on progressive cooperation between the political and technical communities. Consequently, there is a gap weakening the scope and reach of theoretical and empirical work on cyberspace in general. Indeed, this problem has the potential to become exponentially larger in the immediate future: not only are real-world professionals and scholars having trouble building bridges between obvious mutual interests, but this 'Chinese knowledge wall' separates each group respectively. Just as phreaking involves a subculture of specialists who experiment and toy with telecommunication systems, the intellectual, technical, and governmental worlds need a new generation of 'phreak-scholars' who are adept at building connections between these diverse, inter-related knowledge bases. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014. All rights are reserved.
This chapter addresses the analysis of the phenomenon of modern technique by Martin Heidegger, especially regarding the issue of information societies and the role of the virtual network with respect to providing information about the political behavior of states, which accordingly affects the international security environment. We propose a debate on international relations theory, specifically from the perspective adopted by the Copenhagen School of International Security Studies. We conduct a study from the perception that cyberspace, as a multiverse, is not uniform, and therefore, the various actors emerge with different capacities for political action depending on the dependency of the states and societies to use new information and communication technologies (NICTs) as well as the interconnections with critical infrastructures (i.e., Critical Information Infrastructure). © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014. All rights are reserved.
... In this sense, we also search for the factors that might dilute regimes characteristics with geopolitical orientations. At least, we can suggest that the politics of multinationals' matter with the existing polarizing international environment (10,14,17,(64)(65)(66). ...
... In addition to governance indicators, Cyberspace has been an arena of international relations (64). This space creates a policy pressure on the United States to be more active against state-linked information operations (65). ...
... In this sense, we also search for the factors that might dilute regimes characteristics with geopolitical orientations. At least, we can suggest that the politics of multinationals' matter with the existing polarizing international environment [10,14,17,[64][65][66]. ...
... In addition to governance indicators, Cyberspace has been an arena of international relations [64]. This space creates a policy pressure on the United States to be more active against state-linked information operations [65]. ...
Why do Social Media Corporations (SMCs) engage in state-linked information operations? Social media can significantly influence the global political landscape, allowing governments and other political entities to engage in concerted information operations, shaping or manipulating domestic and foreign political agendas. In response to state-linked political manipulation tactics on social media, Twitter and Meta carried out take-down operations against propaganda networks, accusing them of interfering foreign elections, organizing disinformation campaigns, manipulating political debates and many other issues. This research investigates the two SMCs' policy orientation to explain which factors can affect these two companies' reaction against state-linked information operations. We find that good governance indicators such as democracy are significant elements of SMCs' country-focus. This article also examines whether Meta and Twitter's attention to political regime characteristics is influenced by international political alignments. This research illuminates recent trends in SMCs' take-down operations and illuminating interplay between geopolitics and domestic regime characteristics.
... The problem, however, exists in analyzing about the control, i.e., where it begins and where it ends. Thus, the arena of cyberspace witnesses that the power is neither more state-centric nor real, although it can be technological as well (Kremer and Muller 2014). ...
... Liberals consider states as central actors in world politics but at the same time contend that other non-state actors like transnational corporations, pressure groups social movements are equally important and play significant roles in IR. Therefore, it takes into account emergence of new online groups and technologies having the impact on the structures and actors in global politics (Kremer and Muller 2014). ...
... = 0.314). Kremer and Muller (2014) proposed that cyberspace refers to the visual world formed by computers and networks, where information is stored, processed, and communicated. It includes numerous digital platforms such as the internet and cloud infrastructures. ...
This study examined the impact of cyber security on risk mitigation strategy by commercial banks in the emerging market. The objectives included exploring the relationship between cyberspace and cyber threats, identifying the causes and challenges of these threats, and proposing solutions. A quantitative research approach was adopted, utilizing questionnaires for data collection from a sample of 25 respondents. Results indicated that major cyber risks included phishing, hacking, and internal accounting fraud (Johnson, 2016). Key challenges identified were inadequate oversight by managers, insufficient data encryption, reliance on third-party services, and lack of national standards and infrastructure, which hinder efforts to combat cyber threats (Alsayed & Bilgram, 2017). The study concluded that enhancing cyber security is crucial for Zimbabwean banks. Recommendations for NEWMAN Bank (NB) include implementing stringent monitoring of staff activities related to customer confidentiality, conducting regular cyber security audits, raising customer awareness, and adopting measures such as multifactor authentication, automatic logout features, and strong firewalls to mitigate cyber risks effectively.
... Along with the development of new technologies, military activities have shifted into new environments, creating a hybrid format of warfare in multi-domain operations. In the 21st century, cyberspace has become a new battleground (Kremer and Müller, 2013;Lonergan and Lonergan, 2023), where cyber domain is recognized as a separate domain for conducting military operations (NATO, 2016;Ministry of Defence, 2023). The significance of the cyber domain cannot be overstated as its impact can occur at the operational, tactical and strategic levels. ...
Battles in the cyber domain often lack visibility compared to the physical domain, which can lead to insufficient appreciation of its actors’ achievements by the general public and society. Nonetheless, it has become a crucial area of modern warfare in which cyber professionals defend the nation’s critical infrastructure, support other military operations and achieve military objectives that could not be attained in other domains. Although cyber combatants might not have as high a risk of injury or death as those on the front lines, they still can face traumatic events and suffer from the same types of issues after the war as any other veteran. Earlier studies on war veterans have shown they have elevated risks of mental health issues, substance use, social problems and financial difficulties which might push some individuals towards a path of crime. The cyber domain is also not limited by time or place, which has given rise to cyber volunteerism in which skilled individuals around the globe decide to assist their own country or friendly nations. This publication aims to identify the challenges cyber veterans might face when transitioning back to civilian life and develop appropriate strategies to facilitate their reintegration. It also raises the awareness of the hundreds of thousands of volunteers who can develop similar problems after the war. Without proper awareness, support and dialogue, some of these individuals can also drift towards harmful social implications such as cybercrime.
... However, a large part of the scholarly field of cybersecurity seems to have moved its focus from cyberwarfare to a broader and more complex understanding of security in cyberspace that surpasses the military element (e.g. Christensen & Liebetrau, 2016;Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010;Friis & Ringmose, 2016;Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009;Kassab, 2014;Kremer & Müller, 2014;Langø, 2016). The main critique of the 'narrow' conceptualization of security in cyberspace is that the 'narrow' understanding concerns itself more with explaining the concept of war rather than that of security (Christensen & Liebetrau, 2016, pp. ...
1 Abstract With Denmark as its case, this thesis joins an already exciting conversation in the social sciences about the increasing challenges small states face in cyberspace. The thesis explores Denmark as a small state in relation to NATO and the EU. Collectively, the evidence gathered in this thesis explores the undefined role of small states in the realm of cyberspace and proves that cyberspace contains new security issues and dynamics in the international system. Small state issues are often not accounted for in conventional studies on cybersecurity. In an attempt to cover some of these issues, this thesis will explore Danish cybersecurity strategies paying special attention international cooperation on cy-bersecurity. The thesis discovers that Denmark in the globalized cybersecurity sphere has multiple options and challenges. Denmark has, however, been passive in defining a balance between NATO, the EU and domestic policies that have seen Denmark dismiss opportunities in both organizations. Though neither NATO nor the EU can guarantee Danish cybersecurity, NATO and especially the EU provide an array of initiatives through which Denmark can compensate for its relative weakness by cooperating on expertise and intelligence sharing, capacity development and emergency response entities to cyberattacks, but due to a high domestic political risk for the Danish government of backing referendums on lifting opt-outs on the ASFJ and Defence, Denmark has been reluctant to pursue the possibility of engaging in deep EU cooperation on cybersecurity.
... To avoid duplications, the EU will explore opportunities on how the EU and NATO can complement their efforts to heighten the resilience of critical governmental, defence and other information infrastructures on which the members of both organizations depend (European Commission, 2013a). Protection of critical infrastructure is identified as one of the key comprehensive cyber security strategy elements (Kremer and Muller, 2014), and the regulation of this category should only intensify (Segura Serrano, 2015). To this end, the European Commission initiated the adoption of the Network and Information Security Directive; the main purpose of which is to establish requirements for managers of such infrastructure (European Commission, 2013a). ...
Given the global nature of cyber threats, assurance of a cyber security policy is very important not only at organization level but also at national level. Currently, cyber security as such is not independently regulated internationally; therefore the role of the EU and NATO in ensuring cyber security has become particularly significant. This article presents a study which compares the cyber security policies of the EU and NATO organizations. An analysis of how national cyber security strategies correspond with the cyber security policies and the strategic directions of these organizations has been carried out. We have also carried out a comparative study of the provision of national cyber security strategies of the EU and NATO. The study reveals that regardless of similar goals, namely assurance of cyber resilience, the selected harmonization and coordination approaches, as well as norms of national cybersecurity strategies, differ.
... study of the critical role of small Islands for the global extension of US military technological networks, and Karen T. Litfin's analysis of space technologies are suggestive: Litfin shows how satellites, as a technology of surveillance, have socialized a global gaze that made possible arms control both 2 Castells(2011),Mowlana (1997),Drezner and Farrell (2004), Giacomello (2009), Mueller (2010). 3 For example,Eriksson and Giacomello (2006),Kremer and Müller (2013) see. 4 SeeBousquet (2009), Halpin et al. (2006,Edwards (1996),Manjikian (2010),.5 Warkentin and Mingst (2000),Deibert and Crete-Nishihata (2013),Mueller et al. (2013),Costigan and Perry (2012). 6 See e.g.Boas (2004),Mueller and Chango (2008),Diamond (2010),Anduiza et al. (2012),Hussain and Howard (2013),. ...
The growing preeminence of science and technology in today's world no longer fits into most existing analytical frameworks. Material elements, technical instruments, and scientific practices are intertwined with basically every aspect of global politics. Nevertheless, the discipline of International Relations (IR) as a whole tends to conceptualize this topic as an exogenous phenomenon. By adopting the notion of techno-politics, we argue that it is neither sufficient to treat sciences and technologies as external to " social " relations, nor as dominating human behavior and determining political outcomes. We propose rather to open up a middle zone in order to study the intersection of science and technology with international and global affairs. Conceptually, the notion of techno-politics involves two broad sets of approaches: interaction and co-production. This introductory chapter presents the chapters of the volume as examples of how the global politics of science and technology might be studied. As a toolbox of methodological insights, the contributions also point towards pathways for future research that enhances the global politics of science and technology as subfield of IR.
Правопорушення у сфері інформаційних технологій становлять реальну загрозу суспільним відносинам на внутрішньодержавному рівні та міжнародному правопорядку. Проблема протидії правопорушенням у сфері інформаційних технологій неодноразово розглядалася в документах регіональних міжнародних організацій. Оскільки кожен регіональний правовий режим є унікальним і має свої особливості, у статті розглядаються можливі наслідки такої регіоналізації. На основі проведеного дослідження зроблено висновок, що регіоналізація міжнародно-правової взаємодії у боротьбі забезпечення кібербезпеки має свої позитивні і негативні сторони та призвела до ситуації, яка частково може бути пояснена транснаціональним характером правопорушень у цій сфері.
Governance theory in political science and international relations has to adapt to the onset of an increasingly digital society. However, until now, technological advancements and the increasing convergence of technologies outpace regulatory efforts and frustrate any efforts to apply ethical and legal frameworks to these domains. This is due to the convergence of multiple, sometimes incompatible governance frameworks that accompany the integration of technologies on different platforms. This theoretical claim will be illustrated by examples such as the integration of technologies on the “human platform” as it is referred to in the case of enhanced soldiers. Hence, successful governance might require new approaches borrowed from a distant relative, namely cybernetics. Insights gained from cybernetics for governance theories might be able to give guidance for a more efficient and adaptive governance approach that is able to deal with increasing complexity caused by technology and governance convergence. While cybernetics itself might be considered a governance approach, it has had surprisingly little reception in the wider field of governance within the area of social and political sciences. This article will develop cybernetic governance as a set of expandable governance principles that are applicable to an increasingly complex digital and smart society. It thereby tries to further galvanise what could be termed cybernetic governance theory as a subject of worthwhile insights from the combination of otherwise largely the disjoined fields of cybernetics and governance.
This article explores the struggle for 'digital sovereignty' in the European Union. A seeming contradiction -the internet, after all, spans the globe - digital sovereignty is portrayed as the winning geo-economic formula to keep the EU secure, competitive , and democratic in the digital future. Approaching digital sovereignty as a discursive claim and analysing it through a case study of the European cloud project Gaia-X, we show that there is no singular understanding of digital sovereignty in the EU. Instead, we identify six markedly different conceptions across the domains of security, economy and rights. The article outlines three scenarios for how the digital sovereignty agenda may develop and thus shape the EU's digital policy and the EU's relations with the rest of the world: constitutional tolerance (where the conceptions co-exist), hegemony (where one conception dominates), or collapse (where the agenda falls apart due to inbuilt conceptual contradictions).
Scandinavian Cybersecurity is currently facing significant challenges as a result of the countries small state status. The Scandinavian countries have historically built great international cooperation and taken much part in the international community. Furthermore, the Scandinavian countries are some of the most digitalized countries in the world, but are they safe? This thesis aims to analyze if the Scandinavian countries successfully make use of international alliances, institutions, and norms to compensate for their relative weakness as small states in cyberspace. To test this, the thesis has analyzed how the countries have utilized NATO, EU, and international norm building as their main platforms for international cooperation, and if these corporations have helped Denmark, Norway, and Sweden increase their cybersecurity.
With a particular rise since the turn of the millennium, cyber-security become one of the most important security sector in contemporary security politics. Despite this, the convergence of cyberspace and security has mostly been analyzed within the context of technical areas and had been neglected in the political realm and international relations academia. The article argues that in line with developments in the domestic and international arena, the AKP government shifted towards the securitization of cyberspace. Secondly the article argues that there seems to be two waves of securitization and desecuritization within the case. The first wave starts from 2006 through the end of 2017 whereby cyber securitization took place within the subunit level and very much connected to political and societal sectors. This first wave particularly heightened after the 2016 attempted coup and the eventual collapse of the peace process with the PKK. The second wave came in the 2018 onwards and instead of securitization, there is a desecuritizationn of cyber attacks took place mostly at the unit level. In both waves, the desecuritization and securitization is constructed within the national security discourse. However in the first wave, a threat to national security is constructed and hypersecuritized particularly in relation to developments at the societal level. In the second wave, the emphasis is put on the strength of national security therefore the threats and cyber-attacks at the unit level that are originated from other states is downplayed in order to construct a national pride and strength. The main goal of this article therefore is to fill the gap in the Copenhagen school related to cyber security sector. The second aim is to fill the gap specifically in Turkey's response to events in cyberspace and construction of a cybersecurity discourse and culture Resumen Con un aumento particular desde el cambio de milenio, la ciberseguridad se convirtió en uno de los sectores de seguridad más importantes en la política de seguridad contemporánea. A pesar de esto, la convergencia del ciberespacio y la seguridad se ha analizado principalmente en el contexto de las áreas técnicas y se ha descuidado en el ámbito político y la academia de relaciones internacionales. El artículo sostiene que, de acuerdo con los desarrollos en el ámbito nacional e internacional, el gobierno del AKP se inclinó hacia la titulización del ciberespacio. En segundo lugar, el artículo sostiene que parece haber dos oleadas de titulización y desecuritización dentro del caso. La primera ola comienza desde 2006 hasta fines de 2017, en la que la titulización cibernética tuvo lugar dentro del nivel de subunidades y muy conectada con los sectores políticos y sociales. Esta primera ola se intensificó particularmente después del intento de golpe de 2016 y el eventual colapso del proceso de paz con el PKK. La segunda ola se produjo en el 2018 en adelante y en lugar de titulización, hay una desecuritización de los ataques cibernéticos que se llevaron a cabo principalmente a nivel de unidad. En ambas oleadas, la desecuritización y la titulización se construyen dentro del discurso de seguridad nacional. Sin embargo, en la primera ola, se construye y se hipersecuritiza una amenaza a la seguridad nacional, particularmente en relación con los desarrollos a nivel social. En la segunda ola, el énfasis se pone en la fuerza de la seguridad nacional, por lo que se minimizan las amenazas y ataques cibernéticos a nivel de unidad que se originan en otros estados para construir un orgullo y una fuerza nacional. Por lo tanto, el objetivo principal de este artículo es llenar el vacío en la escuela de Copenhague relacionado con el sector de la seguridad cibernética. El segundo objetivo es llenar el vacío específicamente en la Aydindag, D.
This paper discusses the current circumstances of security in cyberspace, such as cyber armies and cyber intelligence. Cyber intelligence plays a vital role in the balance of power. Most importantly, this paper explores previous studies of the International Relations (IR) theory of Realism. Cybersecurity can be applied as the equivalent of a nuclear deterrent of Realism and is inspired by the sense of the threat that allied countries felt in regard to cybersecurity. Countries utilize capacity building for military affairs, economics, and administration for cyber deterrence. Even though the circumstances of cybersecurity are deeply affected by the deterrence theory of Realism, concepts of capacity building for cybersecurity are derived not only from Realism but also from Liberalism and Constructivism. In the end, through this paper, I found that there is an interdependence of Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism.
o ciberespaço compreende um novo ambiente de sociabilidade humana, proporcionado pelos desenvolvimentos das tecnologias de informação e comunicação. As duas primeiras décadas do século XXI apresentam a expansão desse ambiente e, principalmente, da Internet, um de seus maiores componentes; junto com tal expansão presenciamos também sua crescente importância política, econômica e social. Justamente nesse ponto o artigo pretende mobilizar a teoria gramsciana para discutir como o ciberespaço, por ser um espaço da vida social, também está submetido às relações de hegemonia e é, portanto, um ambiente de luta política. Para tal discute-se sobre a dinâmica interna do mundo cyber, a presença de espaços de difusão da concepção de mundo das classes dirigentes, bem como dos espaços alternativos. A conclusão aponta para uma visão da Internet como elemento de grande importância para os movimentos sociais, na geração do sujeito coletivo e da vontade coletiva, aspectos centrais para a difusão de uma concepção do mundo pautada nas classes e grupos subalternos, a proposta do comunista sardo.
A partir da crescente importância do ciberespaço e das tecnologias de informação e comunicação para a política, economia e sociedade contemporâneas, o artigo tem por objeto a política cibernética dos Estados Unidos da América e sua formulação dentro da agenda de política externa desse Estado. Posicionando a cibersegurança e demais problemas que emergem dessa temática como assuntos intermésticos, o trabalho adota a perspectiva estrutural da política externa norte-americana para avançar a hipótese de um contínuo iterativo entre as diversas ações e proposições das administrações sobre o tema. Nesse sentido, procedemos com uma análise documental e histórica das políticas em relação ao ciberespaço do governo Obama e do primeiro ano do governo Trump, procurando especificar se há elementos de continuidade ou de mudança. Nossas conclusões apontam para um posicionamento “especial” da política cibernética dentro do executivo norte-americano, representando uma permanência do objetivo de manutenção da condição hegemônica do Estado, também no “mundo cyber”.
An issue that has been widely debated in the West is whether cyberwarfare gives militarily weaker actors asymmetric advantages. Is cyberwarfare a weapon of the weak? Or does it rather multiply the advantages enjoyed by militarily superior actors? These questions have major implications for China, which – as a rising power – must face stronger and weaker opponents at the same time. Based on an analysis of the Chinese journal Guofang Keji, this article investigates how China’s strategic community theorises advantage and disadvantage in the cyber domain and how this differs from Western perspectives on cyberwarfare.
As tecnologias de informática e comunicação influenciam o campo de estudo das Relações Internacionais, criando um novo ambiente de ação: o ciberespaço. Tais processos engendram um fenômeno denominado por alguns autores de “ciberização” (cyberization) das relações internacionais que ainda padece de teorização adequada. O artigo tem por objetivo refletir de maneira preliminar sobre a adequação e potencialidade explicativa das categorias presentes na obra gramsciana de “Estado” e “hegemonia”, ao contexto do ciberespaço. Ao mesmo tempo, pretendemos contemplar o desenvolvimento desigual e combinado do capitalismo internacional – perspectiva recente de engajamento com a obra do sardo. Nossa hipótese afirma a potencialidade dessas categorias no trato desse novíssimo ambiente reconhecendo, para tal, a necessidade de um rigor metodológico e a reflexão sobre a própria ferramenta deixada por Gramsci de “tradução” (ou “tradutibilidade”), isto é, a constante ressignificação de suas categorias às particularidades históricas, culturais e sociais.
The debate on both the impacts of cyber attacks and how to respond to them is active, but precedents are a few. At the same time, cybersecurity issues have been catapulted into the highest of high politics: cyberpolitics. The objective of this chapter is to encourage political decision-makers (and others) to create a framework of proportionate ways to respond to different kinds of cyber hostility. The proportionate response is a complicated, situational political question. This chapter creates a context for the contemporary politics of cyber affairs in the world and determines five variables that policymakers need to consider when evaluating appropriate responses to a cyber attack. As offensive cyber activity becomes more prevalent, policymakers will be challenged to develop proportionate responses to disruptive or destructive attacks. There has already been significant pressure to “do something” in the light of the alleged state-sponsored attacks. Past experience suggests that most policy responses are ad hoc. This chapter comprehensively analyzes how cyber attacks should be treated as a political question and represents a rough framework for policymakers to build on. The chapter presents five variables that policymakers need to consider when evaluating appropriate responses to cyber hostilities. Combining incident impact, policy options, and other variables, the framework outlines the different levers of cyberpolitics that can be applied in response to the escalating levels of cyber incidents. The response framework is also an integral part of the state’s cyber deterrence.
Cyberspace is a socio-political and technological domain with unique characteristics. Cyberspace transcends territorial and legal boundaries and is mostly owned and managed by the private sector. The fact that states are unable to secure cyberspace on their own, forces them to develop cooperative mechanisms with other states and international organizations, but also with the private sector. This reality raises a number of issues regarding the most effective model of governance. Viewing cyberspace as a global commons, balancing between state sovereignty and the fragmentation of cyberspace, debating between multilateral governance and multi-stakeholderism and establishing cyber norms, sketch a rather complex picture of cyberspace governance. The cases of ITU, ICANN, IGF and NETmundial offer us a pragmatic insight into the power politics of cyberspace. Cyberspace is a geopolitical arena, where states compete with each other, but are also being challenged by the private sector.
Massenmedien haben über Jahrzehnte ihre politische Bedeutung ausgebaut; die internetbasierten Medien versprechen rapide Erweiterung von Kommunikation in neuer partizipativer Qualität. In der schwer durchschaubaren auswärtigen Politik scheint Medien zunehmend Macht zuzuwachsen, indem sie die Wirklichkeit definieren, Entscheidungen beeinflussen oder gar bestimmen, sei es allein aus ihrer Funktionslogik (Übermittlungsstruktur, Ausmaß, Geschwindigkeit, Echtzeit), sei es wirtschaftlich oder politisch motiviert (quotenbezogene Fixierung auf Aktualität/Spektakuläres; partikuläre Interessen). Die Bestandsaufnahme medialer Entwicklungen und ihrer Auswirkungen unter verschiedenen Perspektiven zeigt, dass Medien meist weiterhin der Politik folgen und nicht umgekehrt; nur wenn die politische Lage unklar bleibt und maßgebliche Akteure unsichere Haltung zeigen, können Medien entscheidenden Einfluss ausüben. Die „sozialen“ Medien (Internet/Mobiltelephonie) werden überschätzt (Unkontrollierbarkeit, Partizipation, Mobilisierung, Demokratisierung) und geschmäht (Kontrollier- und Manipulierbarkeit, Aktivismus ohne strukturelle Effekte, Gefahr für Kultur/Demokratie); auch für sie gilt, dass ihr hohes technisches und kommunikatives Potential nur im komplexen Zusammenwirken mit ihren Rahmenbedingungen über kurzfristige Erregtheit hinaus wirksam werden kann.
Massenmedien haben über Jahrzehnte ihre politische Bedeutung ausgebaut; die internetbasierten Medien versprechen rapide Erweiterung von Kommunikation in neuer partizipativer Qualität. In der schwer durchschaubaren auswärtigen Politik scheint Medien zunehmend Macht zuzuwachsen, indem sie die Wirklichkeit definieren, Entscheidungen beeinflussen oder gar bestimmen, sei es allein aus ihrer Funktionslogik (Übermittlungsstruktur, Ausmaß, Geschwindigkeit, Echtzeit), sei es wirtschaftlich oder politisch motiviert (quotenbezogene Fixierung auf Aktualität/Spektakuläres; partikuläre Interessen). Die Bestandsaufnahme medialer Entwicklungen und ihrer Auswirkungen unter verschiedenen Perspektiven zeigt, dass Medien meist weiterhin der Politik folgen und nicht umgekehrt; nur wenn die politische Lage unklar bleibt und maßgebliche Akteure unsichere Haltung zeigen, können Medien entscheidenden Einfluss ausüben. Die „sozialen“ Medien (Internet/Mobiltelephonie) werden überschätzt (Unkontrollierbarkeit, Partizipation, Mobilisierung, Demokratisierung) und geschmäht (Kontrollier- und Manipulierbarkeit, Aktivismus ohne strukturelle Effekte, Gefahr für Kultur/Demokratie); auch für sie gilt, dass ihr hohes technisches und kommunikatives Potential nur im komplexen Zusammenwirken mit ihren Rahmenbedingungen über kurzfristige Erregtheit hinaus wirksam werden kann.
In the last few decades, the understanding of security has been changing. New areas emerged which may influence security facets, which were not urgent earlier. Now those facets can endanger individual persons or even states. Breaches of cyber security, separate attacks or intense cyber wars are becoming more usual than conventional wars in the physical space; violations of cyber security may cause great damage, ruin businesses or even temporarily paralyze full-fledged functioning of individual states or regions. Many countries of the world, realizing that such a threat is real, adopted Cyber Security Strategies; for some countries, this is not the first version of such a strategy. This article examines the place of Cyber Security Strategies in the system of state documents, the nature and importance of such strategies as well as whether they are binding on individuals and institutions. The article explores in more detail the principles of ensuring cyber security provided for in such strategies, i.e. the principles identified by the states, as important for ensuring cyber security. It is discussed why these principles are so different in the strategies of individual states.
The following chapter provides an in depth look at a broad selection challenges related to Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism, as identified through prolonged engagement with a multitude of horizontal and vertical cyber-security stakeholders. Out of six critical areas identified, the two leading causes, were through the evolving rate of technology, and, the subsequent lack of education, awareness and training. These two underlying factors further influenced and affected the severity of the additional four critical areas; the capability of investigators, cooperation and information sharing, legislative systems and data protection, and, organisational and societal resilience. Through the consultation and elicitation of information from over 90 individual domain experts, practitioners and security stakeholders, the research of this chapter is dedicated towards improving international awareness towards leading threats, vulnerabilities, and challenges to the continually evolving sphere of cybersecurity.
The debate on both the impacts of cyber attacks and how to response to attacks is active but precedents are only a few. Strategies and political speeches are always (at least partially) declaratory and vague by nature, and beyond these declarations the practical reality of cyber security as a matter of national security issue is challenging. At the same time cyber issues have catapulted into the highest of the high politics, cyberpolitics, and the line of digital and physical is blurring in many ways. Primary intention of this paper is to encourage the national policies concerning on the issue of how cyber attacks should be treated and lead to policies for response. The paper determinates five variables which policymakers need to consider when evaluating appropriate response to a state-sponsored cyber attack. As offensive cyber activity becomes more prevalent, policymakers will be challenged to develop proportionate responses to disruptive or destructive attacks. Already, there has been significant pressure to “do something” in light of the allegedly state-sponsored attacks. Proportionate response is a complicated political question and also situational dependent. This paper analyses in a comprehensive way how cyber attacks will be treated especially as a political question, and this paper represents a rough example of the framework that policymakers should build on.
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