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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1998,
\toL 75, No. 2, 318-331Copyright 1998 by (he American Psychological Association, Inc.
0022-3514/98/S3.00
On Being Happy and Mistaken:
Mood Effects on the Fundamental Attribution Error
Joseph P. Forgas
University of New South Wales
Does temporary mood influence the occurrence of the fundamental attribution error (FAE)? Based
on recent affect-cognition theorizing and research on attributions, 3 experiments predicted and found
that negative moods decrease and positive moods increase the FAE, because of the information-
processing consequences of these affective states. In Experiment 1, happy mood enhanced and sad
mood reduced dispositional attributions based on coerced essays advocating unpopular opinions.
Experiment 2 replicated this effect using an unobtrusive mood induction in a field study. Experiment
3 further confirmed these results and also showed that changes in the FAE were linked to mood-
induced differences in processing style, as indicated by memory data and confirmed by mediational
analyses. The results are discussed in terms of the cognitive processing strategies that mediate mood
effects on attributions. The implications of the findings for everyday inferences and for contemporary
theories of affect and cognition are considered.
Explaining the behavior of others is one of the most critical
and demanding cognitive tasks people face in everyday social
life (Heider, 1958; Jones, 1979). The fundamental attribution
error (FAE), or correspondence bias, refers to a pervasive ten-
dency by people to underestimate the impact of situational
forces and overestimate the role of dispositional factors when
making such judgments (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 1977).
Despite the critical importance of causal attributions about oth-
ers,
little is known about how different psychological states,
such as a person's mood, may affect causal inferences. Drawing
on past research on attributions (Jones, 1990; Quattrone, 1982;
Ross,
1977), as well as recent affect-cognition theorizing
(Bower, 1991; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Fiedler, 1988,
1991;
Forgas, 1992a, 1995a), these three experiments explore
the possibility that good moods can accentuate, and bad moods
inhibit, the FAE as a result of the information-processing conse-
quences of these affective states.
The FAE
There has been a strong philosophical inclination in liberal
Western cultures, at least since the Enlightenment, to emphasize
the causal role of independent, self-reliant individuals in shaping
events (Sampson, 1988; Smith & Bond, 1994). One psychologi-
cal reflection of this individualistic cultural orientation has been
the tendency for people to underestimate the impact of situa-
tional factors and overestimate the role of dispositional factors in
This project was supported by a Special Investigator Award from the
Australian Research Council and by the Research Prize from the Alexan-
der von Humboldt Foundation, Germany. The contribution of Stephanie
Moylan is gratefully acknowledged.
Further information on this research project can be found at
http://www.psy.unsw.edu.au/—joef.jforgas.htm.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Joseph
P.
Forgas, School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney
2052,
Australia. Electronic mail may be sent tojp.forgas@unsw.edu.au.
controlling behavior, a bias sometimes labeled the "fundamental
attribution error" (Ross, 1977) or the "correspondence bias"
(Gilbert & Malone, 1995).
An early demonstration of the FAE was reported by Jones
and Harris (1967), some 10 years before the phenomenon re-
ceived its better known name from Ross (1977). On the basis
of the theory of correspondent inferences, Jones and Harris
argued that
when a person expresses a high probability opinion, attribution of
underlying attitude will not vary as a function of a perceived choice;
when an unexpected or unpopular opinion is expressed, correspon-
dent attribution will vary directly with the amount of choice per-
ceived, (p. 3)
These investigators presented people with a brief essay advocat-
ing a popular (anti-Castro) or an unpopular (pro-Castro) opin-
ion, allegedly written by a person who either freely chose to
write it or was coerced into doing so. As predicted, people
inferred stronger links between underlying attitudes and the es-
say when the speaker argued for an unpopular view and chose
to do so freely. Surprisingly, however, Jones and Harris also
found that people continued to attribute correspondence between
the essay and private attitudes even when the writer clearly had
no choice, and they did so especially when the attitude was an
unpopular one (the pro-Castro position).
Despite some debate as to just how "fundamental" this error
is (Harvey, Town, & Yarkin, 1981; Miller & Lawson, 1989),
subsequent evidence confirmed that there is indeed a widespread
tendency for people to attribute internal causation and to dis-
count external, situational forces (Burger, 1991; Gilbert & Ma-
lone,
1995; Jones, 1990; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Judges seem
prepared to discount even highly salient situational factors and
tend to disregard external constraints even when imposed by
themselves (Gilbert & Jones, 1986). It seems that despite clear
evidence that behavior is often shaped by external forces such
as social history and current environment, people will frequently
act as if observed behavior was largely a manifestation of dispo-
sitional qualities.
318
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