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10.1111/conl.12232.
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Title:
Emotions and the Ethics of Consequence in Conservation Decisions: Lessons from Cecil the
Lion
Authors:
MICHAEL PAUL NELSON (mpnelson@oregonstate.edu, 541-737-9221), Oregon State
University, Department of Forest Ecosystems and Society, Corvallis, OR, 97331, USA
JEREMY T. BRUSKOTTER (bruskotter.9@osu.edu, 614-595-7036), The Ohio State University,
The School of Environment and Natural Resources, Columbus, OH, 43210, USA
JOHN A. VUCETICH (javuceti@mtu.edu, 906-487-1711), Michigan Technological University,
School of Forest Resources and Environmental Sciences, Houghton, MI, 49931, USA
GUILLAUME CHAPRON (gchapron@carnivoreconservation.org, +46-76-117-75-23), Grimsö
Wildlife Research Station, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, SE - 73091
Riddarhyttan, Sweden
Running Title:
Emotions and Ethics in Conservation Decisions
Keywords:
Animal Welfare, Cecil the Lion, Conservation, Consequentialism, Emotions, Environmental
Ethics, Moral Dilemma, Trophy Hunting
Type of Article:
Policy Perspectives
Number of Words in Abstract:
163
Number of Words in Manuscript:
2240
Number of References:
36
Number of Figures and Tables:
0
Corresponding Author:
MICHAEL PAUL NELSON (mpnelson@oregonstate.edu, 541-737-9221), Oregon State
University, Department of Forest Ecosystems and Society, Corvallis, OR, 97331, USA
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
2
Abstract
Though the conservation community has long premised its moral foundations on
consequentialist thinking, and has embraced a dualistic worldview severing reason from
emotion, the conservation community has erred by failing to address – or even
acknowledge – the limitations of these fundamental tenets. This failure reemerged in 2015
when a wealthy hunter killed an African Lion named Cecil for a trophy, in turn prompting a
debate within the conservation community about the appropriateness of killing Cecil. A
number of conservationists 1) defended such instances of trophy hunting on the basis that
money generated by trophy hunting can support conservation, and 2) ridiculed as irrational
those who oppose such instances of killing in the name of conservation. We suggest this
response by the conservation community represents common, but problematic, ethical
reasoning. We offer a critique of both the ethical underpinning of such reasoning and the
assumptions about the relationship between reason and emotion. We urge ethical and
social psychological maturation on behalf of the conservation community.
Introduction
Aldo Leopold (1933) first described wildlife management as “the art of making land
produce sustained annual crops of wild game for recreational use.” Though Leopold’s views
about conservation changed dramatically over his lifetime, we still largely follow the model
he described in 1933. That is, a dominant focus of wildlife management continues to be the
treatment of wildlife as “crops” to be cultivated and harvested for human use. Yet, in recent
years, people have begun to question whether that focus is legitimate: if, for example,
killing a cougar for a trophy is the same as harvesting a deer for food. Likewise, many
question the legitimacy of certain tools used in wildlife management, objecting to the pain
and suffering inflicted. These issues often spark intense debates where well-meaning
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3
disputants – often conservationists themselves – mishandle basic principles that are well
known in the scholarly fields of ethics. In this essay, we argue that discourse about the
appropriateness of killing in the name of conservation would be more constructive if
conservationists understood (a) some of the shortcomings and limitations of
consequentialism, a basic school of thought in the academic discipline of ethics, and (b) that
emotion is not easily or appropriately separated from reason in human judgment and
decision-making. We use the recent case of the killing of Cecil the lion by a trophy hunter to
illustrate.
Consequentialism
The 2015 killing of a high-profile African lion, named Cecil, by an American trophy
hunter rekindled the controversy regarding whether trophy hunting of endangered animals
is acceptable (Capecchi and Rogers 2015). This episode represents a much broader
controversy about the appropriateness of trophy hunting in the name of conservation.
Much of the discourse on this topic focuses on a key empirical question for conservation
(i.e., can trophy hunting benefit a species or population?) (Di Minin et al. 2015). But the
discourse also tends to skirt the broader ethical question sitting at the heart of the
controversy. This question, put simply, is—what constitutes a good reason to kill an animal?
The Cecil episode also has direct policy implications because the US Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS), which recently listed African lions under the U.S. Endangered Species Act
(ESA), also created a special rule that allows for the importation of lion parts (normally
illegal under the ESA) obtained in legal trophy hunts from countries with “scientifically
based” harvest quotas (80 Fed. Reg. 80,016).
Those who support trophy hunting rely primarily on two, oft-repeated, premises: (a)
trophy hunting does not jeopardize the population and (b) trophy hunting can be useful,
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4
even necessary, for the species being hunted because it provides funding for their
conservation (e.g. Di Minin et al. 2015). In addition to a rich academic literature both
defending and challenging the empirical claim that trophy hunting benefits species and
populations (see, for example, Lindsey et al. 2007 and Treves 2009), this issue has broad
social interest as well. For example, an article published on National Geographic’s news site
noted, “Supporters say regulated hunts raise much-needed money for conservation and
help manage populations” and contends, “…scientists can prove that the taking of select
individuals will not endanger the species” (Howard 2015). Similarly, a piece published in the
New York Times, noted hunting advocates “argue that, if done responsibly, the selling of
expensive licenses to big-game hunters can help pay for efforts to protect endangered
species” (Capecchi and Rogers 2015) and an article in The Conversation, authored by a pair
of academic scientists, lends further support, arguing that “conservation costs money” and
trophy hunting provides a means of funding conservation (Rust and Verissimo 2015).
Looking across the coverage, the message is clear—though trophy hunting is extremely
controversial, it is justified when it raises funding for conservation.
These arguments presuppose an ethical theory called “consequentialism”— which
posits that the consequences of one’s actions or a policy is the sole basis for judging
whether they are right are wrong (consequentialism is invoked, for example, by the well-
known aphorism, “the ends justify the means.”). Consequentialist thinking is common in
conservation (see Gore et al. 2011). While the limitations of consequentialism are well
known to ethicists, these shortcomings are less known to the conservation community.
Below we consider three of the most pertinent shortcomings.
The first shortcoming is that in some cases the ends do not justify the means. Even if
we grant that trophy hunting does not jeopardize the population of conservation concern
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5
and that it brings in significant funds for conservation, we are still left with the question, is
the killing justified? This question cannot be dismissed simply by appealing to the beneficial
consequences of the killing. Indeed in many other human affairs we condemn actions or
policies even if beneficial ends are obtained. For example, trafficking humans is taken to be
a wrong way to treat humans even if doing so generates revenue that would be used for
philanthropic purposes. The revenue that could be generated is not sufficient to override
the wrong that is done when we condone human trafficking. The analogous questions need
to be asked of trophy hunting in the name of conservation.
A second shortcoming of consequentialism is its tendency to underappreciate the
importance of motivation when determining the rightness or wrongness of an action. The
importance of motivation in society is highlighted, for example, by the difference between
manslaughter and murder – in those two cases, the moral culpability, the crime, and the
punishment are all very different, even though the consequence of both crimes is exactly
the same. Where trophy hunting is concerned, the motivations of the hunter are critical in
determining the appropriateness of her or his actions. In the case of Cecil, the hunter was
not motivated by the need for food or to protect himself, his family, his livestock, his pets,
or his livelihood. The motivation for killing Cecil was recreation for the purpose of acquiring
a trophy. The explosion of condemnation for this hunter’s actions is a testament to the fact
that many people do not believe trophy acquisition is an appropriate motivation to kill
(Decker et al. 2015).
The controversy about the appropriateness of trophy hunting for conservation will
likely persist until opponents are given good reason to believe that trophy hunting for
conservation does not fall victim to these concerns about motivation. The importance of this
concern is further indicated by controversies surrounding such practices as, for example,
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6
long-shot animal shooting (Petzal 2014), hunting that is tantamount to target practice (e.g.,
prairie dog shooting, Conniff 2013), and various wildlife killing contests (Bixby 2015).
Finally, consequentialist approaches demand that we accurately predict future
consequences of our actions and policies. The criticism here is blunt. Where the relationship
between humans and nature is concerned, we simply are not very good at predicting the
outcomes of our actions or policies (e.g., Holling and Meffe 1996). The concern applies to
this particular case because our ability to reliably manage a trophy hunt without harming
the population is far from certain (e.g., Packer et al. 2009, Whitman et al. 2004, Palazy et al.
2011).
Moreover, as a general principle, we tend to overestimate the benefits and
underestimate the costs of our actions, especially when we are the beneficiaries of the
action (Sagoff 2004, Weinstein 1980). This principle applies here insomuch as if one
identifies with the basic and well-justified principles of animal welfare, then one is liable to
underestimate the cost of harming a population and overestimating the cost of harming
individuals; whereas if one identifies with the basic and well-justified principles of
conservation, then one is liable to overestimate the cost of harming a population and
underestimating the cost of harming individuals.
Important antidotes to these shortcomings are reflected by the underlying principles
of other ethical frameworks, such as deontology (Alexander and Moore 2015) and virtue
theory (Hursthouse 2013). Indeed, judging whether the killing of endangered wildlife is
justified requires analysis both of the consequences for the population (or species) and the
individual organisms that are being killed, and the motivations and actions of the individual
doing the killing. We urge the conservation community to consider these other ethical
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7
perspectives when deciding whether it should condone the various instances of killing in the
name of conservation, including trophy hunting.
Emotion
In addition to a more sophisticated understanding of ethical perspectives (how we
should behave with respect to wildlife), conservationists could also benefit from a more
thorough understanding of psychological explanations of how people actually make
judgments and decisions, especially the role of emotions. Some conservation professionals
expressed support for Cecil’s killing, specifically, and trophy hunting, generally, while
chastising those opposed as irrational or emotional. For example, one article chided, “While
it is sad that we sometimes have to resort to killing animals for conservation, let’s not allow
emotions to overtake our arguments” (Rust and Verissimo 2015). The notion that people
oppose lethal actions because their judgment is clouded by emotion is, in our experience,
common in conservation debates. Indeed, the idea that emotion is the opposite of, or
antithetical to, reason dates back at least as far as Plato (Gardiner et al. 1937). However,
research in psychology and neuroscience reveal flaws in this idea. This research indicates
our deliberations and decision-making utilize both effortful, cognitive processes as well as
quick, intuitive emotional processes (Greene et al. 2004, Kahneman 2011), and suggest that
emotion can actually improve decision-making (Clark et al. 2008). Indeed, research on
humans with damage to ventromedial prefrontal region of the brain (a region that assists
with processing emotions) indicates that individuals with such damage have difficulties
making a variety of judgments and decisions (Bechara et al. 2000, 2004). Thus, while it may
seem desirable to eschew emotion in decision-making, research suggests this may not be
possible, let alone desirable.
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8
Psychological research indicates that the emotion of anger is a perfectly normal and
healthy reaction to any of several kinds of perceived injustice (Batson et al. 2007, 2009). For
example, we expect people to react angrily when they themselves are hurt by someone
else’s actions. We expect and even encourage people to respond angrily when cared-for
others are harmed, whether a child, friend or even pet. Likewise, anger at a violation of a
moral principle (e.g., do unto others…), whether codified in law or scripture, is an
appropriate response in a society dependent upon complex rules for maintaining order.
Individuals who fail to respond with appropriate emotions (like empathy) when witnessing
injustice might be described as callous or anti-social. In fact, lack of empathy is associated
with narcissistic personality disorder (Ritter et al. 2011) and a variety of aggressive, anti-
social behaviors (Miller and Eisenberg 1988), while empathetic responses are associated
with a variety of helping behaviors, including pro-environmental behavior (Schultz 2000,
Berenguer 2007).
Certainly, emotional outrage is sometimes no more than irrational lunacy (just as
reason can at times turn into rationalization), and emotions can lead to less thoughtful,
systematic processing of information (Wilson 2008). But often, emotional outrage is a
reasonable (perhaps even ‘reasoned’) response to injustice and unfairness. Thus, although
the eruption of emotional outrage is sometimes grounds for dismissing those who are
outraged, it can also be a call for closer inspection for signs of injustice. (Note that we are in
no way defending some of the clearly unvirtuous behavior exhibited by some opponents of
to trophy hunting in this case, who called for violence against Cecil’s killer (see Capecchi and
Rogers 2015)).
Tools such as argument analysis (Nelson and Vucetich 2012) and conflict resolution
(Madden and McQuinn 2014) can be useful for elucidating circumstances when emotions
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9
are, or are not, an appropriate response to some form of injustice. Where emotional
responses appear inappropriate, decision-aiding tools that encourage thoughtful, systematic
review of information can also be used to counteract emotional biases (Wilson 2008). Such
methods can also prevent one from being overly-attentive to emotions (e.g., attentive to
the point of being inappropriately distracted from relevant facts or circumstances that merit
attention). In any case, if the root cause of an emotional response is injustice, then the
appropriate response is to address the injustice.
There is increasing evidence to suggest that the public is becoming more empathetic
toward wildlife (Manfredo et al. 2009), and people seem increasingly willing to question
conservation practices they view to be morally problematic. From a practical perspective,
dismissing stakeholders’ views in an emotionally-charged environment will almost certainly
decrease trust among parties (Wilson 2008), and could undermine support for conservation
initiatives. The key for conservation professionals is recognizing that emotion is not
anathema to rational decision-making.
Conclusion
The Cecil case highlights the under-appreciated importance of the human
dimensions of conservation, in particular those pertaining to ethics and psychology. Trophy
hunting as a means of conserving species is vigorously defended by some conservationists
who implicitly rely on consequentialist ethical arguments. More than a century of
scholarship in the field of ethics reveals flaws with consequentialism, calling into question
conservation actions that rely solely on consequentialist arguments. The idea that emotion
is the antithesis of rationality is also centuries old, and is employed as a means of dismissing
people who display emotion in conservation debates. Yet, psychological research suggests
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10
emotional reactions to injustice are normal and healthy, and emotions can be critical for
making ‘good’ judgments and decisions.
These new perspectives need not paralyze conservationists. As seen above, a variety
of practical tools are available for assisting conservationists in understanding the ethical
underpinnings of their positions, and for addressing the proper role of emotions in decision-
making.
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