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Integrity and autonomy

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... This view is also called "integrity as coherence" because it is associated with the requirement of coherence among the principles, commitments and values that a person defends as her own. Being understood on that base, integrity reflects the person's commitment with herself to keep and maintain certain values and convictions as genuinely hers, especially in the face of difficulties and contrary pressure (MILLER, 2013;BIGELOW;PARGETTER, 2007). The idea is that keeping a morally meaningful life demands commitment to, and defense of, a set of in-depth convictions, those that are very dear to us. ...
... This view is also called "integrity as coherence" because it is associated with the requirement of coherence among the principles, commitments and values that a person defends as her own. Being understood on that base, integrity reflects the person's commitment with herself to keep and maintain certain values and convictions as genuinely hers, especially in the face of difficulties and contrary pressure (MILLER, 2013;BIGELOW;PARGETTER, 2007). The idea is that keeping a morally meaningful life demands commitment to, and defense of, a set of in-depth convictions, those that are very dear to us. ...
... A person of complete integrity in this sense would probably resist abandoning her beliefs merely by suggestion, external influence or seduction (COX; LA CAZE; LAVINE, 2013;MCFALL, 1987, p. 6-9). Sometimes this connection between integrity and coherence is presented as strength of will (MILLER, 2013;BIGELOW;PARGETTER, 2007). Other similar conception is "integrity as clean hands". ...
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Usually moralist behaviour and attitude are defined in terms of a very demanding obedience to moral principles or obligations, a kind of intransigence towards abiding by the moral rules and sternness of the moral condemnations. From an ethical point of view, moralism is considered a flaw or distortion in making moral considerations, in relation to precedence of moral aspects or to the appropriate moral scope. In this paper, assuming the possibility of a positive moralism, I criticize the limitations of the negative conception, and present a more comprehensive conception. According to this conception, moralism is described as a moral perspective based on the value integrity. I defend this conception can explain many characteristics we associate with both negative and positive moralism. Since moral criticism involves asking for justification and opening to excuses, I suggest the negative moralism is an objectionable moral attitude or behaviour, precisely, because it blocks or hinders the possibility of moral justification and excuse.
... To possess integrity is to possess an undivided and coherent self. One version of this view is defended by Bigelow and Pargetter (2007). They define integrity as strength of will. ...
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Integrity is one of the leading normative concepts employed in our society. We frequently talk about the degree of integrity of community leaders and famous historical figures, and we highly value integrity in our elected public officials. But philosophers have had a difficult time arriving at consensus about what integrity consists in. Some claim that it is a purely formal relation of consistency, others that it has to do primarily with one's identity, and still others that it involves subjective or objective moral requirements. The primarily goal here is to outline the leading facets of integrity in the contemporary philosophical literature.
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Chapter
Integrity is one of the leading normative concepts employed in our society. We frequently talk about the degree of integrity of community leaders and famous historical figures, and we highly value integrity in our elected public officials. But philosophers have had a difficult time arriving at consensus about what integrity consists in. Some claim that it is a purely formal relation of consistency, others that it has to do primarily with one's identity, and still others that it involves subjective or objective moral requirements. The primarily goal here is to outline the leading facets of integrity in the contemporary philosophical literature.
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Many people have claimed that integrity requires sticking to one's convictions come what may. Greg Scherkoske challenges this claim, arguing that it creates problems in distinguishing integrity from fanaticism, close-mindedness or mere inertia. Rather, integrity requires sticking to one's convictions to the extent that they are justifiable and likely to be correct. In contrast to traditional views of integrity, Scherkoske contends that it is an epistemic virtue intimately connected to what we know and have reason to believe, rather than an essentially moral virtue connected to our values. He situates integrity in the context of shared cognitive and practical agency, and shows that the relationship between integrity and impartial morality is not as antagonistic as many have thought – which has important implications for the 'integrity objection' to impartial moral theories. This original and provocative study will be of great interest to advanced students and scholars of ethics.
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Despite the fact that most of us value integrity, and despite the fact that we readily understand one another when we talk and argue about it, integrity remains elusive to understand. Considerable scholarly attention has left troubling disagreement on fundamental issues: Is integrity in fact a virtue? If it is, what is it a virtue of? Why exactly should we value integrity? What is the appropriate way to have concern for one’s own integrity? Is having integrity compatible with having significant moral flaws? After an overview of common ‘data points’ or platitudes concerning integrity, this article outlines six distinct views of integrity that have been defended and draws attention to problems each has accommodating these data points.
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Many people think that integrity is a central concept for moral reasoning. Political, educational, and business leaders tout the importance of integrity for our society's moral health. But there are reasons to doubt that it is solely a moral concept. Our intuitions seem to confirm that a committed Mafia boss may have some form of integrity. Or one might say that integrity is the mere expression of other moral commitments or depict it as a formal virtue lacking any moral content. Others question whether or not it is even desirable or achievable. In this dissertation, I develop an account of integrity that defends integrity from these doubts and present it as a central moral concept. In Chapter 1, I distill a basic notion of integrity from the existing discussions. In Chapter 2 I answer the question, "Is integrity a moral concept?" In Chapter 3 I answer the question "Is integrity a virtue?". In Chapter 4 I respond to an important empirical objection to the moral identity account of integrity. John Doris and Gilbert Harman argue that consistency of character is doubtful because situational factors often overwhelm a person's moral identity. The purpose of this chapter is not to contradict the findings of the social psychology experiments presented in defense of their position, but rather to show that the moral identity account of integrity can better explain their findings. In Chapter 5 I take up another empirical challenge to integrity as a moral virtue. David Luban claims that the quest for integrity is dangerous because we tend to rationalize our unethical acts in the name of integrity. I conclude that individuals can maintain their substantive integrity even when situational pressures and professional roles pressure them to compromise their moral values.
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This paper makes a preliminary case for a central and radical claim. I begin with Bernard Williams’ seldom-faced argument that integrity cannot be a moral virtue because it lacks two key ingredients of moral virtues, namely a characteristic thought and motivation. Whereas, for example, generosity involves the thought that another could use assistance, and the motivation to actually give assistance, integrity lacks these two things essential to morally excellent responses. I show that several maneuvers aimed at avoiding Williams’ challenge fail and that others are likely to remain unpersuasive. The paper concludes by offering an argument to the best explanation: Williams’ important insight is best explained by the supposition that integrity is an epistemic virtue, and an epistemic virtue of a practical sort.
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While it isn't clear that we are right to value integrity — or so I shall argue — most of us do. Persons of integrity merit respect. Compromising one's integrity — or failing completely to exhibit it — seems a serious flaw. Two influential accounts suggest why. For Bernard Williams, integrity is 'a person's sticking by what [she] regards as ethically necessary or worthwhile.' To this Cheshire Calhoun adds a helpful negative gloss: To lack integrity is to underrate both formulating and exemplifying one's own views. People without integrity trade action on their own views too cheaply for gain, status, reward, approval or for escape from penalties, loss of status, disapproval. Or they trade their own views too readily for the views of others who are more authoritative, more in step with public opinion, less demanding of themselves, and so on. These glosses capture something close to a core understanding of integrity. As I will show, the core of this nearly standard view sees integrity as a loyalty-exhibiting virtue — integrity is a kind of fidelity or loyalty toward certain features of oneself. There are important variations on this theme. According to one variation, the person of integrity shows fidelity to those values, principles or commitments — call them convictions — that are partly constitutive of her identity as a practical agent. Another variation has integrity involve an overriding concern with the coherence of one's convictions: integrity requires an unswerving fidelity to the second-order, 'meta-commitment' of making coherent one's first-order convictions. A third variation has it that persons of integrity have an unbreakable allegiance to certain 'bottom line' principles. This understanding has obvious attractions. Because we think it important for people to adhere to their convictions, especially in the face of temptation or challenge, this understanding seems plausible and compelling in its own right. But some recent literature has seen integrity grow well beyond this core understanding into a veritable Swiss Army Knife of virtues. Cox, Le Caze and Levine see in integrity something for everyone: [Integrity] stands as a mean to various excesses: on the one side, conformity, arrogance, dogmatism, fanaticism, monomania, preciousness, sanctimoniousness, rigidity; on the other side, capriciousness, wantonness, triviality, disintegration, weakness of will, self-deception, self-ignorance, mendacity, hypocrisy, indifference. Tellingly, they also see an important link between integrity and morality — an increasingly common claim that will prove important to my discussion: Over and above these virtuous characteristics … attributions of integrity presuppose fundamental moral decency … immoral people … do not even seem to be candidates for integrity. Setting itself against immorality and other unsightly vices, what is not to like about integrity? As these last comments show, it is tempting to view integrity as the confluence of all good things. This is a temptation to resist. I will for the purposes of this paper adopt a more skeptical stance. I shall question the normative credentials of integrity. I will argue that integrity is typically taken to be a loyalty-exhibiting virtue in a way that has largely escaped attention. That is, integrity is typically assumed to require a stance of more or less uncritical partiality to one's commitments. Insofar as integrity is loyalty-exhibiting in this respect, integrity is itself a source of moral danger: roughly, a person's concern to preserve her integrity threatens to lead her into moral error. This gives cause to question the value of integrity. A natural remedy suggests itself. If a commitment to moral principles, or perhaps correct moral principles, is a necessary condition on exhibiting integrity, this constraint would eliminate the threat of moral danger. As against this, I will criticize a recent and representative attempt to moralize the virtue of integrity. The challenge to integrity posed by moral danger is better addressed by rejecting the loyalty-exhibiting assumption that creates the problem. I will also argue that, while integrity does require a commitment to having a certain kind of goal, it is not characterized by loyalty to moral convictions come what may, nor by loyalty to any particular set of moral convictions. Rather, it is characterized by an allegiance to the epistemic goal of having convictions there are good, defensible reasons to...
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It has been argued that voluntary euthanasia (VE) and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) are morally wrong. Yet, a gravely suffering patient might insist that he has a moral right to the procedures even if they were morally wrong. There are also philosophers who maintain that an agent can have a moral right to do something that is morally wrong. In this article, I assess the view that a suffering patient can have a moral right to VE and PAS despite the moral wrongness of the procedures in light of the main argument for a moral right to do wrong found in recent philosophical literature. I maintain that the argument does not provide adequate support for such a right to VE and PAS.
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This article discusses the place of integrity in Ronald Dworkin's legal and political philosophy. It presents integrity as a response to certain problems that arise in any society in which more than one contestant view about justice is allowed to determine public policy and legal principle. It also analyzes the relation between integrity and justice, arguing that although integrity requires citizens and officials sometimes to uphold policies or positions they take to be unjust, Dworkin is nevertheless wrong to present them as competing political virtues. Instead, integrity operates as a second-level concept, addressing situations that arise in a society where there is disagreement about justice (and where, therefore, there is no uncontroversial account of what justice requires to set against the requirements of integrity). The article concludes with some reflections on the role of individual convictions about justice in context of law and social action.