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Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption
Abstract
Elections serve two functions in representative democracies. First, they select political actors who enact public policies in the light of constituents' preferences. Second, they permit citizens to hold their representatives accountable and to punish them if they enrich themselves in corrupt or self-serving ways. In other words, elections provide both incentives for politicians to enact certain kinds of policies and constraints on politicians' malfeasance. In this chapter, we focus on the second of these two functions and investigate how different electoral systems constrain corrupt rent-seeking, holding constant other political, economic and social factors.
... The standard research design for corruption studies differs from that for economic-voting studies. Instead of analyzing electoral outcomes over time as the dependent variable, corruption studies tend to use political institutions (including electoral processes) as independent variables in order to test their influence crosssectionally on corruption-related outcomes (Adsera, Boix, & Payne, 2003; Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005; Tavits, 2007a). The consistent finding has been that electoral democracies systematically have lower levels of corruption, and electoral accountability serves as one of the assumed causal mechanisms: voters don't like corruption, and periodic elections enable them to prevent it. ...
... The consistent finding has been that electoral democracies systematically have lower levels of corruption, and electoral accountability serves as one of the assumed causal mechanisms: voters don't like corruption, and periodic elections enable them to prevent it. More specifically , parliamentary regimes have been found to have systematically less corruption than presidential regimes (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005). At the same time, single-seat elections tend to do better than proportional representation , and open-list tends to do better than closed-list proportional representation (Kunicova & RoseAckerman, 2005). ...
... governments controlled by a single party over a relatively long period of time, with little or no influence over policy by opposition parties) make a significant difference in reducing corruption (Tavits, 2007a). The central difficulty with such studies is the weakness or absence, sometimes freely admitted (e.g. Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 598), of a causal story to explain the statistical results. It is a challenge to disentangle the myriad of institutions (e.g. ...
A basic theory of electoral accountability is widely accepted by academic opinion: voters cause politicians to gain or lose office through periodic elections, thereby influencing policy through the threat of electoral sanction. Empirical studies run the gamut from findings of strong support for this theory, to mixed or conditional support, to weak or negative results. When electoral processes are analyzed in terms of two distinct causal linkages within a three-part chain of accountability, however, positive findings are revealed as weaker than they appear while a compelling trend emerges toward findings ranging from conditional to negative in the last two decades. This trend is visible in three topical areas—economic voting, political corruption, and ideological congruence—and it holds for both presidential and parliamentary regimes as well as for a variety of electoral systems. The new electoral skepticism’s unsettling results and insightful methods may help to improve future research and reform efforts alike.
... Agency models have been widely used to explain corruption in the public administration, but political corruption has also been explained in the light of the agency paradigm (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005), when voters (the principal) entrust politicans (the agent) monopoly and discretionary powers over public resources. In these models, political corruption arises when politicians use their public positions for personal gain, inasmuch such a misconduct does not jeopardize their chance of being re-elected. ...
... Notably, the effects of electoral rules and forms of government on political corruption are an ongoing debate among economists and political scientists. 14 Concerning electoral rules, the plurality (or majoritarian) rule of representation has often been opposed to the proportional rule of representation in terms of anti-corruption outcomes, the former being theoretically and empirically associated with higher accountability of incumbents and hence higher incentives to perform well and behave honestly (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2004; Persson et al., 2003; Persson, 2002). Regarding the forms of government, the same literature opposes theoretically presidential to parliamentary regimes, the former being associated with stronger checks and balances and hence less incentives to misbehave. ...
... Parliamentary forms of government are indeed associated with better policy outcomes, while the empirical literature is not unanimous concerning the effect of presidentialism on corruption (Kunicova and RoseAckerman, 2005). If Persson and Tabellini (2004) find a positive effect of presidential systems on corruption in countries with weaker democratic institutions, Kunicova and Ackerman (2005) stress the role of electoral rules in this relationship by showing that corruption finds a fertile ground in presidential systems with rules of proportionality and low district size. These findings are partly corroborated by Gerring and Thacker (2004), who emphasise the effects of parliamentarism and unitarism on political corruption. ...
Because of shared norms of ethics, trust, and coordination prevailing in a given society or a social group, corrupt micro-level decisions are related to each other. In micro empirical analysis, this interdependence of corruption decisions can be addressed through the hierarchical modelling of corruption data. Exploiting a baseline sample of 34,358 bribe reports of firms from 71 developing and transition countries, I use a three-level estimation framework to re-examine the contribution of five major determinants of corruption emphasized by the literature: the economic and human development levels, the size of governments, trade openness and democracy. Multilevel estimations stress that the negative effect of income per capita on bribery is found to be mostly driven by improvement in human capital, more particularly by the decline in fertility rates. They also allow reconciling some contrasting findings of the literature on other corruption determinants. First, higher school attendance may increase corruption incidence by inducing larger public spending, but may also reduce the size of bribes by improving the scrutiny over public agents. Second, public intervention has a positive effect on bribery through public spending, but a negative effect through taxation. Third, trade openness has a positive effect on bribery, explained by state interventions on the one hand and by the country’s geographical distance from main world markets on the other hand. Fourth, results reveal a negative effect of political rights and press freedom on corruption, but also show that young democracies may experience higher corruption levels because of larger scope for private transactions. All in all, the significance of random coefficients across estimations, and the sensitivity of some coefficient estimates to their inclusion, point that the contribution of key corruption determinants emphasized in this study is nevertheless highly context-dependent.
... Although there is widespread agreement that certain economic contexts, political cultures and institutional features are likely to constrain electoral punishment of corruption, we are still short of understanding what is the mechanism behind this lack of electoral consequences. More recently, individual-level explanations have become popular through the use of surveys and to test voters' attitudes towards corruption during elections[25,24,70,97,102]. However, most of these studies offer a static analysis of electoral punishment by looking at a particular election in a given country[59]. ...
... The nature of the electoral system and the type of elections Some aspects of the electoral system may constrain citizens' ability to punish corruption[22,24,70,97]. The type of election, whether it is of first-or a second-order, matters to the likelihood of voters punishing an incumbent for being involved in corruption scandals. ...
... If a scandal affects one of the running candidates, there is still time to register a new one, whereas, if the scandal breaks out during presidential elections, the implications can be decisive to the party in question. Majoritarian electoral systems with larger single-or multiple-member districts and lower barriers to access are often related with less corruption than proportional representation (PR) systems where candidates are selected from party lists with more limited individual accountability mechanisms[70]. According to Persson et al. 'voting on party lists (the career-concern effect) or in relatively small electoral districts (the barriers-to-entry effect) reduce the effectiveness with which voters can exploit the ballot to deter corruption' ([98]: 21). For Reed[110], however, multi-member districts, which are often associated with higher elvels of accountability, also offer some constraints to electoral punishment, since it allows for competition among candidates of the same party. ...
One of the intriguing phenomena in democracy is the fact that politicians involved in, accused of or condemned for corruption in a court of law get re-elected by their constituents. In some cases, corruption does not seem to negatively affect the development of political careers. In this introductory article, we try to develop a multidimensional framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption. First, we will look into various studies on electoral punishment and highlight their advancements and shortcomings. Then, we will propose a more dynamic account of electoral punishment of corruption that takes into account individual as well as macro level explanations. Finally, we will disaggregate these two analytical dimensions into various explanatory factors.
... What makes constitutional features particularly interesting as measures of institutional quality is that different rules have been shown to have different policy implications. More precisely, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) suggest that proportional electoral rules are more prone to rent-seeking and corruption than majoritarian rules. Furthermore, Gerring and Thacker (2004) and Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) argue that presidential systems have higher levels of corruption than parliamentary systems. 1 According to their theory we should expect natural resources-dependent democracies with proportional rule to be more negatively affected by resources than majoritarian countries, especially if they have highly appropriable resources like oil, ores or metals. ...
... More precisely, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) suggest that proportional electoral rules are more prone to rent-seeking and corruption than majoritarian rules. Furthermore, Gerring and Thacker (2004) and Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) argue that presidential systems have higher levels of corruption than parliamentary systems. 1 According to their theory we should expect natural resources-dependent democracies with proportional rule to be more negatively affected by resources than majoritarian countries, especially if they have highly appropriable resources like oil, ores or metals. Also, presidential systems should have a negative effect in comparison with parliamentary systems. ...
... We expect β1 (the regression coefficient of natural resources) to be all the more negative, the more appropriable the resource. β2 should be negative if the country is a presidential system according to Gerring and Thacker (2004) and Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) and positive if it has a majoritarian electoral rule. The interaction term β3 should be positive (and larger than β1) if the constitutional feature keeps corruption low, that is if the country has an majoritarian electoral systems and/or a parliamentary system. ...
Recent work on the so-called resource curse has focused on the importance of the inter - action between institutional quality and resource abundance. The combination of low- quality institutions and easily appropriable resources (such as oil and minerals) tend to be particularly bad for economic development. On the other hand, if institutions are good these same resources contribute more to economic growth than other types of natural wealth. While certainly pointing in the right direction this strand of literature leaves some open questions. First, it is vague on the precise channels through which institutional quality operates. Second, the empirical measures of institutions are often composite measures that arguably include measures of institutional outcomes rather than durable "rules of the game". Using data for the period 1970-2003, this paper study the extent to which combinations of resource-types and constitutional setup determine the degree of appropriative activity in a country. Our results show that parliamentary regimes and majoritarian electoral systems are associated with less (or no) resource curse-effect than are presidential and proportional electoral systems. These effects are particularly strong in countries having much ores, metals and fuels.
... In doing so, we build on the comparative politics literature on corruption that suggests various potential determinants of corruption, including culture, economic development, state size, age of democracy, legal systems, the freedom of the press, and political institutions (see Treisman 2007 and Svensson 2005 for reviews). Since presidential systems universally exist across Latin America, this form of government alone cannot account for variations in conditions across Latin America; however, other institutional features such as electoral systems, judicial systems, and federalism might contribute to systematic differences across countries (Geddes & Neto 1992; Persson & Tabellini 2004, Kunicová & Rose Ackerman 2005 Treisman, 2007, Ríos-Figueroa 2012). Regarding the effect of decentralization on corruption, scholars tend to focus on issues of monitoring and competition typically involved with fiscal decentralization (Shleifer & Vishny 1993, Weingast 1995, Treisman 2000), but some also discuss the effects of political and administrative decentralization. ...
... Regarding the effect of decentralization on corruption, scholars tend to focus on issues of monitoring and competition typically involved with fiscal decentralization (Shleifer & Vishny 1993, Weingast 1995, Treisman 2000), but some also discuss the effects of political and administrative decentralization. Empirically, research suggests that while fiscal decentralization is negatively correlated with corruption, political and administrative decentralization tends to be associated with higher corruption (Treisman 2000, Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman 2005, Gerring & Thacker 2004, Fan, Lin, & Treisman 2009). In addition to comparative research as to how the federal structure of the political system influences the pervasiveness of corruption, some scholars also examine how the structure of the judicial system may affect the control of corruption. ...
Latin America has been at the forefront of a dismaying global trend of declining media freedom. In previous research we have shown that presidents, when unconstrained by a powerful opposition and institutional checks, can [and do] silence the press using a variety of legal, political and economic measures. Federalism provides an added dimension that complicates the relationship between presidential power and press freedom. Previous research on federal systems has shown that they may be more vulnerable to corruption and criminal activity because legal enforcement both through the police and the courts can occur at multiple levels, leading to a lack of oversight and dispersed power. In this paper we focus on the four countries with federal systems (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) to illustrate how decentralized power, judicial independence and state-level actors (e.g. governors, bureaucrats, media owners) increase opportunities to stifle press freedom in some regions of the country, above and beyond the actions a president may take. We expect to find variation in federalism’s effect on press freedom across the four countries depending on the nature of the legal system, the degree to which state-level parties act independently from national party apparati and the range in regulation of media licenses and cross-ownership of media outlets. Where more matters are decided in state courts, greater party variation exists at the state level and where people, including politicians, may own more media outlets in a single region, we anticipate lower levels of media freedom. Additionally within countries we expect to see variation in press freedom across states based on the nature of state politics, media concentration, and judicial professionalism.
Through a combination of case studies and (state-level) statistical analyses, we will examine federalism’s general effect on press freedom as well as investigate which mechanisms among those described above lead to greater declines in state-level media freedom. Ultimately we draw preliminary conclusions on the relative importance of subnational- versus national-level determinants of press freedom in Latin America’s federal countries.
... A general consensus instead affirms that democracy reduces corruption, because it makes political parties more accountable to the electorate and enables the press to operate more freely (Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Kunicova and RoseAckerman, 2005). However, some aspects of democratic elections may create opportunities for corruption (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Political instability is widely believed to increase corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Park, 2003). ...
... The results in Table 4reflect the effects of membership in a PTA on other political risk measures (i.e., government stability, internal conflict, law and order, ethnic tension, and democratic accountability 1 ), conventionally included in related studies, because corruption is also a measure of political risk. For example, democratic accountability might reduce corruption by making political parties more accountable to the electorate and enabling the press to operate freely (Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005). Conversely, political instability measures such as internal conflict, inefficient law and order, and ethnic tensions provide proxies for corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Park, 2003). ...
Using country-level panel data, this study tests whether a country’s decision to join a preferential trade agreement (PTA) or existing participation in one affects its corruption levels. The sample for this study pertains mostly to first-generation PTAs that arose prior to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The results suggest that member nations that entered into pre-WTO PTAs exhibited higher levels of corruption. This claim is general and is not indicative of the undesirability of trade agreements. Nevertheless, the findings reveal interesting factors related to trade agreements in the pre-WTO period.
... Analysing mixed systems in an empirical framework is not easy. Previous works (Kunicova and Rose Ackerman, 2005) have studied those systems using a dummy variable, but this practice is misleading because some of them have a larger proportional element than others; that is, they may be designed with different degrees of proportionality. Therefore, in order to consider mixed systems properly, a continuous measure of the degree of proportionality of an electoral rule is needed. ...
... nal system the incentive for corruption is higher than in a majoritarian system (Persson and Tabellini (1999; 2002). The empirical works of Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003), Gagliarducci, Nannicini, Naticchioni, (2011) suggest that countries with proportional systems have much more widespread corruption than countries with majoritarian systems. Kunicova and Rose Ackerman (2005) find that closed lists PR are more corrupt than open lists PR, and both are more corrupt than plurality systems. Chang (2001) and Chang (2005) conclude the opposite: open list PR and plurality systems could lead to more corruption than closed list PR, since the former allow voters to favour or disfavour individual politicians. Golden an ...
... The intuition behind our argument is straightforward. Simply put, politicians' principals—voters—can punish politicians for poor governance only when faced with evidence of malfeasance (cf. Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). That evidence will in general be available only when those in a position to know about it have incentive to reveal it, however. Taking as our starting point the maintained hypothesis that voters will in fact punish malfeasance when they see it, 4 a suitable test of our argument requires identifying reasonable measures of—or proxies fo ...
... With regard to the plenary, the key is competition to participate in the governing majority. In relation to this, Kunicová and Ackerman (2005) have argued that the multiplicity of parties, characteristic of proportional-representation systems, may create incentives for holding back information on malfeasance. The problem comes in two parts. ...
We approach corruption and, more generally, government quality as an information problem. Neither voters nor anyone else can do anything about poor government quality if they do not know about it or cannot identify its source. In our view, information about misgovernance can, for the most part, be forthcoming from political parties. This focuses attention to the conditions under which parties may reveal such information. We argue that their incentive to do so depends on the strength of party competition in the electoral and legislative spheres. Our empirical results based on cross-section sample of up to 128 countries support the proposition that more party competition will strengthen the incentive to reveal observed malfeasance in other parties and consequently act as a deterrent on malfeasance. The positive impact of party competition on government quality is mitigated in the presence of special interests something which is as expected since parties which cater to specific constituencies are less likely to compete among each-other and more likely to collude to the detriment of good government.
... Indeed, and this is where we part from the existing literature, elites sometimes might be willing not only to tolerate others' bad behavior but also to take advantage of their influence to behave badly themselves. Persson et al. (2003), Chang (2005 , Kunicovà and Ackerman (2005), and Chang and Golden (2006) examine how electoral rules affect how accountable political candidates are to voters. Tavits (2007) explains that the principleagent relationship is tightened in the presence of clear lines of responsibility for enacting anti-corruption policies (see also, Gerring and Thacker 2004). ...
Legislative checks give whoever wields them influence over policy making. Rational politicians should use that influence to make themselves better off in any way possible, whether in terms of policy benefits, private benefits, or both. Disincentives exist only to the extent that corrupt actors can be held accountable, which is problematic because the people best positioned to observe and block corruption—legislators with influence in the policy-making process—are by the same token well-positioned to benefit from it. Legislative checks, we argue, thus create conditions for collusion and corruption among legislators (e.g., copartisans or coalition partners) that is offset only to the extent that those involved can expect to pay costs for being seen to cooperate with each other. We find, testing our claim against data from a sample of 97 countries, strong support for our hypothesized relationship between institutional checks and corruption.
... Our study therefore corroborates the findings of the literature (e.g. Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Bertot et al. 2010) in that the lack of transparency is a good indicator of corruption. 18 Unger and Ferwerda (2011) use a regular probit model, while we use an ordered probit model. ...
Red flags are widely used to minimize the risk of various forms of economic misconduct, among which corruption in public procurement. Drawing on criminal investigations, the literature has developed several indicators of corruption in public procurements and has put them forward as viable risk indicators. But are they genuinely viable, if only corrupt procurements are analysed? Using a dataset of 192 public procurements — with 96 cases where corruption was detected and 96 cases where corruption was not detected — this paper addresses the identification of significant risk indicators of corruption. We find that only some indicators significantly relate to corruption and that eight of them (e.g. large tenders, lack of transparency and collusion of bidders) can best predict the occurrence of corruption in public procurements. With this paper we successfully tap into one of the most vulnerable areas of criminological research — selecting the right sample — and consequently, our results can help increase the detection of corruption, increase investigation effectiveness and minimize corruption opportunities.
... In an effort to reconcile these findings, some scholars have suggested that the relationship between electoral system and corruption is conditional on district magnitude (Chang & Golden 2007). A large and significant disagreement exists as to whether electoral systems with opened or closed rules for the selection of candidates lead to higher levels of electoral corruption (Carey & Shugart 1995, Kunicova & Rose Ackerman 2005, Gingerich 2013). One fruitful direction of further comparative investigation is whether differences in electoral systems exert a systematic effect on the mix of clientelistic strategies. ...
In elections around the world, large numbers of voters are influenced by promises or threats that are contingent on how they vote. Recently, the political science literature has made considerable progress in disaggregating clientelism along two dimensions: first, in recognizing the diversity of actors working as brokers, and second, in conceptualizing and disaggregating types of clientelism based on positive and negative inducements of different forms. In this review, we discuss recent findings explaining variation in the mix of clientelistic strategies across countries, regions, and individuals and identify a few areas for future progress, particularly in explaining variation in targeting of inducements by politicians on different types of voters.
... At the risk of being simplistic, we can classify the literature on corruption into three categories: (1) those that consider that the economic factors are important, (2) those that focus on political factors, and (3) those that stress the cultural and religious factors. According toKunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005), a process of democratic institutionalization increases political participation and competition, which limit politicians' tendency to engage in corrupt practices by raising the citizens' capacity to restrain it legally. So, the ultimate effect of democratization should be greater transparency, accountability, modernization of the bureaucratic system and thus a reduction of corruption. ...
We carry out an empirical analysis to evaluate the likely effects of political alternation on corruption in Mexico after controlling for a set of economic and educational variables. We estimate the relevant coefficients from a panel data set for the period 2001-2010. We find evidence that actual political alternation restrains corruption. RESUMEN Se realiza un análisis empírico para evaluar los posibles efectos de la alternancia política sobre la corrupción en México después de controlar variables económicas y de educación. Se estima los coeficientes utilizando una base de datos panel para el periodo comprendido entre 2001 y 2010. Se encuentra evidencia que la alternancia política (efectiva) limita la corrupción. Palabras clave: Corrupción, democracia, alternancia política, competencia política, panel de datos, México.
... Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Blume et al., 2009) as an indicator of political rents. While those studies found indeterminate eects of the form of government, Kunicová and Ackerman (2005) found that presidential systems are more prone to corruption, thereby lending further support to the assumption. Second, it is throughout the paper assumed that citizens are attentive enough to the policy choices of the ruling politicians and react to a larger extraction of government funds with an increased probability of an uprising. ...
What are the factors driving the choice of the form of government? So far, it has been argued that higher income inequality makes a parliamentarian system less likely. Using a rational-choice model and focusing on a set of assumptions that fits well with unstable democracies, this paper finds that the composition of the constitutional assembly does play a key role for the choice of form of government. Who holds the majority in the constitutional assembly has a strong effect on the choice of form of government, especially when the policy conflict within the society (measured by income inequality in the model presented here) is high. This finding supports the case for a stronger focus on institutional details.
... If the signs of the variables of interest (in this case, the overall marginal effect rather than the single coefficients) remain unchanged, the results are considered to be robust according to Sala-i-Martin (1997). Several studies include dummies for geographical areas or the OECD (see, for instance, Swamy et al. 2001; Gerring and Thacker 2005; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005) to account for regional differences in corruption levels. In line with Persson et al. (2003), I expect OECD members to have lower corruption levels. ...
On average, higher per capita income comes with lower corruption levels. Yet, countries like Mexico, Libya and Saudi Arabia are relatively wealthy but experience comparatively high corruption levels. Simultaneously, countries like Madagascar or Mozambique (in the 1990s) combine poor economic development with a low level of corruption. I propose that the two most common variables in corruption research – wealth and democracy – are mutually conditional: economic development brings about a larger (and stronger) middle class that demands public goods from the government. However, citizens’ ability to influence governmental decision-making varies by political regime type. In democracies, citizens are, on average, more successful in demanding goods from the government than in autocracies. Using a large-N approach (up to 139 countries, 1984–2006), the analysis finds robust empirical support for the proposed conditional effect.
... Although several scholars use institutional factors to explain variance in political corruption (e.g. Della Porta, 2004; Gerring and Thacker, 2004; Johnston, 2002; Kunicková and Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Lederman et al., 2005; Persson et al., 2003; Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002; Pujas and Rhodes, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 2001, Smilov and Toplak, 2007 ), to date the influence of the regulation of political finance on party corruption has received little or no attention. Following the popularity of the 'cartel party thesis' (Katz and Mair, 1995), scholars have rather looked at the effects of party finance regulations on party systems (Booth and Robbins, 2010; Pierre et al., 2000; Scarrow, 2006; Spirova, 2007), electoral volatility and membership (CasasZamora, 2006; Whiteley, 2011), as well as on the organisational development of individual parties (Casal Bértoa and Spirova, 2013; Nassmacher, 2009; Tavits, 2007; Van Biezen, 2003). ...
Political finance regulation is often praised in terms of its ability to introduce equality among political parties, to create more transparent political parties and to lower the influence of affluent donors on the political decision-making process. Little examination exists, however, of the effectiveness of this type of regulation. This article aims to fill this gap by addressing whether and to what extent different types of public funding regulation have improved the legitimacy of political parties by improving their image in terms of corruption. Towards this end, and focusing on both European and Latin American democracies, this article investigates whether a relationship indeed exists between the perceived corruption of political parties and the regulation of political finance. It finds such a relationship does exist, although not in the direction commonly stipulated by the advocates of party finance regulation.
... Our analysis, while confirming his results using panel data and a dynamic specification, shows that the electoral rules are actually important for the performance of the political regime. The importance of this interaction is found also by Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) which study the relationship between the political system and the level of corruption, using a cross-section of ninety-four democracies. They show the presidential regime associated with a proportional electoral rule determines high levels of corruption. ...
The present work looks at the role of political institutions | political regimes and electoral rules | in determining the performance of the government to define and implement sound policies for the economy. The results of the empirical investigation on a panel of 80 democracies over the period 1996-2011, show an important impact of the political regime on the performance of the government | the presidential regimes reduces the quality of the government |, while electoral rules do not matter. However, the analysis shows that the interaction between political regimes and electoral rules plays a crucial role for the quality of the government. In particular, a presidential regime improves the government performance when associated with a majoritarian rule, while worsens it when combined with a proportional rule.
... The goal of this paper is to mark an improvement on both counts. Empirical studies of the determinants of corruption, including the degree of government administrative and fiscal decentralization, are generally based on cross country regressions (Fan, Lin, Treisman, 2009; Arikan, 2004; Bjedov, Madies, Schnyder, 2010; Treisman, 2007 Treisman, , 2000 Bardhan and Mokherjee, 2005; Kunicová and Rose-Ackermann, 2005; Fjeldstad, 2003; Fisman and Gatti, 2002; De Mello and Barenstein, 2001; Huther and Shah, 1998), , if not on case studies (Jin et al., 2005; Zhuravskaja, 2000; Montinola et al. 1995). For a variety of reasons, including data limitations, the time series dimension of the two link between decentralization and corruption has never been examined so far . ...
... A substantial bulk of research has shown that a politico-economic approach stressing the importance of institutions is a powerful tool in understanding corruption (Abed and Gupta, 2002; Bradhan, 1997; Rose-Ankerman, 1997). Electoral rules and structures substantially affect the corruption level (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005) and countries tend to achieve an equilibrium position that is driven by the balance of political forces and institutions (Bird et al., 2006Bird et al., , 2008). Beyond these empirical backings in the choice of government-quality control variables, the theoretical underpinnings of the corruption literature point to the central role of good governance in the fight against the scourge. ...
Purpose
Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across African countries? Why are some countries more effective at battling corruption than others? To assess these concerns this paper aims to examine the determinants of corruption control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption using panel data from 46 African countries for the period 2002‐2010.
Design/methodology/approach
The panel quantile regression technique enables us to investigate if the relationship between corruption control and the exogenous variables differs throughout the distribution of the fight against corruption.
Findings
Results could be summarized in the following. Greater economic prosperity leads to less corruption control and the magnitude of the effect is more important in countries where the fight against corruption is high. Regulation quality seems bimodal, with less positive effects in the tails: among the best and least fighters of corruption. There is support for a less negative consequence of population growth in countries that are already taking the fight against corruption seriously in comparison to those that are lax on the issue. Findings on democracy broadly indicate the democratization process increases the fight against corruption with a greater magnitude at higher quantiles: countries that are already taking the fight seriously. The relevance of voice and accountability in the battle against corruption decreases as corruption control is taken more seriously by the powers that be. Good governance dynamics of political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law gain more importance in the fight against corruption when existing levels of corruption control are already high.
Social implications
The results of this study suggest that the determinants of corruption control respond differently across the corruption‐control distribution. This implies some current corruption‐control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt African nations. As a policy implication, the fight against corruption should not be postponed; doing so will only reduce the effectiveness of policies in the future. The rewards of institutional reforms are more positive in countries that are already seriously engaged in the corruption fight.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to existing literature on the determinants of corruption by focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable (control of corruption). It is likely that good and poor corruption fighters respond differently to factors that influence the fight against corruption. There are subtle institutional differences between corrupt and clean nations that may affect corruption‐control determinants and government efficacy in the fight against corruption.
... In the first place, institutional configurations that ease the identification of responsibility [45] have been found to increase political accountability because they allow voters to evaluate and punish their representatives more effectively. Persson et al. [38] , Kunicova and Rose- Ackerman [27], and Chang et al. [8] discuss how different aspects of the electoral system constrain voters' ability to punish representatives individually. Manzetti and Wilson [32] show that the strength of democratic institutions is a significant mediating factor in the relationship between corruption and government support. ...
Previous studies of the electoral consequences of corruption in Spanish local elections have found that voters do not necessarily punish corrupt mayors. As has been pointed out in the comparative literature, the average loss of electoral support by corrupt incumbents is small and does not prevent their reelection most of the times. What remains unsolved, however, is the remarkable variability in this pattern. This article explores some of the micro-level variables that may mediate the effect of corruption scandal on the vote. We focus on three factors: ideological closeness to the incumbent party, political sophistication, and employment status. Our results provide only partial support for our hypotheses, suggesting that the effects of corruption are much more complex than what may seem at first sight.
... The literature on elections and campaign finance reform is replete with various accounts of the impact of corruption on the vote. Taking note of the unique Philippine presidential electoral system and the nationally elected Senators and members of Congress, one clearly sees the fulfilment of Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman's prediction: " proportional representation systems together with presidentialism are associated with higher levels of corrupt political rent-seeking " (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 583). Furthermore, the unpredictability of the Philippine party systems favor electoral uncertainty which consequently " encourages politicians to corruption activities under electoral systems that are dominated by the personal vote " (Chang, 2005, p. 719). ...
The unprecedented synchronized automated elections of May 2010 in the Philippines
saw how results of presidential elections could be obtained nearly overnight. Such
nation-wide occurrences dramatically altered the mode in which Philippine elections
had always been propagated: Typified by arduous and oftentimes onerous
delays in the publication of results stretching all the way to several months after
the day of the elections. This inquiry explores the implications of this change to
prevailing theories and practices of election reforms. More importantly, it critiques
the premise that the automation of elections curbs corruption and that it
generates authentic political competition. Using data obtained from last May 2010
synchronized automated elections, this inquiry proposes several analytical models
in understanding the interplay of election reforms and corruption in determining
electoral outcomes.
... By far the most popular institutional variable for the analysis of established democracies is electoral systems, together with the Duvergerian implications for party systems. We know, ceteris paribus, that countries with proportional electoral rules (PR) and multiparty systems, compared to those with single-member districts (SMD) and fewer-party systems, experience higher government spending (Scartascini and Crain, 2002; Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno, 2002; Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006), shoulder higher price-levels (Rogowski and Kayser, 2002), enjoy policies that are (Powell, 2000Powell, , 2009) or are not (Golder and Lloyd, 2012) closer to the median voter, suffer higher corruption (Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi, 2003; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005), and reform policy more slowly in response to shocks (). What we do not know is why. ...
Electoral competitiveness is a key explanatory construct across a broad swath of phenomena, finding application in diverse areas related to political incentives and behavior. Despite its frequent theoretical use, no valid measure of electoral competitiveness exists that applies across different electoral and party systems. We argue that one particular type of electoral competitiveness – electoral risk – can be estimated across institutional contexts and matters most for incumbent behavior. We propose, estimate and make available a cross-nationally applicable measure. Unlike extant alternatives, our measure is party-specific and independent of electoral and party systems. Descriptive statistics show a marked difference in mean electoral risk across electoral systems. An application to regulation and price levels illustrates the measure’s utility.
... Until very recently, there was still a scarcity of studies examining the processes of adoption and reform or the high degree of crossnational variation in electoral systems. It is well established that electoral rules have an impact on the number of parties that get into the Parliament (Cox 1997; Duverger 1964 Duverger [1954; Lijphart 1994; Rae 1971 [1967]; Sartori 1997 [1994]; Taagepera and Shugart 1989), the candidates' incentives to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995), the incumbents' opportunities to engage in corrupt behaviour (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005), the government's motivations to increase public expenditure or run budget deficits (Persson and Tabellini 2005), and the achievement of some sort of geographical (Latner and McGann 2005 ) or genderbalanced (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008) representation; but only in recent years has the long list of effects the literature attributes to electoral systems provoked the emergence of a true body of research on the determinants of their origins and changes. ...
Elections serve two functions in representative democracies. First, they select political actors who enact public policies in the light of constituents’ preferences. Second, they permit citizens to hold their representatives accountable and to punish them if they enrich themselves in corrupt or self-serving ways. In other words, elections provide both incentives for politicians to enact certain kinds of policies and constraints on politicians’ malfeasance. In this chapter, we focus on the second of these two functions and investigate how different electoral systems constrain corrupt rent-seeking, holding constant other political, economic and social factors.
Bu calisma, Orta Dogu-Kuzey Afrika (MENA) ve Hazar bolgesinden 21 ulke (N=21) icin, dogal kaynak zenginligi ve ekonomik buyume iliskisinde yonetisim gostergelerinin aracilik etkisini, 1996-2012 donemi yillik dengeli panel verileri (T=17) kullanarak incelemektedir. Bu kapsamda, kisi basina ham petrol uretiminin kisi basina reel GSYH uzerine etkisi tahmin edildikten sonra, bu iliskide kurumsal-temelli yonetisim gostergelerinin aracilik rolunu belirlemek icin hiyerarsIk regresyon analizi uygulanmistir. Ikili regresyon tahmin sonuclari, kisi basina ham petrol uretimi ile genel olarak kuresel yonetisim gostergeleri arasinda negatif bir iliski oldugunu ve yonetisim gostergelerinin tum boyutlarinda meydana gelen gelismelerin kisi basina reel GSYH’yi artirdigini gostermektedir. HiyerarsIk regresyon sonuclari, ham petrol uretimi ve kisi basina reel GSYH arasindaki iliskide yonetisim gostergelerinin, kismi bir araci degisken olarak, onemli bir rol oynadigini gostermektedir. Bu bulgu, dogal kaynak zenginliginin ekonomik buyumeyi artirmasinin, bu zenginliginin ayni zamanda yonetisim gostergelerini bozmasi nedeniyle engellenme egiliminde oldugunu ortaya koymaktadir. Tum sonuclar, kurumsal niteligi gelistirecek demokratik, politik ve hukuki duzenlemeler ile birlikte yolsuzlugu ve siddeti onlemeye yonelik butunlesIk politikalarin onemine dikkat cekmektedir.
This paper presents a review of political economy studies focused on the quality of governance and, in particular, on the institutions that mould the policymaking process, influencing the risk of sub-optimal policy outcomes. It examines features of the UK Westminster model that amplify the risk of policy failure, drawing on political science literature on the British constitution and empirical, comparative studies of the British macro polity. The paper also discusses the limits and possibilities of institutional reform, including the conditions for and drivers of institutional change.
We collect data about 172 countries: their parliaments, level of corruption, perceptions of corruption of parliament and political parties. We find weak empirical evidence supporting the conclusion that corruption increases as the number of parties increases. To provide a theoretical explanation of this finding we present a simple theoretical model of parliaments formed by parties, which must decide whether to accept or reject a proposal in the presence of a briber, who is interested in having the bill passed. We compute the number of deputies the briber needs to persuade on average in parliaments with different structures described by the number of parties, the voting quota, and the allocation of seats among parties. We find that the average number of seats needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases. Restricting the minimal number of seats a party may have, we show that the average number of seats to be bribed is smaller in parliaments without small parties. Restricting the maximum number of seats a party may have, we find that under simple majority the average number of seats needed to be bribed is smaller for parliaments in which one party has majority, but under qualified majority it hardly changes.
Research linking credible commitments to the rule of law in terms of property rights and contract enforcement is a hallmark of recent efforts to explain economic growth and development. However, many postcommunist states have had difficulty making such commitments and spurring growth. Many argue political polarization prevents states from reforming laws and protecting property rights in some countries whereas single-party governance renders state promises incredible in others. I analyze pooled cross-sectional time-series data for twenty-four postcommunist countries and provide evidence effective constraints among elected officials act as democratic commitment mechanisms rendering government policies credible.
This study offers an empirical test of the effect of decentralisation on political trust. A comparative analysis of citizens in 47 countries suggests indirect and heterogeneous consequences of decentralisation. First, while various dimensions of decentralisation are significantly associated with political trust at the country level, no dimension has a direct effect on political trust at the individual level. Second, not all forms of decentralisation contribute to the promotion of political trust. And, finally, two dimensions of decentralisation (that is, fiscal and administrative) promote political trust through reducing the negative effect of democratic values.
We study the rent-seeking behaviour of political parties in a proportional representation
system, where the final policy choice of the parliament is a weighted average of
parties’ policy positions, weights being their vote shares. We find that parties’ policy
preferences and their rent levels are strongly linked. Our main result is that an extreme
party chooses a higher rent level than a moderate party, except in some cases of unlikely
distributions of parties. An extreme party has more policy influence than a moderate
party since it pulls the final policy towards its position more than a moderate party.
Hence, a voter is ready to pay more rents to an extreme party in exchange of a greater
policy influence. Furthermore, note that the voter does not need to be an extremist
to vote for an extreme party. She is acting strategically in order to influence the final
policy in her advantage as much as possible. In turn, this strategic behaviour of voters
allow more extreme parties to earn higher rent levels.
Überblick über die Korruptionsproblematik,
ihre Präsenz in der Judikative und Lösungsansätze im internationalen Vergleich
Political racialization has shaped the route to political power in Guyana from the mid-1950s, cementing ethnic insecurity and patronage politics. The 22-year rule of the East Indian-dominated Party is threatened by disaffection with corruption and by emigration of its ethnic base. A so-called REDD agreement with Norway in 2009 provides international legitimation and funding to win over indigenous Amerindian voters. REDD illustrates how dispensation of international aid, without robust checks and balances, can maintain and extend entrenched power. The Government enlists the discourse of REDD to advance its project of maintaining networks of power and privilege.
Lobbying a coalition government is different from lobbying a single-party government, since in the case of a coalition government, the interest group can intervene in the intragovernmental decision process. In the case where the interest group prefers the status quo to the surplus maximizing policy, the interest group influences the policy without any contribution due to its credible threat to block unfavorable proposals. Furthermore, we show that when, say, a leftist coalition government may be replaced by a rightist coalition government, the final policy reflects a rightist interest group’s preferences more heavily due to the interest group’s forward-looking considerations.
Abstract To establish the scope and level of corruption in the contemporary United States, a collaborative project of political scientists is needed. Such a study should start with explicating the definition of corruption various scholars use. Three are noted here: using public goods for personal gains, deflecting public goods to private groups, and making such moves when these are legal although they are still illicit. To assess corruption on these levels, we must consider that various forms that capture takes beyond the corruption of the laws themselves. A study of the major differences in the level of corruption among the three branches of government may improve our understanding of the prevalence and causes of corruption. A study of rent may help predict that future course of corruption. Other topics whose study warrants collaborative investigation are listed.
Corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a
vast range of institutional, jurisdictional, societal and economic conditions. Research
indicates that corruption’s predominantly negative effects have arisen to a massive transborder
threat while creating high obstacles to sustainable and prospective development. It
is this paper’s aim to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey
of existing literature on corruption and its antecedents and effects. A particularly strong
focus is put on presenting and discussing insights resulting from empirical research.
Several international organizations, for example the World Bank, advo-cate public sector decentralization as a way to improve economic and so-cial outcomes in the developing world. But decentralization is not the only means through which international organizations and donors attempt to foster development. Another important instrument of development pol-icy is aid. In order to evaluate whether decentralization does indeed ad-vance socio-economic progress, we need to understand how it interacts with other development policies. This paper studies whether aid is more effective in decentralized countries by focusing on three important de-velopment goals: increasing economic growth, lowering infant mortality, and overcoming poverty. We estimate TSLS models using a cross-section dataset with country averages for 81 countries over the period 1990-2009. The results suggest that aid is not more effective in decentralized coun-tries. Decentralization, therefore, is not a promising strategy to enhance the effectiveness of aid.
While effective state capacity can reasonably be considered a necessary condition for democratization, strong states do not automatically produce democratic regimes, nor do they guarantee their survival. Far from being sufficient conditions for democracy, strong or capable states are also thought to be indispensable for the maintenance of autocratic rule. The present article puts to the test the hypothesis that a certain level of state capacity is needed to engage in effective electoral malpractice, using general and more specific indicators of electoral fraud. This article proposes two opposing mechanisms through which state capacity can influence the quality of elections: through infrastructural state capacity and coercive state capacity. The article demonstrates that electoral fraud is more likely in countries where infrastructural state capacity is weak and that coercive state capacity plays a more ambiguous role than previously thought. The analyses also reveal that different factors are at work when looking at precise types of electoral malpractice rather than general measures: voter and candidate intimidation, fraudulent tabulation of votes, unfair media coverage of campaigns and vote buying seem to engage different sets of facilitating structures.
In recent years, and from different social disciplines, the quality of the government has gained relevance as a topic in the international debate. Scholars and international organizations have developed a variety of methodologies that try to explain the causes and the effects of the quality of government on social, economic, and political development. Despite this emergent industry of methodologies and indicators, the conceptual discussion of the definition of quality of government itself has been understudied. This has led to a set of conceptual inconsistencies and weaknesses. In this paper, we present a brief discussion of the main perspectives developed on this topic, discuss the ways in which this notion has been defined, and point to their main shortcomings. Finally, we offer some criteria to develop a more useful and conceptually defensible definition of quality of government.
This paper analyzes the impact of migration on destination-country corruption levels.
Capitalizing on a comprehensive dataset consisting of annual immigration stocks of OECD countries from 207 countries of origin for the period 1984-2008, we explore different channels through which corruption might migrate. Independent of the econometric methodology applied,
we consistently find that while general migration has an insignificant effect on the destination
country’s corruption level, immigration from corruption-ridden origin countries boosts corruption in the destination country. Our findings provide a more profound understanding of the economic implications associated with migration flows.
This paper analyzes the impact of migration on destination-country corruption levels.
Capitalizing on a comprehensive dataset consisting of annual immigration stocks of OECD
countries from 207 countries of origin for the period 1984-2008, we explore different channels
through which corruption might migrate. Independent of the econometric methodology applied,
we consistently find that while general migration has an insignificant effect on the destination
country’s corruption level, immigration from corruption-ridden origin countries boosts corruption
in the destination country. Our findings provide a more profound understanding of the
economic implications associated with migration flows.
Corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range
of institutional, jurisdictional, societal and economic conditions. Research indicates that corruption’s
predominantly negative effects have arisen to a massive trans-border threat while creating
high obstacles to sustainable and prospective development, ultimately impairing everybody’s life.
This paper provides a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of existing literature on corruption and
its antecedents and effects. Consequently, we bridge the gap between existing theories of different
fields of research including economics, psychology, and criminology in order to draw a conclusive
picture of corruption on the micro-, meso- and macro-level.
Comparative studies of corruption focus on the selection and incentives of policymakers. With few exceptions, actors who are in charge of implementing policies have been neglected. This article analyzes an original data set on the bureaucratic features and its effects on corruption in fifty-two countries. Two empirical findings challenge the conventional wisdom in literature. First, certain bureaucratic factors, particularly meritocratic recruitment, reduce corruption, even when controlling for a large set of alternative explanations. Second, the analysis shows that other allegedly relevant bureaucratic factors, such as public employees’ competitive salaries, career stability, or internal promotion, do not have a significant impact.
Why are some nations more effective at battling corruption than others? Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across developing nations? How do wealth effects play-out when existing corruption-control levels matter in the corruption battle? To investigate these concerns we examine the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption. The following broad findings are established. (1) Population growth is a(an) tool(impediment) in(to) the fight against corruption in Low(Middle) income countries. (2) Democracy increases (decreases) corruption-control in Middle(Low) income countries. As a policy implication, blanket corruption-control strategies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different income-levels and political wills in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of corruption-control and income-bracket.
We present a simple model explaining corruption on geography and climate conditions. We test the model's validity in a cross-section of 115 countries. Controlling for all other corruption's determinants we find evidence supporting the model's predictions. Corruption increases with temperature and declines with precipitation and non-cultivatable land. Corruption also declines with per capita GDP, democracy, median age and British colonial heritage; and increases with natural resources, bureaucracy and communist past. Finally, corruption declines with the ratio of internet users to total population. This new finding is interpreted as capturing the beneficial interaction of economic development, human capital/education and independent news.
Using a large cross-country data set of developing and developed countries it is found that less fragmented municipal government structures are associated with more honest (less corrupt) behavior by government officials. The evidence is strongest for high-income countries. Corruption is measured various ways, including perceived corruption by citizens and experienced corruption by business managers. Fragmentation is defined as the average “size” of a municipality, measured alternatively in terms of geographic area or population served. A similar conclusion is drawn for other “bottom-tier” governmental units, at the same level as municipalities or one tier below, although the results are less strong statistically. Overall, these findings suggest that some caution should be exercised before adopting more fragmented local government structures as a strategy to promote good governance.
Data on the perceived levels of corruption from a cross-section of countries has been introduced fruitfully into recent empirical research. This chapter reviews studies on the consequences and causes of corruption. It includes research on the impact of corruption on investment, GDP, institutional quality, government expenditure, poverty, international flows of capital, goods and aid. Causes of corruption focus on absence of competition, policy distortions, political systems, public salaries as well as an examination of colonialism, gender and other cultural dimensions. --
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