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The Implicit Volition Model: The Unconscious Nature of Goal Pursuit

January 2014

In book: DUAL PROCESS THEORIES OF THE SOCIAL MIND (pp.400-422)
Chapter: 27
Publisher: Guilford
Editors: Jeffrey Sherman, Bertram Gawronski, Yaacov Trope

Authors:

Gordon B. Moskowitz

Lehigh University

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400

The set of “dual- process models” that

emerged from the 1970s through the 1990s

revolutionized the way we think about the

nature of consciousness and processing in

the mind that is unconscious. These mod-

els reinvigorated research on motivation in

order to better understand not merely what

motivates behavior but what motivates the

use of either systematic or heuristic thought

processes, as well as the transition from one

to the other during self- regulation. These

models of a motivated social cognition typi-

cally described a default processing system

that quickly makes sense of stimuli in a

fashion that relies on the mere triggering of

associations but one that can be modified by

a separate system where one may alter these

outputs through new processing, processing

that would allow one to initiate operations

that promote achieving some end. This regu-

lation of responding to serve the intentions

and goals of the individual is how control is

defined. Despite the utility of these models,

there are two issues that arise from research

inspired by this dual- process approach that

are the focus of analysis in this chapter

The first is that contrasting controlled

processes with automatic processes suggests

that there are some forms of social cognition

that are goal- directed and motivated (con-

trolled), and others that are not, that happen

too quickly for control to be deployed (e.g.,

Fazio, 1990). I argue here that this distinc-

tion, while a useful metaphorical device,

is likely a false dichotomy. It is true that

most dual- process models have described

these two types of processes in terms of a

continuum in which the endpoints reflect

absolute states, with most implicit process-

ing reflecting some degree of control. Bargh

(1990) distinguished between the purely

automatic process and the goal- dependent

automatic process, once again capturing the

idea that much of social cognition that hap-

pens outside awareness may still be moti-

vated. However, these distinctions do not go

far enough. All cognition is social (in that

it occurs within the norms, values, expec-

tations, and shared beliefs of the environ-

ment and culture in which it occurs), and

a defining aspect of social cognition is its

goal- directedness. Even low-level implicit

cognition, such as how and where to place

attention selectively, what from among a

complex stimulus array we perceive, how we

categorize, and the experience of the passage

of time are controlled by goals. It does not

make sense, beyond the metaphorical level,

to talk about controlled as opposed to other

types of cognitive processing. Cognitive pro-

cessing is a tool used to serve the needs of

the organism, and, therefore, is controlled.

This is linked to the second issue I analyze

in this chapter, that of consciousness and

C H A P T E R 2 7

The Implicit Volition Model

The Unconscious Nature of Goal Pursuit

Gordon B. Moskowitz

Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 400 1/2/2014 12:57:43 PM

The Implicit Volition Model 401

control. In the initial wave of dual- process

models, the distinction between a motivated/

goal- directed process and an automatic pro-

cess made sense, because control was defined

as borne of the conscious will and the

explicit desire to attain an end. The defin-

ing features of an automatic process (aside

from its inability to be controlled) were said

to be its efficiency and ability to be triggered

and run to completion without conscious

intent or awareness. This implied that con-

trol had to be defined as requiring aware-

ness, effort, and conscious intent. Control

meant either (1) explicitly using processing

to modify the outputs of an automatic pro-

cess so that goals were better attained (e.g.,

Devine, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Gil-

bert, 1989; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kübler,

& Wänke, 1993), or (2) consciously setting

desired ends and engaging operations for the

explicit purpose of delivering a desired state.

In each case monitoring and feedback pro-

cesses provide requisite information about

progress toward the goal that allows the

system to know whether to continue and at

what pace (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981).

In the intervening years, however, a grow-

ing line of research on unconscious goals

has rendered the “automatic– controlled”

distinction muddier. It is not merely that all

cognition is controlled, but that this is pos-

sible because control need not be defined as

conscious.

The conceptualization of control as not

being synonymous with effort, inefficiency,

and conscious contemplation of goals was

first discussed in earnest in work on mind-

sets and the phases of goal pursuit (e.g.,

Gollwitzer, 1990), the theory of lay epis-

temics (Kruglanski, 1990), Bargh’s (1990)

auto- motive model, and my own research in

graduate school on goal effects on implicit

inference (Moskowitz, 1993; Uleman &

Moskowitz, 1994) and priming effects

(Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz, Chai-

ken, & Bargh, 1994). Yet it must be rec-

ognized that much of the classic theorizing

on human goal pursuit (e.g., Lewin, 1936;

Zeigarnik, 1927) and animal goal pursuit

(Tolman, 1932) had long ago conceptualized

goal pursuit as not requiring consciousness.1

Other classic approaches between the 1930s

and the implicit goal “revival” of the 1990s

were merely agnostic on the issue, with mod-

els that focused on conscious goals, but that

were amenable to the notion of unconscious

goals, had one thought to introduce them

(e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Carver & Scheier,

1981). Having consciousness does not mean

humans lack the ability to process without

it, and this key point took some time to be

rediscovered when it comes to issues relating

to control.

While synthesizing decades of research

on implicit versus explicit cognition, dual-

process models have fallen short in synthe-

sizing research on implicit versus explicit

volition. Even modern models have not

fully integrated this conceptualization of

control. For example, Payne (2006) pro-

posed a process dissociation model to

explain stereotype- based biases that persist

in responding even when one intends to be

unbiased. Payne argued that dual- process

theories such as that introduced by Payne,

Lambert, and Jacoby (2002) “attempt to

explain when, how, and why behavior is

driven by automatic versus intentionally

controlled aspects of thought. . . . [We] have

proposed a particular dual- process theory

to account for both intentional control over

decisions and the patterns of unintended

bias seen in snap judgments” (p. 288). Payne

posited that faces of black men trigger auto-

matic associations (semantic and emotional)

that dictate responding when controlled

processing fails. A “weapons task” was used

to examine whether control fails or succeeds

(and what default processing occurs when it

fails). In this task, faces of black or white men

preceded an image of either a weapon or a

tool, and participants needed to identify the

object as a weapon or tool. Results showed

that with ample time participants were accu-

rate (but still faster to decide “weapon” when

they had seen a black man’s face). However,

when pressured for time, participants could

not implement control via the “required”

effort, and control failed: Participants were

more likely to report seeing a weapon when

any image was preceded by a black face.

Payne concluded that activation of weapons

when participants saw black faces was auto-

matic. Control is relegated to a conscious/

effortful process in which the prevention

of the expression of those stereotypes may

occur. The bias even emerges when people

are instructed not to stereotype, strength-

ening Payne’s conclusion that activation of

a stereotype is more efficient than control:

Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 401 1/2/2014 12:57:43 PM

402 HA B I TS, G OAL S , A N D MOT I V ATI O N

“In this and other studies, the weapon bias

seems largely independent of intent. This is

important because it means that the bias can

coexist with conscious intentions to be fair

and unbiased” (p. 288). While it is true that

they can coexist, the implication that this

makes the bias uncontrollable is not true.

A striking majority of modern dual-

process accounts have yet to acknowledge

the unconscious role of goals. For example,

in the domain of prejudice, Mahzarin Ban-

aji, a developer of the Implicit Association

Test (IAT), noted on the television show The

Cycle (February 14, 2013) how we can view

the control of prejudice: “Some of us have

used the power of our conscious minds to

tell ourselves that information simply is not

correct, whereas others have not. . . . And

that’s really the difference.” The association

of bias with a group cannot be controlled,

according to this account, but behavior can

under the appropriate conditions be predi-

cated on awareness of the bias and the con-

scious motivation to rectify (overturn) the

bias.

This failure to incorporate a role for

implicit goals in control over implicit cogni-

tion, such as the activation of stereotypes or

the implicit association of negative affect to

a group, has implications not only for theory

but also for how policymakers and practi-

tioners approach the control of unwanted

bias. For example, Devine, Forscher, Austin,

and Cox (2012) developed a bias reduction

training program for medical practitioners

based on the following logic: “When they

believe they have acted with bias, people

who endorse values opposed to prejudice

are motivated to inhibit the expression of

implicit bias by seeking out information

and putting effort into tasks they believe

would help them break the prejudice habit”

(p. 1268). The intervention draws from dual-

process model notions of control, aimed at

training people to develop new conscious

responses when faced with awareness of

a bad habit (implicit bias). Such a strategy

based on effort can be effective, but fails to

acknowledge the complementary role for

goals that do not require effort.

An example of a model that has altered/

modernized its conception of control is

Sherman’s (2006) quadruple- process model.

This model identifies many types of auto-

matic and controlled processes that can be

summarized as falling within four general

categories of processes— two classes of auto-

matic and two classes of control processes.

The first class of control is what Sher-

man called regulation, or overturning bias

(OB), processes in which one is attempting

to inhibit or overturn unwanted informa-

tion that one has detected in one’s response

(e.g., the presence of a stereotype, or any

unwanted thought). The second type of con-

trol is what Sherman called discrimination

or detection processes, in which the person

exerts consciousness and effort to analyze

stimulus items in the service of a goal to get

accurate information (to determine the qual-

ity of a persuasive message, the attributes

of a person, etc.). Whether the role of con-

sciousness and effort in control is necessary

is challenged by Sherman’s model. Though

not the central purpose of that model, it has

the flexibility to incorporate unconscious

control by offering a processing model “that

does not treat automaticity/control as the

central or defining distinction among pro-

cesses. Instead, the particular nature of the

process is the key question (i.e., What does

the process do?) and the automatic versus

controlled nature of the process is only one

important feature of the process” (p. 181).

Calanchini and Sherman (2013) recently

reiterated this stance:

The operation of Detection [D] and Overcom-

ing Bias [OB] demands a more nuanced por-

trayal of automaticity and control because D

and OB possess features of both. For example,

though it is clear that their operation can be

disrupted, it also is clear that they are suffi-

ciently efficient to influence responses during

the performance of implicit tasks. This sug-

gests two important points. First, researchers

should resist the temptation to describe pro-

cesses as either automatic or controlled. . . .

Second, we need to broaden the range of pro-

cesses that may be characterized as automatic.

However, a fully explicated account of how

implicit volition is integrated into the model

has yet to be developed. For all the emerging

evidence supporting dissociating the four

processes of the quadruple- process model

(e.g., Calanchini & Sherman, 2013), none

has yet focused on unconscious goals.

Most approaches to control fall squarely

into what Sherman (2006) called an OB

response, yet do not offer the flexibility of

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The Implicit Volition Model 403

Sherman’s model for conceptualizing OB as

an implicit process. And because they are

contingent on conscious awareness of a bias-

ing influence, they circumvent the possibil-

ity of unconscious control. While stages of

the control process may be automated, they

describe the enterprise of control as con-

tingent upon the existence of (1) awareness

of bias, (2) explicit motivation to counter-

act that bias, (3) the possession of a theory

regarding how to counteract the bias accu-

rately, (4) the ability (cognitive resources)

to deploy a strategy to counteract the bias,

and (5) lack of disruption from concomitant

mental operations. Indeed, this set of con-

tingencies describes not only how people

may regulate the goal of being nonbiased

but also a more general form of explicit self-

regulation that can apply to the pursuit of

any goal. This is why rather than use the

term overturning bias, the implicit volition

model (IVM) describes such control pro-

cesses as reactive control.

Reactive control is initiated as a reaction

to an existing state in which a shortcoming,

or relative failure, in the pursuit of a desired

end is detected (e.g., a goal not being met, a

bias in one’s responding). Importantly, the

IVM further stipulates that these processing

stages in reactive control that compensate

for or counteract a failure or a shortcoming

in attaining a desired goal do not need to

be conscious. The bias or shortcoming can

be implicitly triggered, as can the motiva-

tion to counteract the bias, as well as theo-

ries about the operations that need be initi-

ated to achieve the goal and the operations

themselves. Stating that the processes in

reactive control need not be conscious does

not in any way undermine the value of reac-

tive approaches to control that are rooted in

consciousness. It simply highlights that such

approaches are limited, constrained by the

assumption that control cannot be implicit.

Reactive control is only complemented and

extended by allowing for implicit goals.

The allowance for implicit goals does not

merely extend how we understand reactive

control. It also highlights a second set of

control processes that can be contrasted to

reactive control—proactive control. Rather

than seeing control as a reaction to feedback,

Sherman (2006) described “discrimination”

or “detection” processes as a set of control

processes that directs how stimulus infor-

mation is analyzed when a goal has been

adopted (e.g., a goal to get accurate informa-

tion leading to closer attention to individuat-

ing information about a person). This reflects

a classic goal- setting approach to control, in

which goal pursuit is set in motion by the

selection of a desired state (through delib-

eration among possible choices and evalua-

tion of inputs, e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981;

Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Goll-

witzer, 1990) rather than as a counteractive

response to negative feedback. The IVM

refers to such processes as proactive control,

or control that involves triggering a goal

that then directs cognition and behavior in

the service of goal attainment. Again, such

control can be wholly implicit— one need

not be aware of either the desired state or of

the processes engaged to move toward goal

attainment (the host of mental operations

initiated relating to the implementation and

strategies for pursuing the goal). For exam-

ple, in the Stroop task we see a controlled

process of naming a color interfered with by

a so- called “automatic process” of reading

words and inferring the meaning in those

words. But the latter process is no less con-

trolled than the former process. We simply

fail to recognize the goal that directs the lat-

ter process. Though participants performing

a Stroop task are explicitly asked to pursue

the goal of naming colors, they also bring

with them their habitual goal of distilling

meaning from words This latter goal has

receded into the background and operates

implicitly, but this does not make its pursuit

and influence any less controlled.

To illustrate the distinction between reac-

tive and proactive control let us return to the

example of an unwanted thought associated

with a group, such as a prejudice or a stereo-

type. Models that focus on reactive control

(1) assume that control occurs to compen-

sate for bias, and that such bias is introduced

by the typical operations of the mind that

trigger stereotypes outside of awareness,

without conscious intent, even among low-

prejudice people, and (2) implicate aware-

ness of bias as necessary to engage the coun-

teractive steps deemed necessary for control.

While this is a useful procedure for reducing

bias, anything other than this reactive path

to control will be ignored by a model pos-

iting that control over implicit stereotypes

and prejudices must be more effortful than

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404 HA B I TS, G OAL S , A N D MOT I V ATI O N

the implicit processes that trigger them (and

such assumptions define most dual process

models). This discounts the viability of pro-

active control, because the processes that

give rise to stereotyping and prejudice would

be beyond the reach of such control, leaving

only modification of these outputs of auto-

matic processing as a viable control strategy.

The IVM proposes that not only is the

reactive approach not limited to conscious

control attempts, but also that the implica-

tion of implicit control opens the door to

proactive control of these biases. There is

no reason to assume that to prevent stereo-

typed responses is more effortful than the

processes that trigger them. For example,

when goals are accessible that are antitheti-

cal with stereotyping they proactively initi-

ate implicit processes associated with those

goals that promote goal attainment. This

includes processes that dictate how the per-

son is categorized and whether stereotypes

are activated or inhibited (Moskowitz, Goll-

witzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Moskowitz

& Li, 2011). The cognitive processes trig-

gered in response to any given target vary

from situation to situation as one’s goals

in the situation dictate. And one’s goals

need not dictate stereotypes being retrieved

from memory, despite the ease with which

this may occur when pursuing some types

of goals. A thought experiment, though

extreme, illustrates the point. Imagine a

white American injured in a terrorist attack,

who is bloodied and worrying about ampu-

tation, when a black man emerges from the

crowd and says, “Relax, I’m a doctor. I can

help you.” Will cultural stereotypes of black

people be activated? A model of implicit,

proactive control argues that they will not,

because one’s goals lead not to the recruit-

ment of those associations but to associa-

tions related to a different category (doc-

tor), inhibiting interfering associations and

inferences. From this perspective, proactive

stereotype control is more than preventing

a stereotype’s activation. Such activation is

itself serving a goal (e.g., to understand what

a person is like and likely to do, to make pre-

dictions, to feel power, to enable feelings of

ingroup superiority, etc.). It is just that the

goal is not visible.

There is no need to describe either pro-

active or reactive control as limited to con-

sciousness, or to describe one as more auto-

matic than the other (though many people

find reactive control more intuitively obvi-

ous as a conscious reaction). The implicit

operation of these forms of control may even

provide a more efficient way to achieve a

goal (e.g., not stereotyping) than explicitly

pursuing the goal (e.g., when explicitly try-

ing not to stereotype leads one ultimately

to rely on stereotypes more). As Bargh and

Huang (2009) argued, consciousness in goal

pursuit captures only a small piece of what

the goal system controls and how it exerts

control. Much of what we think of as auto-

matic is controllable, and much of what we

think of as controlled is regulated outside

conscious awareness in a manner that once

would have been called “automatic” (Bargh,

1990; Custers & Aarts, 2010; Gollwitzer &

Moskowitz, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2002).

VOLITION NEEDS NO INFERENCES:

THE 13 POSTULATES

OF THE IMPLICIT VOLITION MODEL

The Sovereignty of the Implicit

Goal System

Definitions of control as requiring aware-

ness, consciousness, and effort are so prev-

alent that it led Wegner and Bargh (1998,

p. 453) to state: “the term ‘unconscious con-

trol’ doesn’t seem right at all.” My purpose

in this chapter is to extend the definition of

control; to highlight that the automatic–

controlled dichotomy is limited because

control may lack the features of conscious-

ness, effort, and awareness. It may be habit-

ual, triggered through associations, in the

way that automatic processes are typically

defined. Ostrom (1984) famously declared

the sovereignty of social cognition, herald-

ing the arrival of a distinct field of inquiry

that laid waste to the need to distinguish

between social and nonsocial cognition.

While undeniable that social and nonso-

cial objects have different properties (e.g.,

a rock cannot be motivated to cause harm,

nor does it change across situations) that

lead us to think about them differently, our

thoughts regarding each are, nonetheless,

social in nature. Ostrom (p. 3) proclaimed

that “all knowledge is social knowledge,

and all social knowledge derives from action

on the environment.” Ostrom’s reasoning is

extended here in a way that I hope does not

Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 404 1/2/2014 12:57:43 PM

The Implicit Volition Model 405

alter his meaning: Action on the environ-

ment is always in the service of the goals of

the organism within that environment.

That is, what makes cognition social is

not merely that the content of one’s process-

ing may be people, but that the stimulus—

whether person or object— must be acted

and reacted toward, and that this reaction

occurs in the service of the goals of the

person in relation to that stimulus within

a social environment (its norms, culture,

opportunities, threats) at that point in time.

What makes social cognition sovereign is

the social nature of all cognition, and what

makes it social is the motivated nature of

all cognition— any commerce with the envi-

ronment introduces needs, motives, values,

and goals that are the guiding force of any

response. Cognition is a tool servicing the

needs, intentions, and goals of the organism

accessible at that moment; it occurs in the

context of the goals of the organism in that

setting.

This point has its opponents. For example,

Bargh (1989, 1990) has argued for classify-

ing social cognition into its goal- dependent

and goal- independent forms. Bargh pro-

vides examples of preconscious automatic-

ity and postconscious automaticity, which

are meant to reflect the types of process-

ing that are independent of goals (indeed,

the only events on which such processing

is said to be contingent is the presence of

a triggering stimulus and the allocation of

attentional resources, so that these stimuli

can be detected and processed by the sen-

sory apparatus). The primary examples pro-

vided are those of social construct activa-

tion and evaluation extraction. Yet research

on implicit goals has led to a reframing of

such phenomena. Construct accessibility

is now discussed as being motivated and

understood only in a goal system (Eitam &

Higgins, 2010). Implicitly associating affect

with categories is also now conceived to be

a controlled phenomenon (e.g., Dasgupta &

Greenwald, 2001; Glaser & Knowles, 2008)

and as occurring because automatic attitude

activation helps organisms pursue survival

goals by providing fast feedback, allow-

ing them to avoid that which is harmful

and approach that which is beneficial (e.g.,

Chen & Bargh, 1999; Eder & Rothermund,

2008). And even the allocation of attention

is controlled (e.g., Moskowitz, 2002).

These developments have led some to

argue that much of conscious control is an

epiphenomenon, something experienced

to deliver a feeling of agency (e.g., van der

Weiden, Aarts, & Ruys, in press; Wegner

& Wheatley, 1999). Huang and Bargh (in

press) even argued that consciousness is an

exaptation of the unconscious. Drawing

from the animal literature, they conclude

that our evolutionarily earlier ancestors,

who lack consciousness in goal pursuit, pro-

vide an illustration that the development of

conscious goals occurs after the development

of unconscious goals. They argue that most

models have it backwards, and unconscious

goal pursuit is the evolutionarily older,

dominant, and more common form of goal

pursuit, with consciousness in goal pursuit

built upon—a scaffold to—older processing

structures.

However, I do not posit that the existence

of an implicit volition system that directs all

cognitive processing renders consciousness

as being uninvolved in control, or epiphe-

nomenal. Instead, I posit that implicit goals

have their genesis in the conscious intentions

and experiences of the individual. While it

is true that consciousness can be epiphe-

nomenal, the IVM is not contingent on a

belief that this is typically the case, or that

unconscious goals are more primary due

to processes of evolution that favor them.

Rather, the IVM argues that goal- directed

responding becomes automated over the

course of one’s lifetime, through learning,

deliberation, evaluation, and other forms

of conscious processing. The needs of the

organism specify what goals to pursue,

under which circumstances, and the specific

means to achieve those ends. Over time, the

choices made to promote needs satisfaction

that associate goals and contexts and means

become routine and automatically engaged,

as consciousness recedes from being neces-

sary for goal- directed responding. The role

of consciousness is often felt through its

impact on establishing associations formed

between cues, environments, people, means

of responding, and goals.

It was a watershed moment for psycholog-

ical science when Bargh (1990) reintroduced

these ideas in the “auto- motive” model and

amended existing models of human goal

pursuit by highlighting the question that had

been ignored: Why assume that one’s goals

Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 405 1/2/2014 12:57:43 PM

406 HA B I TS, G OAL S , A N D MOT I V ATI O N

in any moment arise from one’s conscious

selection of them? The IVM develops these

ideas by removing consciousness as the point

of focal interest in control and instead focus-

ing on the processes through which control

is implemented in both its reactive and pro-

active forms.

Postulate 1: Goals in Humans Are

Derived from Needs, Motives, and Values

A goal is a desired end state one has not

yet attained but is committed (to varying

degrees, as a function of its value and ones

efficacy) to approach or to avoid, with a

focus toward attaining the desired end in

the future. The “end” can range from the

concrete (“Do not think about white bears”)

to the abstract (“Maintain a rosy outlook”),

and the semantic meaning associated with

the end state (what it means to be “rosy”)

can change with the context. The most

dominant source of goals is needs (e.g., Deci

& Ryan, 1991; McClelland, 1985).2 Needs

were once defined as biological states of the

organism required to sustain life, but are

now accepted to include psychological states

that are essential for well-being and for

survival in the social world. A need speci-

fies classes of incentives, which comprise a

broad set of environmental opportunities

for action that can bring about desired out-

comes (a product of needs and the context).

Motives are broad classes of desires or pre-

ferred states that emerge from needs, a “ten-

dency to desire or be fearful of a specific type

of positive or negative experience in a par-

ticular life domain” (Elliot & Niesta, 2009,

p. 61). They develop early in life through

an infant’s experience with incentives and

become cognitively elaborated over time.

Motives provide the direction and energy for

action by linking desired end states within a

broad domain to incentives and the means

to pursue those incentives. Goals are lower

level yet within this hierarchy, and “are

viewed as the carriers or servants of higher-

order motivational propensities [that are]

. . . usually insufficiently precise to regulate

behavior effectively in that no specific stan-

dard or guideline for behavior is provided”

(Elliot & Niesta, p. 65). Research through-

out the 20th century informs us that that

those actions that are more instrumental for

attaining a goal are specified by opportuni-

ties for acquiring the incentives in the con-

text, and by one’s efficacy at pursuing those

opportunities (e.g., Bandura, 1989; Lewin,

1936; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). This

suggests that the specific goal selected at

any moment is tied to (1) its desirability

(value), which is specified by the goal’s asso-

ciation to the person’s respective need, and

(2) beliefs about how the goal can be real-

ized and whether it is feasible to expect goal

attainment.

Postulate 2: Goals Are

Cognitively Represented

Tolman (1932) posited that when, via expe-

rience, external cues in the environment

come to satisfy a given need of an animal,

this leads that organism to form an asso-

ciation between the need state and those

environmental cues. The cues come to have

value to the animal in terms of satisfying a

goal. This association among goals, values,

stimuli, and contexts was said to be “rep-

resented” (stored in memory) in the mind

of the perceiving organism so that it would

be triggered when the organism entered the

appropriate context, initiating the relevant

behavior that can deliver the value the stim-

ulus affords. Humans also develop goal rep-

resentations through associative experience.

Bargh (1990, p. 100) stated:

Goals and intents are represented in the mind

in the same fashion as are social constructs,

stereotypes, and schemas . . . goals and intents,

and the procedures . . . and plans . . . associated

with them, may become directly and automati-

cally linked in memory with representations of

environmental features to which they are fre-

quently and consistently associated.

Kruglanski (1996) elaborated on this con-

cept of goal representations by further posit-

ing them to have a hierarchical organization,

in which desired end states are superordi-

nate and processing routines and actions–

behavior routes (means) are low-order com-

ponents of the representation. This allows

the representation to be marked by equi-

finality, in which many means are linked

to one higher- order goal (e.g., Kruglanski,

Pierro, & Sheveland, 2011). It can also be

marked by multifinality (e.g., Kruglanski et

al., 2013) in which several high-order ends

Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 406 1/2/2014 12:57:44 PM

The Implicit Volition Model 407

are attained by the same means (killing two

birds with one stone).

A state of multifinality suggests one way

that people select an action from among the

many means they might enact (given a state

of equifinality); they select that which has

value for multiple goals, which proffers com-

pounded value. Evidence for a goal represen-

tation with such a multifinal configuration is

provided by showing that the value assigned

to multifinal means declines when a subset

of the goals served by the means is deacti-

vated and means lose their compounded

value (e.g., Chun, Kruglanski, Friedman, &

Sleeth- Keppler, 2011). Evidence for goal rep-

resentations is also provided by the transfer

of affect from superordinate to lower-order

elements of a representation (e.g., energiz-

ing means with the motivational properties

of the goal). Ferguson and Bargh (2004)

showed that the implicit evaluation of its

means is more positive when a goal is held

more strongly (see also, Fishbach, Shah, &

Kruglanski, 2004).

Postulate 3: Goals Representations Link

Ends to Multiple Means and Implicit

Processing Routines

Goal representations include not only an end

state, but associations to relevant means for

attaining the desired end. As an example,

Cacioppo, Priester, and Berntson (1993;

see also Chen & Bargh, 1999; Friedman &

Förster, 2002) had participants enact means

associated with approach and avoidance

goals. Arm flexion (pulling the arm toward

oneself) or extension (pushing it away from

oneself) was enacted during a word evalu-

ation task. They found that neutral words

were evaluated more positively during flex-

ion and negatively during extension. This

could only occur if means (flexion) were

associated with a goal (approach) and its

affect, and this affect then transferred to the

neutral object. Shah and Kruglanski (2003)

illustrated that merely thinking about means,

not enacting them, triggers goals associated

with those means, while Aarts and Dijkster-

huis (2000) showed that thinking about a

goal activates its means.

Cogntive processing routines that prepare

one for action are also part of a goal’s repre-

sentation, so the organism is tuned to detect

stimuli relevant to the goal and is precon-

sciously processing relevant information.

Gollwitzer (1990) made this point by focus-

ing on mindsets associated with distinct

phases of goal pursuit. For example, delib-

erative and implemental mindsets function

when goals are being selected versus pur-

sued. They affect thought production, recall

of task- relevant information, analysis of

desirability- related information, inferences

based on feasibility- related information, and

attention.

Processing styles are associated not only

with broad phases of goal pursuit but also

specific goal contents. Balcetis and Dun-

ning (2006) have shown that early stages of

visual processing are shaped by motives. Eye

movements governing the perception of an

ambiguous stimulus array were directed by

preferences, so that a desired interpretation

emerged as a result of implicit perceptual

processing. Balcetis, Dunning, and Granot

(2012) further showed that during binocular

rivalry (where ambiguity is created by expos-

ing each eye to different images), desires

determined which of two images was expe-

rienced. This extends research of Bruner and

colleagues (e.g., Bruner & Goodman, 1947;

Postman, Bruner, & McGinnies, 1948)

showing that values and needs control the

thresholds at which stimuli are perceived.

Many goal representations have been

shown to have associated cognitive process-

ing routines that facilitate goal attainment.

Examples include the following: A goal of

thought suppression has associated implicit

monitoring processes that provide feedback

regarding the absence– presence in the mind

of the unwanted thought (e.g., Galinsky &

Moskowitz, 2007; Macrae, Bodenhausen,

Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Wegner, 1994). A

goal of being egalitarian toward members

of a group leads to inhibition of stereotypes

associated with that group (e.g., Moskow-

itz et al., 1999; Moskowitz & Li, 2011)

and selective attention to cues related to the

group (Moskowitz, Li, Ignarri, & Stone,

2011; Moskowitz, 2002). A goal of being

creative leads to retrieval of remotely asso-

ciated knowledge (Ward, Finke, & Smith,

1995). A goal of approaching gains leads to

focusing concern on aspirations and accom-

plishments, and the strategic inclination to

approach matches to desired end states,

while a goal of avoiding risk leads to focus-

ing concern on protection/safety and the

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408 HA B I TS, G OAL S , A N D MOT I V ATI O N

strategic inclination to avoid mismatches to

desired goals (Higgins, 2009).

Postulate 4: Goal Representations Specify

Not Merely Means and Ends, but Value

Like vectors, goal representations are

marked by not only a direction in which

one is striving but also valence that marks

the affect associated with attaining the end

and its pursuit. The representation captures

anticipatory desire, a sense that reaching the

end state will have positive consequences.

Most models of goal pursuit implicate the

value of the goal state as a determining force

for commitment to a goal and whether a

goal is transformed into behavior (e.g., Fer-

guson, 2007), such that even infusing affect

(outside consciousness) to neutral seman-

tic knowledge transforms it to a goal (e.g.,

Custers, 2009; Custers & Aarts, 2005). And

decreasing positive affect associated with a

desired end state reduces the motivation to

pursue it (e.g., Aarts, Custers, & Holland,

2007; Winkielman, Berridge, & Willbarger,

2005).

Postulate 5: Goal Representations

Are Marked by Tension States Arising

from Discrepancies

A goal is a desired end state toward which

one is striving. Semantic knowledge of the

end state is not sufficient to label a represen-

tation as a goal, nor is valuing the end state.

Striving must also be represented, which is to

say that feedback regarding progress toward

the end state must indicate a shortcoming

or discrepancy between the valued end-

point and one’s current state (Lewin, 1936,

1951)—the desired end is not yet attained.

When monitoring– feedback reveal such a

discrepancy, an aversive tension arises that is

similar to the drive associated with a physi-

ological need. Lewin posited that goal dis-

crepancies also produce a tension that must

be reduced, providing motivational force

that persists until that tension is satisfied.

One is impelled to respond in goal- directed

ways to eliminate the tension.

This principle was reintroduced into mod-

ern theorizing about goals by Wicklund and

Gollwitzer (1982). They posit that when

shortcomings with respect to a goal pursuit

are encountered (discrepancy), one experi-

ences self- definitional incompleteness (ten-

sion). Tension will be greatest when an indi-

vidual is committed to a goal domain, when

it is self- defining. One manner in which peo-

ple compensate for the sense of incomplete-

ness surrounding a challenged identity is by

attempting to acquire alternative symbols of

success in the domain or new symbols sug-

gesting that one possesses positive qualities

linked to the goal.

In order to know when the discrepancy

has been reduced and the tension addressed,

to know whether to cease or to continue

responding, the processing system is engaged

in monitoring processes. Monitoring of

a goal pursuit provides two types of feed-

back regarding the discrepancy that informs

the system’s “decisions” (e.g., Jostmann &

Koole, 2009). The first type of feedback is

amount of progress toward a goal (Liber-

man & Dar, 2009). The second type is rate

of progress toward the goal that informs the

individual regarding matters of pace (Carver

& Scheier, 1998). Together, these steps of

monitoring, feedback, and operations aimed

at discrepancy reduction comprise a nega-

tive feedback loop (Carver & Scheier, 1981;

Miller et al., 1960) or closed- loop control

system (Powers, 1973) that persists until the

negative state has dissipated and the discrep-

ancy is eliminated (Martin & Tesser, 2009).

Postulate 6: Goal Activation– Selection

and Goal Pursuit– Implementation Need

Not Be Conscious

There is nothing in Postulates 1–5 that needs

to specify a role for consciousness in any

given goal pursuit. The goal, and its ends,

means, cognitive operations, affect, and dis-

crepancies, by virtue of being mentally repre-

sented, can be selected and pursed in a given

moment without requiring consciousness,

just as with any other mental representation.

Rather, what is specified in these postulates

is a distinction being drawn between pro-

cesses involved in the setting, selection, trig-

gering, creating, and accessibility of a goal

versus processes involved in the implementa-

tion, pursuing, monitoring, and attainment

of a goal. This parallels the more general

case of mental representation activation, in

which a distinction is drawn between a con-

Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 408 1/2/2014 12:57:44 PM

The Implicit Volition Model 409

struct’s activation and its application (where

the activated construct guides responding;

e.g., Devine, 1989; Gilbert, 1989; Strack et

al., 1993). Each can proceed without con-

sciousness.

Goal activation can be called unconscious

if it meets one of two criteria: (1) The stim-

ulus activating the goal is not consciously

detected (e.g., subliminal presentation) or

(2) one’s state of goal activation is not con-

sciously noticed, even if at some point either

the goal- relevant stimuli or the goal itself

had been consciously detected. Chartrand

and Bargh (1996) illustrated these criteria in

two seminal experiments. In the first, goals

were primed by subliminal exposure to goal-

relevant words; in the second, by conscious

exposure to the words as part of a “scram-

bled sentence task” (a set of words in jum-

bled order had to be arranged in a fashion

that produced a coherent sentence). In each

case the unconscious triggering of the goal

yielded the same mental operations as when

the goal in question had been consciously

introduced.

Goal pursuit can be implicit when the

processes serving the goal (1) are not con-

sciously initiated or detected, or (2) they

are consciously initiated but the connection

between the response and the goal is not

detected. Examples of the former, in which

people engage in responses without knowing,

are revealed using a host of tasks, such as eye

tracking (e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 2006),

mouse trajectories (e.g., Freeman, Dale, &

Farmer, 2011; Packer, Miners, Ungson, and

Okten (in preparation), and reaction time

measures (e.g., facilitating response times to

a goal- relevant target when it is the focus of

attention, and reducing response times to a

focal target when it is not) are used to reveal

selective attention (e.g., Custers & Aarts,

2007; Gollwitzer, 1993; Moskowitz, 2002;

Shah, 2003). For example, Trawalter, Todd,

Baird, and Richeson (2008) showed that

white participants who had avoidance goals

related to black people (due to feelings of

threat) selectively directed attention towards

black faces, even though the faces were pre-

sented for only 30 milliseconds, too brief a

time to direct attention consciously to a face.3

Four general categories of goal pursuits

emerge when crossing the dimension of pres-

ence versus absence of consciousness with

the dimension of goal activation– setting ver-

sus goal pursuit– implementation. The first

category is the consciously primed goal that

has conscious operations (which has been

the target of much of the history of research

on goals). The second is the unconsciously

primed goal that has unconscious operations

(e.g., in the Stroop task in which goals to dis-

till meaning lead to the reading of words to

be the dominant response rather than color-

naming). The third is the consciously primed

goal with unconscious operations (e.g., when

conscious attempts at thought suppression

yield implicit monitoring processes). The

fourth category is unconsciously primed

goals with conscious operations (e.g., when

conscious flexion is influenced by implicit

approach goals). Of course, any given goal

pursuit can have a mixture of conscious and

unconscious operations, as well as any oper-

ation being able to serve multiple conscious

and unconscious goals that are activated

simultaneously.

Postulate 7: Goal Representations Vary

in Their State of Accessibility (and Can

Be Primed)

As stipulated in Postulate 6, because goals

are representations, conscious deliberation

about what goal to pursue is not neces-

sary. A goal can be passively primed (attain

a state of readiness by being accessible in

working memory) either through internal

mental operations or external cues associ-

ated with the goal (features of the environ-

ment) that serve to trigger the goal. Bargh

(1990, p. 100) stated:

The mechanism proposed here by which the

social environment may control judgments,

decisions, and behavior is the formation of

direct and automatic mental links between

representations of motives and goals in mem-

ory (and consequently the goals and plans

associated with them) and the representations

of the social situations in which those motives

have been frequently pursued in the past. The

result of this automatic associative link is that

the motive– goal–plan structure becomes acti-

vated whenever the relevant triggering situa-

tional features are present in the environment.

Goal priming, as a subtype of construct

priming more generally, is governed by the

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410 HA B I TS, G OAL S , A N D MOT I V ATI O N

principles of activation and inhibition that

apply to other representations, such as ste-

reotypes, categories, and attitudes. The

probability that goal representations are

“activated directly by environmental infor-

mation is a joint function of their applicabil-

ity to the information and their accessibil-

ity in memory” (Bargh, p. 100).4 To review

illustrations of goal priming the literature

is next divided according to ways goals are

primed.

The Unconscious Triggering of a Goal

by an Undetected Stimulus

Goals are unconsciously primed by sublimi-

nal exposure to words linked to the goal

(e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), but this

is not the only way. Since significant others

are associated with specific goals, sublimi-

nal exposure to those significant others can

prime the goal (e.g., Fitzsimons & Bargh,

2003; Shah, 2003). And not all implicit

primes are in the external environment. It

is possible to prime a goal from one’s men-

tal activity. For example, observing others’

behavior leads one to infer the goals of those

others, often without awareness that infer-

ences have been made and, implicitly prim-

ing that goal (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin,

2004).

The Unconscious Triggering of a Goal

by Consciously Detected Stimuli

Similar to the scrambled sentence task of

Chartrand and Bargh (1996), Bargh, Goll-

witzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, and Trötschel

(2001) triggered a goal in participants

unconsciously by having them work con-

sciously on word search puzzles containing

goal- relevant words. Aarts and Dijksterhuis

(2003) used a picture of an environment

to increase accessibility of goals associ-

ated with that environment. Williams and

Bargh (2008) showed that physical sensa-

tions associated with an object trigger goals

with which those sensations are metaphori-

cally linked. Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, and Ross

(2004) showed that goals may be primed

by objects in the room. And people with

whom we interact trigger goals linked with

those people (e.g., Moskowitz et al., 2011;

Richeson & Shelton, 2007; Trawalter et al.,

2008).

Consciously Selected Goals That Implicitly

Retain Accessibility

A goal consciously selected at one point in

time can retain its accessibility in later con-

texts in which the individual lacks aware-

ness that the goal is now accessible. This can

be illustrated when one believes that he or

she has disengaged from a goal. This type

of priming is seen in the research of Dijk-

sterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, and Van Barren

(2006), in which problem- solving goals were

consciously relinquished prior to resolving

the problem. Goal accessibility was shown

to linger by participants continuing to work

on the problem unconsciously. Research

on implementation intentions (specifying

if–then plans that link cues to responses)

is another example (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1993;

Parks-Stamm & Gollwitzer, 2009). Con-

sciousness is needed to form an intention but

not to trigger a plan. The mere presence of a

cue specified by the plan implicitly initiates

the response.

Goals That Attain Heightened Accessibility

from Discrepancy Detection

Discrepancies can be primed (e.g., Custers &

Aarts, 2007) as well as consciously detected

(either by external agents giving feedback

or by one’s monitoring processes). Even if

consciously detected, the discrepancy can

ultimately recede into the unconscious if

responses are made at a later point in time,

when one is not aware of its lingering accessi-

bility. This occurs not only when a response

is temporally distanced from discrepancy

detection but also when the response bears

no surface resemblance to the goal and does

not seem relevant to it (e.g., Koole, Smeets,

van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999;

Gollwitzer, Wicklund, & Hilton, 1982;

Monteith, Ashburn- Nardo, Voils, & Czopp,

2002; Moskowitz, 2002).

Chronic Goals

Bargh (1990) provided an extensive review

of goals that, through consistent and habit-

ual pursuit, acquire a chronic state of height-

ened accessibility that persists across a vari-

ety of contexts. These goals are associated

with individuals’ long- standing interests and

are highly relevant to their most cherished

Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 410 1/2/2014 12:57:44 PM

The Implicit Volition Model 411

values and motives (e.g., Moskowitz, 1993,

2002; Moskowitz et al., 1999).

Consciously Selected Goals That Explicitly

Retain Accessibility

This category of goal priming occurs when

one’s goals attain heightened accessibility by

being consciously selected, with conscious

focus on the goal and its relevance to one’s

behavior both being maintained throughout

goal pursuit.

Postulate 8: Goals Are Regulated

by Compensatory Responses That Include

Implicit Cognition

Wegner and Pennebaker (1993) provide

a framework in which control of mind is

combined under the same umbrella as con-

trol of behavior. Just as a goal discrepancy

triggers tension and goal- relevant behav-

ioral responses, so too does it trigger goal-

relevant mental operations. Cognition initi-

ated in self- regulation, whether in the form

of reactive or proactive control, is compen-

satory in that it exists to counteract the ten-

sion arising from a discrepancy between a

current and a desired state. Automating such

responses facilitates goal attainment by pro-

viding greater efficiency for initiation and

regulation of a goal pursuit. It allows for

(1) heightened readiness to attend to, detect,

and respond to stimuli; (2) the retrieval and

inhibition of semantic knowledge; and (3)

activation of compatible and inhibition of

incompatible goals (a horizontal communi-

cation among goals called goal shielding;

Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002).

Three examples illustrate the compensa-

tory nature of even extremely low-level cog-

nitive functioning. First, Van Bavel, Packer,

and Cunningham (2011) examined a variant

of “own-race bias.” Rather than study pref-

erential recall for members of one’s racial

group, they examined biased processing of

people with whom one shared a randomly

assigned group membership. They proposed

that motivation to process members of one’s

own (nonracial) group preferentially would

be reflected by implicit modulation at even

low-level stages of face processing. Since

facial recognition processes originate within

100–200 milliseconds of stimulus onset

in an area of the fusiform gyrus called the

fusiform face area (FFA), they used func-

tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)

to assess how FFA activity was impacted by

faces made motivationally relevant through

participants’ assignment to a randomly

determined ingroup. The results showed

greater FFA activity for these goal- relevant

faces. The goal of preferential processing of

ingroup members triggered compensatory

control processes of face perception in the

FFA.

Examples of goal shielding provide a sec-

ond illustration of the implicit nature of com-

pensatory cognition. Shah (2003) primed

two goals: a consciously set analytic reason-

ing goal and an unconsciously primed cre-

ativity goal (via subliminal presentation of a

picture of a significant other who valued the

participant’s creativity). For some partici-

pants, the conscious and unconscious goals

were compatible; for others, the goals were

irrelevant to each other. After being primed,

participants performed a reasoning task.

Goal shielding is observed in the form of

response facilitation when the two goals are

compatible. Priming with a compatible goal

(creativity) initiated implicit operations that

pulled the participant’s attention toward and

promoted reasoning goals. Aarts et al. (2007)

illustrated goal shielding among incompat-

ible goals in which we see inhibition rather

than facilitation. Inhibitory processes ward

off distractions and keep progress to a focal

goal on track. Finally, goal shielding has also

been shown to be a compensatory process

when the obstacles to a goal serve to trigger

heightened commitment to and accessibility

of that goal. For example, Fishbach, Fried-

man, and Kruglanski (2003) had participants

perform a task that exposed them to words

related to a temptation (e.g., cake) to one of

their goals (e.g., diet). This was followed by a

task that assessed the ease of thinking about

the goal compared to control items. After the

temptation, thoughts of the goal were more

prevalent. Temptation triggers a functional

response when encountered: Relevant goals

and means are brought to mind to counteract

the temptation, what Fishbach et al. called

counteractive control. This allows a tempta-

tion, ironically, to serve as a cue to avoid dis-

tractions and obstacles, and enhances stay-

ing on track in goal pursuit.

Finally, the direction of attention to goal-

relevant stimuli illustrates yet a third implicit

Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 411 1/2/2014 12:57:44 PM

412 HA B I TS, G OAL S , A N D MOT I V ATI O N

compensatory cognitive operation. Moskow-

itz (2002) gave participants the explicit goal

of identifying the direction (up or down) in

which a target item moved, while ignoring

a distracting second target that moved in a

different direction (left to right). Half of the

participants also held an implicit egalitarian

goal. Importantly, the targets in this task

were actually words that moved too quickly

to be identified as such, words that some-

times were relevant to egalitarian goals. The

results showed that attention was distracted

toward targets that were to be ignored, but

only if one had an egalitarian goal, and only

if the target was a goal- relevant word. Mos-

kowitz et al. (2011) conceptually replicated

this point using people as the goal- relevant

targets. Participants were shown an array

of four images of men and asked to iden-

tify (via a button press) which of them was

wearing a bow tie. The correct response was

always a white man in a bow tie, yet the

array at times contained an image of a black

man as one of the three nonfocal items. Par-

ticipants once again showed displaced atten-

tion at speeds too fast for conscious control,

but only if two conditions were met: (1) The

array had to contain a black man’s face, and

(2) the participant had to have been primed

previously with a goal of being egalitarian

to black men.

Postulate 9: Goal Attainment Reduces

Goal Accessibility

Once a goal is attained, the means and incen-

tives that serve that goal are divested of their

motivational force. This does not mean that

the end state no longer has value. It merely

means that striving to attain that state, enact-

ing means to approach the value linked to the

state, is not of use at that time and in that

context. A goal requires both a discrepancy

between a current state and an end state,

and value being attached to that end state.

If one values a state but there is no discrep-

ancy between one’s current state and that

desired state, one does not have a goal. This

is why one will persist at responding until a

discrepancy is reduced and tension is allevi-

ated (see Martin & Tesser, 2009). Evidence

for this “persistence until” logic is provided

by showing that so long as a discrepancy

exists, one displays classic characteristics

of motivated behavior, such as persistence

in the face of obstacles and resumption of a

disrupted task. But these characteristics are

not seen when feedback signaling significant

progress toward the goal is provided by the

system’s monitoring processes (e.g., Cesario,

Plaks, & Higgins, 2006; Förster, Liberman,

& Higgins, 2005; Koole et al., 1999; Liber-

man & Förster, 2000).

For example, Moskowitz et al. (2011,

discussed earlier) found that the attention

of white participants who held egalitarian

goals was distracted to faces of black men.

However, they also found that this act of

compensatory cognition only persisted as

long as the goal was not yet attained. When

people who held egalitarian goals next

wrote essays about success at being egalitar-

ian, their attention was no longer diverted

from the focal task. The essay afforded them

a chance to compensate for their failure at

being egalitarian, thus bringing implicit

compensatory control (selective attention) to

a halt. Moskowitz and Li (2011) also illus-

trated this principle, but using stereotype

inhibition as the compensatory response

that is halted.

Postulate 10: Goals Are Nested Within

Goal Systems That Allow for Rotation

among Goals

Kruglanski et al. (2002) described goals as

embedded in a system of many horizontally

linked goals that impact one another, with

systemwide coordination among compatible

and opposing forces. Goal systems there-

fore raise issues of how to determine what

goal to select in any moment, and which,

from among many possible means, to select

to pursue that goal. Goals linked in a sys-

tem can promote one another, and move-

ment toward one can facilitate standing on

another, but they can compete as well, and

movement toward one goal may require

inhibiting another. Which goal is selected

in a given moment, when people rotate from

one goal to another, and when one disen-

gages from a goal comprises a complex set

of issues that is beyond the scope of a com-

plete review here. However, factors that are

important to these issues are strength of

commitment to the goal, opportunities that

afford one a means to attain the goal, and

the instrumental value those means possess.

These can vary from moment to moment.

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The Implicit Volition Model 413

For example the value of the goal is

impacted by one’s history of goal pursuit

within the context. Baumeister, Vohs, and

Tice (2007) argued that successful goal regu-

lation has a positively reinforcing impact on

the value associated with the goal, increasing

its desirability and strengthening its affec-

tive component, increasing the likelihood

that the goal will again be set as the desired

criterion. Commitment to a goal is impacted

by a variety of factors, one of which is the

number of equifinal means associated with

the goal. Kruglanski et al. (2011) showed

that while having many means linked to

a goal decreases the commitment to any

given means, it increases commitment to the

goal (impacting subjective probability, the

expectancy, that the goal can be achieved).

Brehm and Self (1989) describe commitment

as being determined by factors such as the

strength of the need that yielded the goal

and the incentive value of the task.

Finally, because goals are hierarchically

linked to superordinate goals, motives, and

needs, it is possible that pursuit of one goal

within the system can contradict or conflict

with a superordinate goal. The goal of feel-

ing comforted may lead one to eat a cupcake

despite this conflicting with a long term

and superordinate goal of being healthy and

eating well. As opportunities afford one

chances to pursue a goal, and as the value of

a goal waxes and wanes, we may see behav-

ior that appears inconsistent. But apparent

inconsistency may merely reflect rotation

among goals as contexts and opportunities

dictate.

Postulate 11: Goal Pursuit Is Limited

by Resources

Goals are in competition for shared but

limited resources (e.g., Vohs, Kaikati, Kerk-

hof, & Schmeichel, 2009). Any goal pursuit

depletes this resource to a degree and can

result in the resource pool being usurped.

This results in a state called ego depletion,

marked by a temporary loss of self- control.

Ego depletion is not limited to the domain

responsible for depletion; it represents gen-

eral loss of ability to engage in executive

functioning (e.g., Richeson & Trawalter,

2005; Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004) and

control (e.g., Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco,

2005). Because ego depletion is a temporary

state, regulatory ability returns after rest

or other interventions. These resources can

be bolstered with training. Gailliot, Plant,

Butz, and Baumeister (2007) showed that

practice at regulation makes one resistant to

ego depletion. The biological basis for deple-

tion and replenishing of the resource pool is

not yet well understood (e.g., Molden et al.,

2012).

Postulate 12: Implicit Control Involves

Both Facilitation and Inhibition

The IVM incorporates the logic of goal

shielding— that pursuit of a goal involves

processes that not only facilitate attain-

ment of a desired end, but also inhibit

goals, temptations, and means that would

serve as obstacles to attainment of that end.

This makes possible an assortment of con-

trol strategies that previously had not been

deemed possible according to dual- process

theories. In a view of control that is largely

conscious and reactive, the role of control

is to overcome or counteract the effects of

an implicit cognitive process that has been

brought to one’s awareness as a potential

source of bias. The conscious efforts at cor-

rection that ensue represent an important

method to regulate behavior and cognition.

But this approach blinds us to seeing goals

as more than mere conscious tools to deploy

after we become aware of a problem to be

counteracted. Control, if proactive, can pre-

vent an unwanted (biasing) response from

ever being produced. Implicit forms of pro-

active control initiate not only goal- relevant

processing that circumvents the triggering

of the unwanted response but also cogni-

tive activity that inhibits undesired outputs.

Concrete examples of such processes are

seen in research on stereotype control.

In my own laboratory (e.g., Galinsky &

Moskowitz, 2000; 2007; Moskowitz et al.,

1999, 2011; Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor,

2000; Moskowitz & Li, 2011; Moskowitz

& Stone, 2012; Sassenberg & Moskowitz,

2005), we have found behavioral evidence

for the interplay of facilitative and inhibitory

processes in proactive stereotype control,

both with chronic goals and goals primed

in the situation. While it is well established

that stereotypes are associated with groups,

and that thinking about the group often

activates such stereotypes outside awareness

Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 413 1/2/2014 12:57:44 PM

414 HA B I TS, G OAL S , A N D MOT I V ATI O N

(e.g., Devine, 1989), this is not an obstacle

to proactive control. Indeed, it is argued that

such efficient and effortless activation of

stereotypes is itself a form of proactive con-

trol. Some goals, such as “sense making,”

are compatible with stereotype activation—

the stereotyping is in the service of the goal.

Thus, the prevalence of implicit stereotype

activation is seen here as a reflection of the

prevalence of goals that recruit stereotypes

as part of goal operations. However, because

stereotype activation is controlled by the

self- regulatory system— it is a cognitive tool

recruited for a reason— it is argued that one

has the power quickly and efficiently not to

activate stereotypes by exercising the same

control system. Encountering a member of

a stereotyped group who is relevant to one’s

goal will not lead to stereotype activation

if that goal is incompatible with stereotyp-

ing. Rather, it will lead to heightened goal

activation, to facilitated processing of goal

relevant stimuli (such as tuning attention

to goal- relevant stimuli; Moskowitz, 2002;

Moskowitz et al., 2011; Trawalter et al.,

2008); and to goal- shielding processes of

stereotype inhibition. For example, an egali-

tarian goal is incompatible with stereotyp-

ing. Just as other goals recruit stereotypes

as part of their operations of goal pursuit,

egalitarian goals recruit compensatory cog-

nitive operations that inhibit stereotypes due

to their incompatibility with the goal.

Implicit but motivated inhibition of ste-

reotypes when one is exposed to a stereo-

typed group was first illustrated by Mos-

kowitz et al. (1999). Men with (and without)

chronic egalitarian goals were recruited for

an experiment. They were primed with faces

(Experiment 3) and names (Experiment 4)

of men and women, then asked to respond

to words either related to the female stereo-

type or not. Participants without chronic

egalitarian goals had stereotypes activated

(facilitated responding to stereotypical

words following female faces). But men with

chronic egalitarian goals instead inhibited

stereotypes of women (slower reaction times

to stereotypical words following female

faces). Moskowitz and Li (2011) extended

this finding of implicit inhibition by shift-

ing the stereotyped group to black men, and

shifting the source of the goal from being

chronically held to being manipulated.

White subjects without a chronic egalitarian

goal were brought to the laboratory. Half

were primed with a goal to be egalitarian

to black men. The results revealed a similar

pattern of stereotype inhibition, this time

for people with temporarily induced egali-

tarian goals— seeing a black man slowed

responses to stereotype- relevant words (but

not to control words). But stereotype activa-

tion occurred among people without primed

egalitarian goals.

Such lack of stereotype activation is not

merely a failure at control (e.g., poor regula-

tion of a goal to stereotype), or an indica-

tion of nothing happening when a target is

encountered. It is a goal- directed set of pro-

cesses, including inhibition, being initiated

that service the goal of being egalitarian.

This is illustrated in several experiments in

a variety of ways. First, using the “persis-

tence until” logic reviewed earlier, stereo-

type inhibition ceases to occur if partici-

pants are given the opportunity to write an

essay affirming their egalitarian goal prior

to the reaction time task (e.g., Moskowitz &

Li, 2011; Moskowitz & Stone, 2012). This

indicates a motivated process being shut

down rather than the lack of processing, or

failure at an alternative goal pursuit. Mos-

kowitz et al. (2000, see also Moskowitz &

Stone, 2012) further showed that encoun-

tering goal- relevant people not only leads to

inhibitory processes but also facilitates pro-

cessing of goal- compatible stimuli and leads

to heightened accessibility of the goal itself.

There is now evidence for proactive con-

trol of stereotypes across many laboratories.

Mendoza, Gollwitzer, and Amodio (2010)

had participants form implementation inten-

tions not to stereotype. They found that

implicitly triggering these plans later using

environmental cues led to control over ste-

reotype activation (as well as improved con-

scious control). Similarly, Devine, Plant,

Amodio, Harmon-Jones, and Vance (2002)

showed that people motivated to control

prejudice for internal reasons do not respond

as quickly as other individuals to negative

words after being primed with black faces.

Cunningham, Van Bavel, Arbuckle,

Packer, and Waggoner (2012) argue that

even rapid responses to the race of a face are

controlled by goals, such that race may be

deemed irrelevant for processing. Instead,

low-level processing is directed by the goals

currently triggered, and this can include

Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 414 1/2/2014 12:57:44 PM

The Implicit Volition Model 415

proactively avoiding race for a more instru-

mental response. Cunningham et al. used

electroencephalography (EEG) to examine

control over processes in the first 100 milli-

seconds of face perception that lead to racial

biases in social categorization. They noted

that “although the relationship between spe-

cific brain regions and ERP [event- related

potential] waves is not perfectly precise, very

early ERP waves, such as the P100 and N170

appear to subserve early face processing”

(p. 2). They examined whether approach

goals attenuate biased processing of black

faces by collecting EEG data as partici-

pants performed a task that presented them

with faces of white and black men. Consis-

tent with prior evidence of racial bias, they

found that white faces were associated with

a larger P100 than black faces. But they also

found proactive control, in that this effect

interacted with goals. An approach goal

altered the influence of race during the first

100 milliseconds of perceptual processing.

Amodio and Devine (2010) reviewed fur-

ther neuroscience evidence to support pro-

active control. They posited that the ante-

rior cingulate cortex (ACC) brain region

monitors for conflicts between intended and

automatic responses, thus representing a

low-level, if not initial, step in control. Con-

flict is low when black targets are paired

with stereotypical items; thus, ACC activ-

ity should be low. However, pairing black

targets with nonstereotypical target items

should lead to high ACC activity, indicating

that control mechanisms are being recruited

early, without conscious deliberation or

awareness.

Postulate 13: Implicit Processes

of Goal Pursuit Need Not Be the Same

as Conscious Goal Pursuit

Implicit control in stereotyping revealed suc-

cess at inhibiting “automatic” processes.

Contrast this with findings from research on

stereotype suppression (e.g., Wegner, 1994)

and avoiding race bias (e.g., Payne, Lambert,

& Jacoby, 2002), in which explicit goal pur-

suit led to control failures. Payne et al. dem-

onstrated that explicit control is limited by

resource demands, whereas Wegner (1994)

found a more debilitating effect— ironically,

stereotype activation increases with the

explicit goal of suppressing stereotypes. A

similar contrast emerges from work on cre-

ativity. Asking people to adopt a goal of hav-

ing a creative solution to a problem leads to

strikingly uncreative responses tethered to

old examples that resemble plagiarism more

than novelty. Priming creativity outside of

consciousness produces the desired increase

in creativity (e.g., Sassenberg & Moskowitz,

2005). Examining decision making, Dijk-

sterhuis et al. (2006) revealed that providing

ample time for conscious responding reduces

the quality of the decisions reached relative

to pursuing the goal of making an accurate

decision when limited to implicit processing

(under load).

However, some examinations have illus-

trated that implicit and explicit goal pursuit

yield similar results following similar pro-

cesses. Chartrand and Bargh (1996) found

that an unconsciously primed goal to form

an impression followed the same processing

stages as when one consciously adopts the

goal of impression formation. And Pessi-

glione et al. (2007) found that on a hand-grip

task in which promise of a reward (money to

be won on a given trial) was presented sub-

liminally, the increase in effort was the same

as when promise of reward was presented

consciously, and the same region of brain

activity moderated effort on the task.

Given that they share the same mecha-

nisms of control (operations, monitoring,

feedback, tension reduction, etc.), and many

illustrations demonstrating that unconscious

and conscious control follow identical pro-

cessing steps, why do some studies demon-

strate an apparent inconsistency— conscious

goal pursuit fails, whereas implicit goal

pursuit succeeds? In some cases, conscious

processing can alter the meaning of the goal,

because deliberation can recruit interpretive

biases that yield changes to how the goal is

framed or understood. The meaning of the

goal “be a good student” can change when

defined in terms of a standard set by one’s

beliefs about personal ability versus a stan-

dard set by what one ought to be to bring

pride to others. Furthermore, conscious goals

invoke metacognition—thoughts about the

goal pursuit. This is especially likely when,

for example, with the weapons task and ste-

reotype suppression, the task itself invokes

theories about how one is biased (that may

or not be accurate) and what one needs to

do prevent/overturn bias (if it is perceived

Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 415 1/2/2014 12:57:44 PM

do to

416 HA B I TS, G OAL S , A N D MOT I V ATI O N

to have occurred). When a person is made

aware of bias, the control process is not

merely derailed by what may be incorrect

theories of how control ought to be executed,

but by processing limitations and restrictions

in cognitive capacity. Even with an accurate

theory, conscious execution of the steps may

be rendered incomplete or inexact if one

lacks ability to perform the work required,

such as when resources for control are lim-

ited or responding is at a fast pace. Implicit

control circumvents these pitfalls to control.

Consciousness may at times be an obstacle

to a goal better pursued implicitly; it can

lead one astray by focusing one’s attention

on irrelevant information or causing one to

rationalize an inappropriate response.

CONCLUSION

Dual- process models too often limit con-

trol to that which is conscious and effort-

ful. Despite the counterintuitive feel of it,

control can be, and often is, implicit. And

unlike conceptions of the role of the uncon-

scious in responding that have highlighted

it as a source of error and bias (e.g., heu-

ristic use in decision making), unconscious

goals are an efficient and functional source

for much human responding, perhaps guid-

ing all cognition. It is just as likely that con-

sciousness in control can introduce as much

error and bias as can lack of consciousness.

This suggests that consciousness is not a dis-

tinguishing factor in control: All cognition

is controlled, often implicitly, and conscious

control can have the same operations and

outcomes as unconscious control. Conscious

control need not mean a qualitatively differ-

ent type of processing than implicit control.

Nor need it suggest primacy of one form of

control over the other. As Sherman (2006)

stated: “Rather than treating automatic and

controlled processes as separate categories

of processes it would be more useful to treat

automaticity and control as features of pro-

cesses” (p. 181).

Implicit control suggests that the associa-

tions activated and inhibited when encoun-

tering a stimulus of any type are not inde-

pendent of ones goals. One can respond to

the same target in many ways as a function

of the context, the opportunities for action

within that context, and the goals of the

individual relating to that target at that time

in that context. For example, if one has the

goal of cooperating with others, it may be

that in a given context, the opportunity to

pursue that goal is best afforded by a prefer-

ence for people who share one’s racial iden-

tity, which could promote stereotyping of

outgroups. However, it may be that shared

racial identity does not afford one the best

opportunity to achieve the goal, and catego-

rizing based on race would not occur and

stereotypes would not be triggered. Alterna-

tively, one could have a goal that does pro-

mote categorizing people into racial groups

but discourages stereotype activation as the

dominant association to the group (as illus-

trated by Moskowitz et al., 2011).

Stereotyping, like many unwanted

responses, can be controlled not merely by

reactively changing how we respond when

our implicit goals encourage stereotyping.

It can be controlled by changing one’s goal

and proactively initiating processes that

never yield stereotype activation. Augment-

ing the well- elaborated power of conscious

control is what many goal researchers now

believe to be the more omnipresent form of

control— unconscious goals that implicitly

direct social cognition.

NOTES

1. Tolman (1932, p. 134) warned, regarding goal

pursuits in animals, that “the reader will per-

haps need constantly to remind himself that

the use of the terms perception, mnemoniza-

tion and memory implies nothing as to con-

sciousness.” It can be argued that the notion

of unconscious goals and operations of goal

pursuit got lost in the cognitive revolution

when models of goal pursuit shifted from ani-

mal to human participants, with conscious-

ness as the distinguishing factor elevating

human above animal goal pursuits. With that

shift came fervor for examining rationality

and conscious choice as central to control.

2. Other sources of goals are theories (theo-

ries about the nature of ability; e.g., Grant

& Dweck, 2003) and fantasies about future

hopes (especially by contrasting those fanta-

sies against a standard set by negative aspects

of current reality; e.g., Oettingen, 2000).

Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 416 1/2/2014 12:57:44 PM

The Implicit Volition Model 417

3. Since conscious control is possible only after

600 milliseconds elapse once one encounters

a stimulus (e.g., Fazio, 1990), responses made

within this period occur without the benefit

of conscious control. Thus, flashing a cue that

triggers a goal can indicate an implicit goal if

the cue and the goal- directed response occur

within this period prior to consciousness.

4. However, there are also unique features of

goal priming that make it distinct from other

types of accessibility. First, accessibility

strength and its impact on responding depend

on the motivational value of a goal and instru-

mentality of opportunities in the environment

(e.g., Eitam & Higgins, 2010). Second, with

semantic knowledge, the accessibility strength

decreases as time passes from the time of con-

struct activation. The passage of time impacts

goal accessibility differently. Goal representa-

tions contain a discrepancy, the state of which

is being monitored and fed back through the

system. Such operations keep the goal con-

struct reactivated as time passes and increase

accessibility strength, so that its ability to

impact subsequent responding increases as

time passes; the goal looms larger (e.g., Bargh

et al., 2001; Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003;

Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007; Liber-

man & Förster, 2000).

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How do explicit and implicit evaluations shift? A preregistered meta-analysis of the effects of co-occurrence and relational information

Preprint

Full-text available

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Based on 660 effect sizes obtained from 23,255 adult participants across 51 reports of experimental studies, this meta-analysis investigates whether and when explicit (self-reported) and implicit (indirectly revealed) evaluations reflect relational information (how stimuli are related to each other) over and above co-occurrence information (the fact that stimuli have been paired with each other). Using a mixed-effects meta-regression, relational information was found to dominate over contradictory co-occurrence information in shifting both explicit (mean Hedges’ g = 0.97, 95-percent CI: [0.89; 1.05], 95-percent PI: [0.24; 1.70]) and implicit evaluations (g = 0.27, 95-percent CI: [0.19; 0.35], 95-percent PI: [ 0.46; 1.00]). However, considerable heterogeneity in relational effects on implicit evaluation made moderator analyses necessary. Implicit evaluations were particularly sensitive to relational information (a) in between-participant (rather than within-participant) designs; when (b) co-occurrence information was held constant (rather than manipulated); (c) targets were novel (rather than known); implicit evaluations were measured (d) first (rather than last) and (e) using an AMP (rather than an IAT or EPT); and (f) relational and co-occurrence information were presented in temporal proximity (rather than far apart in time). Overall, the present findings suggest that both implicit and explicit evaluations emerge from a combination of co-occurrence information and relational information, with relational information usually playing the dominant role. Critically, variability in these effects highlights a need to refocus attention from existence proof demonstrations toward theoretical and empirical work on the determinants and boundary conditions of the influences of co-occurrence and relational information on explicit and implicit evaluation.

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Although temporal conceptualizations of motivational processes have not held center stage in motivation science, the situation is currently changing. Drawing on work in the subfield of language learning motivation, where the motivational endurance needed to master a second language has been a major concern, the aim of this article is to contribute to the body of work currently exploring motivational persistence. After outlining the broader academic context of motivation and time, and describing the disciplinary trajectory of research into language learning motivation, we present two interrelated and multifaceted frameworks that seek to explain long-term motivation and motivational persistence: (a) the notion of a “directed motivational current,” which refers to a period of intense, enduring, and self-sustaining engagement within an activity-sequence, and which is phenomenologically akin to an extended flow experience, and (b) a multicomponent framework of long-term motivation that offers a general account of sustained effort in learning. This framework integrates diverse components, such as self-concordant vision, habitual actions, progress checks, and affirmative feedback, and references a motivational process that is characterized by positive emotional loading and passion, and is supported by self-control capacity and self-regulatory skills.

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May 2002

Three studies examined the moderating role of motivations to respond without prejudice (e.g., internal and external) in expressions of explicit and implicit race bias. In all studies, participants reported their explicit attitudes toward Blacks. Implicit measures consisted of a sequential priming task (Study 1) and the Implicit Association Test (Studies 2 and 3). Study 3 used a cognitive busyness manipulation to preclude effects of controlled processing on implicit responses. In each study, explicit race bias was moderated by internal motivation to respond without prejudice, whereas implicit race bias was moderated by the interaction of internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. Specifically, high internal, low external participants exhibited lower levels of implicit race bias than did all other participants. Implications for the development of effective self-regulation of race bias are discussed.

Plans and the Structure of Behavior

Article

Oct 1960

The selfish goal

Article

Jan 2009

Normal and pathological consequences of encountering difficulties in monitoring progress toward goals

Article

Jan 2009

Motivations for judging and knowing: Implications for causal attribution

Article

Jan 1990

Regulating behavior in the social world: Control in the context of intergroup bias

Article

Jan 2010

Forgetting all else: On the antecedents and consequences of goal shielding

Article

Dec 2002

Six studies explore the role of goal shielding in self-regulation:by examining how the activation of focal goals to which the individual is committed inhibits the accessibility, of alternative goals. Consistent evidence was found for such goal shielding, and a number of its moderators were identified: Individuals' level of commitment to the focal goal, their degree of anxiety and depression, their need for cognitive closure, and differences in their goal-related tenacity. Moreover, inhibition of alternative goals was found to be, more pronounced when they serve the same overarching purpose as the focal goal, but lessened when the alternative goals facilitate focal goal attainment. Finally; goal shielding was shown to have beneficial consequences for goal pursuit and attainment.

Five markers of motivated behavior

Article

Jan 2009

Habits as knowledge structures: Automaticity in goal-directed behavior

Article

Jan 2000

This study rested the idea of habits as a form of goal-directed automatic behavior. Expanding on the idea that habits are mentally represented as associations between goals and actions, it was proposed that goals are capable of activating the habitual action. More specific, when habits are established (e.g., frequent cycling to the university), the very activation of the goal to act (e.g., having to attend lectures at the university) automatically evokes the habitual response (e.g., bicycle). Indeed, it was tested and confirmed that, when behavior is habitual, behavioral responses are activated automatically. in addition, the results of 3 experiments indicated that (a) the automaticity in habits is conditional on the presence of an active goal (cf. goal-dependent automaticity; J. A. Bargh, 1989), supporting the idea that habits are mentally represented as goal-action links, and (b) the formation of implementation intentions (i.e., the creation of a strong mental link between a goal and action) may simulate goal-directed automaticity in habits.

Self-regulatory strength

Article

Jan 2011

The Implicit Volition Model: The Unconscious Nature of Goal Pursuit

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