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Warum war Athen eine Demokratie? Ein spieltheoretisches Modell

  • January 2002
Authors:
Hanno Scholtz at University of Zurich
Hanno Scholtz
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... Depending on technologies for these two usages, in a simplifying model two equilibria are possible, either one 'proto-democratic' with about an equality in power relations, or an hierarchical one with centralized power and a sharp social differentiation into knights and peasants. (Scholtz 2001) Figure 2: Income relations between the West (Europe and its offshoots) and the rest of the world 2 ...
Civil democracy: How partition led into this crisis and what we need to fix it
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  • Sep 2018
The first decades of the 21st century see a world in crisis not less than the early 20th century did. Sociology describes a ’second modernity’ emerging, and a loss of institutional performance and legitimacy, globalizations, social inequalities, economic crises, political violence and terrorism in times of hugely shifting global resource distributions are much the same in both century starts. Behind this similarity, this paper sees one common cause: The Europe of Western Christianity had a specific ‘groups under roofs’ structure that partitioned individuals but linked them as groups in open instutional structures. This model was especially successful and spread its heritage in the form of partitioning forms of democracy across the globe. But partitioning democracy is successful only in ‘groups under roofs’ societies, and hence it did not properly work outside the West, and does neither work on the global level nor in contemporary individualized Western societies. An adequate problem solution capacity can only be (re-)gained with Civil democracy that stores and uses trust not in the form of one-every-four-years ballot mark, but in a (not necessarily but adequately IT-based) system that allows for the flexible storage of trust relations to diverse kind of civil society actors and the support of direct democratic decision making as the norm. As systemic solution, Civil democracy demands a social movement for its realization.
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... This was the result of an equilibrium in mixed strategies from the beginning of agricultural societies onwards: Given economies of scale in the production of both goods and influence, stable societies emerged which basically consisted of two classes, peasants doing only production and knights doing only influence. (Scholtz 2001) ...
Idea, background, and conditions for the implementation of network-based collective decision-making
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  • Jul 2017
This paper describes network-based collective decision making (NBCDM), an ICT-based technique of mak-ing collective decisions from very modest group sizes up to the global scale, suitable for all cases outside the vanishing European tradition of identical individual-to-group mappings that allowed for Western industrial democracies. The paper describes four characteristics, counting, trusted actors which allow for efficiency in option evaluation, electronic storage of trust relations, and evaluation of represented trust mappings. It inte-grates NBCDM into the history of collective decision-making, describes possible use case for its application, structures the field of cases by applying a number of criteria, and describes the possible path of introducing such NBCDM as systemic change.
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The egalitarian battlefield: Reflections on the origins of majority rule in archaic Greece
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We explore the emergence of formal institutions of majority rule in archaic Greece from a historical and conflict-theoretic perspective. Referring to ancient and modern sources we first conclude that institutions of majority rule entered Greek collective decision-making in the seventh century BC. We argue that this development must be seen in connection with the local economic growth pattern and the adoption of a highly idiosyncratic form of warfare, which enabled Greek city-states to mobilize a greater number of citizens for war. Military participation of citizens depends on parameters of warfare and economic parameters. We show that the reduction of the average costs of fighting, coupled with an increased decisiveness of conflict, may result in an increased military participation rate. The integration of elements of majority rule in the constitution of the city-states was the political consequence of this development.
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