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The values of spontaneity
Abstract
There is a widespread intuition that acts displaying " spontaneity" possess value at least in part by having this quality. Spontaneity may be taken as the sole or primary source of an action's value or it may be thought to be a reason to further value an action that is considered good for other reasons as well, for example, because it realizes some independent worthwhile end. Spontaneous actions may be valued for a variety of reasons: These actions may be thought to be more aesthetically appealing for agents or observers, they may be valued for the joy that they engender or because they help one to relax or live longer, and so forth. Although I do not discount the importance of these kinds of values, my primary interest in this chapter is with views that accord some kind of ethical value to spontaneous actions. Many people share a belief in the value of spontaneity, but there is less of a consensus concerning what spontaneity is. We fi nd two primary senses of the word "spontaneity" in Western writings. The fi rst takes spontaneity to be that quality of actions that arise or proceed "entirely from natural impulse" or that come "freely and without premeditation or effort."1 Spontaneity in this sense is most often used to describe the activity of plants, nonhuman animals, or poets. The second sense of spontaneity takes it to be "voluntary and unconstrained action on the part of persons."2 That is, spontaneous actions are those that arise or proceed freely from an autonomous agent. Versions of this second sense of spontaneity are prominent in philosophical writings. For example, Thomas Hobbes describes voluntary actions, by which he means roughly actions that are not motivated by fear, as "spontaneous."3 One of the most elegant and infl uential expressions of this second sense of spontaneity is found in the writings of Immanuel Kant. For Kant, spontaneity is the ability to think and act in the world independently of the determinations of desire. Reason can provide an order distinct from and independent of what Nature offers, and rational agents can perceive and act in the world according to the norms and principles of such an order. Moreover, they have the ability to know that they are seeing and acting in this way.4 On such a view, spontaneous actions demonstrate the characteristic quality of Kant's distinctive notion of free will. They are expressions of an autonomous agent's unique ability to transcend the natural order and produce genuine actions as opposed to mere events. The two senses described above share the idea that spontaneous actions are characterized by the absence of constraint or external coercion, but apart from this they are different and to some degree incompatible. On the fi rst, spontaneity describes a state from which Kant's free and autonomous rational agents purportedly must break free. And yet, this sense of spontaneity is thought to provide a fi rm-though not moral-standard for plants, animals, and poets. In general, it is good when plants, animals, and poets operate without obstruction or constraint and express "natural impulse(s)" that come "freely and without premeditation or effort." According to the Kantian version of the second defi nition, spontaneous actions express the ability of rational, free, and autonomous agents to transcend the natural order. This ability serves as the ground of human dignity and when properly employed provides the basis for normative moral claims.5 In the discussion above I have followed the convention that seeks to distinguish the normative component of our two senses of spontaneity by maintaining that in the former cases we are concerned with describing the proper natural functions of plants and animals, or certain aesthetic values of poetry, while in the latter, Kantian case we are talking about moral normativity. Perhaps this distinction can be made to work, but it is not as neat as it might fi rst appear to be. For example, many people endorse the view that an ethical action that arises or proceeds with ease and "without premeditation or effort" can be morally better than one that is carried out only after prolonged consideration and with diffi culty.6 Sorting out such issues and the various aspects of these two senses of spontaneity are beyond the scope of this chapter, though I return to these two Western senses of spontaneity in the conclusion. My remarks are intended only to set the stage for my primary concern, which is to describe and analyze two early Chinese views of spontaneity.7 I take as my primary sources Confucian and Daoist texts from the pre-Qin period (i.e., before 221 bce).8 My goals are fi rst to describe two related yet distinct types of spontaneity, which I shall refer to as "untutored" and "cultivated" spontaneity, and show that they share deep and important similarities. Next, I argue that the similarities they share are the primary source of the feelings of satisfaction and joy that such actions are thought to arouse in both those who perform and those who observe them. Finally, I argue that these two early Chinese conceptions of spontaneity can help us to understand some of our own intuitions about the ethical value of spontaneity.
This paper explores the concept of skill in Zhuangzi and Stoicism, and argues that the role of the Stoic techne in practicing the art of living can be better understood if we introduce some perspectives of Zhuangzi’s Ji. For Zhuangzi, by manifesting Dao and cultivating virtue, skillful activity can be taken as the spiritual exercise to nourish the art of living with which one can do things with great ease, and achieve spiritual satisfaction. Similarly for the Stoics, by following logos and cultivating virtue, skillful activity can be used to practice the art of living with which one can do everything well consistently and achieve happiness. By highlighting the role of skillful activity in manifesting Dao (or logos) and obtaining virtue, both Zhuangzi and the Stoics try to nourish an art of living through the practice of professional skills, which makes life a good flow, i.e., spiritual satisfaction or happiness.
The distinctive contribution of the Axial Age is the innovation of sustained spiritual practice to effect a “systematic deconstruction” of ordinary consciousness and effect a transformation of the self. India is paradigmatic with well-known forms like Hindu yoga and Buddhist meditation. Taoism, clearly, and with some demonstration, Confucianism are shown to be Chinese analogues focused on the idea of self-cultivation. For Greece, the work of Pierre Hadot is seminal: philosophy as practically focused on the spiritual transformation of the self through askesis. Israel is the least evidenced case, with the suggestive possibility that early prophets undertook “training for ecstasy” within guilds whereas later prophets focus on textual interpretation as involving systematic self-disciplinary rigor. All critically renounce “this worldly” power for a higher, “other worldly,” transcendence.
In this article, I identify “spontaneity” as a significant but poorly-analyzed term in social theory and description through an overview of tensions between varying technical accounts of spontaneity in research literature. In contrast to conceptually-slippery “realist” accounts of spontaneity, I argue for viewing spontaneity ethnomethodologically, i.e., as a contextually-emergent social practice. I suggest two directions for future applications of this approach: first, an ethnomethodological approach to rhetorical analysis of unanalyzed use of the term “spontaneity” in research literature, and second, observational studies of improvisational theatre, a social practice in which orientation toward the production of spontaneity by participants is criterial to the identity of the practice.
This article brings Xunzi's views on religious practice into conversation with Peter Berger's sociological understanding of religion in an effort both to deepen our understanding of their theories concerning the constructed nature of religious worldviews and to consider critically the plausibility of their arguments. The author suggests that comparison of Berger's theory in The Sacred Canopy with Xunzi's account of the Dao enables us to explain why certain weaknesses arise in Berger's theory—namely, the difficulty of imagining how the self could ever escape the sacred canopy to achieve authenticity and the tension between his assertions about the precariousness of the social order and the apparent stability of the social order suggested by his descriptions. By uncovering Berger's hidden assumptions about the self, comparison with Xunzi's work also suggests a way the problems might be remedied.