No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
International climate change financing: The Green Climate Fund (GCF)
Abstract
Over the past several decades, the United States has delivered financial and technical assistance for climate change activities in the developing world through a variety of bilateral and multilateral programs. The United States and other industrialized countries committed to such assistance through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, Treaty Number: 102-38, 1992), the Copenhagen Accord (2009), and the UNFCCC Cancun Agreements (2010), wherein the higher-income countries pledged jointly up to 100 billion annually by 2020. The Cancun Agreements also proposed that the pledged funds are to be new, additional to previous flows, adequate, predictable, and sustained, and are to come from a wide variety of sources, both public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.One potential mechanism for mobilizing a share of the proposed international climate financing is the UNFCCC Green Climate Fund (GCF), currently under negotiation by Parties to the Convention. If established, the fund would be capitalized by contributions from donor countries and other sources and used to support climate change mitigation and adaptation projects, programs, policies, and other activities. The GCF would complement, or perhaps replace, many of the existing multilateral climate change funds (e.g., the Global Environment Facility, the Climate Investment Funds, the Adaptation Fund), and become the official financial mechanism of the Convention. A UNFCCC-appointed Transitional Committee has been tasked with designing the CGF, with the intent of bringing a finished proposal for a decision before the UNFCCC 17th Conference of Parties in Durban, South Africa, November 28 - December 9, 2011. Many issues remain to be clarified during negotiations, and some involve long-standing and contentious debate. They include: what role the CGF would play in providing sustained finance at scale, how it would fit into the existing development assistance and climate financing architecture, how it would be legally and institutionally governed, how it would be capitalized, and how it would allocate and deliver assistance efficiently and effectively to developing countries.The U.S. Congress-through its role in authorizations, appropriations, and oversight-would have significant input on U.S. participation in the fund. As negotiations proceed, Congress may raise concerns regarding the cost, purpose, direction, efficiency, and effectiveness of the UNFCCC and existing international financial institutions. These concerns may be weighed against the negotiated design characteristics of the new fund in an effort to assess its potential performance. Congress may then be required to determine and give guidance to the allocation of funds between bilateral and multilateral climate change assistance as well as among the variety of multilateral mechanisms. Potential authorizations and appropriations for the GCF would rest with several committees, including the U.S. House of Representatives Committees on Foreign Affairs (various subcommittees); Financial Services (Sub-committee on International Monetary Policy and Trade); and Appropriations (Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs); and the U.S. Senate Committees on Foreign Relations (Sub-committee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection); and Appropriations (Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs).
... given that implementation of GHGE commitments by developing countries depends largely on financial and technical assistance from major polluters, especially industrialised countries. Thus, as part of their commitments under the UNFCCC and following the Cancun climate agreements in 2010, developed countries not only pledged the sum of USD30 billion between 2010-2012, they also backed it with a promise to mobilise another USD100 billion every year up to 2020 as mitigation and adaptation assistance to developing countries to help them reduce their GHGEs and also adapt to the impacts of climate change (Lattanzio, 2014;Schalatek et al., 2010). ...
... This is against the background of the exposition in the literature review concerning the dual role of the World Bank as both a carbon trader and fossil-fuel financier, which runs contrary to the whole idea of financing and promoting low-carbon, climate resilient and sustainable development in developing countries. Worth mentioning, in particular, is the Bank's past record and continued financing of environmentally unfriendly projects, particularly in developing countries (Mendelsohn et al., 2006); its pro-West and pro-dirty investments in Africa and other developing states (Amusan 2014a and, as well as its perception as a key promoter of the neoliberal economy (Bond, 2012;Lattanzio, 2014). It should be recalled that the same World Bank provided Eskom with a loan of $3.75 billion for the construction of a coal-fired power plant in April 2010 (Bond, 2012: 163). ...
... Therefore, it will be unfair to expect that all funds will be facilitated from the international Africa's NAMA commitment towards a BAU/PPD emissions reduction trajectory relative to the Copenhagen Accord was tied to international technological and financial assistance (Tyler, 2010: 577;Winkler et al., 2011: 5818 Based on the discourse in the literature review, there are currently a number challenges confronting the GCF and other financial instruments within the UNFCCC framework. These range from their non-compulsion that is largely voluntary (Klein et al., 2003); their inadequacy both fiscally and technically (Amusan, 2010;Lalthapersad-Pillay and Oosthuizen, 2011); the concern that they may be diverted into more general development issues, many of which may not connect directly with climate change (Lattanzio, 2014); that the structure of the funds supports sectorspecific adaptations rather than societal adaptations, which could bring about more benefits (Klein et al., 2003); the delay on meeting pledges (Bond, 2012;Lalthapersad-Pillay and Oosthuizen, 2011); as well as other controversies around their sources, control mechanism, accessibility and implementation strategy (Bond, 2012 andBrunnee et al., 2012). which focuses mainly on biodiversity and community, are also not being effectively utilised (G9). ...
The thesis examined South Africa’s interaction with climate change on the global scene and domestically in terms of policy and other regulatory frameworks aimed at addressing the climate change phenomenon. This was done in order to unearth the political interplay involved in South Africa’s approach towards climate change in view of its delicate position as both a contributor to climate change and one of the hard-hit by its adverse impacts. The researcher relied on systematic exposition and adaptation of key underpinnings of “complex interdependence” and “second image reversed” as a theoretical basis for discussion. On the other hand, the researcher used responses captured through in-depth interviews with purposively selected respondents and a range of secondary data. While the Nvivo software was used in the study to generate relevant themes and sub-themes, qualitative content analysis (QCA) was used to interpret the data collected using the themes and sub-themes as units of analysis. In addition to examining the environmental right as enshrined in the 1996 Constitution, two principal policy instruments for addressing climate change in South Africa, namely the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA, 1998) and the National Climate Change Response (NCCR, 2011) were reviewed in the study. In particular, the Business-As-Usual/Peak-Plateau-Decline (BAU/PPD) emission reduction trajectory and South Africa’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) were also examined. This examination was done against the background of a historical analysis of the trajectory of the global environmental and climate change regimes and discussion on different aspects of South Africa’s involvement in the global climate change process. It was revealed that South Africa’s approach to climate change is characterized by a political interplay. At the global level, South Africa has been actively involved in the global climate change process, particularly within the UNFCCC framework, while at the domestic level there are puzzling challenges regarding its policy response to climate change. Much of these reflect in the failure of the country’s political leadership to muster strong will needed to bring about an end to the use of coal as a major energy source and foreign income earner; neutralize basic fossil fuel interests which seek to ensure that coal remains a growth catalyst in South Africa; prioritize climate change as an important issue of national concern rather than an environmental byproduct and, therefore, a side-issue which should not be taken seriously; mainstream climate change considerations and planning into all relevant sectors and national departments; pursue a more ambitious transition to a low carbon and climate resilient South Africa; and incentivize mitigation and adaptive behaviour in majority of South Africans as part of the overall efforts towards achieving a low-carbon transition.
The study concluded that the challenges are doable given greater commitment and deliberate actions on the part of the South African government, including support from the international community, mostly in terms of capacity building and technology transfer. In this regard, it recommended amongst others that South Africa’s low-carbon transition needs to go through a fresh consultation phase to allow for public comments and strong national position on climate change.
... However, the international cooperation equilibrium can be challenged by free-rider intentions, which is to say that countries benefit from the carbon reductions of others without themselves contributing to reduction efforts that would impose costs on their citizens. 36,37 Because cooperation is hard to achieve, we assume no international cooperation or consensus over equity. The results provide an economically rational mitigation approach, thereby enhancing national climate pledges in light of vulnerability and national risk aversion toward climate change. ...
... It would be economically favorable for countries to cooperatively act toward the 2 C goal. 36 Reviewing the NDCs on the basis of cost-benefit analysis provides an alternative perspective for countries to view the emission reduction in an economic aspect. Besides the equal-effort 2 C scenario, further research can explore other possibilities for combining the national costbenefit review with equity and 1.5 C. ...
The use of equity principles to review the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) is critical to facilitating more ambitious climate actions. However, disagreement over the equity principles persists. We instead treat emission reduction as a solely economic behavior motivated by avoiding future economic damage from climate change. Assuming no international cooperation, we provide a solely economic mitigation pathway to review national climate pledges until 2100. Using the value in 2030 to review the NDCs, we find that the NDCs of China, the USA, and the EU are 1.5, 1.4, and 0.9 respective GtCO2eq lower than their solely economic emission levels, whereas India commits 3.8 GtCO2eq more than its solely economic emission level. We also propose an equal-effort cooperation scenario toward 2°C where each country reduces emissions by 28% of their solely economic levels in 2030. Through exploration of the economic trade-offs, our results suggest that more ambitious NDCs are urgently needed.
... Under the UNFCCC, the multilateral funding frameworks comprise the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Funds within these instruments are channelled through third-party implementing agencies (Lattanzio 2011). These include United Nations agencies, World Bank and other multilateral financial institutions, and major nongovernmental organizations. ...
... Back in 2010, the U.S. made available US$1.3 billion as climate assistance to developing countries, which was split almost equally between bilateral and multilateral programmes, while its budget authority for all foreign operations coordinated by the Departments of State (DOS) and Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was US$32.8 billion (Lattanzio 2011). Between 2013 and 2014, the U.S. delivered over US$5.5 billion in public finance to the GCF (U.S. DOS 2016, 40). ...
Relying on complex interdependence as a theoretical approach, this paper investigates the hypothetical damage that the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement could represent for Africa in terms of climate finance. In June 2017, President Donald Trump publicly declared the U.S. intention to withdraw from further participating in the multilateral Paris Agreement. To keen followers and analysts of the U.S. climate policy beyond its borders, such unilateral action was never a surprise. Rather, it is nostalgic of the experience of the Kyoto Protocol, particularly how more or less similar move unduly prolonged the global climate negotiations up till late 2015 when the Paris Agreement came about. Although the Paris Agreement is remarkable as it represents the first states-wide climate deal, it however left a number of issues unresolved. Notable among which is climate finance which has remained the most contentious and of critical concern to developing countries, particularly in Africa. Pitted against the fact that Africa contributes less to climate change and, ironically, the hardest-hit by the phenomenon, the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement aggravates concerns around climate finance and, indeed, portends additional burdens for a continent that is still struggling to cope with the untoward fallout of climate change.
... The facilitator, playing the role of the UN Secretary General or UNFCCC Executive Secretary, gives a brief overview on climate change, historical GHG emissions, the context of current UN climate negotiations, and expected consequences of business-as-usual emissions trajectories including sea level rise, ocean acidification, and increasing risks of extreme weather, crop yields and other impacts (https://www.climateinteractive.org/programs/world-climate/instructor-resources/slide-sets/). The facilitator then presents the key policy decisions participants are charged with: specifying their bloc or nation's fossil fuel emissions pathway through 2100; their effort to protect against deforestation and/or promote afforestation; and how much money, if any, they will contribute to or seek from the UN Green Climate Fund [35]. None of the materials (briefing memos or presentation slides) are prescriptive. ...
... Respondents were included in the analysis if they reported no previous experience with World Climate, answered !80% of the pre-and post-survey questions analyzed, and provided Age and gender data refer to usable cases. Note: the survey asked participants to select an age range (e.g., [25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35] rather than entering their age (see S2 Appendix for full survey). Indicates whether or not participants chose to participate in a climate change-related activity or course (yes) or were required to participate as part of a program or course unrelated to climate change (no). ...
Climate change communication efforts grounded in the information deficit model have largely failed to close the gap between scientific and public understanding of the risks posed by climate change. In response, simulations have been proposed to enable people to learn for themselves about this complex and politically charged topic. Here we assess the impact of a widely-used simulation, World Climate, which combines a socially and emotionally engaging role-play with interactive exploration of climate change science through the CROADS climate simulation model. Participants take on the roles of delegates to the UN climate negotiations and are challenged to create an agreement that meets international climate goals. Their decisions are entered into C-ROADS, which provides immediate feedback about expected global climate impacts, enabling them to learn about climate change while experiencing the social dynamics of negotiations. We assess the impact of World Climate by analyzing pre- and post-survey results from >2,000 participants in 39 sessions in eight nations. We find statistically significant gains in three areas: (i) knowledge of climate change causes, dynamics and impacts; (ii) affective engagement including greater feelings of urgency and hope; and (iii) a desire to learn and do more about climate change. Contrary to the deficit model, gains in urgency were associated with gains in participants' desire to learn more and intent to act, while gains in climate knowledge were not. Gains were just as strong among American participants who oppose government regulation of free markets - a political ideology that has been linked to climate change denial in the US - suggesting the simulation's potential to reach across political divides. The results indicate that World Climate offers a climate change communication tool that enables people to learn and feel for themselves, which together have the potential to motivate action informed by science.
... The facilitator, playing the role of the UN Secretary General or UNFCCC Executive Secretary, gives a brief overview on climate change, historical GHG emissions, the context of current UN climate negotiations, and expected consequences of business-as-usual emissions trajectories including sea level rise, ocean acidification, and increasing risks of extreme weather, crop yields and other impacts (https://www.climateinteractive.org/programs/world-climate/instructor-resources/slide-sets/). The facilitator then presents the key policy decisions participants are charged with: specifying their bloc or nation's fossil fuel emissions pathway through 2100; their effort to protect against deforestation and/or promote afforestation; and how much money, if any, they will contribute to or seek from the UN Green Climate Fund [35]. None of the materials (briefing memos or presentation slides) are prescriptive. ...
... Respondents were included in the analysis if they reported no previous experience with World Climate, answered !80% of the pre-and post-survey questions analyzed, and provided Age and gender data refer to usable cases. Note: the survey asked participants to select an age range (e.g., [25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35] rather than entering their age (see S2 Appendix for full survey). Indicates whether or not participants chose to participate in a climate change-related activity or course (yes) or were required to participate as part of a program or course unrelated to climate change (no). ...
Climate change communication efforts grounded in the information deficit model have largely failed to close the gap between scientific and public understanding of the risks posed by climate change. In response, simulations have been proposed to enable people to learn for themselves about this complex and politically charged topic. Here we assess the impact of a widely-used simulation, World Climate, which combines a socially and emotionally engaging role-play with interactive exploration of climate change science through the C-ROADS climate simulation model. Participants take on the roles of delegates to the UN climate negotiations and are challenged to create an agreement that meets international climate goals. Their decisions are entered into C-ROADS, which provides immediate feedback about expected global climate impacts, enabling them to learn about climate change while experiencing the social dynamics of negotiations. We assess the impact of World Climate by analyzing pre- and post-survey results from >2,000 participants in 39 sessions in eight nations. We find statistically significant gains in three areas: (i) knowledge of climate change causes, dynamics and impacts; (ii) affective engagement including greater feelings of urgency and hope; and (iii) a desire to learn and do more about climate change. Contrary to the deficit model, gains in urgency were associated with gains in participants’ desire to learn more and intent to act, while gains in climate knowledge were not. Gains were just as strong among American participants who oppose government regulation of free markets–a political ideology that has been linked to climate change denial in the US–suggesting the simulation’s potential to reach across political divides. The results indicate that World Climate offers a climate change communication tool that enables people to learn and feel for themselves, which together have the potential to motivate action informed by science.
... It will channel a significant share of financing for adaptation and mitigation, including activities to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation, and was expected to be fully operational by 2014. Regarding the status of the contributions, at the Cancun conference (2010) a target of 100 billion USD by 2020 was established, with an initial allocation of 30 billion in the period 2010-12 (Lattanzio, 2014). As of March 31, 2014, the total amount of pledges and contributions to the GCF Trust Fund amounted to only around 55 million USD (GCF, 2014). ...
... The second issue is conceivably more complex and involves also noneconomic categories. Broadly speaking, the GCF is expected to be distributed in equal parts for adaptation and mitigation measures (Lattanzio, 2014). The adaptation measures focus on the degree of vulnerability of recipient countries, while the mitigation measures aim to reduce the negative impact of abatement costs on short-and medium-term development paths (Fussel & Klein, 2006;IPCC, 2007IPCC, , 2013. ...
... Although the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1994) was the first international treaty to acknowledge and address human-driven climate change, and provided a structure for the international consideration of climate change, it did not contain detailed obligations for achieving particular climate change-related goals. 18 The ultimate aim of the UNFCCC was to "stabilize GHG concentration at a level that would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system". 19 Iran ratified the UNFCCC in 1996. ...
Moving toward energy transition for an oil and gas rich country such as Iran could be a great advancement for the global energy transition and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction. Despite the international and national commitments of Iran to reduce GHG emissions and increase the share of renewables in its energy mix, the re-imposition of sanctions following the withdrawal of the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), have hindered the successful achievement of such targets. This paper examines the main impediments derived from these sanctions, as a lack of foreign investment, a lack of technology transfers and consequently, the shift in Iran's policy away from renewable energy. As energy transition toward renewables falls into the category of a global public good through its decarbonising the energy sector, the US's sanctions on Iran will not only affect Iran, but also the global population as a whole. This paper is original since the situation is examined from an Iranian perspective and uses official documents, statements, and laws, obtained from both Persian and English sources.
... Financial capacity is determined by contributions from donor countries, innovative mechanisms and the private sector. 36 Finally, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer may offer relevant lessons for a future agreement on antibiotic resistance. The Montreal Protocol proceeded with initial mild steps followed by periodic scientific assessments, permitting cautious governments to join the protocol as it progressed. ...
... The 2009 Copenhagen Accord contained pledges from developed to developing country Parties for US$30 billion in 'fast start' climate financing between 2010 and 2012, and for an additional US$100 billion in 'long-term finance', per year, by 2020 (UNFCCC 2014). The Accord also proposed the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which would add to the availability of direct access modalities (Lattanzio 2014;UNFCCC 2014). The Copenhagen commitments were reaffirmed in the Cancun Agreements, which followed at 16th Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2010 and ''also proposed that the pledged funds are to be new, additional to previous flows, adequate, predictable, and sustained'' (Lattanzio 2014, p. 2). ...
Small island developing states (SIDS) are among the most vulnerable in the world to the impacts of climate change. SIDS have prioritised adaptation to climate change as it is widely accepted that some climate change is inevitable. Given the high cost of adaptation and the financial constraints faced by SIDS, many have pursued international adaptation financing to meet adaptation costs and ease domestic constraints. This paper analyses international adaptation financing commitments to SIDS across multiple regions between 2010 and 2014. It has three aims. First, it identifies trends in this financing from Members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to SIDS. Second, using a multivariate regression model, it identifies the determinants of this financing to SIDS, compared to other developing countries. Third, it elicits the perspectives of policy-makers in SIDS on their experience with international adaptation financing to date. This study finds that (1) the allocation of funding and donor commitments to SIDS is highly skewed, (2) whether a country is classified as a SIDS is a determinant of the amount of adaptation financing it can expect to receive—other determinants include population, per capita income, governance quality and vulnerability, depending on how it is conceptualised and measured, and (3) SIDS are dissatisfied with the current levels of international adaptation financing and their experience with accessing it. This paper concludes that, while international adaptation flows have not been sufficient, SIDS have not been disadvantaged in their access to such financing over the period, compared to other developing countries.
Can international organizations (IOs) like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) gain significant organizational autonomy, even if member states dominate the decision process? We identify policy-guiding organizational rules as a major source of organizational autonomy that is missed by both intergovernmental and bureaucracy-focused approaches to IOs. Theoretically, we develop a mechanism that demonstrates how organizational autonomy arises from intergovernmental institutional settings, if organizational rules provide clear policy guidance, a decision procedure generates strong incentives for actors to honor these policies, and member states are generally committed to the overall IO policy. Empirically, we show that the institutional setup of the GCF meets these prerequisites remarkably well. The analysis of two highly contentious funding applications demonstrates that the GCF actually produces organizationally preferred decisions, even if important board members advocate different solutions. We conclude that policy-guiding rules may be better predictors for funding decisions in IOs than member state preferences or bureaucratic self-interest.
In the face of negative changes in climate change and the natural environment, the financial system is obliged to change its financial mechanisms as efficiently as possible to help the economy transform according to the green rate concept. The taxonomy published by the EU (2021) is an economic classifier, with the help of which businesses can transform their processes and banks can select green projects. Sustainability and the fight against climate change is one of the strategic directions of the Bank of Lithuania, so in order to achieve better results, it would be appropriate to combine state and business investments. And although the sustainability of business activities is becoming a priority, commercial banks providing loans do not yet have clear criteria or a unified evaluation system for distinguishing environmentally friendly business. In Lithuania, the banking sector is guided by ESG principles, the EU taxonomy regulation, and other autonomously created criteria that allow to decide whether to promote one or another business that could potentially create not only financial, but also additional, sustainable ecological returns. According to the principles of UN Responsible Banking, there are already actively committed banks that contribute to the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement for integrated sustainability as a natural element necessary in the long term. The article analyzes the current topic of the green exchange rate in the banking sector, uses the systematization and comparative analysis of scientific literature. The concept of green finance is discussed; changes in bank activities and a new look at creditable businesses according to the green rate standard and the transformation of banks through the criteria of their activities.
Small island developing states (SIDS) are recognized as being among the most vulnerable countries to climate change—many are highly exposed and sensitive to, inter alia, sea-level rise and increased intensity storms, yet often lack the human and financial resources needed for successful and/or effective adaptation. The international community has responded to SIDS’ precarious situation, in part, by establishing a suite of multilateral funding mechanisms to help finance costly adaptation projects and programs. However, to date, there has been a mismatch between the level of international climate finance mobilized and the scale of adaptation that is needed in SIDS. This paper reviews the relevant academic and policy literatures to provide a system-wide diagnosis of the institutional and conceptual problems plaguing adaptation-specific multilateral climate funds, which are often addressed in isolation. We show that, following the establishment of the Global Environment Facility, many multilateral climate funds have been rife with administrative issues, creating barriers to access for particularly vulnerable countries. The funding that SIDS do receive is often insufficient to meet the costs of adaptation, and funding allocations are demonstrably skewed amongst SIDS and amongst types of adaptation projects and programs funded. In concluding, we propose reorienting multilateral adaptation finance towards resilience as a means of improving the governance of international adaptation finance and increasing access for SIDS and other particularly vulnerable countries.
This paper examines the climate financing potential of transport sector in Pakistan. The study is grounded on secondary data, which is taken from environmental compendium and (Pakistan economic survey 2017-18). The study has focused, the following objectives. To Calculate the Economic Cost and Benefits of Substituting Engine Fuel for small, medium and large vehicles in Pakistan. To Examine the Effect of Policy Intervention on environmental degradation in context of Transport sector in Pakistan and to examine the economic value of CO2 emissions offsetting from transport sector. The study has used simple excel calculations, using the standards of per unite emissions and cost on each kilometer's distance covered. The paper is appealing for funding clean transport and the study has used component and compound base approaches for desegregation and aggregation of environmental quality and economic feedbacks of the policy interventions for transport sector. This study found that shifting from dirty fuel to cleaner fuel the transport will require significant cost for engine shifting. The study concluded that the cost of shifting and economic benefits of shifting to clean fuel indicates that Pakistan can be well-off in long-run but in short run it can increase the existing cost of sector and services.
This chapter outlines the manifestations of climate change in South Asia based on its observed effects and provides country-wise likely changed scenario of climate in the near future. It highlights the impact of climate change on the sea-level, forests, fisheries, marine ecosystem, the effects of temperature rise on precipitation, on tropical cyclone, on the aquafire and depleting level of groundwater, etc. It also vividly elaborates the influence of climate change on people’s health and its induced migration resulting into new abrasion in the urban-scape of SAR. The chapter gives an account of global efforts to address the risk of climate change.
Background
Bangladesh is widely recognized to be one of the most climate vulnerable countries in the world and climate change issues are being one of the major focuses of the government and other development agencies of Bangladesh. One of the most vulnerable aspects in climate change is the fragile ecosystems in Bangladesh. Climate finance is perceived as key enabling factor to protect the fragile ecosystems in Bangladesh from climate change impacts. ResultsThis paper examined the extent current policy and financial instruments in Bangladesh under broader purview of ‘climate finance’ that can protect the fragile ecosystems from climate extremes. The existing public policy discourses regarding climate change finance of Bangladesh neither significantly address the issue of ecosystem approaches of climate change adaptation nor identify restoration or protection of ecosystem as a key adaptive capacity of the vulnerable population and related social, economic, built and natural systems. There are also no financial instruments designed under different climate funds that potentially can address the needs of ecosystem. Conclusions
This fact reminds the way institutional culture in general and culture of policy making in Bangladesh is determined by the powerful minorities in a business-as-usual institutional architectures.
The institutions of global governance have changed dramatically in recent years. New organizational forms—including informal institutions, transgovernmental networks, and private transnational regulatory organizations (PTROs)—have expanded rapidly, while the growth of formal intergovernmental organizations has slowed. Organizational ecology provides an insightful framework for understanding these changing patterns of growth. Organizational ecology is primarily a structural theory, emphasizing the influence of institutional environments, especially their organizational density and resource availability, on organizational behavior and viability. To demonstrate the explanatory value of organizational ecology, we analyze the proliferation of PTROs compared with the relative stasis of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Continued growth of IGOs is constrained by crowding in their dense institutional environment, but PTROs benefit from organizational flexibility and low entry costs, which allow them to enter “niches” with limited resource competition. We probe the plausibility of our analysis by examining contemporary climate governance.
Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to design several methods for enforcing developed countries’ responsibilities under the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GCF has been one of the core subjects of the world climate summits held under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. However, the development of the GCF has not progressed smoothly, and many concerns remain unresolved.
Design/methodology/approach
– This paper illustrates three approaches for financing the GCF that vary in terms of the relative weights accorded to environmental responsibility and economic capacity. These three methods include the historical responsibility (HR) principle, the ability to pay (AP) principle and the preference score compromises (PSC) approach (which is a combination of the HR and the AP principles).
Findings
– The empirical analysis demonstrates that the USA is the largest contributor to the GCF under the HR principle due to the volume of its historical emissions, whereas the European Union bears the greatest financial responsibility under the AP principle, based on its gross domestic product. Under the PSC approach, the European Union and the USA each undertakes a financial burden that approximates 40 per cent of the total financing for the GCF. These nations are followed by Japan, which has a share of almost 9 per cent.
Originality/value
– This study is the first attempt to introduce the PSC concept into discussions regarding GCF financing. A scheme of burden sharing that combines environmental responsibility and economic capacity factors is developed and introduced. The respective weights assigned to the two factors are determined based on the Borda rule in voting theory, which avoids the arbitrary allocation of weights between the HR and the AP. These findings will be useful for mobilising the GCF in the Post-Kyoto era.
Institutional mechanisms for administering international climate finance constitute key components of an effect global climate regime, and the Green Climate Fund represents what promises to become the most important such mechanism. As the Fund begins to serve its function of transferring economic resources from developed to developing countries to support mitigation and adaptation activities, it faces several obstacles. Since contributions to the Fund by states or private parties are voluntary, they are not necessarily based on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle. Its governing instrument also departs from UNFCCC principles. In addition, the Fund faces a significant ambition gap in pledges to fund its operations. By instantiating several informal means of applying climate justice norms to assessments of national contributions to climate finance, some of this resistance might be overcome, increasing support for the Fund and, with this, increasing prospects for reaching consensus on a new climate treaty architecture at COP 21.
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries lack sufficient funds to combat climate change. The growth of projects under the clean development mechanism (CDM) is not consistent in the region and the relation of that growth to national GDP is not equivalent either. The disbursement of climate funds promised by different countries and donor organisations to different countries in GMS region is very low. A few countries have relied more on external funds to combat climate change, while some have developed their own funds. A strong database and involvement of civil societies might help the region better utilise these climate funds.
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) has been one of the core issues of the world climate summits under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in recent years. However, the GCF has not progressed smoothly, and currently there are no satisfactory schemes for raising and distributing the fund. This paper first discusses how to finance the GCF among Annex II countries. It introduces the 'preference score compromises' (PSC) approach which is based on environmental responsibility and economic capacity, with historical emissions as an indicator for environmental responsibility and GDP as indicator for economic capacity. The results show that the United States and the European Union are the two largest contributors to the GCF, sponsoring more than 80% of the funds. Second, we discuss how to allocate the funds among non-Annex II parties. The 'adaptation needs' (AN) approach, which takes account of economic strength and climate damages, is proposed to achieve the adaptation purpose of the GCF, and the results reveal that African countries with high levels of climate vulnerability could get most funds, with a share of almost 30%. Regarding the mitigation purpose of the GCF, this research introduces two approaches: the 'carbon reduction contribution' (CC) approach and the 'incremental cost' (IC) approach. Both approaches could achieve significant reductions in carbon emissions in non-Annex II parties, whereas the latter may provide limited adaptation finance but result in more mitigation effects. This paper also develops a method to combine abatement efficiency and adaptation fairness of the GCF, and we find that with an equal split between the AN and CC (or AN and IC) approaches, the amount of USD 100 billion could finance an emissions reduction of 1613 MtCO 2 (2477 MtCO 2), while allocating USD 16 (or USD 9) per capita for adaptation in non-Annex II parties. The schemes proposed may be useful for promoting the development of the GCF in the future.
The institutions of global governance have changed dramatically in recent years. New organizational forms – including informal institutions, transgovernmental networks and private transnational regulatory organizations – have expanded rapidly, while the growth of formal intergovernmental organizations has slowed. Organizational ecology provides an insightful framework for understanding these changing patterns of growth. Organizational ecology is primarily a structural theory, emphasizing the influence of institutional environments, especially their organizational density and resource availability, on organizational behavior and viability. To demonstrate the explanatory value of organizational ecology, we analyze the proliferation of private transnational regulatory organizations (PTROs), compared to the relative stasis of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Continued growth of IGOs is constrained by crowding in their dense institutional environment, but PTROs benefit from organizational flexibility and low entry costs, which allow them to enter “niches” with limited resource competition. We probe the plausibility of our analysis by examining contemporary climate governance.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.