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Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge

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... This limitation should not apply to the execution of research or making the results available in an internet database or repository, for which I favor an "anything goes" approach (cf. Feyerabend, 1975). Fewer, but more meaningful, publications may help relieve the theoretical stagnation in experimental psychology and allow for its theoretical advancement, however nonlinear and erratic that still may prove to be. ...
... All too strict statistical rules and normative approaches (e.g., Wagenmakers et al., 2012) do not fit in the "anarchist" development of science (cf. Feyerabend, 1975), because they could block unforeseen, but very adaptive, solutions to scientific problems. Reviewers should be highly critical of papers suffering from the statistical illusion and while doing so evade a proper theoretical analysis. ...
... The history of science seems to defy sharply delineated general schemes (cf. Feyerabend, 1975). Its irregular development may show striking parallels to biological evolution (cf. ...
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A publication deluge has impeded rather than advanced theory in experimental psychology. Many researchers rely more on null-hypothesis significance testing than literature studies to determine whether results are worthwhile. Four problematic publication practices are symptomatic for the theoretical deficit: (a) reinventing the wheel, (b) the Proteus phenomenon, (c) mechanical (non) replications, and (d) the survival of discredited hypotheses. Remedies include the development of AI tools recommending semantically related references, mandatory hypothesizing before and after results are known, and theoretical syntheses guided by meta-analyses and process models. The nonlinear theoretical development shows parallels to the optimization procedure of biological evolution. Theoretical hypotheses rather than experimental results are the elementary units of science. The fittest theories may survive alongside the least fit because they are not made to compete in research publications. Even if publication practices improve, winning hypotheses will often represent local optima and still cannot be taken with absolute certainty. It is simply a sad fact that in soft psychology theories rise and decline, come and go, more as a function of baffled boredom than anything else; and the enterprise shows a disturbing absence of that cumulative character that is so impressive in disciplines like astronomy, molecular biology, and genetics. (Meehl, 1978, p. 807) The sheer, and ever-rising, volume of publications has impeded rather than accelerated theoretical progress in experimental psychology. The larger the field, the slower the citation rates of top-cited articles change over the years (Chu & Evans, 2018). New hypotheses apparently do not get noticed and researchers stick to the trusted ones. "A deluge of papers in a scientific field does not lead to a quick turnover of central ideas, but rather to
... However, this again does not mean that we can confuse the two problems under discussion. In his time, E. Mach, for example, continued to believe in the modern idea of a "philosophy of science" [12], but the same can no longer be said of P. Feyerabend, a postmodern philosopher for all intents and purposes, for whom the philosophy of science died or came to an end, giving way to something completely different [13][14][15]. Feyerabend's philosophy invites us to discuss what a "closed" epistemology as opposed to an "open" one would be. If the doctrine is, according to this philosopher (and, as will be seen below, also partly according to Quine himself), that an open epistemology is one where different philosophical approaches to science are entirely legitimate and possible, that is, if the doctrine is that an open epistemology is inextricably linked to relativism, I would say that this understanding of the concept is rather restricted and debatable. ...
... If the doctrine is, according to this philosopher (and, as will be seen below, also partly according to Quine himself), that an open epistemology is one where different philosophical approaches to science are entirely legitimate and possible, that is, if the doctrine is that an open epistemology is inextricably linked to relativism, I would say that this understanding of the concept is rather restricted and debatable. As I have suggested, I do not see why the critical rationalism of Popper, who, for all intents and purposes, is a modern philosopher (i.e., basically Kantian in books such as The Logic of Scientific Discovery), despite the criticism levelled against him by the author of Against the Method [13], is not to be considered an "open epistemology" in view of the social, cultural and political impact of such rationalism, in particular on what we nowadays call "critical thinking". But Popper was surely a champion neither of relativism, as is clear from his important article "The Myth of the Framework", nor of such theses on the subject as those put forward by Quine in "Ontological Relativism" [16]. ...
... Any epistemology is open insofar as it basically accepts this plurality, multiplicity, and diversity. This seems to me to Ribeiro be what Feyerabend argues for, following Quine, at least in part (and also, partially, Popper), with his "methodological anarchism", subscribing to the thesis of "referential inscrutability" [13][14][15]. But that is also what Popper [10] himself claimed since the 1960s, although he basically disputed that such inscrutability could be philosophically sustainable [16]. ...
... The organization question has had proponents on both sides. An anarchistic view with little structural organization for theory construction processes stems from Feyerabend's (1975) book Against Method. Diametrically, in an influential book, Langley et al. (1987Langley et al. ( , 2006 believed they had demonstrated via AI programs that scientific discovery could be achieved using highly organized algorithmic methods. ...
... With 23 heuristics to choose from at each juncture, adding organization would reduce the size of the search space. The framework shows an hypothesized organization structure that does this and guides: including partial serial ordering, cycles, and a hierarchy (partially ordered set) of subprocess relations between processes at different levels, in contrast to the unorganized collection envisioned by Feyerabend (1975). ...
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Science historians have recognized the importance of heuristic reasoning strategies for constructing theories, but their extent and degree of organization are still poorly understood. This paper first consolidates a set of important heuristic strategies for constructing scientific models from three books, including studies in the history of genetics and electromagnetism, and an expert think-aloud study in the field of mechanics. The books focus on qualitative reasoning strategies (processes) involved in creative model construction, scientific breakthroughs, and conceptual change. Twenty four processes are examined, most of which are field-general, but all are heuristic in not being guaranteed to work. An organizing framework is then proposed as a four-level hierarchy of nested reasoning processes and subprocesses at different size and time scales, including: Level (L4) Several longer-time-scale Major Modeling Modes, such as Model Evolution and Model Competition; the former mode utilizes: (L3) Modeling Cycle Phases of Model Generation, Evaluation, and Modification under Constraints; which can utilize: (L2) Thirteen Tactical Heuristic Processes, e.g., Analogy, Infer new model feature (e.g., by running the model), etc.; many of which selectively utilize: (L1) Grounded Imagistic Processes, namely Mental Simulations and Structural Transformations. Incomplete serial ordering in the framework gives it an intermediate degree of organization that is neither anarchistic nor fully algorithmic. Its organizational structure is hypothesized to promote a difficult balance between divergent and convergent processes as it alternates between them in modeling cycles with increasingly constrained modifications. Videotaped think-aloud protocols that include depictive gestures and other imagery indicators indicate that the processes in L1 above can be imagistic. From neurological evidence that imagery uses many of the same brain regions as actual perception and action, it is argued that these expert reasoning processes are grounded in the sense of utilizing the perceptual and motor systems, and interconnections to and possible benefits for reasoning processes at higher levels are examined. The discussion examines whether this grounding and the various forms of organization in the framework may begin to explain how processes that are only sometimes useful and not guaranteed to work can combine successfully to achieve innovative scientific model construction.
... Evaluation should take into account this ambiguity instead of trying to eradicate it. Some teachers, in rejecting this rigid and dogmatic view of science, may accept an extreme relativism, both methodological -"anything goes", there are no specific strategies in scientific work (Feyerabend, 1975)-and conceptual: there is no objective reality which allows us to test the validity of scientific construction. "The only basis for scientific knowledge is the consensus of the research community". ...
... We have already referred to how the nature of scientific activity has given rise to many debates in which nuances and discrepancies are noted (Toulmin, 1961;Popper, 1968;Kuhn, 1970;Bunge, 1976;Lakatos, 1970;Feyerabend, 1975;Laudan, 1984...). Sometimes, this creates a certain confusion among teachers and researchers in science education and leads us to ask if there is any sense in talking about an adequate view of science and if it is worthwhile to include the philosophy of science in programmes for teacher training (Martín, Kass and Brower, 1990;. ...
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Summary We are conscious of the difficulties of speaking about an “adequate image” of scientific activity, which seems to suggest the existence of a supposed universal method, of a unique model of scientific development. We need to avoid any interpretation of this sort. However, this cannot be achieved simply by refusing to talk about the characteristics of scientific activity but with a conscious effort to avoid reductionisms, "myths" and distortions of what can be understood, in a broad sense, as a scientific approach. We shall dedicate the first part of this paper to establishing these distorted views of science. On the other hand, this consideration of the distortions to be avoided implicitly conveys a positive characterisation of the nature of science. Lastly we shall refer to some of the educational implications of such a clarification.
... Por otra parte, los conceptos de verdad y pensamiento racional, fundamentos de la Ilustración, han sufrido un varapalo intelectual enorme a partir de la segunda mitad del siglo XX en determinadas universidades occidentales patrocinadoras de la filosofía posmoderna (Andrade, 2013). Desde Feyerabend y su idea de que no existe diferencia entre la ciencia y un cuento de hadas sintetizado en su lema todo vale (Feyerabend, 1970); hasta Lyotard que considera que la ciencia es solo una narrativa más (Lyotard, 1979), o el mismísimo Derrida, cuya obra se centra en la crítica de lo que él considera la ideología totalizante del logocentrismo; es decir, el pensamiento basado en la lógica y la razón (Derrida, 1967). ...
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El bulo siempre ha existido, pero la difusión global, masiva e instantánea gracias a los entornos digitales es algo novedoso. Contagia a toda la sociedad. Nos coloca ante una pandemia de desinformación que nos reclama prevención y vacuna. Con esa idea —vacunar contra la información falsa— nace este manual. A los autores —profesores de la universidad pública e investigadores de las "fake news" desde distintas perspectivas— nos llegaban peticiones de sectores como periodistas o profesores de universidad y de Secundaria que anhelaban un manual con lenguaje claro, con ejercicios didácticos y con ejemplos cercanos que ayudaran a entender el fenómeno, y que pudiera usarse indistintamente en redacciones, facultades e institutos. Y con ese propósito hemos trabajado: abordamos desde qué es una "fake news" hasta cómo se verifica una noticia; desde cómo el cerebro crea sesgos cognitivos que favorecen la desinformación hasta cómo Wikipedia o Facebook dominan el marco ideológico. Estudiamos la producción, la distribución y la recepción de textos, imágenes y sonidos, porque no sólo se miente con palabras. Y exploramos cómo repercute la desinformación en ámbitos diversos como el auge de los populismos o la salud, sobre todo tras la pandemia del Covid-19.
... In principle, then, the specific practices of all communities of geographers studying mobility are generative rather reductive (Latour 2005). This most emphatically does not mean that "anything goes" (Feyerabend 1975), as all articulations should be plausible to peer groups in academia and increasingly beyond; they must be sufficiently robust, logically coherent, and inscribed into one or more traditions of research that they simultaneously prolong and change (Stengers 2000(Stengers , 2005. Emphasizing the generative qualities of research makes clear that mobility is always more than, and in excess of, what a single study or a particular tradition of research can make understandable. ...
... Huxley's (1932) critique in particular is a profound one, especially because of the irony in his critique, which projects a picture of scientists as individuals with the tendency to treat theory as being a dogma or doctrine of scientism (Sorell 1994;Sheldrake 2012). Consequently, such critical mindset towards theory is in tune with Feyerabend's (1975) anarchistic theory of knowledge, which essentially questions the supremacy of a single scientific method. ...
Chapter
This book chapter provides revitalizing thoughts on the meaning of theory, theorizing, and philosophizing in the field of Information Systems (IS). More specifically, the chapter scrutinizes and explicates central definitions of theory, theorizing, philosophy, and philosophizing, in the context of developing theoretical implications as a part of a larger theory development project. Additionally, the chapter introduces the concept of kernel philosophies and conceptualizes different spaces for theory development projects in IS. Finally, the chapter ends with concluding remarks on philosophy and philosophizing as supportive medium for the theorizing process in IS.
... Estas concepciones de la ciencia están centradas en la observación de las prácticas de los científicos ya aceptados como tales, por lo que deja sin respuesta la pregunta crucial: ¿hay alguna forma de delimitar la "ciencia" de lo que no lo es? Y, sobre todo, ¿por qué preferir la práctica científica tal como se conoce en Occidente antes que otras prácticas de nuestra u otras culturas, como la religión o la magia? La pregunta es más que pertinente, porque una proyección lineal de la idea de los paradigmas de Kuhn, y en menor medida de los programas de investigación de Lakatos, podría desembocar en la propuesta, efectivamente planteada por Feyerabend , de que "todo vale" a la hora de proponer teorías sobre cualquier sector de la realidad, con lo que cualquier práctica o discurso podría aspirar al estatus científico (Feyerabend 1970). ...
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The article explores the different conceptions on public deficit from the viewpoint of the epistemology of paradigms (Kuhn). The main concept is that a particular explanation of a phenomenon (in this case, the public spending and the public deficit) only can be understood within a paradigm, because the words, categories, hypothesis, heuristics, etc., used by researchers, are exclusively internal of such theoretical framework. On the other hand, the evaluation of a specific prediction of a theory, associated with a normative proposal (in this case, the budget constraint for neoclassicals and the expansion of the public spending for postkeynesians) implies a confirmation/refutation of all the theoretical framework, and not only such part of it. Evidences suggest the correction of the poskeynesian predictions about public spending and the failure of the neoclassical. However, the persistence of neoclassical mainstream in the budget constraint conception, in spite of such adverse evidences, is a sign of epistemological weakness of Economics (and the other so called "social sciences").
... The received view has been criticized by some authors (see, e.g., [24,25] ) and it is nowadays maintained to be outdated by several scholars. Nevertheless, we deem that its basic ideas are still epistemologically relevant. ...
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Most scholars maintain that quantum mechanics (QM) is a contextual theory and that quantum probability does not allow for an epistemic (ignorance) interpretation. By inquiring possible connections between contextuality and non-classical probabilities we show that a class TμMP of theories can be selected in which probabilities are introduced as classical averages of Kolmogorovian probabilities over sets of (microscopic) contexts, which endows them with an epistemic interpretation. The conditions characterizing TμMP are compatible with classical mechanics (CM), statistical mechanics (SM), and QM, hence we assume that these theories belong to TμMP. In the case of CM and SM, this assumption is irrelevant, as all of the notions introduced in them as members of TμMP reduce to standard notions. In the case of QM, it leads to interpret quantum probability as a derived notion in a Kolmogorovian framework, explains why it is non-Kolmogorovian, and provides it with an epistemic interpretation. These results were anticipated in a previous paper, but they are obtained here in a general framework without referring to individual objects, which shows that they hold, even if only a minimal (statistical) interpretation of QM is adopted in order to avoid the problems following from the standard quantum theory of measurement.
... The response is straightforward: Whatever works! This emphatic assertion echoes a claim of Feyerabend (1975) in Against Method that "anything goes. " To appreciate this point, we must recognize that creativity researchers have proposed an impressive number of processes and procedures, any one of which is capable of generating creative combinations (Simonton, 2017). ...
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Although scientific creativity has often been described as combinatorial, the description is usually insufficiently formulated to count as a precise scientific explanation. Therefore, the current article is devoted to elaborating a formalization defined by three combinatorial parameters: the initial probability p , the final utility u , and the scientist’s prior knowledge of that utility v . These parameters then lead logically to an 8-fold typology involving two forms of expertise, two irrational combinations, and four “blind” combinations. One of the latter provides the basis for the definition of personal creativity as c =(1− p ) u (1− v ), that is, the multiplicative product of originality, utility, and surprise. This three-criterion definition then has six critical implications. Those implications lead to a discussion of various combinatorial processes and procedures that include a treatment of the No Free Lunch Theorems regarding optimization algorithms as well as the creativity-maximizing phenomena of mind wandering and serendipity. The article closes with a discussion of how scientific creativity differs from artistic creativity. Besides the obvious contrasts in the ideas entering the combinatorial processes and procedures, scientific combinations, products, and communities strikingly differ from those typical of the arts. These differences also imply contrasts in developmental experiences and personality characteristics. In sum, the formal combinatorial analysis enhances our understanding of scientific creativity.
... Historically, discussion about the role of metaphysics in science also includes addressing the demarcation problem in the philosophy of science. 28,[34][35][36][37][38] Although this debate is beyond our purpose here, on one side are those who see a significant and constant role for metaphysics in science. On the other side are those who deny the role of metaphysics or who confine it to the process of discovery or to "immature science, " which does not ascribe to metaphysical constructs, and has replaced them with literal and empirical constructs. ...
... The mainly British sociologists of science such as Harry Collins (1985), Michael Mulkay (1985), Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979). Among philosophers of science, Paul Feyerabend (1975), who comes as close as one can to a rhetoric of science without saying it. Of course, the historian of science Thomas Kuhn, the father of us all. ...
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Paolo Silvestri interviews Deirdre Nansen McCloskey on the occasion of her latest book, Bettering Humanomics: A New, and Old, Approach to Economic Science (2021). The interview covers her personal and intellectual life, the main turning points of her journey and her contributions. More specifically, the conversation focuses on McCloskey’s writings on the methodology and rhetoric of economics, her interdisciplinary ventures into the humanities, the Bourgeois Era trilogy with its history of the ‘Great Enrichment’, her liberal political commitments, and the value and meaning of liberty, equality, and solidarity. Finally, the conversation returns to McCloskey’s ‘humanomics’ approach: an economics with the humans left in.
... The terminology chosen to encapsulate this approach echoes PaulFeyerabend's (1993) famous epistemological anarchism, for which "[s]cience is (and should be) an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives" (p. 9). ...
Thesis
The present doctoral dissertation explores the birth and epistemology of the Anthropocene Hypothesis - that is, the 'stratigraphic' or 'geological' variant of the broader 'Anthropocene' concept. A fundamental target of the research is separating conceptually between the 'Anthropocene' as a boundary object - borrowed, re-shaped, and re-adapted by humanities, social sciences, and extra-academic domains - and the Anthropocene Hypothesis as the formulation of the 'Anthropocene' into stratigraphic grounds. A second related target is delineating an epistemology (i.e., the fundamental knowledge statements and epistemic context) of the Anthropocene Hypothesis based on its birth, its empirical body, its theoretical virtues, and the debates surrounding it. The research locates at the intersection of History and Philosophy of Science, Anthropocene Studies, and Interdisciplinary Research.
... A subject (person)-centred archaeology, as introduced here, is not subjective per se because it is subject-centred. It is not an entry into the chaotic world where anything goes (Feyerabend 1975) and where all actions and interpretations are equally valid. A subject-centred craft involves individuals weighing up all the range of options, actions, and possibilities-of how to walk a landscape, how to trowel or mattock a layer, how to section a deposit, how to sample or empty a feature, how to connect different parts of a site or landscape interpretively, and so on. ...
Chapter
Archaeological fieldwork is normally treated as a matter of applying techniques that are designed to recover particular data sets, which have been identified either on the basis of research priorities or by the concerns of cultural resource management. The data are treated as objectively secure, whilst their interpretation might be open to question. The role of theory is widely assigned to the process of interpretation, and therefore often treated as an optional aspect of the analysis that is excluded from the process of data recovery. We counter this characterization by treating theory as one of the essential tools required by the fieldworker to enable the critical evaluation of the procedures by which archaeological knowledge is constructed. Such a theorized perspective pre-eminently requires that the procedures of fieldwork help fieldworkers to develop an interpretive archaeology of people in an informed way at the moment of fieldwork.
... Hence, the best recommendation is to use whatever works (cf. "anything goes" in Feyerabend, 1975;see Russell, 1983). This necessary ignorance echoes the No Free Lunch Theorems in algorithmic problem solving (Wolpert & Macready, 1997), Table 2. Eight varieties of BVSR: differential timing, location, and strategy. ...
... Throughout the geographically-focused Chapters 3-6, two key concepts in Mediterranean and European LBA/EIA scholarship (Kristiansen & Larsson, 2005) are challenged: 'elites' and 'centralisation'. The author's approach is based on an anarchist perspective (Feyerabend, 1975;Scott, 2012), and grows from deconstructing the prevalent colonial narratives in Mediterranean archaeology. In this perspective, anarchic forms of social organisation are characterized by leadership (a social or communal one), but free of governance, legality, or socioeconomic inequalities. ...
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Ralph Araque Gonzalez. Intercultural Communications and Iconography in the Western Mediterranean during the Late Bronze Age and the Early Iron Age (Freiburg Archaeological Studies 9. Rahden, Nordrhein-Westfalen: Verlag Marie Leidorf, 2018, 397pp., 214 figs., 20 tables, hbk, ISBN 978-3-89646-797-3) - Volume 23 Issue 2 - Pau Sureda
... En este sentido, los referentes epistemológicos de la línea NOS han ido tomando creciente distancia de la visión heredada, instalándose primero en la llamada nueva filosofía de la ciencia (KUHN, 1962;LAKATOS, 1978;TOULMIN, 1972;FEYERABEND, 1975), que aún hoy en día es muy citada, y moviéndose en los últimos años hacia las visiones más actuales, por ejemplo, la concepción semántica de las teorías. ...
... There is equifinality: many roads lead to Rome. As much as Feyerabend (1977) argues against methods in research, I would argue against a method for pursuing an academic career. ...
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‚Landschaft‘ ist ein sehr komplexer Begriff – nicht zuletzt, weil die Prozesse ihrer Veränderungen auf der Ebene der Objekte, des Individuums und ihrer sozialen Konstruktion ineinandergreifen. Die Landschaftsforschung hat in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten zahlreiche theoretische Zugriffe entwickelt, die sich jedoch primär als ‚Theorien mittlerer Reichweite‘ (Merton) charakterisieren lassen. Es existiert allerdings kein umfassender theoretischer Zugriff auf Landschaft und, mehr noch, auf Landschaftsprozesse. Insofern muss die Landschaftsforschung, will sie unterschiedlichen Ebenen von Landschaft und ihren Prozessen gerecht werden, reflektiert auf Theorie- und Methodenmixe zurückgreifen (Neopragmatismus). Der Artikel beleuchtet die Prozesshaftigkeit von Landschaft anhand des ‚dreifachen Landschaftswandels‘, differenziert landschaftstheoretische Grundpositionen aus und stellt zentrale Herausforderungen theoretisch-konzeptioneller Zugangsweisen heraus.
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For several decades, the somatic mutation theory (SMT) has been the dominant paradigm on cancer research, leading to the textbook notion that cancer is fundamentally a genetic disease. However, recent discoveries indicate that mutations, including “oncogenic” ones, are widespread in normal somatic cells, suggesting that mutations may be necessary but not sufficient for cancer to develop. Indeed, a fundamental but as yet unanswered question is whether or not the first step in oncogenesis corresponds to a mutational event. On the other hand, for some time, it has been acknowledged the important role in cancer progression of molecular processes that participate in buffering cellular stress. However, their role is considered secondary or complementary to that of putative oncogenic mutations. Here we present and discuss evidence that cancer may have its origin in epigenetic processes associated with cellular adaptation to stressful conditions, and so it could be a direct consequence of stress-buffering mechanisms that allow cells with aberrant phenotypes (not necessarily associated with genetic mutations) to survive and propagate within the organism. We put forward the hypothesis that there would be an inverse correlation between the activation threshold of the cellular stress responses (CSRs) and the risk of cancer, so that species or individuals with low-threshold CSRs will display a higher incidence or risk of cancer.
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The paper aims to identify, describe, analyse and evaluate the motivational aspects of the decision-making process for university studies based on a questionnaire survey conducted by students of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava (Slovak Republic). Using analytical-synthetic and mathematical-statistical methods, the answers obtained from a set of questions focused on the analysis of decisive motives for the choice of study, field and faculty, the fulfilment of ideas about study and perspectives of further professional orientation and application in practice were evaluated. This matter is very topical, as the decision to study at university is undoubtedly one of the fundamental decisions of life. A specific decision is formed by a number of factors that can shape the student’s approach to fulfilling his/her study duties and his/her attitudes in applying his/her knowledge and skills in practice. Keywords: student motivation, decision-making, university studies, questionnaire, university, Slovakia
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The phenomenon of the quantified self, which is especially addressed by sociology and medical humanities, is still quite disregarded by philosophy. Yet, the philosophical issues it raises are various and meaningful, from the realm of epistemology to the realm of ethics. Moreover, it may be read as a key symptom to investigate the complex technological era in which we live, starting from the meaning of contemporary technology itself from a philosophical perspective. I shall focus on one of the epistemological issues raised by the phenomenon of the quantified self by arguing that it may be read in terms of epistemological anarchism, which also leads to other epistemological issues, such as a possibly detectable crisis of the notions of knowledge in general and science in particular as founded on the relationship between particularity and universality, as well as between reality and ideality. I shall select cases that are peculiarly representative of the founding epistemological stance I shall focus on. Yet, the reason why they deserve special attention is that they are also representative of an increasingly widespread attitude characterising not only the community of the quantified self but also, at least to some extent, anyone of us who may happen to use technologies (from apps to self-track symptoms to google to search symptoms) to try to self-diagnose.
Article
This work explores the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics in relation to Lakatos’ philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of mathematical practice. I argue that, while the philosophy of mathematical practice typically identifies Lakatos as its earliest of predecessors, the later Wittgenstein already developed key ideas for this community a few decades before. However, for a variety of reasons, most of this work on philosophy of mathematics has gone relatively unnoticed. Some of these ideas and their significance as precursors for the philosophy of mathematical practice will be presented here, including a brief reconstruction of Lakatos’ considerations on Euler’s conjecture for polyhedra from the lens of late Wittgensteinian philosophy. Overall, this article aims to challenge the received view of the history of the philosophy of mathematical practice and inspire further work in this community drawing from Wittgenstein’s late philosophy.
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Science proceeds by a progressive process of posing scientific hypotheses and conducting experiments to test them. When this process is directed toward a treatment to improve human health, it is called a clinical trial. The great philosophers of science argued that a good scientific hypothesis “sticks its neck out” with a quantified prediction which can only be tested in an experiment that is free of bias. They further argued that failure should be welcomed as an opportunity to refine and progress, and replication is the best route available to obtain conclusive evidence that a treatment works. In behavioral clinical trials, the scientific hypothesis is translated as the hypothesized pathway. It is the quantified path by which a behavioral treatment is hypothesized to improve a behavioral, biomedical, or chronic disease endpoint. It guides the design of the trial, the interpretation of results, and the next step in a progressive, translational program of research. A trial is inconclusive when it falls prey to any of a number of known biases. Because a behavioral trial synthesizes a behavioral treatment with a health endpoint, biases identified in behavioral sciences, medicine, epidemiology, and biostatistics can all pose potential problems. Mastery of this complete range of potential biases will promote the rigor and conclusiveness of any single behavioral trial.
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Die Digitalisierung verändert nicht nur unsere Welt und unser Leben in ihr, sondern auch die Art und Weise, wie wir sie philosophisch erfassen. Ausgehend von einer detaillierten Klärung der Begriffe „digital“ und „analog“ wird die Hauptthese entwickelt: So lange wir Menschen in hybriden Mensch-Maschine-Systemen leben, müssen wir unsere digitale Umwelt ständig re-analogisieren, ein Vorgang, der in anderem Kontext „Interpretation“ heißt. Dass die Digitalisierung das Ende der klassischen Philosophie bedeutet, wird an zwei von deren Eckpfeilern illustriert: am Platonismus, demzufolge Verstehen letztlich auf einer Reduktion der Vielheit der Phänomene auf die Einheit der Ideen, d. h. der Allgemeinbegriffe beruht, und am Cartesianismus, der mit seiner Forderung, wissenschaftliches Wissen müsse zweifelsfrei bewiesen sein, bis in die heutige Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie hinein wirkt. Wie an einer Neuinterpretation von Turings Imitationsspiel („Turing-Test“) gezeigt wird, mündet das in eine Rehabilitierung der Täuschung „im außermoralischen Sinne“, von der das neue Philosophieren nach dem Ende der alten Philosophie ihren Ausgang zu nehmen hat.
Article
This paper interprets the philosophy of Jean-Francois Lyotard as a postmodernist political theory. Referring to the Lyotard’s Postmodern Condition (1979), postmodernity is marked as the moment when the modernist metanarratives – e.g. Christianity, Enlightenment, Marxism – lose their legitimizing power. A multitude of diverse, mutually irreducible micronaratives weaken the universalistic-oriented project of modernity, and a worldwide fragmentation eradicates any presumption or the possibility to establish social, cultural or any other totality.Lyotard derives his explanation of this world of pluralism from the notion of the language games, a concept introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, 1953). According to the Austrian thinker there are many language games but in their respective heterogeneity it is not possible to reduce all of them to the common set of rules. Similarly, Lyotard’s politics of postmodernism – unimaginable without the infl uence of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language – describes the state of our world in relation to unlimited number of disparate language games. At the same time Wittgenstein’s concept informs Lyotard’s theory of diff erend: a confl ict between two opposing sides which cannot be ultimately resolved since there is no universal criterion of evaluation. Injustice, in this context, is the result of the forceful imposition of particular framework incapable to recognize specifi c position and stance of each of the parties involved. Finally, this paper questions the very justifi cation of the present examination of the philosophy of postmodernity. After recent emerging of various theoretical discourses which off er an alternative to postmodernism, the latter approach is recognized as one among many philosophical options within an interdisciplinary fi eld of contemporary humanities. However, Lyotard’s philosophy of postmodernism – interpreted as a political theory – proves to be a relevant theoretical discourse still capable of explaining pluralism, heterogeneity and incommensurability of modern language games in our – post-postmodern – world.
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This chapter revisits the two conceptions of rationality, one is basically a legacy of the positivistic model of science, and the other emphasizes the Wittgensteinian underpinnings for a reaction against positivistic models of rationality and knowledge that can be seen in the shift from logical models of rationality and knowledge that dominated Logical Empiricism to historical models that have been recently argued for and advocated by historically oriented Wittgensteinians, Kuhn, Toulmin and Feyerabend, that has undermined several crucial assumptions upon which the standard empiricist account depended. The chapter investigates the two conceptions in terms of arguments around foundationalism and non-foundationalism, examining Popper’s critical rationalism and Kuhn’s “paradigms”, Lakatos’ research programmes and the historicist turn in philosophy of science.
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This travel essay is devoted to the trip to the Netherlands made by the editors of METHOD yearbook in October 2019. During the journey the authors took part in the 41st Annual Conference of the Association of Interdisciplinary Studies in the University of Amsterdam and visited Eindhoven to meet Bernardo Kastrup. These notes represent some of their experiences and reflections inspired by the Low Countries that are deeply biographically associated with personal life and scholarly research of René Descartes.
Article
Modern economic science is experiencing difficulties in solving theoretical and practical problems, including its inability to predict future economic crises, and, after their onset, the effective ways to overcome them. This is largely due to the fact that representatives of different theories have different assessments of the ongoing processes in the economy and offer essentially different and often mutually exclusive ways to solve economic problems. The search for a common language and ways to unite the efforts of economists in achieving social progress is on the agenda. The paper addresses the possibilities of productive interaction between scientific programs in economics via mutual enrichment of ideas, and shows what role metalanguage plays in this process. It claims that metalanguage will allow representatives of various research programs to form a realistic view of each other’s concepts, and not to criticize the caricatures of their opponents’ theories.
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Este libro no es una guía de investigación. Lo que aquí se pretende es propiciar la reflexión y el debate con relación a lo que se denominará en este trabajo como la realidad ontológica del diseño, la cual se propone como objeto de estudio de todo proyecto de investigación en diseño. No cabe duda de que esta parte reflexiva ha hecho falta para clarificar el significado y naturaleza de la investigación en diseño. La idea es abrir la discusión en torno al tema y ofrecer una propuesta para concebir esta actividad, definir su personalidad y proponer el pragmatismo como una aproximación adecuada al estudio de la realidad dentro de la cual tiene lugar el acto de diseño. …después de las ciencias «duras», las ciencias sociales han logrado abrir nuevos caminos en la investigación, entre otras razones, por el tiempo y espacio dedicados a la reflexión y a la generación de acuerdos dentro de la comunidad académica y científica. En diseño, es necesario realizar un camino similar. El avance en la investigación dependerá fundamentalmente del proceso de reflexión y debate en torno a lo que es o debería ser la investigación en diseño; su objeto de estudio y la forma de abordarlo. El capítulo 1, describe cómo se concibe y ejerce la investigación en diseño en la actualidad. El capítulo 2, trata sobre el diseño y su realidad ontológica. El capítulo 3 se refiere a la dimensión humana, social e individual del usuario del diseño. El capítulo 4, describe el saber, el sentir y el creer del diseñador. El capítulo 5, analiza el objeto del diseño. El capítulo 6 describe las relaciones entre los elementos ontológicos de la realidad del diseño. El capítulo 7 expone el encuadre y contexto: fase preparatoria para la investigación. Por último, el capítulo 8, aborda el tema sobre el pragmatismo y diseño.
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Международный сетевой альманах SUMMA METHODOLOGIAE (СУММА МЕТОДОЛОГИИ) - это общественный проект и площадка сетевой коммуникации интеллектуального движения последователей Московского методологического кружка. Альманах издается при содействии Некоммерческого научного фонда «Институт развития им. Г.П. Щедровицкого». Составление и общая редакция: Вячеслав Марача и Валерий Проскурнин
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We continuously talk about autonomous technologies. But how can words qualifying technologies be the very same words chosen by Kant to define what is essentially human, i.e. being autonomous? The article focuses on a possible answer by reflecting upon both etymological and philosophical issues, as well as upon the case of autonomous vehicles. Most interestingly, on the one hand, we have the notion of (human) “autonomy”, meaning that there is a “law” that is “self-given”, and, on the other hand, we have the notion of (technological) “automation”, meaning that there is something “offhand” that is “self-given”. Yet, we are experiencing a kind of twofold shift: on the one hand, the shift from defining technologies in terms of automation to defining technologies in terms of autonomy and, on the other hand, the shift from defining humans in terms of autonomy to defining humans in terms of automation. From a philosophical perspective, the shift may mean that we are trying to escape precisely from what autonomy founds, i.e. individual responsibility of humans that, in the Western culture, have been defined for millennia as rational and moral decision-makers, even when their decisions have been the toughest. More precisely, the shift may mean that we are using technologies, and in particular emerging algorithmic technologies, as scapegoats that bear responsibility for us by making decisions for us. Moreover, if we consider the kind of emerging algorithmic technologies that increasingly surround us, starting from autonomous vehicles, then we may argue that we also seem to create a kind of technological divine that, by being always with us through its immanent omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence and inscrutability, can always be our technological scapegoat freeing us from the most unbearable burden of individual responsibility resulting from individual autonomy.
Chapter
Die Methodologie ist die Lehre von den in der Wissenschaft angewandten bzw. anzuwendenden Methoden – man kann sie also sowohl deskriptiv als auch präskriptiv betreiben. Eine Vorstellung davon zu haben, welches Vorgehen als wissenschaftlich gelten kann, ist unabdingbar für jeden Wissenschaftler und jeder Wissenschaftler muss zwangsläufig gewisse Methoden anwenden. Da diese Methoden die Qualität der Wissenschaft und die Verlässlichkeit der Erkenntnisse derselben wesentlich beeinflussen, sollte die Entscheidung darüber, welchen Methoden man folgt und vertraut, bewusst und kritisch getroffen werden – anstatt die Wahl der Methoden dem Zufall, der Tradition oder dem allgemeinen Usus anheim zu stellen. In diesem Buch soll unser Augenmerk zwar der Theoriegeschichte gelten; zum besseren Verständnis derselben sind aber gewisse Kenntnisse der Methodologie von großem Vorteil, vielleicht sogar unverzichtbar. Deshalb soll in diesem Kapitel ein kurzer Überblick gegeben werden über die wichtigsten methodologischen Ansätze und deren Rezeption in der Ökonomie.
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The introduction provides an overview of the central arguments concerning the nature of rationality outlining two competing notions referred to as the absolute notion of rationality and constitutive rationality. The former sees science as the exemplification of rationality as its best and is concerned to advance universal standards of rationality valid for all actual and possible claims to knowledge. The latter is a historical conception of rationality, that views rationality as constitutive of any sustaining system of beliefs. It is a notion that is closely allied to considerations such as intelligibility and the implicit norms of different realms of discourse.
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