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The Utopia of Unified Science: The Political Struggle of Otto Neurath and the Vienna Circle

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Abstract

Neurath's approach to the problem of the unity of science is different from conceptions we may call traditional, to know, those that consider that what unites in one single concept the diverse sciences is the adoption of a method, or those that defend that this is carried through by certain characteristics which can be found in the body of knowledge considered scientific. Neurath's stance also diverges from the standpoint that there is no unifying factor for science, that is, the view that the different sciences are only classified under such concept because of the historical origin of such activities. Neurath's proposal is to consider science as an attitude, a posture in relation to the problems of the world, the scientific world-conception. This text presents such approach in connection to the aspect of social transformation that can be found in Neurath's thought. This is done following a comprehension of the ideas of the Vienna Circle, seeking to understand a continuity among the ideas of the members of such group, especially Neurath and Carnap. The present text aims, as well, at recovering the Neurathian idea that we can use a philosophical approach to science to struggle against the problems of the world.
doi: 10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n2p319
THE UTOPIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE:
THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF OTTO NEURATH
AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE
IVAN FERREIRA DA CUNHA
Abstract. Neurath’s approach to the problem of the unity of science is different from con-
ceptions we may call traditional, to know, those that consider that what unites in one single
concept the diverse sciences is the adoption of a method, or those that defend that this
is carried through by certain characteristics which can be found in the body of knowledge
considered scientific. Neurath’s stance also diverges from the standpoint that there is no
unifying factor for science, that is, the view that the different sciences are only classified
under such concept because of the historical origin of such activities. Neurath’s proposal is
to consider science as an attitude, a posture in relation to the problems of the world, the
scientific world-conception. This text presents such approach in connection to the aspect
of social transformation that can be found in Neurath’s thought. This is done following a
comprehension of the ideas of the Vienna Circle, seeking to understand a continuity among
the ideas of the members of such group, especially Neurath and Carnap. The present text
aims, as well, at recovering the Neurathian idea that we can use a philosophical approach to
science to struggle against the problems of the world.
Keywords: Unity of science; Neurath; Vienna Circle; philosophy of social sciences; encyclo-
pedism.
1. Introduction: the Vienna Circle, Carnap and Neurath
This text aims at discussing Neurath’s approach to the problem of the unity of sci-
ence. Such problem has to do with how the multiplicity of things called “sciences”
can be understood under a single concept. In other words, it is the inquiry over
what all forms of scientific knowledge have in common, or the question about what
science is.
There are three usual answers to the problem of the unity of science. The first
is that science is what is produced by certain method, the scientific method. The
second is that science is a body of knowledge with certain features, such as an origin
in experience, or a logical entanglement of its parts, or the propriety of explaining
the world. The third is the defense that science is a collection of diverse activities
with no significant resemblances among each other, except that they share a historic
origin, namely, the natural philosophy from the 16th and the 17th centuries.
The third conception poses many serious challenges to the other ones. However
this third conception seems to be a rather incomplete provisional answer that rests
Principia 17(2): 319–329 (2013).
Published by NEL Epistemology and Logic Research Group, Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), Brazil.
320 Ivan Ferreira da Cunha
on the idea that science is what scientific communities do. This is unsatisfactory since
it sounds like we are not looking for the uniting factors in the right place.
1
In the present paper, I am going to show another conception for the unity of
science: that which considers science as an attitude, as a way to look at the world.
Such idea was adopted in the 20th Century by the group of philosophers and scien-
tists known as the Vienna Circle.
We are going to discuss the ideas of such group, but it must be clear that it is
difficult (if not impossible) to find a coherent system of such ideas, since Vienna
Circle has always been marked by internal controversies. Such controversies hap-
pened even between Carnap and Neurath, who were the members with most similar
ideas.
2
The undeniable fact, however, is that there was a piece of work written jointly
by three representatives of the Circle (and agreed to some extent by the others). And
in that text the different points of view of the Vienna Circle are supposed to meet in
the same page. That text is known as the manifesto of the Vienna Circle. It came out
in 1929 with the title Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: der Wiener Kreis.
3
Therefore,
one can talk about “the Vienna Circle”, as long as one follows the Manifest; the ideas
of the Vienna Circle, hence, are the ideas presented in the Manifest. This is the ap-
proach we are going to make here, as we seek to understand Carnap’s and Neurath’s
stances as part of the ideal of the Vienna Circle.
In the Manifest the Vienna Circle states that there is a scientific attitude, the
scientific world-conception, characterized by the principle that there is no inaccessi-
ble knowledge, no unsolvable riddles, no unfathomable depths, as can be found in
theological and metaphysical standpoints. Such scientific attitude towards the world
should be taught and enforced to all people, in order to improve educational systems
and life quality in general, since it defends the human capacity of solving problems
with no recourse to any kind of magical thought, and without proposing that we
should faithfully resign face the adversities the world presents us (Hahn, Neurath
and Carnap 1929[1973], p.304–10).
In the Manifest the Vienna Circle also talks about the body of knowledge pro-
duced by the scientific world-conception, and the turning point of such group is that
they deal with such body of knowledge by using symbolic logic tools, which allow
one to understand the connections among scientific concepts. This part of the pro-
posal was developed mainly by Rudolf Carnap, the most well-known member of the
Vienna Circle, by means of the construction of a logical system in which all science
objects (concepts and events alike) are to be related to objects from the elementary
experience of an individual. Hence Carnap proposed a syntax that formulates all
statements of science, demarcating it from metaphysics.
4
The criticism to metaphysics is that it aims chiefly at the expression of feelings
about certain things, making statements that don’t fit the form proposed by Carnap.
The aim of expressing feelings is very important, but metaphysics is not the adequate
Principia 17(2): 319–329 (2013).
The Utopia of Unified Science 321
medium for that: in the Manifest the Vienna Circle contends that such task should
be carried through by art, and not by theorizations that intend to be knowledge
(Hahn, Neurath and Carnap 1929[1973] p.307). Some years later Carnap would
say that metaphysicians are musicians with no musical ability since they can’t
handle any musical instrument they turn into pretense theoretical research (Carnap
1932b[1959], p.73–80).
This is probably the most famous claim made by the Vienna Circle, and it fits into
the second kind of answer to the problem of the unity of science — that which sees
science as a body of knowledge. However in the Manifest one can easily notice that
Vienna Circle proposes science to be united as an attitude, a world-conception. So,
let’s examine the works of Otto Neurath for a better comprehension of this position,
and for understanding how it articulates with Carnap’s proposals in the Vienna Circle
project.
2. Neurath’s social utopias
Neurath was a social scientist and economist,
5
and he had already worked on many
economic, historic and social matters in early 20th Century, before World War I. Dur-
ing the war he also developed some models for economy, and in the reconstruction
period he was nominated a director of a central planning office in the German state
of Bavaria. His office aimed at distributing goods and work force in order to meet
the demands of the different social classes of that state: miners, farmers, industrials,
tradespeople etc. He had quite a success for a while, but in 1919 a communist revo-
lution broke in Bavaria. The revolutionaries were sympathetic to Neurath’s work and
allowed him to go on, but soon afterwards the revolution was violently repressed —
and Neurath was considered a traitor, he was then arrested, tried, and deported back
to Austria.
6
While working in this kind of project, Neurath advanced his view on the social
sciences. His idea is that the social scientist must create utopias, i.e., models of soci-
ety, abstractions as to how a group of people might organize and work. This involves
the elaboration, for instance, of arrangements of social organization, projects for ur-
banization and habitation, models for the distribution of goods, and even standards
of lifestyle. Such utopias would serve to inform the government and ordinary peo-
ple about possibilities for life. Politicians would be like engineers, technologists that
apply the utopias, the theoretical models developed by social scientists, to concrete
situations in people’s lives, proposing alternatives in society.
7
In the 1920’s Neurath
was able to apply his proposals in a urbanization project that aimed at eliminating
slums in Vienna.
It is very important to remark that this is not a traditional technocratic concep-
Principia 17(2): 319–329 (2013).
322 Ivan Ferreira da Cunha
tion of social engineering, in which the government determines the function of each
people in a society, according to some so-called correct scientific theory. Neurath’s
proposal is that each one of the persons involved must be informed about the many
possibilities foreseen by the social scientists, the manifold of utopias available at the
moment of application. Also, the people must take part on the decisions, and even
on the elaboration of utopias. People’s lives would not therefore be altered simply
by a decree: Neurath’s conception implies that people are free to build their own
lifestyles, their own economic systems, or any other thing planned for certain group.
And such freedom is to be enhanced by scientific knowledge.
The technocrat view of social engineering is a form of what Neurath calls pseu-
dorationalism, the idea that reason can furnish proposals that are absolutely correct
and universally valid. Neurath criticizes this position in many texts
8
by saying that it
is an absurd pretension to suppose that any scientific theory, philosophical or artistic
view, or political solution in short, any rational product is to be correct in ev-
ery case, valid for every person and every situation, infallible, and that it takes into
account every aspect of something. In Neurath’s view, even though humankind, by
means of science, has powers to change and improve the world, it is not going to
happen at once, as in a magic trick. Likewise, no solution is complete and absolute,
some problems always remain, just as new challenges are created. Pseudorational-
ism in social science and engineering appears in the form of projects based on some
theory as to how society must be organized, which are presented and applied by
governments without broad debate with the involved community: good social engi-
neering must be able to present to the population without formal instruction how
certain project will be good or bad in short, medium, and long terms. It also must be
able to receive and discuss counterproposals made by such population.
The aspect that interests us is that Neurath considered that this kind of work
was one of the main advantages that the broad dissemination of the scientific world-
conception could bring; he used a scientific method of solving problems in analyzing
the requirements of the people with whom he dealt, instead of merely applying a
fixed model of “good living”, or of “well distributed goods”. The idea was to analyze
each problem under the light of the largest number of possible solutions, aiming at
enhancing the well-being of the humans that receive the product of science.
Another matter that must be mentioned is the importance of communication in
Neurath’s proposals. If the utopias are to be known by every person involved in the
application of a certain project, then it is necessary that such models are presented
in terms that allow the broadest comprehension. Two projects advanced by Neurath
stem from this idea: ISOTYPE, a visual language to present complicated statistical
data;
9
and physicalism, the idea that it must be possible to elaborate all scientific
production in terms of the objects surrounding us. Even if it is not possible to talk
about electrons and societies in palpable terms, somehow such knowledge turns out
Principia 17(2): 319–329 (2013).
The Utopia of Unified Science 323
to things: a led that lights up, or a playground built in the neighborhood. This kind of
object is understandable by everyone, without complicated special instruction. Phys-
icalism, therefore, is not about reducing all sciences to physics: it is concerned with
the educational aim of disseminating scientific knowledge and improving society.
3. Unified science and the Encyclopedia
As Nemeth points out (1982[1991], p.290-2), one of the utopias Neurath set forth
is the so-called unified science, a project presented in the Manifest as the great goal
of Vienna Circle (Hahn, Neurath and Carnap 1929, p.306). The physicalist language
would make possible the cooperation and communication among scientists from the
most diverse fields; and even more than that, not only among scientists, but among
all people, since science affects the lives of everybody. This is what Neurath called
the universal jargon, or universal slang. Such language must be logically articulated
in order to be easily understood and so that it is as free of ambiguity as possible.
Nevertheless, we must take into account that Neurath had no illusions as to gen-
erating an absolutely precise and completely ambiguity-free language: he planned
a language which gets more and more refined in a continuous and infinite process
(Neurath 1937[1983], p.172–4).
Carnap’s proposal, which I talked about in the beginning of this text as the
most famous item in the Vienna Circle showcase, had the objective of establishing
the physicalistic language for unified science. Carnap proposed the concept “thing-
language”,
10
a language that contains only everyday life objects to which all concepts
of science should be able to be related. The idea is that each branch of science has
its own technical and specific dialect, but such jargon should relate somehow to the
objects around us. Each special science has therefore its own laws establishing rela-
tions inside its own ontological sphere; the relation to physical objects happens by
means of an extension to the thing-language, independently of scientific laws.
11
Just like the other social projects advanced by Neurath, unified science should be
built by all those who share the scientific attitude, the scientific world-conception,
from all branches of science, of art, of common life, creating a plurality of views of
science. Unity of science is taken into effect therefore in the union of the people who
share a kind of world-view, the stance that science can help us solve our problems.
Such union is carried through by means of the coordination, or, in better words, the
orchestration of the different areas of science.
12
An important feature of Neurath’s proposal for the union of scientific world-
conception is pluralism. The world-view of each of the persons and groups is not,
and should not be, identical. Neurath says that science itself is constituted like that,
in each of its specific branches. Statements about observables, for example, are con-
Principia 17(2): 319–329 (2013).
324 Ivan Ferreira da Cunha
ceived by Neurath as a complex of concepts which are not simply absorbed by sense
organs: there are sensory elements, but also cultural, historic, and social elements
alike in the observational statements. These are therefore neither simple nor primi-
tive in the common philosophical sense; and each scientific community reaches con-
ventions as to what is observable, just as to what is acceptable. Neurath’s pluralism
keeps away the phantoms of a super-science that intends to legislate over all human
knowledge and of an all-inclusive metaphysics: unified science is the construction
of bridges among sciences, keeping up with the individuality of each area (Neurath
1937[1983], p.172–4).
This exposition may throw a different light on the famous Neurath’s ship illus-
tration, which says that “we are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open
sea, without ever being able to dismantle it in dry-dock and reconstruct it there from
the best components” (Neurath 1932-3[1983], p.92).
13
The idea is that science is
just like any other part of life: it is not possible to stop and withdraw to a safe fixed
place for planing a general renovation, or a reconstruction out of nothing. This illus-
tration shows the opposition Neurath established against the philosophical strategy
of elaborating a “system”, i.e., the attempt to build knowledge as a uniform whole.
Such strategies usually seek a solid and indubitable basis to justify all knowledge
thoroughly. Neurath opposes to systems like those of Descartes and Kant, that failed
to notice our condition of sailors in the open sea: they had the illusion of finding a
dry-dock, apart from any social and cultural context.
The pretension of elaborating a “system” that comprehends the whole of human
enterprise is a form of pseudorationalism. We cannot find a final answer, absolutely
correct, for all our problems, in a philosophical deus ex machina. We must keep
sailing on with the best we have at hand.
In spite of such situation, we can create devices to guide the reconstruction of
our ship, artifacts that might make the construction end up differently. Neurath ad-
vanced one of these with the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,
14
a project
presented in the thirties and developed along the three following decades. It aimed
at bringing to life the utopia of unified science, in which all people that share the sci-
entific world-conception unite and communicate about their productions and their
views of the world. Such cooperation would create a series of works, the Encyclope-
dia itself, that would serve as a source of reference and learning about the scientific
way of looking at the world and of solving problems. Science was to be shown in
the Encyclopedia as a mosaic, a collection of irregular pieces, different from one an-
other, but due to its organization, it generates an image when observed from some
distance.
15
Principia 17(2): 319–329 (2013).
The Utopia of Unified Science 325
4. Concluding remarks
I opened this paper with a characterization of the ideals of the Vienna Circle as a
struggle to enforce a scientific world-conception in opposition to metaphysical or
theological points of view. In such characterization, the proposals of the Vienna Cir-
cle serve very well to Neurath’s political aims, as it integrates his utopias with other
Vienna Circle members elaborations, such as Carnap’s physicalism and logical sys-
tems. When one reads Neurath’s or Carnap’s works from the period focused here,
one faces the risk of forgetting that they were part of a group, so that there should
be an interconnection of all they were saying. As I pointed out, such interconnection
is not to be perfect as the Vienna Circle was not a homogeneous group on the
contrary, polemic was one of their main features.
Therefore, one must ask, after realizing all this political aspect of the Vienna Cir-
cle thought, what was their political struggle — or, if Neurath was the most political
among them, towards what was he struggling? In the Manifest the Vienna Circle af-
firms that the problem they rise against is the strengthening of a metaphysical and
theological tendency, both in common life and in the scholar environment (Hahn,
Neurath and Carnap 1929, p.301–4). And the Vienna Circle would react against that
by putting forward projects that would make science more present in life, initiatives
that would bring a better understanding of science to the world.
As I sought to present, Neurath’s (and Vienna Circle’s) view of unified science as
an attitude towards the world is largely humanistic: the scientific attitude, the unify-
ing bond of all science, is a stance towards the world that considers nothing to be a
priori impossible for the human being no unsolvable problems and no inaccessi-
ble knowledge. Neurath nevertheless doesn’t grant any kind of mystic omnipotence
to humankind, since according to him knowledge is a natural phenomenon which
cannot be built in an ideal manner, in a perfect system. Science is therefore the path
for solving problems, but it is made erratically, fallibly. Following Neurath’s ship
metaphor, the reconstruction of the ship is exclusively and completely within our
reach, but we cannot disassemble it piece by piece in a shipyard so that the rebuild-
ing is carried through as good as we can imagine. We must go on endlessly sailing in
open sea.
We have seen, as well, that Neurath names as utopias the abstract models in the
humanities. Philosophy of science can, as any human endeavor, propose situations
to be aimed at, in utopian fashion Neurath was doing it when he proposed the
Encyclopedia. When the Encyclopedia’s first number came out, in 1938, it seems that
it was already too late, at least for that generation: instead of looking for a scientific
(i.e. fallible, humanistic, pluralist, transparent, comprehensive etc.) way of solving
problems, Europe had taken a pseudorationalist shortcut through totalitarianism.
At this juncture, a common criticism to Neurath’s encyclopedic project — and to
Principia 17(2): 319–329 (2013).
326 Ivan Ferreira da Cunha
Vienna Circle’s project as well is that it became outdated. Traditional philosophy
of science has been supposedly replaced by the “science studies”, a postmodernist
contextual approach that presents itself in the form of many disciplines, such as
sociology of science, anthropology of science, just as other studies that focus on
specific branches of science.
16
Defendants of this area often say that there is no
science as a unified whole and that Neurath’s political utopia is pointless, since it is
a device to fight against totalitarianism and its obscurantist persecution.
17
Science
studies on the other hand fights the political homogenization, since it focus on the
diversity of scientific thought and in the independence of scientific communities
this is supposed to be a more relevant struggle.
A Neurathian response must first of all claim that if there is an environment
for such ideas, it was created by the Encyclopedia. We must remember that Kuhn’s
Structure of Scientific Revolutions was the second number of volume two in that work.
The Encyclopedia really united people who were interested in thinking about science,
and those people communicated and cooperated in such a way that they created a
new way of studying science. Now as to the political part of the criticism, it may
be true that totalitarianism is not anymore the enemy as it was in the 1930’s. But
neither would be the danger of homogenization of thought. The world is no longer
polarized between capitalism and communism as it was during the cold war — also,
the world is not tending towards any of them, as it seemed to be in the nineties.
And therefore the aim of making science diverse enough to stand up against such
polarization does not hold any longer. We don’t have to fear anymore the risk of
having only one way of thinking.
One could argue that both totalitarianism and homogeneous thought are still
huge problems of the current world, and it is reasonable to agree with that. How-
ever, we must notice that such enemies are showing up in a different fashion. This
difference of presentation entails a difference in the understanding of the problem.
Finally, we see that Neurath and the Vienna Circle were struggling against total-
itarianism with a portrait of science as an unified whole. The representatives of the
postmodernist approach sought to fight the risk of homogeneous thought with an
image of science as a diverse and plural endeavor. Thus, the question that remains
has to do with what kind of picture of science we need in order to fight the problems
of today. So, what portrait of science would contribute to, in the Manifest phrasing,
our life of the present?
18
And what kind of problem could we fight? Of course, these
are complicated questions much beyond the scope of this paper.
19
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IVAN FERREIRA DA CUNHA
Núcleo de Epistemologia e Lógica, NEL / CNPq
Departamento de Filosofia
Centro de Filosofia e Ciência Humanas, CFH
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
88010-970 Florianópolis, SC
BRASIL
clockwork.ivan@gmail.com
Resumo. A abordagem de Neurath ao problema da unidade da ciência é diferente de con-
cepções que podemos chamar de tradicionais, a saber, aquelas que consideram que o que
une em um único conceito as diversas ciências é a adoção de um método, ou aquelas que
defendem que isso é feito por certas características encontradas no corpo de conhecimentos
considerado científico. A posição de Neurath também diverge do ponto de vista de que não
há um fator unificador para a ciência, isto é, a visão de que as diferentes ciências só são clas-
sificadas sob tal conceito devido à origem histórica de tais atividades. A proposta de Neurath
é considerar a ciência como uma atitude, uma postura em relação aos problemas do mundo,
a concepção científica do mundo. Este texto apresenta tal abordagem em conexão com o
aspecto de transformação social que encontramos no pensamento de Neurath. Isso é feito
Principia 17(2): 319–329 (2013).
The Utopia of Unified Science 329
a partir de uma compreensão das ideias do Círculo de Viena e procurando entender uma
continuidade entre as ideias dos membros de tal grupo, especialmente Neurath e Carnap.
O presente texto procura, também, recuperar a ideia Neurathiana de que podemos utilizar
uma abordagem filosófica à ciência para lutar contra os problemas do mundo.
Palavras-chave: Unidade da ciência; Neurath; Círculo de Viena; filosofia das ciências sociais;
enciclopedismo.
Notes
1
For a broad presentation of the third approach, see Galison and Stump 1996. There is also
the pragmatist approach, but we shall not discuss that in the present text.
2
A study of the differences between Carnap and Neurath, stemming from a reading of Neu-
rath as a critic of Carnap, can be found in Liston 2009.
3
Hahn, Neurath and Carnap 1929; Henceforth, Manifest.
4
See the Aufbau (Carnap 1928). Afterwards, Carnap left aside the requirement of reference
to the a subject’s elementary experience, taking physical objects as the basic ones in his
system. Such shift, already considered in the Aufbau was stated in “The Unity of Science”
(Carnap 1932a).
5
This and the next sections will discuss Neurath’s proposals. For more information, see
Uebel 1991; Cartwright, Cat, Fleck and Uebel 1996; Nemeth, Schmitz and Uebel 2007; and
Symons, Pombo and Torres 2011.
6
This story is told from testimonies in M. Neurath and Cohen 1973, p.7–29. See also Cat,
Cartwright and Chang 1996, for more historical, political, and sociological elements.
7
See Nemeth 1982 for Neurath’s view of Utopia and for his social engineering projects. See
also the introduction (p.3–12) to Nemeth, Schmitz and Uebel 2007.
8
Neurath 1921 provides a good example of the opposition to pseudorationalism. Nemeth
1982[1991] p.288–90 explains the origins of Neurath’s stance and the continuity between
such standpoint and the scientific world-conception.
9
See Neurath 1973, chapter 7.
10
See Carnap 1936-7, p.466.
11
See discussions about that in Carnap 1934, and Carnap 1956.
12
This aspect is emphasized by Cat, Cartwright and Chang 1996, p.362–9, in connection
with other of Neurath’s political projects.
13
The ship illustration appears in many texts; the one quoted is probably the best known.
14
Neurath, Carnap and Morris (org.) 1955 and 1970. Henceforth Encyclopedia.
15
Neurath presented these ideas in his chapter to the opening number of the Encyclopedia,
Neurath 1938. For more information on the Encyclopedia, see Cunha 201+, Reisch 2005,
Nemeth and Roudet 2005.
16
See Biagioli 1999.
17
See, for example, Galison 1996, and Hacking 1996, for elaborations on that.
18
In the German original, Leben der Gegenwart (Hahn, Neurath and Carnap 1929[1973],
p.317).
19
This paper was written with the support of CNPq, the Brazilian National Council for Sci-
entific and Technological Development.
Principia 17(2): 319–329 (2013).
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