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Russia: Ambitions and Ammunitions in Global Economic Competitiveness
Abstract
After the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., Russia is repositioning itself as a major politicaleconomic actor in the Eurasian geo-region. These aspirations are commensurable with Russian history, geography, and rich mineral resource base, specifically energy. To a large extent, Russia's resurgence has been propelled by extraordinary reliance on oil and gas buttressed by high global energy prices. Russia's political-economic ambitions, posturing, and recent improvements are found in stark contrast with its mediocre ratings in social and environmental performance. The study explores strategic attractiveness, cost, and risk of doing business, and reveals that Russia trails Germany and U.S.A., key aspirational comparators, in critical global competitiveness rankings. It also lags behind China, a major comparator. Under high energy prices, Russia appears capable of maintaining a certain degree of global competitiveness and improvements, although tempered by growing politic-economic strategic ambitions. The study calls for reforms and strategic improvements in developing human capital and innovations toward sustainable global competitiveness.
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Russia has undertaken several largely piecemeal and halting efforts to revamp the armed forces it inherited from the Soviet Union. In 2007, near the end of then-President Vladimir Putin's second term in office, he appointed Anatoliy Serdyukov-the former head of the Federal Tax Service-as defense minister as part of an effort to combat corruption in the military and carry out reforms. After the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict revealed large-scale Russian military operational failures, the leadership became more determined to boost military capabilities. U.S. government and congressional policymakers are following the progress and goals of these reforms as they consider issues related to U.S.-Russia relations and U.S. national security interests. The reforms launched by Russian leadership called for reducing the total size of the armed forces from its size of 1.2 million in 2008 to under 1 million. Three major initiatives included accelerating planned cuts in the officer corps to reduce their numbers from 355,000 to a later-adjusted total of 220,000. The reforms also included revamping the training of noncommissioned officers to make them more effective and introducing military police, both aimed partly at boosting discipline in the barracks. The reforms aimed to reduce the four-tier command system of military districts, armies, divisions, and regiments to a two-tier system of strategic commands and fully manned brigades that could be quickly deployed for combat. A large-scale 10-year weapons modernization plan also was launched, and military budgets are being increased substantially. The weapons modernization plan prioritizes the procurement of new missiles and platforms to maintain strategic nuclear deterrence, but also includes new planes, helicopters, ships, missiles, and submarines for the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, and other arms of service. Russia's national security strategy, military doctrine, and some aspects of the military reforms reflect assessments by some Russian policymakers that the United States and NATO remain concerns, if not threats, to Russia's security. Other assessments, however, emphasize enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities and possibly hedges against the rise of China. Seeming to stress these latter concerns, in December 2008, Serdyukov asserted that the reforms were aimed at switching to a performance-capable, mobile, and maximally armed military ready to participate in at least three regional and local conflicts. Compared to Russia's previous attempts to revamp its armed forces, the current reform effort has gone further in altering the force structure and operations of the armed forces, according to most observers. However, the reforms face daunting delays, modifications, and setbacks. It remains highly uncertain whether Russia will be able to marshal the budgetary and demographic resources to field a substantially professional military with high readiness, as planned, or to modernize its ailing defense industries to obtain a new array of weaponry over the next 10 years. U.S. policymakers have maintained that Serdyukov's defense reforms pose both risks and opportunities for the United States and the West. While warning that Russian military programs are driven largely by Moscow's perception that the United States and NATO remain the greatest potential threats, U.S. policymakers also have raised the possibility that Russia's military reforms might in the future make it feel less strategically vulnerable and that it might participate more in international peacekeeping operations. In general, U.S. policymakers and others have urged a policy of hedging against these possible risks through countervailing diplomacy and defense efforts while also following an engagement policy with Russia to cooperate on global issues of mutual interest and to encourage Russia to democratize, respect human rights, and embrace pro-Western foreign policies.
Reviews the founding principles and policies of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, established in London in 1990. The bank is both a public and private lender, but lacks the remit to take into account environmental conditions and impacts in its programme activities. The author examines the many possibilities for changing the bias of the Bank's policies to ensure that environmental repair is seen to be a legitimate investment opportunity. -T.O'Riordan
The recent global financial and economic crisis has revealed weaknesses of the Russian model of development in the 2000s. It is doubtful whether the efforts currently under way by the Russian Government to “repair” the existing model without political and economic reforms will lead toward a major improvement of the investment climate as only slight changes are being made (e. g., the improvement of the Russian migration regime and the development of special economic zones). However, the federal elections in 2012 could lead to more efficient steps, although it is difficult to predict the scale of probable positive shifts in the investment climate. This article discusses Russian inward FDI and its policy context.
With the publication of his best-selling books "Competitive Strategy (1980) and "Competitive Advantage (1985), Michael E. Porter of the Harvard Business School established himself as the world's leading authority on competitive advantage. Now, at a time when economic performance rather than military might will be the index of national strength, Porter builds on the seminal ideas of his earlier works to explore what makes a nation's firms and industries competitive in global markets and propels a whole nation's economy. In so doing, he presents a brilliant new paradigm which, in addition to its practical applications, may well supplant the 200-year-old concept of "comparative advantage" in economic analysis of international competitiveness. To write this important new work, Porter and his associates conducted in-country research in ten leading nations, closely studying the patterns of industry success as well as the company strategies and national policies that achieved it. The nations are Britain, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. The three leading industrial powers are included, as well as other nations intentionally varied in size, government policy toward industry, social philosophy, and geography. Porter's research identifies the fundamental determinants of national competitive advantage in an industry, and how they work together as a system. He explains the important phenomenon of "clustering," in which related groups of successful firms and industries emerge in one nation to gain leading positions in the world market. Among the over 100 industries examined are the German chemical and printing industries, Swisstextile equipment and pharmaceuticals, Swedish mining equipment and truck manufacturing, Italian fabric and home appliances, and American computer software and movies. Building on his theory of national advantage in industries and clusters, Porter identifies the stages of competitive development through which entire national economies advance and decline. Porter's finding are rich in implications for both firms and governments. He describes how a company can tap and extend its nation's advantages in international competition. He provides a blueprint for government policy to enhance national competitive advantage and also outlines the agendas in the years ahead for the nations studied. This is a work which will become the standard for all further discussions of global competition and the sources of the new wealth of nations.
In this paper, we study panel data on region-to-region gross migration flows in Russia for 1995-2010. We find that barriers to labor mobility that hindered internal migration in 1990s, have been generally eliminated by the end of 2000s. In 1990s many poor Russian regions were in a poverty trap: potential workers wanted to leave those regions but could not afford to finance the move. In 2000s (especially in late 2000s), these barriers were no longer binding. Overall economic growth and development of financial markets allowed even poorest Russian regions to grow out of the poverty traps. This resulted in convergence in Russian labor market in 2000s; the interregional gaps in incomes, wages and unemployment rates decreased substantially and are now comparable to those in Europe.
Pension reform is a key policy challenge in Russia. This paper examines how pension spending could increase in Russia in the absence of reforms, quantifies the impact of some recent proposals, and suggests some alternatives that would ensure public pension benefits - relative to wages - not fall from current levels while containing spending.
The paper explores evolution and current state of the Russian corporate governance in cultural context. Russia has a relatively short history of corporate governance, and securities market and stock capital play a less significant role, compared to the West. The evolution of culture and corporate governance is analyzed in a comparative setting. Under the Soviet framework, business and corporate developments were non-existent or severely restricted. The post-Soviet capitalism is characterized by dynamic and turbulent developments in corporate governance and business culture. The paper examines the Russian findings from the recent international studies of culture and explores cultural impact on corporate governance in the country.
This article examines the background conditions, trends, and scenarios of Russian economic internationalization. In the context of globalization, Russia is stepping up efforts to re-establish itself as a regional and global power. Despite recent progress in domestic economic development, Russia's comparative ratings in major international surveys remain modest or low and many indicators of political rights and civil liberties in Russia demonstrate worsening trends. Russia still lags behind other countries on many of the criteria measuring economic freedom, market attractiveness, globalization, corruption, opacity, and competitiveness. The article explores the lessons for Russia in its political-economic transformation from “peer” countries such as Chile, China, and Venezuela. In exploring the driving forces of Russian economic internationalization, the article focuses on three alternative scenarios conceptualized as “Chilean,” “Chinese,” and “Venezuelan.” Each of these scenarios reflects various traits that have commonalities with the Russian political-economic system, leadership, and situational characteristics in the international context. After examining the internal dynamics and external environmental factors pertaining to Russia, the article concludes that the most probable mid-range alternative for economic internationalization will resemble the Venezuelan scenario, with some elements of the Chinese model also evident.
The essence of strategy formulation is coping with competition. Yet it is easy to view competition too narrowly and too pessimistically. While one sometimes hears executives complaining to the contrary, intense competition in an industry is neither coincidence nor bad luck.
In 1979, a young associate professor at Harvard Business School published his first article for HBR, "How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy." In the years that followed, Michael Porter's explication of the five forces that determine the long-run profitability of any industry has shaped a generation of academic research and business practice. In this article, Porter undertakes a thorough reaffirmation and extension of his classic work of strategy formulation, which includes substantial new sections showing how to put the five forces analysis into practice. The five forces govern the profit structure of an industry by determining how the economic value it creates is apportioned. That value may be drained away through the rivalry among existing competitors, of course, but it can also be bargained away through the power of suppliers or the power of customers or be constrained by the threat of new entrants or the threat of substitutes. Strategy can be viewed as building defenses against the competitive forces or as finding a position in an industry where the forces are weaker. Changes in the strength of the forces signal changes in the competitive landscape critical to ongoing strategy formulation. In exploring the implications of the five forces framework, Porter explains why a fast-growing industry is not always a profitable one, how eliminating today's competitors through mergers and acquisitions can reduce an industry's profit potential, how government policies play a role by changing the relative strength of the forces, and how to use the forces to understand complements. He then shows how a company can influence the key forces in its industry to create a more favorable structure for itself or to expand the pie altogether. The five forces reveal why industry profitability is what it is. Only by understanding them can a company incorporate industry conditions into strategy.
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