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Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?
Abstract
Prevailing accounts of natural values as the subjective response of the human mind are reviewed and contested. Discoveries in the physical sciences tempt us to strip the reality away from many native-range qualities, including values, but discoveries in the biological sciences counterbalance this by finding sophisticated structures and selective processes in earthen nature. On the one hand, all human knowing and valuing contain subjective components, being theory-Iaden. On the other hand, in ordinary natural affairs, in scientific knowing, and in valuing, we achieve some objective knowing of the world, agreeably with and mediated by the subjective coefficient. An ecological model of valuing is proposed, which is set in an evolutionary context. Natural value in its relation to consciousness is, examined as an epiphenomenon, an echo, an emergent, an entrance, and an education, with emphasis on the latter categories. An account of intrinsic and instrumental natural value is related both to natural objects, life fonns and land forms, and to experiencing subjects, extending the ecological model. Ethical imperatives follow from this redescription of natural value and the valuing process.
... We followed Worster (1977:xi) and Rolston (1982Rolston ( , 1994 in defining intrinsic value as existing independently of humans. Importantly, although humans cannot bestow intrinsic value, they can acknowledge or recognize it. ...
... Several of them spoke of their personal sensory experience as the basis for their belief in the intrinsic value of bobwhites. When they spoke of bobwhite's intrinsic worth, they acknowledged a value for quail that exists independently of human consciousness (Worster 1977;Rolston 1982;Callicott 1985;Rolston 1994). This links directly to their culturally oriented concerns, for they explained that, without intrinsic appreciation for quail instilled in younger generations, the existence of quail will likely be taken for granted, making conservation efforts more challenging. ...
A vast body of ecological research addressing northern bobwhites (Colinus virginianus) exists across this species’ range. State wildlife agencies have regulated bobwhite hunting for a century or more in most states where the species is hunted, and in some cases have expended considerable treasure on bobwhite conservation. Moreover, wildlife conservationists actively manage numerous private and public properties specifically to benefit bobwhites, and have done so for decades. Yet despite all this activity, northern bobwhite abundance has declined across this species’ range for roughly a century, declines are well documented since the 1960s, and this trend continues even in states where the species is most common, such as Texas. Abundance of other grassland bird species show similar trajectories. Although numerous factors may be proximate causes of declining bobwhite abundance, most bobwhite ecologists agree the ultimate cause of these declines is landscape scale loss of suitable habitat that can support all bobwhite life requisites through time. In Texas, these losses primarily are related to (1) lack of fire in modern landscapes, (2) grazing practices, (3) invasive exotic vegetation, and (4) habitat fragmentation due to the previous three factors as well as land ownership fragmentation, suburbanization, and changes to cultivated croplands. Unfortunately, most habitat management tends to occur at a finer spatial scale, and harvest management at a broader spatial scale, than is relevant to bobwhite populations (many Texas properties intensively managed for bobwhite hunting are an exception to this second generalization). Regardless, considering the vast amount of biological data already available addressing bobwhite ecology, more such data are unlikely to lead to changes in the trajectories of bobwhite populations. Instead, any hope of halting or reversing this decline in abundance requires social science that focuses on societal factors underlying conservation policy, because private land management is critical to bobwhite conservation as most bobwhites occur on private lands. We narrowed this gap by completing a two-phase social science study of private land managers in Texas. The first phase used focus groups to discover how primary stakeholders experience and think about northern bobwhites and other grassland bird conservation in Texas. The second phase of the study used the results of the thematic analysis of focus group data to refine questions for a survey instrument, which then was implemented and the data evaluated.
... Some scholars argue that nature holds objective intrinsic value, i.e. value is inherent and not conferred by humans(Soulé, 1985;Rolston, 1982). Thus, nature counts 'whether or not there is anybody to do the counting'(Rolston, 1982). ...
... Some scholars argue that nature holds objective intrinsic value, i.e. value is inherent and not conferred by humans(Soulé, 1985;Rolston, 1982). Thus, nature counts 'whether or not there is anybody to do the counting'(Rolston, 1982). ...
The concept of ecosystem services, wide-spread in academia and policy making, emphasizes societal and economic dependence on natural systems for, among others, provision of food, fibres and water, regulation of climate and soil, and contribution to spiritual and cultural values. Anthropogenic pressures driven by rapid economic development are, however, causing a disruption in the benefits that humans obtain from ecosystems.
Several economic sectors both depend on and impact ecosystem services. There is therefore maturing expectation for the private sector involvement in environmental governance worldwide, as firms are increasingly motivated to pursue sustainability for financial or strategic opportunities.
This dissertation is among the first to address the current research void on the interactions between industries and ecosystem services. The topic is analysed in the context of extensive plantation forestry in the emerging economy of China. The main aim of this work is to investigate if and how the ecosystem services narrative can contribute to further develop corporate sustainability agendas and practices.
Based on the findings from this work, ecosystem services research can provide insights and tools to pursue a more comprehensive and holistic acknowledgement of and response to interlinked ecological and social issues in corporate sustainability. For instance it can enable the understanding of company impacts and dependencies on ecosystems, and associated business risks and opportunities; deepen the analysis of company stakeholders’ perspectives and expectations; contribute to the design of sustainability-oriented practices; and enrich corporate disclosure practices.
Further operationalisation of the ecosystem services approach into corporate sustainability would require a more systematic assessment and comparison of the relations between relevant business sectors and ecosystems, the analysis of global-local trade-offs, the internalizations of concepts such as ecological limits and ecological resilience, and the elaboration of suitable corporate and industrial response strategies.
... Environmental advocates found a new home in the emerging field of conservation biology, where the object is to preserve, or restore and maintain the land community as a biodiverse whole. has an intrinsic value apart from any instrumental, or use, value (ecosystem services) that it provides to human beings (Rolston 1982;Callicott 1986Callicott , 1999 As a consequence, the remaining earth does not absorb rainwater well, which leads to frequent and sometimes serious flooding along the waterways that run down the mountain hollows (Erikson 1978). 7 Strip mining raises toxic chemicals to the earth's surface where they flow into these flooding waterways, poisoning the people while damaging homes, crops, livestock, and other creatures in the living world. ...
... Thus, it is questionable if relational values should be considered a 'third' ethical values concept next to instrumental and intrinsic value (Piccolo, 2017), rather than just an approach that involves more indepth and qualitative methods for ES assessments (Stålhammar and Thorén, 2019). In fact, 'relational values' are not new; they have long been part of environmental thought, in the sense of involving people's meaning-saturated relations with nonhuman nature (Thoreau, 1854;Leopold, 1949;Rolston, 1981Rolston, , 1982Berry, 1988). Such values can also be seen as being rooted in a sense of wonder toward nature (Carson, 1965;Washington, 2019) and in ecoreciprocity (Kimmerer, 2013a;Washington, 2021). ...
The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) has become influential in biodiversity conservation. Its research is published widely and has been adopted by the United Nations and the Convention for Biological Diversity. This platform includes discussion about how values relate to biodiversity conservation. The IPBES emphasizes “relational values”, connecting these with living a “good life,” and “nature's contributions to people” (NCP); building upon ecosystem services (ES), which have dominated nature valuation for 15+ years. Although the IPBES acknowledges instrumental and intrinsic natural values, they purport that by adopting relational values, conservation will become more socially- and culturally- inclusive, moving beyond the “unhelpful dichotomy” between instrumental and intrinsic values. We wholeheartedly agree that conservation should become more inclusive – it should, in fact, morally include nonhuman nature. We argue that far from being half of an unhelpful dichotomy, intrinsic natural values are incontrovertible elements of any honest effort to sustain Earth's biodiversity. We find NCP to be mainly anthropocentric, and relational values to be largely instrumental. The “good life” they support is a good life for humans, and not for nonhuman beings or collectives. While passingly acknowledging intrinsic natural values, the current IPBES platform gives little attention to these, and to corresponding ecocentric worldviews. In this paper we demonstrate the important practical implications of operationalizing intrinsic values for conservation, such as ecological justice, i.e., “peoples' obligations to nature”. We urge the IPBES platform, in their future values work, to become much more inclusive of intrinsic values and ecocentrism.
... Między innymi z tego powodu relacja człowiek-przyroda z istoty swojej ma znaczenie moralne. Człowiek oddziałując na przyrodę, zmienia i kształtuje nie tylko rzeczywistość pozaludzką, ale -co równie ważne -odnosi się też (choć często pośrednio) do drugiego człowieka i własnego człowieczeństwa (Rolston III 1982). Franciszek w Laudato si' wskazuje na powiązanie degradacji środowiska naturalnego z degradacją środowiska ludzkiego, zwłaszcza w krajach ubogich (LS: 43-52). ...
Celem artykułu jest analiza treści i metod akademickiego kursu przygotowanego dla studentów kierunków katechetycznych, zatytułowanego „Teologia stworzenia i etyka ekologiczna”. Teoretyczną inspiracją kursu jest przede wszystkim encyklika Laudato si’ Papieża Franciszka, która daje głębszą podstawę dla etyki ekologicznej niż etyka świecka, również pokrótce przypomniana w artykule. Wywód prowadzi do wniosku, że nowe inicjatywy katechezy ekologicznej są potrzebne dla kształtowania chrześcijańskiego, a zarazem zgodnego ze stanem współczesnej wiedzy naukowej, stosunku do środowiska naturalnego, zaś przedstawiony kurs może pomóc w przygotowaniu przyszłych katechetów do realizacji tego zadania.
... Między innymi z tego powodu relacja człowiek-przyroda z istoty swojej ma znaczenie moralne. Człowiek oddziałując na przyrodę, zmienia i kształtuje nie tylko rzeczywistość pozaludzką, ale -co równie ważne -odnosi się też (choć często pośrednio) do drugiego człowieka i własnego człowieczeństwa (Rolston III 1982). Franciszek w Laudato si' wskazuje na powiązanie degradacji środowiska naturalnego z degradacją środowiska ludzkiego, zwłaszcza w krajach ubogich (LS: 43-52). ...
The aim of this article is to explore Georg Simmel's concept of the blasé attitude and to contrast it with the notion of intelligent teachability, derived from Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition. Here, Stanisław Gałkowski and Paweł Kaźmierczak view these two accounts through the lens of contemporary virtue epistemology, which helps to demonstrate their relevance to present-day educational theory, and to order the attitudes in question as intellectual counterparts of vice, akrasia, self-control, and virtue. There are two main criteria for how to distinguish these four states: (1) motivation to have epistemic contact with reality, and (2) the proper balance between receptivity and autonomy in learning. Taking the formation of intellectual character to be an important educational goal, Gałkowski and Kaźmierczak highlight the role of the teacher as an exemplar of mental disposition.
... Replicating the problem of the nature of values, Rolston (1982) admited that values exist objectively, insofar as they are generated and projected by nature and discovered and interpreted and read by human beings; hence, in this context, the author defends, nature possesses its own (systemic) value, one which is enrooted in its extraordinary generative capacity, i.e., the capacity to produce beings, values and history. In the words of the philosopher, "Nature is a fountain of life, and the whole fountain -not just the life that issues from it-is of value. ...
his reflection on the moral consideration of nature begins with two classic arguments of environmental ethics which, while alerting to the growing human pressure on the environment, show the need to rethink the relation of humans and natural world. In my view, Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, seconded by John Baird Callicott and Holmes Rolston III, is the approach in environmental ethics which not only postulates a broader comprehension of the universe of moral concern, but also lays the ground for a new ethical paradigm wherein the human, as a responsible member of the biotic community, has the duty to preserve the integrity, the balance and the beauty of the latter.
... 'Independent of the valuer' can again be interpreted in two ways: the strong or weak sense (O'Neill 1992). The weak sense suggests that evaluative properties exist even in the absence of the human mind (Rolston 1982); this is the objective intrinsic value definition used by IPBES (2016), but it is a difficult position to maintain (O'Neill et al. 2008;Svoboda 2011). In contrast, in the strong sense, objective intrinsic value means that evaluative properties can be characterised without reference to the (human) valuer (O'Neill 1992). ...
This paper addresses central limitations of ecosystem services and nature’s contributions to people (NCP) by developing a novel approach to consideration of intrinsic values of nature. Intrinsic values are seen as bundled with values of ecosystem services and NCP within the Life Framework, an innovative, comprehensive and easy to communicate framework of values. Building on work by John O’Neill, values are conceived of as related to living with, from, in and as the world. These frames are related to but distinct from more formal ethical justifications of intrinsic, instrumental and relational values, which straddle the four Life Frames. Focusing on intrinsic values, we conceive these as ends without reference to humans as valuers, but which nonetheless can be articulated by people. We draw on more-than-human participatory research and post-normal science to promote the articulation and deliberation of perspectives and interests of the more-than-human world by an extended peer community. This clearly differentiates our approach from both rights-based intrinsic value and utilitarian existence value approaches, although it is inclusive of them. The approach is demonstrated by an elaborate integrated marine ecosystem valuation, where we investigate associations between intrinsic and relational values and the four Life frames. The Life Framework, operationalised through the post-normal, more-than-human participatory approach, operationalises articulated intrinsic values in a way that puts them on an equal footing with values of ecosystem services and NCP, providing an opportunity to bridge and reconcile these different types of value through deliberation. This enhances the recognition and procedural justice of valuation, while at the same time retaining the practical advantages that the ecosystem services framework brings.
... 'Independent of the valuer' can again be interpreted in two ways: the strong or weak sense (O'Neill 1992). The weak sense suggests that evaluative properties exist even in the absence of the human mind (Rolston 1982); this is the objective intrinsic value definition used by IPBES (2016), but it is a difficult position to maintain (O'Neill et al. 2008;Svoboda 2011). In contrast, in the strong sense, objective intrinsic value means that evaluative properties can be characterised without reference to the (human) valuer (O'Neill 1992). ...
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This paper addresses central limitations of the ecosystem services and nature’s contributions to people (NCP) frameworks by developing a novel approach to consideration of intrinsic values of nature. Intrinsic values are seen as bundled with relational and instrumental values within the Life Framework, an innovative, comprehensive and easy to communicate framework of values. Building on work by John O’Neill, values are conceived of as related to living with, from, in and as the world. These frames are related to but distinct from more formal ethical justifications of intrinsic, instrumental and relational values, which straddle the four Life Frames. Focusing on intrinsic values, we conceive these as ends without reference to humans as valuers, but which nonetheless can be articulated by people. We draw on more-than-human participatory research and post-normal science to promote the articulation and deliberation of perspectives and interests of the more-than-human world byan extended peer community. This clearly differentiates our approach from both rights-based intrinsic value and existence value approaches, although it is inclusive of them. The approach is demonstrated by an elaborate integrated marine ecosystem valuation, wherewe investigate associations between intrinsic and relational values and the four Life frames. The Life Framework, operationalised through the post-normal, more-than-human participatory approach operationalises articulated intrinsic values in a way that puts them on an equal footing with values of ecosystem services and NCP, providing an opportunity to bridge and reconcile these different dimensions of value through deliberation. This enhances the recognition and procedural justice of valuation, while at the same time retaining the practical advantages that the ecosystem services framework brings.
... 9 However, while the wind demands an anthropocentric value system, the environmental critic Holmes Rolston III has posed an alternative biocentric axiology through which we can understand this phenomenon. 10 According to Rolston, an intrinsic biological value can be found in natural processes, a term he calls 'biofunctionalism'. 11 Contrary to the human desire to attribute value to a naked world, following Rolston's thesis, I will argue that the peculiar nature of the wind and the cultural symbolism of the weathercock brings to light what Jacques Derrida has termed the 'economic circle'. ...
... Also in this early literature were debates about the relevance of metaethics to normative claims about the intrinsic value of the natural world. Some argued that theories attributing intrinsic value to those parts of the natural world that lack subjectivity (plants, for example) are incompatible with certain metaethical claims about the metaphysical status of value, most notably subjectivist claims (Rolston 1982(Rolston , 1988. If subjectivism understands normative claims to be expressions or descriptions of the subjective mental states of valuers, then it is unclear how these parts of the natural world could have value in their own right (i.e., independently of their relation to an appreciating subject). ...
Environmental ethics is the field that investigates the question of which ethical norms are appropriate for governing human interactions with the natural environment. Considered a branch of practical or applied ethics, environmental ethics has only existed as a field since the late 1970s. At that time, concern about environmental problems was growing, and some philosophers concluded that mainstream ethics' focus on humans' relationships with other humans had left it without a useful theoretical framework for ethically evaluating the relationship between humans and the nonhuman natural world. In response to this situation, they suggested that a new field of inquiry was needed to investigate this matter directly (Rolston 1975; Callicott 1979; Routley and Routley 1979; Regan 1981).
... Moreover, intrinsic conservation ethic depends on the philanthropic attitude towards conservation. It may mean the understanding of equality in valuing all the species for themselves but not as the Value is an objective property of some natural being, which would exist in the absence of man or whether this notion can only be meaningfully conceived of in the presence of a conscious observer (Rolston, 1982;Callicott, 1992). In this context, there developed two schools of thought regarding the bio-centric approach, i.e. the bio-centric individuals and the bio-centric holism. ...
... Our focus on identity should not be construed as an argument for intrinsic value, or the value that a thing has in itself, or for its own sake (Rolston 1982(Rolston , 1994. Instead, identity develops via relationships, rather than in isolation (Ricoeur 1992). ...
Wildlife conservation policy discussions in the United States and Canada often revolve around historical accounts of the success of wildlife management grounded in the public trust doctrine. We suggest that the usefulness of these discussions is partially limited by failure to consider the importance of wildlife “identity” rooted in freedom (i.e., how humans socially construct the “wildness” dimension of wild animals). To demonstrate the interrelations between identity and freedom, we explain that the class of subjects people care most about—partners, children, and people in general—typically should not be privately owned (i.e., chattel) because freedom (as opposed to slavery) is generally accepted as central to human identity, and its abrogation therefore degrades human identity. The degree to which this ethical argument applies to privatization of wildlife depends upon the relationship between freedom and the identity of wildlife as perceived by society. Thus, we suggest policy decisions regarding privatization of wildlife will be more accurately deliberated if society and wildlife professionals more completely considered the degree to which freedom is essential to a wild species’ identity and the degree to which that identity is inviolable.
... Niektorí autori (napr. P. W.Taylor 1981) používajú termín inherentná hodnota vo význame vlastnej (intrinzickej) hodnoty. J.Rodman (1977: 108) tvrdí, že napriek tomu, že nedisponujeme jasným a definitívnym vymedzením preferencií vo vzťahu k hodnotám a hodnoteniu biosféry, všetky prírodné entity majú vlastnú hodnotu už len preto, že sú tým, čím sú.H.Rolston III. (1982) (predstavil antropo-apikálny model ekologickej etiky) pri analýze hodnotovej preferencie prírody pracuje s modelom hodnotovej triády: 1.Ilustračnou deskripciou uvedených modelov dokumentujeme veľkú (a často neprehľadnú) variabilitu v tejto problémovej oblasti. Kým prejdeme k výkladu prístupov k hodnotám a hodnoteniu prírody a prírodných ...
Vysokoškolská učebnica predstavuje panorámu ekologicko - etických konceptov - ekologické etiky, ako možnosť kultúrneho vývoja a naznačuje pokračujúce hľadanie vzťahov s cieľom uznať význam etiky a jej vplyvu na naše porozumenie a náš vzťah so svetom prírody, vrátane scenárov primerane odrážajúcich interakciu človek - príroda v celej ich zložitosti. Osobitná pozornosť je venovaná otázke vnútorného hodnotenie prírody, ľudského a mimoľudského života, a to tak na individuálnej a holistickej úrovni (biocentrizmu) a hodnote fyzikálnych prvkov ekosystémov (ecocentrism).
... Su Ética de La Tierra, escrita en 1949, promovió una aproximación holista del en- tendimiento de una persona en su visión de las relaciones con el medio ambiente. En ella establece que los límites de la moral común incluían suelos, aguas, plantas y ani- males, en definitiva, a la Tie- rra vista colectivamente (Rolston, 1982). ...
The problems of hunger, poverty and ignorance are enemies of the global ecosystem. Therefore, their solutions should not be adopted only for ecological reasons, but for humanitarian reasons as well. Ecology is not to take all responsibility for the environment; it is necessary to consider as well bioethical, social, economical and legal issues, and to adopt policies addressing the problem. It is unavoidable to know the human ontology in order to build a true ecological ethics, without falling in anthropocentric and biocentric extremes. This essay discusses the position of the human being as the moral subject of ecological ethics. It is concluded that human beings possesses two faculties that make them substantially different from other entities: a) intelligence, which aims to seek the objective truth, and b) willingness, which gives the capacity to be free, be responsible of one actions, and capability to love. These abilities are what characterize the human species as a moral agent. The human being, with a responsibly well done work ennobles the environment.
... Such changes would dramatically impact relative prices, rendering neoclassical-style economic and political prescriptions ''especially inappropriate'' (Rammel and van den Bergh 2015, p. 122). Technology and social value co-evolve alongside society's relationship with the natural world (Rolston 1982;Rhodes 1988;Foster 2000); it must be questioned whether or not ours is a society which, as currently constructed, can breed economic valuations appropriate to realizing sustainable ends (Costanza 2000;Foster 2002). Economic valuation approaches derived from existing institutions, policies, and wealth distributions, may become untenable. ...
Founded upon sustainability science, the ecosystem services concept is increasingly defined by an economic valuation approach to natural capital. This latter-day addition risks subsuming the central message of the ecosystem services concept: that humanity is reliant upon the natural world. Three arenas of inappropriate application of the economic valuation approach to ecosystem services are detailed, these are defined as ecological, social-natural, and socioeconomic problems. Each problematic arena suggests the primary shortcoming of the economic valuation approach: it lacks an incorporation of the temporal component. More clearly incorporating the natural conditions and processes which compose and maintain human benefits into the ecosystem services concept will more fully reflect contemporary economics and sustainability science. The framework of Social-ecological Systems (SES) theory provides a broad foundation for the economic valuation of ecosystem services. Emphasizing the importance of human and environmental change, SES theory encapsulates a needed awareness of the dynamic interactions which compose ecosystem services.
... Le concezioni realiste, invece, (ed in questo queste concezioni commettono lo stesso errore delle prospettive che ritengono che il punto di vista della morale sia quello della ragione) assumono che basti raggiungere un particolare punto di vista sul mondo (e, quindi, da questa prospettiva la capacità di cogliere le proprietà che rendono un oggetto buono) per diventare una persona morale. Che, poi, all'interno di una prospettiva realista si possa discutere intorno a se questo particolare punto di vista sul mondo sia una seconda natura che si acquisisce attraverso l'educazione morale (9) e all'interno di pratiche condivise (10) o una qualcosa che è in relazione alla nostra natura biologica (al fatto, ad esempio, che attribuiamo valore agli oggetti), (11) questo non è affatto importante per la nostra analisi. Quello che è importante è che, da una prospettiva realista, il punto di vista morale coincida con questo particolare punto di vista sul mondo e, quindi, con la capacità (partendo da quel punto di vista sul mondo) di riconoscere con sempre più precisione gli oggetti che sono moralmente buoni.(12) ...
La tesi che si intende sostenere è che l’esperienza estetica gioca un ruolo assai importante per la vita morale. L’idea, cioè, è che l’esperienza estetica non solo sia una componente fondamentale della vita buona, ma che essa possa anche contribuire al perfezionamento del carattere morale del soggetto. Che una vita senza spazio per l’esperienza estetica sia una vita manchevole è stato affermato da
diversi autori. Meno sostenuta, invece, è stata l’idea che l’esperienza estetica possa giocare un ruolo molto importante, se non addirittura fondamentale, per il perfezionamento del carattere morale del soggetto. Nelle pagine seguenti si intende esaminare e approfondire proprio questo secondo aspetto, meno considerato, della
riflessione sulla relazione che unisce l’esperienza estetica con quella morale. La tesi che si sosterrà è che un’appropriata concezione morale deve essere in grado di rendere conto dei tratti fondamentali dell’esperienza estetica ed, in particolare, dello stretto legame tra etica ed estetica. Il risultato cui perverremo sarà che una concezione sentimentalista si trova in una posizione migliore di altre concezioni per rendere conto di questo legame.
Social entrepreneurship [SE] is one genre of entrepreneurship which has the potential to address the operational and financial sustainability challenges experienced by NPOs as a means of enabling sustainable social impact. As an evolving field of study built on practitioners’ works, SE suffers from definitional ambiguities. The comparative analysis between the four schools of thought on SE resulted in the acceptance of EMES schools of thought on SE, such as being most aligned to entrepreneurship. The literature is relatively silent on the importance of NPOs’ operational sustainability, focusing on NPOs’ financial sustainability and social impact; an incomplete coverage of NPOs’ sustainability. Entrepreneurial actions, supported by business management, financial and accountability strategies, i.e. SE strategies, result in NPOs’ operational and financial sustainability, enabling sustainable social value creation or social impact—the central premise of SE. While the examination of the literature on SE in practice supported this position, operating business-like is a novel concept for NPOs; thus, this chapter detailed the SE strategies and associated operating practices as a guide for NPOs’ actions.
Neste artigo apresentamos as principais linhas de determinação da abordagem estética de Arnold Berleant, assim como as objeções que lhe são lançadas pelo filósofo ambiental Holmes Rolston III. Tratando-se de uma perspetiva emotivista, a conceptualização de Berleant não faculta a compreensão de uma estética da natureza de significado ético, penalizando, deste modo, o diálogo entre a apreciação estética e a ação. No entanto, a nosso ver, a dimensão sensitiva do apreciante aqui retratada, constitui uma valiosa perspetiva sobre a multidimensionalidade da experiência estética da natureza e, logo, um contributo fundamental que deve ser integrado e afirmado na correlação entre a estética e a ética ambientais.
This paper focuses on natural aesthetics as it relates to an ecological ethics informed by Aldo Leopold and by two contemporary environmental ethicists inspired by him: Callicott and Rolston. In comparison with Callicott, Rolston's work emphasizes the distinctive character of natural beauty and gives reasons to understand such beauty as foundational for acting morally in the natural world. This paper argues, on these theoretical grounds, that an informed natural aesthetics is a requirement of an environmental ethics on account of the co-relational link between integrity, balance and beauty of the biotic community. This more objective foundation can better support conservationist movements in practice bringing together natural beauty and duty in the pursuit of a closer harmony between humankind and the natural world. To put it somewhat paradoxically, Rolston's science-based aesthetics enables him to "see the invisible", see further what is actually there, better than competing accounts.
The concept of intrinsic value is one of the most disputed concepts of ethics, and in particular, environmental ethics. The traditional approaches towards nature are anthropocentric, attributing intrinsic value merely to human beings. Nowadays, environmental philosophers mostly try to distance themselves from anthropocentric attitudes, and they introduce ethical reasons, which do not consider nature merely instrumentally valuable. In general, environmental ethicists are prone to appeal to the concept of ‘intrinsic value’ to justify the necessity of enlarging the scope of moral concern. For this reason, in this dissertation, I aimed to clarify the role of the concept of ‘intrinsic value’ in environmental ethics and I present a metaethical analysis of this concept within v
anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches. I discuss whether intrinsic value exists independently of a valuer, and specifically a human valuer, examining what ethicists mean by ‘intrinsic value’ and what they mean when they call something ‘intrinsically valuable’. In light of these discussions, contrary to defenders of objective value, like Moore, I defend the view that there would not be a value independently of a valuer and attribution of a value is a subjective act. I express that the subjective act of attributing value is related to the agent, but it need not be always for-agent’s-own sake. In other words, what I mean with ‘intrinsic value’ is not the value that is ‘in-itself’ owned by an object because of the object’s intrinsic properties; but the value ascribed to something ‘for-its-own-sake’, not for sake of consequences it might bring. Besides, on the basis of moral contractarianism and depending on Y. S. Lo’s “dispositional theory” grounded on Hume’s moral philosophy, I assert that subjectively attributed values can be universalized.
Through a combination of theoretical and empirical approaches, this book explores the role of international environmental law in protecting and conserving plants.
Underpinning every ecosystem on the planet, plants provide the most basic requirements: food, shelter and clear air. Yet the world’s plants are in trouble; a fifth of all plant species are at risk of extinction, with thousands more in perpetual decline. In a unique study of international environmental law, this book provides a comprehensive overview of the challenges and restrictions associated with protecting and conserving plants. Through analysing the relationship between conservation law and conservation practice, the book debates whether the two work symbiotically, or if the law poses more of a hindrance than a help. Further discussion of the law’s response to some of the major threats facing plants, notably climate change, international trade and invasive species, grounds the book in conservation literature. Using case studies on key plant biomes to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the law in practice, the book also includes previously unpublished results of an original empirical study into the correlations between the IUCN Red List and lists of endangered/protected species in international instruments. To conclude, the book looks to the future, considering broader reforms to the law to support the work of conservation practitioners and reshape humanity’s relationships with nature.
The book will be of interest to scholars and students working in the field of international environmental law and those interested more broadly in conservation and ecological governance frameworks.
This chapter will elaborate on issues discussed in Chap. 1, where we have mentioned that environmental justice is often associated with social justice, or justice in distribution of environmental risks and benefits.
The aim of this study is to extend the rationale and comprehensive understanding in respect to the notion of functionality and beauty in the smart skin buildings. Smart skin in buildings plays a key role in improving building functionality, and the future lies in the use of innovative smart skin strategies. The methodology focused on the objectivity and subjectivity of human perception to assess the aesthetic value of a building’s smart skin. A theoretical analysis has been conducted based on the results of the investigation model and fortified by comparing the results with the findings obtained through the opinions of experts based on AHP methodology. The study demonstrates that there is a relation between both the aesthetic value and the functionality of the smart skin of a building. The findings revealed the difference in the aesthetic evaluation between the subjective functionality and the objective functionality of the building skin. The findings contribute useful evidence for the promotion of our understanding regarding the aesthetic value of the smart skin of a building, based on its functionality.
This article advances and defends three claims: (1) that the proper ethical criticism of environmental art requires a production‐oriented approach—an approach that appraises the ethical merits or flaws of the work in terms of how the artwork is created as well as the consequences of its creation; (2) that, depending on contextual factors, ethical flaws in environmental artworks may, but do not necessarily, constitute aesthetic flaws in those works; (3) that, because environmental artworks appropriate part of the environment as an aspect of their identity, an aesthetic flaw in an environmental artwork necessarily also creates aesthetic disvalue in the environment—disvalue that exists in virtue of the creation of the artwork. I conclude with one further, more speculative claim, which deserves further investigation: the aesthetic flaws of an environmental artwork, which result in aesthetic flaws in the natural environment itself, are always ethical flaws of the artwork. This seems to make environmental art distinctive; in the case of non‐environmental art, aesthetic flaws do not necessarily (if ever) constitute ethical flaws.
This essay is an overview of recent research aimed at establishing a link between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics. I review the work of several prominent environmental philosophers and environmental aestheticians, spelling out some of the difficulties confronting various attempts to find such a link. While I argue that a case can be made for a connection between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics concerning human‐created and human‐influenced environments, I find that there are a number of problems facing attempts to establish a similar connection for natural or pristine environments. I examine some attempts to support such a connection, including each of two different accounts of the aesthetic appreciation of nature in contemporary Western environmental aesthetics as well as the union of these two accounts, sometimes called ecoaesthetics. I briefly discuss two Western versions of ecoaesthetics and then turn to research by Chinese aestheticians, who defend a more robust version of ecoaesthetics. I suggest that this latter work may succeed in connecting environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics, although not in exactly the way in which such a link has been pursued by Western philosophers.
Anthropogenic climate change poses some difficult ethical quandaries for non-anthropocentrists. While it is hard to deny that climate change is a substantial moral ill for humans, many non-human organisms and ecosystems stand to benefit from plausible climate change scenarios. Modelling studies provide evidence that net primary productivity (NPP) could be substantially boosted, both regionally and globally, as a result of warming from increased concentrations of greenhouse gases. The same holds for deployment of certain types of climate engineering. This has a surprising implication: from certain non-anthropocentric perspectives, some plausible scenarios of climate change and climate engineering might bring about morally better states of affairs when compared to both pre-industrial and emission-mitigation baselines. We present existing evidence that certain emissions trajectories and climate engineering scenarios are likely to benefit non-human organisms on the whole, using NPP as a proxy for non-human flourishing. We then argue that, on a non-anthropocentric perspective that affords independent moral value to non-human organisms or systems, there is reason to deem such emissions trajectories and climate engineering scenarios to be morally better than prominent alternatives, including aggressive mitigation. If we are to take non-anthropocentrism seriously, then we should view current discussions of the ethics of climate change and climate engineering as incomplete, for they pay little attention to the well-being of non-human organisms in their own right. However, giving non-anthropocentric perspectives a more prominent place might substantially alter how we view climate ethics, as it would challenge the widely held views that climate change and climate engineering constitute absolute moral ills.
###Kurzzusammenfassung###
Natur hat für Menschen nicht nur extrinsische, instrumentelle Werte, sondern auch vielfältige intrinsische, nicht-instrumentelle Werte. Der immer einflussreicher werdende Ökosystemdienstleistungsansatz versucht, diese intrinsischen ästhetischen, symbolischen und moralischen Werte von Natur als „kulturelle Ökosystemdienstleistungen“ zu erfassen. Dieses Konzept beinhaltet jedoch – das zeigt die vorliegende Analyse – grundlegende begriffliche und ontologische Fehler, die methodische Unzulänglichkeiten bei der Erfassung dieser Werte implizieren und auch kommunikative Probleme mit sich bringen. Das Konzept der kulturellen Ökosystemdienstleistungen stellt einen scientific imperialism dar, der – entgegen der Intention, mit der dieses Konzept eingeführt worden ist – einen angemessenen gesellschaftlichen Verständigungsprozess über die Erhaltung von Naturphänomenen, die wir ästhetisch, symbolisch und moralisch wertschätzen, untergräbt.
###Abstract###
Nature is not only of extrinsic, instrumental value, but has manifold intrinsic, non-instrumental values for humans as well. The increasingly influential ecosystem services approach seeks to capture these intrinsic aesthetic, symbolic and moral values of nature under the concept of “cultural ecosystem services”. However, the present analysis shows that this concept features fundamental conceptual and ontological errors. These errors imply methodological inadequacies in the assessment of these values, and lead to communicative problems. The concept of cultural ecosystem services represents a ‘scientific imperialism’ that – contrary to the intention with which this concept has been introduced – undermines an appropriate process of social understanding about the preservation of natural phenomena which we esteem aesthetically, symbolically, and morally.
###Back Cover###
Naturwissenschaftliche Naturauffassungen sind unverzichtbar, um die Abhängigkeiten menschlicher Gesellschaften von ihrer natürlichen Umwelt zu analysieren. Aber können sie – wie es ein szientifischer Naturalismus anstrebt – die Basis für die Analyse des gesamten Spektrums menschlicher Wahrnehmungen und Wertschätzungen von Natur bilden? Der Autor untersucht diese Frage exemplarisch anhand des Ökosystemdienstleistungsansatzes, der in Praxisfeldern wie Umwelt-, Natur- und Biodiversitätsschutz, Landschaftsplanung oder Nachhaltigkeitspolitik immer mehr an Einfluss gewinnt. Seine Analyse führt ihn zur Forderung nach einer pluralen Konzeptualisierung von Natur. Nur so lassen sich die unterschiedlichen menschlichen Wahrnehmungen und Wertschätzungen von Natur in ihrer jeweiligen Eigenart theoretisch erfassen und praktisch angemessen berücksichtigen.
Those interested in environmental protection are frequently motivated by the idea that environmental destruction is “bad” while environmental conservation is “good.” In some cases, this is based merely on the anthropocentric instrumental value of the environment in relation to humans, but it seems more common that this motivation is generated by a belief that non-humans have intrinsic value, at least at some level of biotic organization. Yet, there is no basis for this claim that is not rooted in either theism or some other form of arbitrary value judgement that, in a materialistic worldview, has no basis outside of the believer's mind. Thus, secular-based environmental ethics that do not rely on theistic or metaphysical assumptions can never be prescriptive; materialistic conservation ethics can never prescribe behavior, they can only describe the arbitrary and fundamentally meaningless values of the philosopher.
A decision was made at the UNFCCC, COP-18 meeting in Doha in 2012 to create a work programme on loss and damage. Part of this programme was to include the production of a technical paper to enhance the general understanding of non-economic losses from climate change. The following article looks carefully at that paper in order to discover whether it provides an adequate conceptual understanding of non-economic losses. Several shortcomings of the paper’s conceptualization of these losses are identified. An alternative ethical framework with methods better suited for capturing a fuller range of non-economic losses is considered. This framework is likely to be most useful if used prospectively for the purpose of devising better adaptation policies to head off potential future losses rather than if used retrospectively for quantifying losses that have already occurred for the purposes of providing compensation.
Human beings lack any evidence for the position that non-human entities have intrinsic value as a mind-independent property. For any possible world alleged to have such intrinsic value, it is possible to conceive another world that is identical in terms of observable properties but that lacks intrinsic value. Accordingly, inferring the intrinsic value of a non-human from some set of observable properties is unjustified, since the same set of observable properties could exist in an otherwise identical world that lacks intrinsic value. Assuming that humans do not have a faculty of intuition that would allow them to perceive unobservable properties like intrinsic value directly, humans have no evidence for the existence of intrinsic value in non-humans. Hence, the position that some non-humans have intrinsic value is unjustified.
Environmental ethics is generally searching for the intrinsic value in natural beings. However, there are very few holistic models trying to reflect the various dimensions of the experience‐to‐be a natural being. We are searching for that intrinsic value, in order to determine which species are holders of rights. In this article, I suggest a set of moral and rational principles to be used for identifying the intrinsic value of a given species and for comparing it to that of other species.
The aim of this study is to extend the rationale and comprehensive understanding in respect of the notion of functionality and beauty in the smart skin buildings. Smart skin in buildings plays a key role in improving building functionality, and the future lies in the use of innovative smart skin strategies. The methodology focused on the objectivity and subjectivity of human perception to assess the aesthetic value of a building’s smart skin. A theoretical analysis has been conducted based on the results of the investigation model and fortified by comparing the results with the findings obtained through the opinions of experts based in AHP methodology. The study demonstrates that there is a relation between both the aesthetic value and the functionality of the smart skin of a building. The findings revealed the difference in the aesthetic evaluation between the subjective functionality and the objective functionality of the building skin. The findings contribute useful evidence for the promotion of our understanding regarding the aesthetic value of the smart skin of a building, based on its functionality.
Keywords: Smart Skin of the buildings; Beauty; Objectivity; Subjectivity; Functionality.
Public concern for ecological and environmental values is making the job of forest management increasingly complex and uncertain and is gradually undermining the domination of timber value as the primary organizing goal of forest policy. The key question is how to balance the pursuit of short-term economic self-interests with the long-term public good. I articulate a moral theory that affirms the existence of a public good that is understood teleologically as an objective purpose to be pursued. I argue that there is a connection between the philosophical and moral concept of creativity and the scientific concept of biological diversity. I suggest that these concepts are both linked to the political question of the public good. The maximization of the ethical good of creativity according to this theory is linked to the maximization of the public good. In forestry, the management of forest ecosystems in order to maximize their creative good is linked to the maximization of the public good and vice versa. This ethical theory is essentially a religious one in the neoclassical theistic tradition, in which authentic human existence is defined in terms of our relationship to reality and a metaphysically and cosmologically informed world view.
Highlighting the discussion of intrinsic value in environmental ethics, this chapter considers the question of whether synthetic life-forms possess an intrinsic value. While arguments against this are debated, three types of intrinsic values are distinguished and attributed to synthetic life-forms. One of these values being inherent worth, because synthetic life-forms have basic biological goals and purposes that provide sufficient grounds for its attribution.
In Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul: Aquinas, Whitehead, and the Metaphysics of Value, Francisco J. Benzoni addresses the pervasive and destructive view that there is a moral gulf between human beings and other creatures. Thomas Aquinas, whose metaphysics entails such a moral gulf, holds that human beings are ultimately separate from nature. Alfred North Whitehead, in contrast, maintains that human beings are continuous with the rest of nature. These different metaphysical systems demand different ethical stances toward creation. Benzoni analyzes and challenges Thomas's understanding of the human soul, his primary justification for the moral separation, arguing that it is finally philosophically untenable. The author finds promising the alternative metaphysics of Whitehead, for whom human beings are a part of nature-even if the highest part; all creatures have a degree of subjectivity and creativity, and thus all have intrinsic value and moral worth, independent of subjective human valuation. Further, though there is difference, there is no moral gulf between God and the world. God is truly affected by the experience of creatures. Benzoni argues that if this vision of moral worth is articulated with sufficient force and clarity, it could help heal the human relation to our planet.
Intrinsic value in nature is a key concept in professional environmental ethics literature in the West. Western scholars such as Holmes Rolston III and Paul Taylor argue that the philosophical foundation of environmental ethics should be based on the concept of intrinsic value in nature. Influenced by this concept, some influential Chinese environmental ethics scholars such as Yu Mouchang and Lu Feng argue that the foundation of environmental ethics in China should be based on the concept of intrinsic value in nature. This paper holds that the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical meaning of intrinsic value in nature is the legacy of Western philosophical traditions, which is in conflict with the Chinese philosophical traditions. Meanwile, the paper argues that the Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature can become the foundation for Chinese environmental ethics. The Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature is based on aesthetic appreciation of nature and people's participation in the beauty of nature.
In this article, the author questions the dominant view, displayed in legislation and many environmental land use planning and management policies, that a human-centred set of values should always form the basis of decision-making. He argues that traditional methods of evaluation, through economic and environmental impact assessment, fail to adequately reflect ecological values, and that a new ethic is required to adequately encompass and develop the idea of "social ecology", the interaction between humans and other life forms and non-living elements of the earth. The author then reviews the impact which the development of such an ethic might have on existing legislation and administrative decision-making, and concludes that to be successful, a highly developed form of community participation and enhanced public consciousness of non human-centred values, would be required.
In this book, Toby Svoboda develops and defends a Kantian environmental virtue ethic, challenging the widely-held view that Kant's moral philosophy has little to offer environmental ethics. On the contrary, Svoboda contends that on Kantian grounds, there is good moral reason to care about non-human organisms in their own right and to value their flourishing independently of human interests, since doing so is constitutive of certain (environmental) virtues. Svoboda argues that Kant's account of indirect duties regarding nature can ground a compelling environmental ethic: the Kantian duty to develop morally virtuous dispositions strictly proscribes unnecessarily harming organisms, and it also gives us moral reason to act in ways that benefit such organisms. Svoboda's account engages the recent literature on environmental virtue (including Rosalind Hursthouse, Philip Cafaro, Ronald Sandler, Thomas Hill, and Louke van Wensveen) and provides an original argument for an environmental ethic firmly rooted in Kant's moral philosophy.
Aquatic meat production provides an increasing proportion of food supply and plays a vital role in food security. Fish are considered to have important advantages in terms of food conversion efficiency compared to livestock which require extensive skeleton. Fish also provide more flesh as available food compared to total body mass and some people consider it more ethical to eat fish than meat. While eating fish benefits humans, has human society considered that when matched up with other vertebrates, fish had been given less attention especially in relation to animal welfare? This paper describes why fish have remained invisible to the eyes of some humans and are often subjected to unjust treatment and disproportionate suffering and examines ethical concepts such as consciousness, sentience, intrinsic value and right to life.
By using ethology and homology, this paper also tries to encourage more discussion and positive engagements as well as possible approaches in policies relating to fish welfare issues especially in the advent of intensifying capture fisheries and aquatic meat production.
This paper focuses on natural aesthetics as it relates to an ecological ethics informed by Aldo Leopold and by two contemporary environmental ethicists inspired by him: Callicott and Rolston. By contrast to Callicott, Rolston's work emphasises the distinctive character of natural beauty
and gives reasons to understand such beauty as foundational for acting morally in the natural world. This paper argues, on these theoretical grounds, that an informed natural aesthetics is a requirement of an environmental ethics on account of the co-relational link between the integrity,
balance and beauty of the biotic community. This more objective foundation can better support conservationist movements in practice, bringing together natural beauty and duty in the pursuit of a closer harmony between humankind and the natural world.
Recent critics (Andrew Light, Bryan Norton, Anthony Weston, and Bruce Morito, among others) have argued that we should give up talk of intrinsic value in general and that of nature in particular. While earlier theorists might have overestimated the importance of intrinsic value, these recent critics underestimate its importance. Claims about a thing's intrinsic value are claims about the distinctive way in which we have reason to care about that thing. If we understand intrinsic value in this manner, we can capture the core claims that environmentalists want to make about nature while avoiding the worries raised by contemporary critics. Since the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value plays a critical role in our understanding of the different ways that we do and should care about things, moral psychology, ethical theory in general, and environmental ethics in particular shouldn't give up on the concept of intrinsic value.
The Ethics of Animal Recreation and Modification studies philosophical and ethical issues arising from new technological possibilities to repair the loss of animal diversity. Several research groups are currently working toward re-creating extinct animals such as the woolly mammoth by the methods of modern genomic technology and of selective breeding. These projects challenge the main underlying tenet of conservation ethics: the extinction of a species is irreversible. For this reason alone, the idea of de-extinction, or reversing extinction, is troublesome. The purpose of this volume is to offer systematic philosophical and ethical analysis on animal de-extinction in the context of ecological restoration. The collection consists of an introduction, epilogue and nine new articles written by philosophers. The intended readership consists of academic philosophers, ecologists and others interested in conservation biology.
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