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Convergence without finalité: EU strategy towards post-Soviet states in the wider Black Sea region
... Bu sayede DO'nun, stratejik ve ileriye dönük bir bakış açısı kazandırılması amaçlanarak, müşterek değerlere, kapsayıcılığa, karşılıklı iş birliğine, çıkarlara ve hesap verilebilirliğe dayanan bir ortaklık altyapısına sahip olması hedeflenmektedir. Ayrıca zirvelerin uluslararası sistemden kaynaklanan (küresel ve bölgesel) zorluklara karşı direnebilmesi için bir arada olmanın avantajını yaşatan ve kurumsal aidiyet bilincini etkileyen siyasi münazaralar bütünü olarak değer kazandığı da vurgulanmaktadır (Wolczuk, 2016 Elinizdeki çalışmada öncelikle ulus-devletler ve sınırlar arasındaki ilişkiye değinilirken sınırların dönüşen anlamı, artan önemi ve devletlerin sınırları ele alış biçimleriyle bu çerçevedeki değişim tartışılmıştır. Daha sonra sınırların göç süreçlerindeki mahiyetine odaklanırken teorik tartışmalara yer verilmiştir. ...
... EU's EPP left the six states contending for EU membership consisting of Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan from South Caucasus, and Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine from Eastern Europe, in chaos. They find themselves between a circumspect EU, which is willing to see them developing but not ready to accept them as EU members except for a geopolitical consideration (Wolczuk, 2010). Russia insists on keeping them under its sphere of influence. ...
The idea of Eurasian integration has come up as a strategic goal of major powers in recent years. Russia's Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the European Union's (EU) Eastern Partnership Program (EPP) with the objective of expanding a sphere of influence and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to create economic integration through transportation infrastructure and trade are three major strategies for this purpose. This study highlights that China's growing presence in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is a clear indicator of its growing influence. Therefore, the article aims to appraise China's rise in Eastern Europe through its BRI and Eurasian integration strategy. Secondly, it presents a comparative analysis of multiple Eurasian integration strategies. Through a prism of "New Regionalism Theory," this study delves into exploring the factors behind China's effort to create regional integration in the whole Eurasia. The findings of the study show that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a unique idea in the sense that it aims at not only the integration of geographically adjacent regions but also creating physical connections in faraway regions. This convergence will not only bring more financial opportunities for the regional states but also manifest a great probability for China's emergence as the greatest Eurasian power.
... In many instances, transfer of EU rules is designed to address the very problems which hamper the convergence with the acquis in the first place, such as political instability, lack of rule of law, weak administrative capacity, corruption and frozen conflicts. 67 Therefore, in many respects, EU policies in the Eastern neighborhood have not necessarily been closely matched with, and suited to, partner countries' needs, capabilities and priorities insofar as the modernization objectives are concerned. 68 Insights from the international development literature can underline the problems that a development strategy based on acquis adoption poses. ...
The accession of the East-Central European (ECE) countries carried a promise of enhancing and enriching the EU’s Eastern policy. The new member states had the strongest interests among EU member states to ensure that countries in the East are prosperous, stable, and democratic. Yet, the EU’s Eastern policy has been largely criticised for its ineffectiveness. So why have they not been able to address the shortcomings in the EU’s Eastern policies? The article argues that the ECE countries supported the way the EU’s Eastern policies were conceived and implemented because they saw it as a potent vehicle to promote their own transition experience not only in the region but also within the EU. We argue that the ECE states have experienced three types of challenges when promoting their transition experience. First, uploading to the EU level remained largely at a rhetorical level. Second, there are conceptual and practical difficulties in defining what constitutes transition experience and harnessing it, as well as coordinating its transfer between the ECE states. Finally, while using transition experience as the basis for their development assistance strategies, the ECE countries actually insufficiently conceptualised the “development” aspect in these policies. Being so driven by their own experience, they have not drawn the lessons from enlargement to use in a non-accession context, especially by incorporating the broader lessons with regard to development.
... To be sure, the lack of a clear membership perspective in the ENP undermines all attempts to promote policy convergence by 'hierarchy' (Knill & Tosun 2009). However, the EU has attempted to solve this structural problem both through 'sequencing' incentives (Wolczuk 2010, pp. 50–52) and remaining rhetorically ambiguous about the long-term accession perspectives of the neighbourhood countries (Youngs 2009). ...
While the EU's policies towards non-member states are often discussed within frameworks of ‘high politics’, one of the most important features of the European Neighbourhood Policy is its emphasis on the ‘low politics’ of sectoral dialogue in functionally differentiated policy fields. Examining policy change triggered in Ukraine by the EU's neighbourhood policy framework, the essay focuses on environmental policy as a typical ‘low politics’ policy field. The results show that in four sub-fields of environmental policy case-specific constellations of domestic veto players, policy-specific conditionality and external capacity building determine domestic policy change.
TAKDİM
Karadeniz: 2020 Gelişmeleri Işığında Bölgesel Değerlendirmeler yayın hayatına başladığı bu ilk çalışmayla küresel ve bölgesel gelişmelere odaklanarak bölge ile ilgilenen araştırmacılar için bir başvuru kaynağı olmayı amaçlamaktadır.
Kısa zamanda yoğun bir çalışma ve emeğin ürünü olarak sizlerle buluşan elinizdeki eserin bilgi ağırlıklı olması hedeflenirken, yazarların yapmış olduğu analizler okuyucunun takdirine bırakılmıştır. Bu noktada birbirinden değerli yazarlarımız çalışmalarını uzmanlıkları çerçevesinde sunarken analitik yaklaşımlarıyla birbirini tamamlayan bölümleri kitaba bütüncül bir perspektif katmaktadırlar.
2020’de Karadeniz Havzasındaki gelişmelerin ele alındığı bu kitapta yirmi bir makale yer almaktadır. Üç bölümden oluşan kitabımızın ilk bölümünde havzadaki ülkelerden onunun 2020 yılında yaşadıkları süreçler masaya yatırılırken; ikinci bölümde uluslararası aktörlerin havzaya yaklaşımları ele alınmıştır. Üçüncü bölümde ise nispeten daha bağımsız makalelerle Karadeniz havzası farklı açılardan incelenmekte ve okuyucuya ilk iki bölümdeki makaleleri analitik olarak birleştirebilecekleri alan sunulmaya çalışılmaktadır.
Birinci bölüm Rukiye Patan ve Özgür Tüfekçi’nin Türkiye’nin pandemi koşulları altında 2020 yılında geçirmiş olduğu süreçleri ele aldığı “Çok Yönlü Dış Politika Arayışında Türkiye: 2020” başlıklı çalışma ile başlamaktadır. Akabinde Hülya Kınık “Karabağ Savaşı ile Yeniden Dirilen Azerbaycan: 2020”; Vahit Güntay “İç Sorunlar ve Çözüm Arayışları İçinde Bulgaristan: 2020”; Dilek Karadeniz Topal “Var Olma Mücadelesi İçinde Ermenistan: 2020”; Hasan Yılmaz “Batı ile Bütünleşme Sürecinde Gürcistan: 2020”; Selim Kurt “Doğu ile Batı Arasında Yönünü Arayan Moldova: 2020”; Eda Tutak “Pandemi ve Seçim Kıskacında Romanya: 2020”; Yaşar Sarı “Bölgesel Mücadelenin Küresel Aktörü Rusya: 2020”; Adnan Seyaz “Reform Arayışının Gölgesinde Ukrayna: 2020”; Şeyma Kalyoncu “Müzmin Sorunlar Sarmalında Yunanistan: 2020” başlıklı makaleleriyle havza ülkelerini ele almaktadırlar.
İkinci bölümde ise havzanın dışındaki aktörlerin havza ülkelerine yaklaşımları ve politika oluşturma süreçleri Murat Ülgül’ün “Trump Giderken: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Karadeniz Politikası, 2020”; Pelin Çolak ve Ceren Hakyemez’in “NATO ve Geniş Karadeniz Havzası: 2020”; Müge Yüce’nin “Geniş Karadeniz Havzası’nda Çin'in Yeniden Konumlanma Stratejisi: 2020”; ve Fevzi Kırbaşoğlu ve Özgür Tüfekçi’nin “Avrupa Birliği’nin Geniş Karadeniz Havzası’na Yönelik Politikaları: 2020” başlıklı makaleleriyle incelenmektedir.
Son bölümde ise ilk iki bölümdeki makaleleri tamamlayıcı ve birleştirici olarak Rahman Dağ “Ukrayna ve Suriye Krizlerinin Kesişimi: Rusya ve Türkiye’nin Jeopolitik Mücadelesi”; İsmail Köse “Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Karadeniz Havzası’nda Göç”; Bülent Şener “‘Kanal İstanbul’ Projesinin Montrö Boğazlar Rejimine Olası Etkileri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme”; Anıl Çağlar Erkan ve Ayça Eminoğlu “Karadeniz Bölgesi Enerji Dinamikleri”; Nisa Erdem “Çevresel Sorunlar Bağlamında Karadeniz Havzasında Türkiye’nin Taraf Olduğu Uluslararası İş Birlikleri”; Ahmet Ateş “2020 Yılı Rus İstihbarat Faaliyetleri”; Büşra Yılmaz ve Murat Çemrek “Karadeniz ve Küreselleşme”; Bayram Güngör “Geniş Karadeniz Bölgesi’nde Entegrasyon Hareketleri ve Güç Mücadelesi: Jeoekonomik Bakış” makaleleriyle elinizdeki eserin tamamlanmasını sağlamışlardır.
Yıllık mahiyetinde hazırlanan çalışmanın bu sayısının yayımlanması hususunda yazılarıyla katkıda bulunan değerli yazarlarımıza ve kitabımıza teveccüh gösteren saygıdeğer okurlarımıza teşekkür ederim.
DOÇ. DR. ÖZGÜR TÜFEKÇİ
KTÜ-SAM Müdürü
Trabzon - Nisan 2021
Karadeniz, farklı coğrafi birimlerin geçiş güzergahı üzerinde yer almasından dolayı Avrasya’nın en mühim iç denizi yakıştırmasına layık görülmüş ve Halford J. Mackinder’in (kara hakimiyeti) teorisinden hareketle, Avrasya’nın deniz kalpgahının merkezinde konuşlandığı ifade edilmiştir (Koçer, 2007: 197-198). Karadeniz aynı zamanda Nicholas J. Spykman, Alfred T. Mahan ve Hausy Scitaklian gibi çağdaş kuramcıların da dikkatini çekmiştir. Söz konusu teorisyenler, Karadeniz’in Ortadoğu ve Asya’yı Avrupa’ya bağladığı, merkez bölgeye en kolay ulaşım olanaklarını sağladığı ve bunların ötesinde karasal alanları kapsayan coğrafya ile medeniyetleri de içerisinde barındırdığı için dünya adasının kontrolünü ele geçirmek isteyen referans nesnelerinin daha geçerli politikalar üretmesi gereken bir nitelik kazandığını vurgulamıştır (Koçer, 2014: 27-28, 63-64).
Avrasya ve Orta Doğu’yu buluşturduğu için dünyanın en kritik kavşaklarından biri kabul edilen Karadeniz’in sahip olduğu hususiyetlere rağmen tarifi üzerinde fikir birliğine varılamamıştır. Bu cihetle Karadeniz, çevresindeki altı ülkeye karşılık gelen dar bir bölge; Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü (KEİ) tarafından sınırlandırılmış bir alan ya da Avrupa Komisyonu’nun kıyı devletlerine ek olarak Azerbaycan, Ermenistan, Moldova ve Yunanistan’ı da (doğal) bölgesel aktörler gördüğü geniş bir havza olarak adlandırılabilir. Ancak Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin ürünü olan bu çok parçalı yaklaşımlar, ülkelerin iç ve dış politikada işbirliği yapmalarına olanak sağlayan ve müşterek bir topluluğa ait olma duygusunu ortaya çıkaran öz bilinçli projeler sunamadığı için Karadeniz’in çoğunluğun mutabık kalacağı şekilde tasvir edilmesini engellemiştir (Konoplyov ve Delanoe, 2014: 356). Bu farklı bakış açıları neticesinde Karadeniz’in Mackinder tarzı jeopolitik kalpgahın merkezinde yer alan bir pivot mu yoksa sınır veya tampon bölge mi olup olmadığının belirsizliğini koruduğu ve bölgenin hangi yönde ilerlediğine dair net bir temayülün geliştirilemediği iddia edilmektedir (Triantaphyllou, 2012: 4).
Bu bağlamda bölgenin ne tür gelişmeler üzerine, hangi birimler tarafından şekilleneceğinin ve yeniden adlandırma girişimlerinde nereye doğru evrileceğinin sorgulanması gerekmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmada, ilk olarak Karadeniz’in kendine özgü hususiyetleri belirtilerek, referans nesnelerinin bölgeye yönelik argümanları temellendirilecektir. Ardından Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Karadeniz’in nasıl bir kavramsal ve sistemsel dönüşüm sürecine girdiği sorgulanacak ve Avrupa Birliği’nin (yeni bir çerçevedeki) Karadeniz stratejilerinin ana hatları ortaya konularak, günümüzdeki politikalarıyla ne ölçüde uyumlu ve uygulanabilir olduğu analiz edilecektir.
This paper seeks to make three contributions to our understanding of small state foreign policy. First, the paper explains the foreign policy trajectory of one particular small state, Georgia, which has with limited success followed a foreign policy of inclusion into the West and its institutions. Second, the paper analyses how variations in statehood widen, narrow and transform the strategic options available to small states. Finally, the paper explores a number of small state foreign policy dilemmas and their consequences for policy success.
The article analyses the way narratives are constructed in EU external relations and their relation to policy practices. Five overarching narratives are identified: the EU as a security provider, the EU as a democratizer and spreader of ‘good’ norms, the EU as an actor that contributes to or assures global peace, the EU as an entity that contributes to the well-being of peoples around the world and finally the narrative of EU good neighbourliness. After a brief section that details the links between discourses, narratives and political practice, the article will systematically explore the five narratives. The rationale for this endeavour is based on the often huge discrepancy found between the ambitious goals set out in narratives and the poor policy track of the EU in its external relations. Continuous policy and discursive redefinition and reconsideration provide a dynamic context in which goals are renegotiated when political reality deviates from them. A clear pattern of downgrading ambitions when policy outcomes do not match them can be observed in the EU's external relations.
EU–Russia relations have often been considered in scholarship to be governed by the dichotomy between conflict and cooperation. Cooperation has often coexisted or overlapped with conflict on a significant number of issues and policy areas, making relations between the two actors very complex. This article explores the dichotomy between conflict and cooperation, highlighting the way it has influenced the two actors’ policies towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. It posits that the difference between what the European Union (EU) says and what it does is desired and perpetuated both by Russia, the EU’s member states and the countries within the Eastern Neighbourhood. Simultaneously, Moscow is unable to formulate a clear strategy for the Eastern Neighbourhood, which makes its approach geared at providing short-term incentives to corrupt politicians in the countries in the region not sustainable in the long term. In doing so, the article also aims to enquire into the potential for EU–Russia relations to move beyond the well-known conflict–cooperation dichotomy.
The article investigates, through a comparative analysis, the different mechanisms of influence that the EU and Russia are projecting in their shared neighborhood in shaping domestic politics. It focuses on the economic and energy sectors in order to analyze two relevant policies for contrasting EU and Russia’s influence in the case of the Southern Caucasus. Contrary to commonly held opinions, Russian influence is receding in both areas and is a dominant external actor only in Armenia. In contrast, the EU is slowly increasing its presence in the economic area and has become a key player in the energy sector.
This paper argues that although the EU is yet to develop a common policy towards Russia, ‘cooperation’ with Russia stems from a pattern of enhanced bilateral relations with Moscow that most member states have sought to develop. These enhanced relations have been characterized by strong economic and energy security ties modelled on the approaches of big EU players such as Germany and France. Moreover, such approaches have impeded any solid practical promotion of the EU's norms and values both in Russia and its Eastern Neighbourhood – or any coherent CSDP actions, for that matter. This has happened although, rhetorically, states such as France and Germany present a highly normative discourse about the EU's role in its Eastern Neighbourhood. A second goal of this paper is to evaluate the way this pattern of ‘cooperation’ impacts on the EU's policy towards its Eastern Neighbourhood and on the geopolitics of the region. Consequently, the paper suggests that the practice of developing enhanced relations with Russia opens the way for Moscow to be viewed by the EU's Eastern neighbours as a power that can offer short-term solutions to pressing problems. At the same time, the shared framework for ‘cooperation’, which seems to inform the behaviour of most EU member states, de facto legitimizes Russia's bid to have the Eastern Neighbourhood under its sphere of influence.
The Southern Energy Corridor (SEC), which aims to link Caspian Basin and potentially Middle East gas supplies to Europe, is one of the EU's six priority axes of energy infrastructures. Drawing on the external governance literature, the article provides an analysis of the EU's efforts in the wider Black Sea area to increase its energy security. It concludes that despite difficult domestic and geopolitical obstacles, the EU is pushing forward its objective to establish the SEC. However, the EU's institutionalised governance, with the incentives derived from close cooperation, has been a necessary condition of impact, but not sufficient. The SEC builds upon the east–west pipelines supported by the USA in order to prevent the Russian control over the Caspian Basin supplies. If the SEC is possible it is mainly because of the path-dependent processes created by those pipelines, which linked the international position of Azerbaijan and Georgia to their transit role between the Caspian Sea and Europe.
Drawing on the literature of EU governance in its neighbourhood, this article investigates the EU's impact on Georgia by examining the following policies regarding EU–Georgia relations during the period 2004–2008: single market access; energy security; and foreign and security policy. It argues that policy-level incentives and the overall process of deepening relations with the EU are necessary conditions for the EU to make an impact. However, the EU-promoted rules and norms are key conditions for EU impact and for understanding whether they are adopted or not. The case of Georgia shows the limits of the EU's normative power. Geopolitical pressures and alternative models of development present a challenge for EU impact.
Looking beyond the enlargement process, the European Union is developing a new policy framework for neighbouring countries that are either currently excluded from, or ineligible for, a perspective on accession. This policy debate focused initially on the new neighbours to the east, that is, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. It was subsequently extended to include Russia, with whom the EU has shared a border since 1995, and also to the countries of the southern Mediterranean. These countries present a common set of policy challenges to the Union, and instability in this area due to poor governance or economic failure will have direct consequences for the security of the EU itself. The centrepiece of the EU's strategy is an offer to neighbours, in return for concrete progress with economic and political reform, and alignment to EU rules, of a stake in the EU's Internal Market. According to the European Commission, this could result in an arrangement for the EU's neighbours similar to the existing European Economic Area (EEA). The paper tests the credibility of this vision by identifying some key characteristics of the existing EEA, and then considering them with reference to the EU's neighbouring countries.
The EU's conditions for the central and east European applicants look deceptively straightforward: they comprise stable democracy, a competitive market economy, and the capacity to implement EU laws and policies (the so called acquis communautaire). However, they are very general and not amenable to quantitative assessment, leaving ambiguity about exactly when they have been met. This ambiguity increases the EU's power in accession negotiations, but the accompanying uncertainty diffuses its influence in shaping institutional and policy choices. This article examines the EU's accession conditionality levers and the constraints on their use. It concludes that readiness for membership depends not only on technical progress in negotiations, but also on when the current member-states are politically ready for enlargement.
The article examines the impact of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) on domestic change in Ukraine during 2005-7. Due to the interplay of external and domestic factors, no political leadership on European matters emerged in Ukraine in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution. The implementation of the Action Plan (AP) – the key instrument of the policy – has been left to the discretion of middle-level state officials, resulting in selective empowerment of sections of the state apparatus. However, without strong political engagement or an effective coordinating mechanism, this delivered slow, uneven and localised results. Nevertheless, despite the limited impact of the ENP, it is through the AP that the European Union has for the very first time started to affect domestic developments in Ukraine.
The article discusses the incentives, economic effects and risks of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP should support growth provided that integration with the EU internal market is concrete and wide-ranging. It should not endanger macro stability but involves two specific risks: over-regulation and fragmentation of the internal market. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.