The clash of perceptions: Comparison of views among Muslims in Paris, London, and Berlin with those among the general public

Abstract

Although Muslims have been living in some areas of western Europe in relatively large numbers since the second half of the twentieth century, their presence generated political debate only when it became associated with a possible threat after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Many alarmists considered Europe's Muslim communities guilty by association, and anti-immigration parties wrote about European Muslims' perceived lack of loyalty to their Western host countries. Negative stereotypes of Muslims, however, are not restricted to pundits on the extreme right, but are fairly widespread in European countries. Perceptions that Islam represents a violent culture intent on subverting Western values have been influenced by events both outside Europe (for example, the sectarian strife in Iraq and Palestinian suicide bombings) and within Europe itself (for example, attacks by homegrown terrorists, and controversies over building new mosques and wearing Muslim head scarves in public). All of these factors became major determinants of how policies toward Muslims are formed in the West. Though many speak about or on behalf of Muslims in Europe, few seem concerned about actually reaching out to hear what Muslims think about integration and related issues that affect their lives. The lack of adequate dialogue and real knowledge about Europe's Muslim communities has fostered the negative public image of Muslims among the general public in some European countries. According to Thomas Petersen, surveys in Germany show that Germans are "increasingly convinced it will not be possible to coexist peacefully with the Islamic world in the long run."1 The Pew Research Center's findings also show that "many non-Muslims associate negative traits with Muslims. Majorities in Nigeria, India, Spain, Russia, and Germany see Muslims as violent."2 Perceptions and expectations matter in politics.3 One example of how the two publics were misreading each other's intentions concerns perceived silence. It is often heard that European publics view Muslims in their own countries as sympathetic to jihadist terrorists when Muslims did not vocally condemn violent attacks. While many religious leaders did denounce terrorist activities, many Muslims say in public and private conversations that they did not feel compelled to react to such attacks simply because they felt no more represented by the extremists who carried them out than did their non-Muslim neighbors. Yet Muslims might have underestimated how this would affect public perception, especially when the public did see orchestrated and organized condemnation of Denmark across different communities after a Danish newspaper printed, and others reprinted, cartoons of the Prophet Mohamed. Framing dialogue about the Muslim presence in Europe primarily in terms of secular issues like security concerns and cultural symbols disguises existing commonalities between Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as the real nature of their differences. Like most deeply religious communities, European Muslims exhibit socially conservative values - so their attitudes regarding such issues as abortion and homosexuality are markedly different from those of the more liberal and secular European general population.4 The intercultural dialogue tends to stall for a number of reasons. Government attempts to establish explicitly Muslim interest groups to be incorporated in the political system are not particularly successful because of the fragmented nature of Muslim communities in Europe.5 Muslim organizations in Europe tend to have limited perceived legitimacy among their constituencies, and therefore play only a very weak role in mediating between mainstream European society and its Muslim minorities. Recently, Munira Mirza, Abi Senthilkumaran, and Zein Ja'far reported that only 6 percent of the British Muslims named the Muslim Council of Britain, an umbrella organization set up to represent all Muslim organizations and institutions within the United Kingdom, as an organization that represents their views as Muslims.6 These limitations imply that organizational dialogue is unlikely to replace real discourse by the people when it comes to grappling with the status of Muslim communities in Europe.

Full text

ThinkForum: Muslims in Europe
Muslims in Berlin, London, and
Paris: Bridges and Gaps in Public
Opinion
by Dr. Zsolt Nyiri, Regional Research Director for Europe, Gallup World Poll
Copyright © 2007 The Gallup Organization, Princeton, NJ. All rights reserved. Gallup® and The Gallup Poll® are trademarks of The Gallup Organization.
Events like the 2005 riots in France and the bombing in the London
Underground that same year have raised concerns about attitudes of -- and
attitudes toward -- Muslims living in Western Europe. The current study
highlights important themes that represent dividing lines or common ground
between Muslim residents of London, Paris, and Berlin and the general
public in their home countries. It also establishes important differences and
commonalities among the Muslim communities in these three cities.
Why were these three cities chosen? Immigration patterns have led
Muslims to settle mostly in large urban areas. The three cities represent
very different patterns of Muslim immigration to Europe: Parisian Muslims
emigrated mainly from North Africa, London Muslims from South Asia, and
those in Berlin chiey from Turkey. Also, the prevailing policy environments
in the three host countries affect Muslims in different ways -- e.g., French
secularism versus British multiculturalism. The samples in Paris and
London are representative of Muslims living in neighborhoods with at least
5% to 10% Muslim penetration; in Berlin, the sample is representative of
Muslim residents throughout the city. The comparison study in each case is
representative of the entire population of the host country.
There are two extreme viewpoints on the issue of Muslim integration into
Europe. On the one hand, Muslims are accused of resisting peaceful
integration into European society, as evidenced by events like the 2005
bombings in London and riots in France. On the other hand, Europeans
are accused of being increasingly hostile toward Muslim immigrants, as
evidenced by the popularity of European anti-immigration parties and the
growing number of legislative attempts to limit the use of religious symbols,
including the Muslim face veil.

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Poll results provide limited support for either of these
extreme positions. Rather, our data reveal that, while
religion remains an important part of their identity,
Muslim residents of London, Paris, and Berlin also
identify strongly with the country they live in. What’s
more, strong majorities both of Muslims living in
these three cities, and of the general populations in
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, would
prefer to live in neighborhoods that are ethnically and
religiously diverse.
Muslims Exhibit Strong Religious Identity and
National Identity
In all three cities, strong majorities of Muslims -- 68%
in Paris, 85% in Berlin, and 88% in London -- say
religion is an important part of their daily lives. These
gures stand in stark contrast to those found among
the general population: Only 23% of French, 36%
of British, and 41% of German respondents overall
consider religion to be an important part of their lives.
However, the idea that their higher religiosity implies
a weaker sense of national identity is simply false. In
London and Paris, when Muslims were not forced to
choose between religious and national identity, they
tended to associate themselves with both. In fact, in
none of the three countries were Muslim residents less
likely than the populations at large to say they identify
strongly with their country (in the United Kingdom, they
were actually somewhat more likely to do so).
These results contrast with how the general public in
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom perceives
Muslims’ degree of loyalty to the countries they live
in. When asked directly whether they think Muslims
living in their countries are loyal to the country,
between 35% and 45% of the Germans, French, and
Britons overall responded afrmatively. However, the
overwhelming majority of Muslim residents themselves
in all three cities studied maintained that Muslims are
loyal to the countries they live in: 73% in Paris, 74% in
London, and 72% in Berlin.
Foundation Exists for Greater Understanding
More and better communication is needed between
Muslims and non-Muslims in each of these countries.
The rst step is to cultivate a better understanding of
how Muslims in Europe tend to reconcile their typically
high degree of religiosity with their largely secular
environments. In turn, Muslims themselves may
benet from a greater understanding of Europeans’
secular mindset. We found, for example, that Muslims’
religious symbols were not necessarily singled out
because they were Muslim, but simply because they
were religious. In France, for example, 64% of the
overall population felt removing the Muslim face veil
was necessary for integration into society – but 54%
said the same about wearing large, visible Christian
crosses.
The data also indicate there is enough common
ground and willingness on both sides to improve the
dialogue. Muslims are very likely – often more likely
than the general public -- to express condence
in democratic institutions and a desire to live in
neighborhoods with mixed ethnic and religious
backgrounds. The idea that it is important to include
Muslim voices in the policy debates and political
processes of these three countries is reected not
only in the opinions of Muslims themselves who
live in them, but also in the majorities of the general
populations (with the exception of Germany) who think
Muslims should be more involved in politics.
Methodology
All surveys were designed and funded entirely by The Gallup
Organization.
Muslim Populations in London, Paris, and Berlin
Field periods
London: Nov. 29, 2006, to Jan. 18, 2007
Paris: Nov. 29 to Dec. 22, 2006.
Berlin: Jan. 5 to Feb. 26, 2007
Probability sample in London and Paris neighborhoods where
Muslim penetration was 5% to 10% or more
All interviews in London and Paris were conducted in home,
face-to-face.
Random Digit Dialing was used in Berlin, dialing of rst and
family names with a high probability to lead to a Muslim
household.
Target: Total 15+ adult population
512 interviews in London, 502 in Paris, and 504 in Berlin
Associated sampling error ±5 percentage points for each
survey
General Public
Field periods
United Kingdom: Dec. 18, 2006, to Jan. 9, 2007
France: Dec. 18-29, 2006
Germany: Dec. 19, 2006 to Jan. 4, 2007
Random Digit Dialing
Phone interviews
Target: Total 15+ adult population
1,204 interviews nationwide in the United Kingdom, 1,220 in
France, and 1,221 in Germany
Associated error ±3 percentage points
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ThinkForum: Muslims in Europe
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Copyright © 2007 The Gallup Organization, Princeton, NJ. All rights reserved.
The Gallup World Poll is the largest available source
of global public opinion data, providing access to the
voices of citizens in more than 130 countries and
areas. For more information, contact Bronson Lee, at
202-715-3030 or worldpollcontact@gallup.com