No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Abstract
Taiwan (the Republic of China, ROC) adopted a semi-presidential system in the 1997 constitutional reform. That system is now being put to the test through the transfer of power from the Kuomintang (KMT) to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) given that the DPP won the 2000 presidential elections. This paper first develops a theoretical framework to analyze political stability under different types of semi-presidential systems. Three factors are singled out as the most critical: presidential power (high or low), president-parliament relations (congruent or incongruent), and party system (biparty or multiparty). Following is a look into Taiwan's institutional background and its process of constitutional reform. We discover that after the inauguration of President Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan fell into a highly unfavorable situation, with a low stability rating. The second part of the paper focuses on the interaction mode between the president and the parliament which is characterized by incongruent relations. Four empirical cases are used to demonstrate the four interaction modes under incongruence: the French Fifth Republic ("cohabitation"), Finland ("division of labor"), Weimar Germany ("collision"), and the Russian Federation ("supremacy of the president"). The Chen (Shui-bian)-Tang (Fei) duarchy is closer to the Finnish "division of labor" system than to any other interaction mode, but with less presidential concessions. This setup is clearly a compromise rather than cohabitation. As such, the Chen-Tang svstem is useful in defusing parliamentary opposition in the short term, but is conflict-prone in nature, as born out by its ultimate collapse.
This article attempts to explain the formation of Taiwan's opposition coalition, a phenomenon of critical importance to the unfolding of her democratic politics. Seeing the case as a multi-stage coalition formation game, the analysis shows that an electoral alliance between the opposition parties can be engineered regardless of how they interact in the legislature - as long as the cohesion of their legislative partnership is based on the expectation that they will cooperate in the upcoming presidential election. Another main argument is that the key to a successful opposition alliance in the 2004 presidential election hinges on the ability to produce a profile of divisible goods for the election. Once ready, these goods must be allocated in proportion to the electoral strength of each party. The greatest obstacle for the pan-Blue parties to build a joint campaign team may lie in the fact that the People First Party (PFP) has a better chance to deliver a viable candidate; the party is weaker, however, than the Kuomintang (KMT) in organizational and financial resources.
This article develops a four-category analytical framework to compare the process of democratic consolidation in East Asia (the Republic of China on Taiwan in particular) and East and Central Europe (ECE - Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary). The four categories are social cleavage, party system, constitutional framework, and the nature of elections. Each category impacts on political stability. A major finding is that Taiwan is characterized by pre-materialist social cleavages, a biparty system sustained by the SNTV (single nontransferable vote) electoral regime and the staying power of the Kuomintang (KMT), a semi-presidential structure plagued by divided government, and identity voting. In contrast, the ECE countries are characterized by materialist social cleavages, a multiparty system, a parliamentary constitutional structure (except for Poland who shares with the ROC a semi-presidential system), and economic voting. Those characteristics have specific implications for political stability: materialist cleavages, biparty system, parliamentarianism, and economic voting are all conducive to political stability, while pre-materialist cleavages, multiparty system, semi-presidential system with divided government, and identity voting induce political instability. With Taiwan gradually developing into a multiparty system, the lessons from the ECE countries are becoming even more pertinent.
Written by an experienced teacher and scholar this new textbook introduces the reader to the big questions that concern change and continuity in how politics operates and how Taiwan is governed. Taking a critical approach, Dafydd Fell provides students with the essential background to the history and development of the political system as well as an explanation of the key structures, processes and institutions that have shaped Taiwan over the last few decades.
This paper is trying to examine the presidential system, its implementation s and challenges in Indonesia. In democratic countries, the presidential system accompanied by many parties in parliament considered to pose instability and turmoil by the political scientists. This is partly because of the requirement to compromise among the parties in the parliament. This bond is fragile and can change depending on the situation. However, this resulted in weakling of the presidential institutions precisely at a time when Executive authority is required. The relationship between legislative and executive is often rocky and tense, so it is important to know how to manage the conflict between these two branches. The practice of presidential system in Indonesia is not much different from this phenomenon. Therefore it required a comprehensive study in order to this country able to consistently implement the system that it really need.
1. Introduction Gary D. Rawnsley and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley 2. The Meaning and Significance of Greater China John F. Copper Part One: The People's Republic of China 3. Peddling Party Ideology for a Profit: Media and the Rise of Chinese Nationalism in the 1990s Yu Huang and Chin-Chuan Lee 4. Modern Political Communication in China Neil Renwick and Qing Cao 5. What Chinese Journalists Believe about Journalism Hugo de Burgh Part Two: Taiwan 6. 'As Edifying as a Bout of Mud Wrestling': Americanization, Institutions and Election Campaigning in Taiwan Gary D. Rawnsley 7. Gender and Party Politics: Case Study of the Democratic Progressive Party on Taiwan Bey-Ling Sha 8. Communications of Identity in Taiwan: From the February 28th Incident to the Formosa Television Corporation Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley Part Three: Hong Kong 9. The Media in Hong Kong: On the Horns of a Dilemma Willy Wo-Lap Lam 10. Media Economics of the Hong Kong Press in Political Transition: Toward a New Viable Political Economy Anthony Fung 11. Directing Hong Kong: The Politics of Contemporary Cinema Andrew M. J. Brown Part Four: The Overseas Chinese 12. Is There a British Chinese Public Sphere? David Parker 13. Children, Media and the Public Sphere in Chinese Australia Yingchi Chu, Stephanie Hemelryk Donald and Andrea Witcomb 14. Talking About Jet Li: Transnational Chinese Movie Stardom and Asian American Internet Reception Julian Stringer Conclusion 15. Greater China, Glabalization and Emancipation Neil Renwick
Although Russia experienced dramatic political breakthroughs in the late 1980s and early 1990s after shedding the shackles of Soviet rule, it subsequently failed to continue progressing toward democracy. M. Steven Fish offers an explanation for the direction of regime change in post-Soviet Russia, relying on cross-national comparative analysis as well as on in-depth field research in Russia. Fish demonstrates that Russia's failure to democratize has three causes: too much economic reliance on oil, too little economic liberalization, and too weak a national legislature.
This is the first academic study of the impact of semi-presidentialism in emerging democracies outside of Europe. Semi-presidentialism is where there is both a directly-elected fixed-term president and a prime minister who is responsible to the legislature. For the most part, semi-presidentialism is seen as being a risky choice for new democracies because it can create potentially destabilizing competition between the president and prime minister. And yet, there are now more than fifty semi-presidential countries in the world. Moreover, many of these countries are in Africa, the former Soviet Union and Asia, often in places where democracy has yet to establish a firm foundation. This study begins with a chapter that discusses the advantages and disadvantages of semi-presidentialism and provides the theoretical framework for a wide-ranging series of country chapters presented in the second part of the book. Written by country/area specialists, the case studies highlight the political processes at work in young semi-presidential democracies. Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe will appeal to those researching and studying in the fields of comparative politics, development and democracy. © 2007 Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup for selection and editorial matter. All rights reserved.
Assessing differences in government performance based on governmental structure (parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential regimes) and partisan control of government (divided and unified government) is an issue that is still unfolding, having received comparatively little attention outside some Western countries. Using survey data from the 2008 legislative elections in Taiwan, this study sheds light on the issue by examining the public perceptions of government performance, comparing the various consequences of government institutions. The findings indicate that four key factors can be used to evaluate the performance of institutional arrangements: presidential performance, parliamentary performance, preference for party control, and cognition of premier appointment. For the example of Taiwan, the results further reveal that the variables of party identification, ethnic consciousness, unification/independence preference, and political knowledge exert important influences on one's evaluation of government performance.
In the past twenty years, social scientists have produced a substantial literature in English on Taiwan's domestic politics. In a review of more than 150 books, articles, and chapters, this article traces the development of that literature and identifies its main themes and topics - including political economy, social change, critical Taiwan studies, ethnicity and national identity, democratization and democratic consolidation, constitutional issues, institutional development, election studies, political parties and coalitions, and policymaking. The article finds the field of Taiwan politics divided into area studies, theoretically-driven work, and policy-oriented research. The author advocates more integration of these approaches as well as more cross-fertilization between qualitative and quantitative work, and between U.S.-based and Taiwan-based researchers. The author also identifies topics in need of additional research, including partisanship and party realignment, institutional reform, legislative politics, bureaucratic politics, and pre-1945 political development.
This article assesses the presidency of Taiwan's Chen Shui-bian from 2000, when he was elected the first non-Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) president to the present. Chen enjoyed broad support at home and abroad, but that soon changed. Three criteria are used to assess his presidency: governance (including political reform), the economy, and his handling of foreign and defense policy. The article concludes that while Chen faced a difficult situation, including having a weak mandate and a legislature controlled by a hostile opposition, he failed to show leadership and resorted to exploiting ethnic tensions. Gridlock resulted. Chen meanwhile saw economic decline and deteriorating relations with the United States and China. Finally, Chen succumbed to corruption. In short, Chen's presidency was a failed one.
Taiwan (the Republic of China, ROC) in 2001 lived under the impact of the historic 2000 presidential elections in which the Kuomintang (KMT) for the first time lost its grip on the central government. The winner of the presidential elections, the charismatic Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) leader Chen Shui-bian, faced stern challenges from three fronts. Politically, Chen had to live with a KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan that has the power to cast a vote of no confidence on Chen's DPP government. Economically, Chen had to navigate between the DPP's avowed antinuclear position and the business sector's insistence on continuing the construction of Taiwan's controversial fourth nuclear power plant. In terms of cross-Strait relations, the DPP's pro-independence stance dashed any chance to improve Taipei's relationship with Beijing. On top of all these challenges, Taiwan found itself in the middle of a worldwide economic recession. Taiwan in 2001 thus witnessed an unprecedented economic crisis accompanied by a domestic political stalemate and cross-Strait impasse. At the end of the year, parliamentary elections were held that deprived the KMT of its majority position in the Legislative Yuan. They also gave the DPP and its new ideological ally, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), a total of 100 seats in the 225-seat Legislative Yuan. President Chen is counting on a more efficient government now that the parliamentary opposition has been curtailed, a world economic rebound, and the hope that Beijing will be forced to negotiate with him. It seems doubtful, however, that the President will get what he hopes for as Taiwan navigates into 2002.
Taiwan (the Republic of China, ROC) in 2000 was overwhelmed by such issues as the March presidential election and its impact on the island's conflict-prone political system, the fragile relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and a shaky economy. The victory of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian in the presidential election was itself a milestone in the ROC's political development, for it ended the more than half century rule of the Kuomintang (KMT). Beijing's saber rattling over the Taiwanese electorate's choice of a pro-independence candidate was less noisy than expected. However, just as people began congratulating themselves on the smooth power transfer and the relatively tranquil state of cross-Strait relations, Taiwan suddenly was caught up by the unprecedented eruption of a feud between the new president and the KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan. Political uncertainty, plus the DPP's pro-environment and pro-welfare policies, put Taiwan's stock market into a tailspin. President Chen and his KMT opponents collided over the issue of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. Chen's first prime minister Tang Fei resigned under great pressure. A DPP minority government was formed in October. At the end of the year the KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan was gearing up to impeach the president. All in all, Taiwan experienced unprecedented volatility in its domestic politics, and it is certain that shocks of greater magnitude are waiting ahead.
Taiwan's streak of bad luck continued in 2002, as economic and political stagnation plagued the island. Cross-strait relations suffered from President Chen Shui-bian's mid-summer reference to "a country on each side of the Strait," although Beijing's sense that the long-term prospects for unification are improving permitted a moderate response. Taiwan's domestic political scene was troubled by partisan divisions and disagreements over how best to manage an economic recession, now in its third year. By any measure-economic, political, or diplomatic-Taiwan's misfortunes abated only slightly in 2002, while confidence in leaders and institutions continued to sink. The stock market hovered near record lows, while unemployment rates approached record highs. Overall, Taiwan's political and economic performance remains so deficient that scholars and citizens alike are questioning whether Taiwan's poorly designed institutions can weather the relentless storms battering the island.
This article argues that semi-presidentialism can be classified into five sub-types: (1) president-dominant semi-presidentialism, (2) premier-dominant semi-presidentialism, (3) parliament-dominant semi-presidentialism, (4) cohabitation semi-presidentialism, and (5) balance-of-powers semi-presidentialism. This framework differs from previous frameworks by emphasizing the constitutional powers of parliament in tandem with two more standard variables, namely, the powers of the president and the party situation in parliament. On the basis of this framework, it suggests that when two opposing branches (president and parliament) achieve parity, they are more likely to come into conflict as regards the passage of legislation. In particular, it is hypothesized that balance-of-powers semi-presidentialism is much more likely to generate political conflicts and political deadlock than any other sub-type, even to the point of breaking down a democratic regime.
This article analyses trends in election campaigning in Taiwan with particular reference to the landmark 2000 presidential election, when the Kuomintang's 50-year monopoly on power finally ended. It examines the growing professionalism in election campaigning that stands alongside, and is shaped by, the systemic and institutional features of Taiwan's electoral landscape, such as the path dependency of the parties and the electoral system used. The article challenges us to reconsider the notion of how identity is shaped and communicated; globalisation has given birth to a spurious catch-all notion of ‘Americani sation’ that is invoked by many modern election observers. It is said to describe a trend towards a global convergence of electoral practices based on the adoption of election campaign techniques developed in the United States. The discourse on Americanisation resonates with the pejorative vocabulary more associated with cultural imperialism, suggesting the displacement of the indigenous by the foreign. The article is a warning against using this discourse too liberally. The flows of influence and information are in fact multi-directional, with the United States absorbing cultural effects as well as supplying them. Newly democratising systems have not undergone a blanket Americanisation because, as the Taiwan example clearly demonstrates, traditional methods of voter mobilisation remain important; the foreign coexists with the indigenous.
When Chen Shui-bian won the presidency in 2000 and the Democratic Progressive Party became the ‘ruling party’, many observers said Taiwan experienced democratic consolidation. Nevertheless Chen and his supporters continued to talk of democratization in the ensuing years. But political reform, advances in civil liberties, and ridding the system of corruption must be considered essential to that process. Reform failed due to the fact that Chen's party did not have a majority in the legislature and the president showed poor leadership. Civil liberties deteriorated owing to Chen playing ethnic politics as well as his administration's lack of respect for democratic values. The view that money ruled in politics and the prevalence of personal greed caused corruption to worsen. These three factors suggest the devolution of Taiwan's democracy during the Chen era rather than its consolidation and explain the new administration's loss of public support.
The study of semi-presidentialism has been advanced by adopting clear-cut subtypes and linking them to system performance such as government stability and democratic survival. The dichotomous classification of president-parliamentarism vs. premier-presidentialism is one such set of subtypes that has gained wide acceptance among students of semi-presidentialism. The main problem with such classification is that it overly focuses on constitution stipulation, to the neglect of the behavioral patterns that mediate between legal norms and system performance. In this paper, we first develop a behavioral classification scheme that differentiates semi-presidential systems into four operational modes: quasi-parliamentarism (QP), presidential supremacy (PS), compromise (COM), and alternation (ALT), and concentrates on the COM mode. We classify world semi-presidential systems according to the four subtypes and identify the COM regimes. It is found that the COMs are situated between the ALTs and the PSs. They are based on, but not determined by constitutional stipulation that grants the president either the power to appoint specific members in the cabinet, or the power to directly design state policies in specific areas. As such, the COM regimes do not conform to either the principle of presidentialism which grants exclusive power to the president to appoint and dismiss cabinet members, or to the principle of parliamentarism which leaves the fate of the government in the hands of the parliament. The COMs recognize the authority of both the president and the parliament in cabinet formation and survival. Selective COMs are examined, including Poland (presidential ministers), Finland (presidential reserved domain), Taiwan (possible future case), Kenya and Zimbabwe (transitory). The rarity of COM cases and their fragility testify to the inherently uncertain and unstable nature of this particular subtype of semi-presidentialism.
Extending the veto player theory to semi-presidential regimes, this paper illustrates the dynamics of policy making in Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou presidency. Semi-presidentialism is difficult to analyze in that the institutional veto players are usually vaguely defined, giving agenda-setters important roles to play. This paper shows that a veto player has the late-mover’s advantage if he is allowed to revise a proposal. That explains why policies involving lawmaking gives Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan considering bargaining power, even to the disadvantage of the president. The same logic implies that the president has a strong incentive to bypass the Legislative Yuan. The premier, encountering the president’s policy initiatives and the Legislative Yuan’s lawmaking power, is unlikely to be a dominant player. This paper exemplifies this dynamics by examining how the features of a policy affects its making in the first two years of Ma’s presidency.
This book examines a typical feature of semi-presidentialism,
i.e. intra-executive conflicts between the president and the prime minister/cabinet, by
analysing the pattern, institutional triggers, and implications of such conflicts in Central
and Eastern Europe. In addition, the choice of semi-presidentialism and differences in
transitional context and constitutional building are accounted for. The following countries
are specifically dealt with: Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania,
Russia and Ukraine. The study’s empirical base is a mixture of data derived from literature,
reports, review of constitutional documents, as well as from an expert survey
conducted among analysts with an expert knowledge on the countries under scrutiny.
The results suggest that both actor-oriented and historical-institutional factors have
to be considered in order to understand why so many post-communist countries ended
up with semi-presidentialism, and why there is such a sharp divide between Central
Europe and the (non-Baltic) former Soviet republics with regard to the choice of semipresidential
type. The pattern of intra-executive struggles reveals that conflicts were somewhat
more recurrent in the early period following the transition, but persist as a frequently
occurring phenomenon throughout the post-communist period. The most common type
of conflict has revolved around division of powers within the executive branch. As for
triggers of conflict, the study suggests that certain institutional factors, such as electoral
concurrence and party system fragmentation, have been important. Regarding the management
of conflict, and the options available to the conflicting parties, the analysis indicates
that the constitutional courts have played an important role as conflict mediators, and
that attempts of changing the constitution, and using public addresses are options preferred
by the presidents. Finally, the analysis shows that intra-executive conflict is associated
with cabinet instability. A case study example also illustrates how the president-parliamentary
framework can be related to policy ineffectiveness. The study finally
concludes that premier-presidential systems have great governance potential provided
that the party systems develop and consolidate. The conclusions regarding the president-parliamentary
system are less encouraging, and it is argued that the adoption of this
system is an important factor in relation to the failed democratisation in many post-
Soviet countries.
There are two important questions in post-conflict constitution making, and at present neither of them has a definitive or uniformly accepted answer. The first relates to the best configuration of institutions to adopt in order to ameliorate the problem of the intergroup conflict. The second concerns the process most apt to produce the best configuration of institutions, whatever it might be. The first question is unanswered because there is a dispute among scholars and practitioners between two opposing views of appropriate institutions to mitigate conflict. Constitutional processes have not generally been geared to yield coherent exemplars of either configuration in a sufficient number of conflict-prone countries to provide a convincing demonstration of the superiority of one approach or the other. The second question is unanswered because in many cases constitutional processes are chosen in a haphazard fashion, without regard to the aptness of the process for the problems to be addressed. Meanwhile, advocates have been arguing for a single, highly structured, uniform process that may be apt for some classes of problems but is not necessarily appropriate for the full range of problems constitution makers confront in coping with divided societies. Hence the questions of what and how are both subject to debate. This Article takes up both questions. It surveys the main contending prescriptions for constitutional designs to cope with serious ethnic conflict, and it enumerates some of the main objections to each. It then reviews some of the available evidence on the efficacy of the contending prescriptions before turning to the question of adoptability. The Article notes that there are many obstacles to the adoption of a coherent set of political institutions to mitigate conflict, which derive mainly from processes of constitution making. For this reason, the Article evaluates some of the main suggestions in the recent literature on constitutional process and thereafter devotes considerable attention to the difficult question of designing a process for constitution making that is geared to the specific problems faced by constitution designers.
This thesis explores the impact of democratic institutions amongst the Asian developing countries. There has been debate about the successful economic rise of these seven countries; however, questions remain over the differing levels of economic performance. Institutional literature has paid scant attention to the role of democracy, and how this has influenced economic development throughout Asia. This thesis explores the relationships between four democratic institutions - cabinets, party-systems, electoral systems and bicameralism - and economic performance across six developing democracies, in addition to Japan. Using current democratic institutional literature derived from OECD countries, this thesis expands the scope to include new countries. The analysis employs both statistical methods and case studies to assess the relationships between four democratic institutions and seven socio-economic indicators between 1986 and 2005. The linear regressions provided evidence that coalition cabinets are correlated with lower levels of inflation and unemployment, but large multi-party legislatures are not. This thesis also found correlations between strong second legislative chambers and higher FDI, lower tariffs and higher income inequality. Although this is an exploratory thesis, I suggest that democratic institutional analysis within Asia does warrant further examination; an assessment of the specific institutions may provide us with clearer notions regarding economic development.
The recent wave of democratic transitions has stimulated scholarly
interest in a previously undeveloped area of study: comparative
presidentialism. Comparative presidentialism seeks to define variant
types of presidentialism that have emerged from transition
processes, to identify the conditions that shape institutional choice
and to understand more clearly the causal relationship between
institutional choice and democratic regime outcomes. Using the
postcommunist transitions, this paper contributes to the emerging
comparative presidentialism literature by suggesting a revision to
the argument that presidentialism leads to failed democratic
transitions. The paper focuses attention away from the institutional
rules of the game and toward the actors who actually make the
institutional choice. Three postcommunist cases, distinguished by
their different regime outcomes, are compared: Russia, Uzbekistan,
and Estonia.
The Hungarian transition from socialism stands out from other
examples of political change in the region, in that the ruling
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) suffered an erosion of
political power generated largely from within the party itself. The
study shows how the Communist Party, after its destruction in the
revolution of 1956, sought to institutionalize its rule through a
course of limited liberalization and the broad co-optation of the
populace. This policy helped create a tacit social compact with
society, particularly in co-opting younger intellectuals who identified
with the goals of reform socialism. However, the party eventually
marginalized this group, creating an internal party opposition that
supported socialism but opposed the MSZMP. Consequently, when
the limits of Hungarian reform socialism became evident in the
mid-1980s, rank-and-file intellectuals within the party began to
mobilize against the party hierarchy, seeking to transform the
MSZMP into a democratic socialist party. These "reform circles,"
drawing their strength primarily from the countryside, spread to all
parts of the party and helped undermine central party power and
expand the political space for opposition groups to organize.
Eventually, the reform circles were able to force an early party
congress in which the MSZMP was transformed into a
Western-style socialist party prior to open elections in 1990.