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Marcus DuBois King
The Weaponization of
Water in Syria and Iraq
Attempts to identify linkages between climate-related events and con-
flict have led to ambiguous and contested results. Some analyses have found
notable correlation between human conflict and climate-related events;
however, they were criticized for being too broad in scope and scale.
debate has inspired additional, more specific research to examine individual
case studies of possible climate change-induced conflict, using fewer variables
water scarcity in this caseand more confined geographical areas.
This essay is based on a project examining the nexus between water stress and
violence at specified stages of conflict in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, and Nigeriaareas
where hostilities are ongoing and military organizations with Islamic extremist ideol-
ogies are major combatants.
More specifically, this piece focuses on Syria and Iraq
between August 2012 and July 2015, the time period when hostilities in Syria grew
most intense and when the role of water in the conflict became discernable, and
asks: How did the supply, manipulation, and/or weaponization of water accelerate
or perpetuate conflict? Is water scarcity one plausible driver of conflict in Syria
and Iraq? The conclusions are telling, and reveal patterns that U.S. policymakers
can use in formulating a response to groups like the Islamic State.
Water Scarcity and Conflict
The greater Fertile Crescent, comprised primarily of the countries of Syria and
Iraq, experienced the worst drought in instrumental record from 20072010, a
phenomenon increasingly attributable to long-term climate trends.
The inability
Dr. Marcus D. King is John O. Rankin Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director
of the Master in Arts in International Affairs Program at George Washington Universitys Elliott
School. He can be reached at or follow him on Twitter @MarcusKingGW.
The author would like to thank Siree Allers, an MA candidate in the Elliott School of Inter-
national Affairs, for providing research support, Arabic translation, and other efforts to this
Copyright © 2016 The Elliott School of International Affairs
The Washington Quarterly 38:4 pp. 153169
of Syria and Iraq to meet demand for waterdue to growing populations and/or
decreasing supply and flawed water policieshas only exacerbated problems
caused by drought conditions.
Water scarcity played a meaningful but com-
plicated role in creating the conditions that led
to political unrest and ultimately violent insur-
rection in Syria in spring 2011 and the spillover
into Iraq. The sociopolitical impacts played out
differently in the two countries. In Iraq, the
roots of radicalization run deeper as they are argu-
ably part of a cycle of conflict that began with the
U.S. invasion in 2003, well before the current
drought. In Syria, climate changes impacts in
the physical environment caused detrimental
second- and third-order effects on ecological and human systems (See Figure 1):
these effects included drought conditions and food insecurity. Forced migration
and short-term and historical policy failures were fourth-order effects that deepened
pre-existing ethnic and sociopolitical fractures. Migration was especially disruptive in
Syria, where farmers and herders were forced to move to cities in search of more pro-
ductive work, only to be relegated to peripheral shanty towns.
There are clear signs that these factors contributed to the rise of militant extre-
For example, in Syria, these environmental effects created a context of
deprivation that allowed the Islamic State (IS) to recruit 6070 percent of its
fighters locally. This is in part because IS maintained municipal service organiz-
ations such as the Islamic Network for Public Services that provided electricity
and transportation in Aleppo.
Similarly, in Iraq, the Al-Nusrah Front and IS both initially recruited heavily
from populations of disaffected Sunni Iraqis. The drought of the late 2000s inten-
sified existing grievances and increased the stress on Iraqi society through the
Figure 1: Systemic Effects of Climate Change in Syria
Water scarcity
played a meaningful
but complicated
role in violence in
Syria in 2011 and
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effects of migration and loss of agricultural productivity. In areas where the
drought weakened civil institutions and the protections they provide, new
fronts opened that not only provided a safe haven to IS combatants but also
served as an incubator where these groups could increase their numbers and
gain momentum. The north and northeastern provincesthe primary agricultural
region that typically produces two-thirds of Syrias crop yieldswere among the
most affected by the drought, and are the same regions that IS has maintained con-
sistent control of since the beginning of the conflict.
This risk will only grow worse with the projected effects of climate change in the
next decade. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates
thatclimatechangeislikelytoputever-greater pressure on water resources in the
Mediterranean and North African regions over the next decades, notably increasing
A recent study concluded that a recurrence of a three-year drought in
Syriaassevereasthatof20072010 is two to three times more likely to reoccur as a
consequence of human-induced climate change than
natural variability alone.
Such an event will only
increase third-order conditions of deprivation, which in
turn increases the fourth-order likelihood that extremist
groups will take advantage of the situation for recruit-
ment or other purposes. Indeed, paucity of water presents
and has created fertile ground for recruitment.
Using Water as a Weapon
A lack of water contributes to political instability and violent conflict in the first
place. The conflict can break out over the lack of water itself, or a malignant actor
can manipulate the water supply in such a way as to turn it into a weapon for use
in an unrelated conflict, effectively weaponizingthe water. There are many histori-
cal examples of waters use as a weapon in conflicts that have started for reasons not
related to water scarcity itself.
For instance, the Dutch opened their dikes in order to
stop advancing French forces in the Third Franco-Dutch War, and during the Korean
conflict, U.S. strategy involved attacking dams in North Korea.
In order to truly understand the weaponization of water, it is useful to understand
the term with some precision. At its most basic level, a weapon is essentially a means
of gaining advantage or defending oneself in a conflict or contest.
A weapon
wielded by a group or individual can take many forms. It is an item, action, offensive
capability, or mechanism used or intended to kill, injure, or coerce.On the battle-
field, weapons may be anything used to gain a strategic, material, or mental advantage
over an adversary. (Interestingly, the term weaponis not formally defined under
international law or treaties regulating the use of force.)
Paucity of water
has created fertile
ground for IS
The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq
The Syria and Iraq region has seen some of the earliest recorded, if not the most
frequent, history of waters use as a weapon. The territory of Syria and Iraq consti-
tute part of the ancient Kingdom of Mesopotamia. The earliest recorded conflict
over water in this region was over 4500 years ago, when a dispute over access to
irrigation water led King Urlama of the city-state of Lagash to cut off the water
supply of the neighboring city of Umma.
A far more recent despot, Saddam Hussein, used water as a strategic weapon
against a Shia population known as the Marsh Arabs, who reside in the swampy
area near the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The Marsh Arabs
rebelled against the regime in the wake of the 1991 U.S. invasion, and Hussein
responded by systematically diverting the water feeding the marshesdriving
more than 100,000 people from their homes, destroying a unique way of life,
and causing an environmental disaster of epic proportionsaccording to the
U.S. intelligence community.
Restoration efforts by the government were 75
percent successful by 2008. Unfortunately, this trend had been substantially
reversed as of July 2015 due to greatly reduced water flow of the two rivers,
related to the confluence of drought and purposeful environmental manipulation
by IS. Similarly, IS control of the upper reaches of the Euphrates River enables
them to further reduce the water flow to the Marsh Arabs, whom IS also considers
enemies due to their minority status as adherents to Shia Islam.
Establishing this sort of chokehold on waterresourcesisjustonewaytoweaponize
water. To understand others, we conducted a systematic analysis of how combatants
used water in the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria from August 2012July 2015
using information gleaned from a variety of primary and secondary sources in
English and Arabic, including IS publications, news feeds, and tweets. Altogether,
we found 44 incidents of water manipulation, which we then classified into five cat-
egories based on the perpetrators intended use of the water weapon for political or
military advantage: strategic weaponization, tactical weaponization, psychological ter-
rorism, extortion or incentivization, and unintentional weaponization. Figure 2 shows
how frequently water was used for each purpose by any actor in this time period. (Inci-
dents in which multiple categories were applicable were double-counted.)
Strategic Weaponization
We identified two types of strategic weaponization. The first is the use of water to
virtually or actually control large or important land areas or facilities to fulfill the
vision of sovereignty, and the second is as an asset to fund activities, such as
administration and weapons acquisition, of a state.Strategic weaponization
also includes targeting or destroying large population centers, or industrial facilities
and/or other infrastructure.
The Islamic State provides ample examples of the strategic weaponization of
water. For instance, on August 7, 2014, IS seized control of Mosul Dam, a 3.2-
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kilometer-long dam on the Tigris River upstream of Mosul city in northern Iraq. It
is unclear what IS might have done next as seizing the dam provided the primary
motivation for U.S. airstrikes the next day. Just 10 days later, from August 1718,
Iraqi and Kurdish forces fought a pitched battle that reclaimed the dam with the
support of about 35 U.S. airstrikes.
In another example, during October 2014, IS diverted the Khalis tributary of
the Tigris River to flood parts of the town of Mansouriya in Diyala province in
Iraq. According to a local official, this action flooded over 3000 donum (781
acres) of agricultural land and inundated homes with up to two meters of water,
causing hundreds of families to flee. IS also cut off water from the Khalis tributary
for 10 days, suspending the drinking water supply to villages by the towns of Man-
souriya, Salam, and Sarajiq.
In another form of weaponization, IS has used water as an asset for funding, col-
lecting taxes on it. In Raqqa for example, the de facto capital of the Islamic State,
the Credit Bank has been turned into the tax authority that collects payments
from business for electricity, water, and security.
Tactical Weaponization
Tactical weaponization is primarily the use of water as a weapon on the battlefield in
direct or immediate support of military operations or against targets of strictly mili-
tary value. In other words, we characterized the weaponization of water on a small,
local scale as tactical. In September 2014, for example, IS diverted waters from
rivers in the Shirwain Basin area in Diyala province, Iraq, to inhibit an advance
by Iraqi security forces. The decision collaterally flooded nine nearby villages.
Figure 2: Incidents of Water as a Weapon in Syria and Iraq
The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq
Instrument of Psychological Terrorism
This type of weaponization involves creating fear among non-combatants of denial
of access or contamination of the water supply. Actors can use this weaponization,
or hydro-terrorism,
on either a strategic or tactical level. In July 2015 in Syria,
Wadi Barada Shura Council militants threatened to cut off water from the Ayn Al
Fija spring, which supplies drinking water to Damascus. They demanded the ces-
sation of military operations after the Syrian Armys Fourth Mechanized Division
and Hezbollahs incursion into Zabadani, a city on the border with Lebanon, after
days of indiscriminate barrel bombings.
Instrument of Extortion or Incentivization
This form of weaponization involves the use of the water weapon to establish
credibility as a governing authority or to reward support from the occupiedpopu-
lace. In June 2014, IS captured Mosul and Tikrit and cut off water to surrounding
villages. Water was suspended from Mosuls water purification plant to Christian
minority villages on the outskirts of Mosul, including Qaraqosh and Bartalla. This
action compelled residents to buy water at the rate of $6.25 USD per cubic meter
instead, which is unaffordable to most residents. Water service was restored to
Mosul by mid-June, and offered at discounted prices to the Sunni residents who
returned to the city after ISs initial seizure.
Unintentional Weaponization
Unintentional weaponization describes an outcome when use of the water weapon
causes collateral damage to civilians or the ecological environment. We found that
water is often a relatively indiscriminate weapon. Unintentional population dis-
placement is a frequent form of collateral damage. For example, as of December
2014, various combatants had damaged 35 percent of the water treatment facilities
in Syria. The contamination of drinking water supplies is a pervasive issue.
The Islamic State and Water Weaponization
All major combatants, with the notable excep-
tion of the U.S. coalition assembled for air
strikes, have intentionally used the water
weapon according to one of our categories
(see Figure 3). However, although we did not
document any cases in this time period, it is
likely that U.S. bombing has caused some col-
lateral damage to water supply sources or
related infrastructure such as dams, levees,
Regimes intention-
ally used the water
weapon less
frequently than
sub-state actors.
Marcus D. King
irrigation systems, or treatment plants at some point. Nevertheless, the data shows
that regimes intentionally used the water weapon less frequently than sub-state
actors. Notably, there were only 5 incidences of water weapon usage by state-
level actors. This may provide evidence that many states are adhering to inter-
national agreements prohibiting the use of the environment as a weapon.
The Islamic State is responsible for the most deployments of the water weapon.
IS-attributed incidents nearly equal the total of all
other incidents combined. ISs frequent weaponization
of water is understandable when one takes their declara-
tory strategic objectives into account: territorial expan-
sion is the groups primary goal, and the water weapon is
an effective means for expanding control of territory.
Indeed, the frequency of weaponization incidents
reached their peak by December 2014, the period
when IS reached its greatest control of territory to
date, and declined thereafter.
The Islamic States Strategy
The frequency and locations of use raise the question of whether the parties to the
conflicts in Syria and Iraq are exercising a coherent water weaponization strategy.
The Islamic State is the only actor that displays evidence of a truly strategic
approach. Notably, one factor that has separated IS from other extremists
groups, such as the Al-Nusrah Front, is the superior ability to articulate a vision
and implement a military strategy in support of that vision.
The vision is the
establishment of a caliphate that will presumably assume many of the attributes
of statehood, including static control of territory and providing municipal services
to its populace. Our investigations and the literature, including statements of IS,
suggest that the use of water as a weapon is indeed an integral part of ISs strategy.
Figure 3: Use of the Water Weapon by Major Combatant Groups
The water weapon
is an effective means
for expanding and
retaining control of
The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq
As a strategic weapon, the significance of water and related infrastructure in
Syria and Iraq is evident. It was widely reported that the decisive factor in the
U.S. decision to launch the air campaign against IS in August 2014 was the organ-
izations seizure of the Mosul Dam. In a letter to Congress justifying the airstrikes,
the White House explained that failure of the Mosul dam could threaten the lives
of large numbers of civilians, threaten U.S. personnel and facilitiesincluding the
U.S. Embassy in Baghdadand prevent the Iraqi government from providing
crucial services to the Iraqi populace.
In this way, it was ISs use of water as
an instrument of both strategic and psychological terrorism that escalated the con-
flict by provoking a new actor and a new type of warfare (the aerial campaign) into
the fray. Among the parties to the conflict, IS has used terrorism as a tactic to great
effect and has been given credit by one academic for mastering the technique of
As a tactical weapon, the use of water in Syria and Iraq has caused few, if any,
military battlefield casualties. However, the water weapon has certainly taken its
toll on vulnerable noncombatants. We can measure this both by the suffering
caused by mass migration and by outbreaks of waterborne disease, which come
from water contamination and the lack of basic water sanitation and hygiene
(WASH) facilities in refugee camps. So the water weapon has proven relatively
useless as a tactical military weapon but effective as a tool of political control.
However, the humanitarian consequences of diminished water supply due to
weaponization are likely to last longer into the future, whatever the immediate
outcome of the war.
Furthermore, water weaponization is a critical enabler of a successful IS military
campaign. Our research suggests IS does not have the capability to conduct effi-
cient warfare without ready access to the water weapon. Along with other
factors, including high morale and some level of support from the Sunni popu-
lation, water enables IS to create an economy of force to exercise strategic or
virtual control over disproportionate amounts of territory with a relatively small
attacking force.
In several instances we identified, IS seizure and resulting ability to destroy
dams created the threat of floods that could wipe out enemy forces distributed
over a wide area as well as civilian population centers. Combatants opposing IS
are forced to take this reality into account in deciding whether to occupy phys-
ically vulnerable territory. Military leaders are also compelled to recognize ISs stra-
tegic advantage as they plan, position forces, and execute counteroffensives.
Beyond using water as a weapon, the Islamic Statea group that wishes to
establish a wide-reaching caliphate governed by Islamic lawwill have to
provide water as a basic service if it wishes to gain and retain legitimacy. In
Baghdad, for example, a heat wave in late July and early August 2015 provoked
mass demonstrations over lack of access to electricity and water. In response to
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the pressure, Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi implemented comprehensive structural
reforms and declared a long weekend. The heat wave has pressured the Kurdish
Regional Government in Iraqs north to implement similar measures.
Islamic State likely faces similar challenges in service provision. In one video
posted by the Scenes from MosulYouTube channel, for example, locals describe
a city beset by electricity cuts and exorbitant water prices.
As Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell, Syria experts at a U.S. think tank
called the Center for Climate and Security, explain, the social contract
between governments and their publics is being stressed by these extreme
events Governments that are responsive to publics in the face of these stresses
are likely to strengthen the social contract, while those who are unresponsive are
likely to weaken it.
It is important to watch for emerging reports of ISs successes
and failures in service provision. This metric will indicate their capacity to retain
territory and legitimize their presence.
The threat of ISs use of the water weapon was the key accelerant that precipitated
U.S. involvement in the aerial campaign against IS. Our analysis of the use of the
water weapon yielded three basic observations, particularly regarding its utility to
IS. First, use of the water weapon has been a critical enabler and perpetuator of ISs
strategic campaign of territorial acquisition. Second, ISs ability to effectively wield
the water weapon is a major factor in achieving the political objective of winning
the hearts and minds of the Iraqi and Syrian people.
The Islamic State has used water resources as both a carrot and stick in a quest
to build popular support. ISs modus operandi upon capturing a municipality is to
assume total control over the core needs of a civilian population, spending signifi-
cant financial resources on providing social services. These actions encompass
monopolization of all industries and municipal services facilities, including electri-
city, water, and gas supplies, local factories, and even bakeries. ISs goal is to take
advantage of discontent to ensure what it perceives as a more efficient and egali-
tarian provision of services.
These actions show that IS has been able to quickly
adapt to the challenges of governing in some areas, methods first pioneered by
Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based Shiite militia.
The costs of utilities, including water, have increased dramatically under IS
rule. Taxation of these goods coupled with higher food prices and unemployment
have pushed people to desperation. IS is using water as part of this economic stran-
glehold to persuade people to join their ranks. This tactic is reportedly working
well in areas that IS has controlled for a significant period. In Palmyra, Syria, as
many as 1200 fighters joined IS between May and September of 2015.
However, intentionally raising the prices of water in an effort to drive people to
The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq
become fighters is a double-edged sword. A population that loses confidence in
ISs ability to provide basic services like electricity and water is less likely to
grant them the legitimacy of a state they seek.
IS had better luck in June 2014, when it captured the Iraqi cities of Mosul and
Tikrit and cut off water to surrounding villages. Water service was restored to
Mosul by mid-June, and offered at discounted prices to Sunni residents. When
IS restored the water supply, the Sunni population who had fled viewed them
as liberators.
Our third observation is that while the use of
water as a weapon indeed has significant his-
torical roots in Mesopotamia, ISs systematic
and sustained deployment of the water
weapon is unprecedented in the history of
modern conflict. The Pacific Institute, a U.S.-
based think tank, maintains a Water Conflict
Chronologydatabase containing descriptions
of worldwide incidents ranging from 3000 BC
to 2010 AD. It contains 343 entries but it docu-
ments no more than a handful of water weaponization incidents associated with
any previous war. Likewise, weaponization specifically classified as terrorism has
been isolated and sporadic.
These conclusions are confirmed by data collected
by a research project on water and conflict based at Oregon State University.
The three main conclusions must be seen in the context of an ever-dwindling
water supply due to stressors including climate change-driven droughts, the
destruction of water infrastructure, and the interruption of water conservation
policy implementation. There is growing evidence that the drought of 2007
2010 is likely to reoccur. The UN Regional Initiative for the Assessment of the
Impact of Climate Change on Water Resources and Socio-Economic Vulner-
ability in the Arab Region (RICCAR) has found that higher temperatures and
longer dry seasons (periods with daily precipitation < 1 millimeter) are likely in
the Middle East and North Africa to the year 2100.
These changes over time
would compound the effects of already water scarce conditions. If the war con-
tinues into the coming year, water scarcity will in many instances magnify the
extent of damage caused by the continued use of the water weapon.
This situation underscores the need for regional coordination as soon as any
peace or truce is reached. Turkey is the upper riparian state on the Euphrates
River, and it has currently severed relations with Syria. Regional coordination,
including regulation of new dam construction and water withdrawals, will be
necessary to prevent the worst outcomes for human security in any post-conflict
situation. It is likely that sub-state actors will continue to exert influence in
more locations than was the case before the current conflict. Nation states will
ISs systematic and
sustained deploy-
ment of the water
weapon is
Marcus D. King
likely have to take the equities of these actors in account in order to reach a sus-
tainable solution to regional water scarcity.
Strategies for U.S. Policy and Regional Engagement
Use of the water weapon by terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq should inform a
future U.S. engagement strategy in this region and
elsewhere to mitigate instability by denying non-
state actors the ability to wage this type of war.
Accordingly, any modification of U.S. strategy to
defeat IS should employ all U.S. foreign policy
tools in defense, development, and diplomacy.
Action should be taken with the realization that
the various forms of water weaponization are so
different in scope and intent that they require tai-
lored prevention strategies and responses.
Defense Policy
In the area of defense policy, the U.S.-led coalition should abide by the Hippo-
cratic Oath in conducting its military campaign: First, do no harm. Allied military
action to dislodge IS from captured territory should be conducted in a way that
minimizes or prevents damage to water supply and infrastructure. It will also be
important to understand ISs use of water as a tool of incentivization if and
when territory is retaken by the allied forces. This requires developing counter
strategies that provide immediate resources and support for reconstruction of
vital infrastructure benefiting populations otherwise susceptible to extremist
recruitment. Successful denial of ISs ability to use the water weapon may be
the decisive factor in determining whether they can be defeated on the battlefield
itself and whether segments of the population that support IS can be persuaded to
shift allegiances.
As of late October 2015, the United States has shifted its strategy to allow some
boots on the ground,deepening engagement in the fight against IS by introdu-
cing small numbers of Special Forces. The Pentagon has given them orders to
create a task force in Northern Iraq designed to coordinate the campaign
against IS, including operations across the border into Syria.
These U.S.
forces should provide tactical assistance to cripple ISs ability to wield the water
weapon through active denial of access to critical water infrastructure. For
example, highly maneuverable rapid reaction teams with air support could be
deployed to protect water bodies, associated infrastructure, and distribution
systems. The U.S. military, including ground forces, should also prioritize
Different forms of
water weaponiza-
tion require tailored
prevention strat-
egies and responses.
The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq
gathering all source intelligence that can be used to prevent weaponization of
water by IS or other regional non-state actors. In addition to information about
planned enemy offensives, this intelligence should include geospatial and hydro-
logical information pinpointing vulnerable water supplies.
Development Policy
In development policy, the U.S. government should play a leading role in the pro-
vision of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction assistance. It might be a
considerable amount of time until conditions on the ground in some areas
permit the reconstruction of water infrastructure. Until those conditions grow
more permissive, the U.S. government should work with civil international organ-
izations and non-governmental development and donor agencies to restore
damaged or destroyed water infrastructure. There is precedent for such
cooperationthe U.S. military and private relief agencies cooperated closely to
replace water and sanitation infrastructure after the cessation of NATO-led air-
strikes during the Kosovo conflict in 1999.
Providing capacity-building assistance to regional governments is also a corner-
stone of the redevelopment process. Technical and financial support for environ-
mental monitoring and more efficient approaches to water management for
agriculture, such as the installation of more efficient drip irrigation systems,
should be one of the highest priorities. The best available hydrological data and
long-term drought and climate modeling should inform development projects in
the water sector. These tools are maintained by a variety of scientific and govern-
mental organizations. U.S. government agencies including USAID have the
capacity to direct this assistance. Members of the U.S. defense community includ-
ing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provide R&D and technical assistance in
support of Combatant Commands (COCOMs).
A successful U.S. strategy for regional engagement should also contain a com-
mitment to science diplomacy, specifically hydro-diplomacy. Hydro-diplomacy
can play an integral role in a conflict avoidance strategy by diminishing the
chances of future political instability fueled by water scarcity. Encouraging
regional coordination of shared water resources between Syria and Turkey
from the Euphrates River Basin is a good start. Preexisting Turkish plans for
the continued construction of dams as part of the Southeast Anatolia Project,
also known as GAP, jeopardize long-term security of downstream Syria by redu-
cing the available water supply.
M. Nouar Shamout of Chatham House and
other Arab water experts have proposed the creation of a new river commission
made up of experts inside and outside the riparian states. This formation of a
commission should be encouraged as it could provide a forum for coordinating
water policies and providing early warning about critical water situations
until a stable peace is reached.
The provision of U.S. technical assistance to
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such a commission would be a significant positive step toward peace-building in
the region.
Leveraging International Law
It is likely that sub-state actors will continue to exert influence in large areas of
Syria and Iraq. Nation-states will likely have to take the equities of these actors
in account in order to reach a sustainable solution to regional water scarcity.
For example, Kurdish minority groups are U.S. allies in the fight against IS. The
Kurds will likely emerge from the conflict with greater autonomy in the northeast-
ern areas of Syria and Iraq. The United States should therefore use its considerable
influence to coax the Kurds into discussions about the equitable allocation of
water supply to downstream territories.
At the same time, it is likely that the best possible U.S. diplomatic response to
the growing capacity of hostile non-state actors to use the water weapon is to legit-
imize state power. It can achieve this by supporting international agreements and
facilitating cooperation among the governments of Turkey, Iraq, and possibly
Syria depending on the outcome of the war. The United States can use diplomatic
leverage in the United Nations and other bodies to support the application and
enforcement of an existing body of international law that prohibits the use of
water as a weapon.
At least two conventions classify water weaponization as a war crime. First, use
of water as a weapon violates Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
Article 49. According to the protocol Starvation of civilians as a method of
combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or
render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs,
crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation
The State Parties to the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to
bring to trial or extradite persons who have allegedly committed the violations
referred to in the Additional Protocol.
Second, using water as a weapon also violates the Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of Military or any Hostile use of Environmental Modification Techniques of
December, 10, 1976 (ENMOD). In its Article I, the Convention prohibits the
Contracting Parties from engaging in military or any other hostile use of environ-
mental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects
as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.Violations
are reported to the UN Security Council and parties to the Convention agree to
provide support or assistance in accordance with the Charter of the United
The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq
As water supplies diminish, the need for nations to craft international legal
responses will only grow more acute. The U.S. Intelligence Community has judged
that the use of water as a weapon will become more common during the next ten
years, not only on the subnational level, but between states as powerful upstream
nations impede or cut off downstream flow. Forecasts also predict that water will be
used within states to pressure populations and suppress separatist elements.
If the U.S. government is not willing to use the foreign policy tools at its dis-
posal to resolve regional water challenges, non-state actors including extremist
groups operating in Syria and Iraq may fill the gap. According to a 2012 U.S. Intel-
ligence Community Assessment, active engagement by the United States to
resolve water challenges will improve U.S. influence and may forestall other
actors achieving the same influence at U.S. expense.
Fight Water with ?
The drought that devastated Syria from 20072010 was a significant driver of the
Syrian civil war. While it is important to avoid oversimplification, the resultant
food insecurity and mass migrations were
among the key factors that marginalized popu-
lations and created widespread discontent,
creating the conditions for the outbreaks of
violence that ensued. When the war in Syria
and Iraq reached greater intensity, purposeful
manipulation or weaponization of water
increased the scale and intensity of conflict.
In Syria and Iraq, nearly all combatants under-
stood the potency of water as a weapon, but its
use has been essential to the heretofore successful war strategy of IS primarily
through its use as a tool of territorial acquisition and control over vulnerable popu-
lations. Therefore, successful denial of ISs ability to use the water weapon may
represent a decisive factor in whether or not they can be defeated.
The magnitude of the use of water as a weapon in Syria and Iraq is probably
unprecedented in modern warfare. Emerging evidence demonstrates that climate
change will contribute to water scarcity even further in the Middle East and
North Africa as well as other areas where other conditions for conflict already
exist. Increased scarcity will only increase the potency of the water weapon. The
successful employment of a water weaponization strategy by IS not only carries
implications for U.S. engagement in Syria and Iraq, it suggests that the use of
water in warfare is likely to become an even greater factor unless countervailing
strategies are designed and implemented by states committed to defeat extremists.
The use of water
has been essential to
the heretofore suc-
cessful war strategy
of the Islamic State.
Marcus D. King
1. Halvard Buhaug et al., One effect to rule them all? A comment on climate and conflict,
Climatic Change 127 (December 2014): 391397, doi:10.1007/s10584-014-1266-1.
2. This research builds on conclusions of two Chatham House style dialogues at the Elliott
School in 20122013 as part of a climate and water security initiative featuring over 60
leaders from government, think tanks, NGOs, and business. The workshop was animated
by the findings of the 2012 National Intelligence Assessment on Global Water Security.
3. Kelley, Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian
Drought,Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
112 no. 11 (2015), pp. 32413246, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1421533112.
4. Francesca De Châtel, The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising:
Untangling the Triggers of Revolution,Middle Eastern Studies 50, no. 4 (2014): 524, doi:
10.1080/00263206.2013.850076; Nadhir A. Al-Ansari, Management of Water Resources
in Iraq: Perspectives and Prognoses,Engineering 5 (2013): 677,
5. See for example, Wadid Erian, Drought Vulnerability in the Arab Region Special Case
Study: Syria (Geneva: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction,
2010), p. 5; Shahrzad Mohtadi, Climate Change and the Syrian Uprising,Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, August 16, 2012.
6. Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, The Elliott School of International Affairs,
7. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, The Syrian rebel groups pulling in foreign fighters,Reuters,
Dec 24, 2013,
8. Kelley, Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian
Drought; Kathy Gilsinan, How ISIS Territory Has Changed Since the U.S. Bombing
Campaign Began,The Atlantic, September 11, 2015,
9. Syrian Civil War: The Role of Climate Change,ECC Platform, http://library.ecc-
10. Kelley, Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian
11. Peter H. Gleick, Water, drought, climate change, and conflict in Syria,Weather,
Climate, and Society 6, no. 3 (July 2014), p. 336,
12. Arthur Westing, Warfare in a Fragile World: The Military Impact on the Human Environment
(Taylor & Francis, 1980) pp. 1419, Table 1.2 (setting forth ecologically destructive wars).
13. Oxford Dictionary.
14. Gleick, Water, drought, climate change, and conflict in Syria,336.
15. Tom Rhodes, Saddam drives 100,000 Marsh Arabs from homes,The Times, September
9, 1994.
16. Peter Schwartzstein Iraqs Famed Marshes Are DisappearingAgain,National Geo-
graphic, July 9, 2015,
17. Vivian Salama and Diaa Hadid, Obama: Iraq forces retake Mosul Dam from militants,
Associated Press, last modified August 18, 2014,
The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq
18. [Daesh wages water war in Diyala in northeastern
Iraq], YouTube video, posted by AlAanTV,October 5, 2014,
19. Benn Hubbard, Life in a Jihadist Capital: Order with a Darker Side, ISIS Puts its Vision
into Practice in a Syrian City,The New York Times, last modified July 2014, http://www.
20. Erin Cunningham, Islamic State jihadists are using water as a weapon in Iraq,The
Washington Post, last modified October 7, 2014,
21. Ibrahim Al Marashi, The Dawning of Hydro-terrorism,Al Jazeera English, last modified
June 19, 2015,
22. Rebels threaten Damascus water over Zabadani assault,NOW News, last modified July 8,
23. ISIS Cuts Off Water, Electricity, Destroys Churches,Assyrian International News
Agency, last modified July 18, 2014,
24. Syria in Crisis,Oxfam Hong Kong, last modified December 5, 2014, http://www.oxfam.
25. Ahmed S. Hashim, The Islamic State: From Al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,Middle East
Policy 21, no. 4 (Winter 2014),
26. Obama applauds recapture of Mosul dam, says Iraq must unite because the wolfs at the door,
The Associated Press, August 18, 2014,
27. Ibrahim Al Marashi, The Dawning of Hydro-terrorism.
28. KRG Announces Public Holiday Due to Heat Wave,BasNews, last modified July 30,
29. Are you provided electricity, water or basic services under the oppression of the Daesh
caliphate?[Arabic Translation], Youtube Video, posted by Witness from Mosul,
August 19, 2015,
30. Thomas Friedman, The Worlds Hot Spot,New York Times, August 19, 2015, http://
31. Charles Lister, Profiling Islamic State,Brookings Doha Center, Number 13, November
32. Yochi Dreazen, From Electricity to Sewage, U.S. Intelligence Says that Islamic State is
Fast Learning How to Run a Country,Foreign Policy, August 19, 2014, http://
33. Joanna Paraszczuk, The ISIS Economy: Crushing Taxes and High Unemployment,The
Atlantic, September 2, 2015,
34. John Vidal, Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn,
The Guardian, July 2, 2014,
Marcus D. King
35. Pacific Institute Water conflict Chronologyupdated February 2013,. http://www2.
36. Oregon State University, Program in Water Management, Conflict and Transformation,
International Water Event Database,
37. Fact Sheet: Brochure on Extreme Climate Indices for the Arab Region, United Nations Econ-
omic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN ESCWA), August 2014, http://www.
38. Dan Roberts, Obama orders US special forces to assistfight against Isis in Syria,The
Guardian, October 30, 2015,
39. Marcus King Water, U.S. Foreign Policy and American Leadership,Report on Confer-
ences held at the Elliott School of International Affairs, October 2013, http://elliott.gwu.
40. Technical Assistance Program,U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, International and Interagency
41. See, for example, David Michel et al., Water Challenges and Cooperative Responses in the
Middle East and North Africa, U.S.-Islamic World Forum Papers, Brookings Institution,
November 2012,
42. M. Nour Shamout, The Euphrates in Crisis, Channels of Cooperation for a Threatened River,
(Chatham House, April 2015).
43. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary IHL Database, https://
44. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary IHL Database, accessed
July 31 2015,
45. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Global Water Security,Intelligence
Community Assessment No. ICA 2012-08, February 2, 2012,
46. Ibid.
The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq
... Past observations in the Middle East have indicated that the loss of livelihoods as well as collapse in social and state-citizen relations -due in part to climate-related stresses -could be exploited by armed groups to further their causes (King 2016;Nett & Rüttinger 2016). Where governments fail to provide support to those left destitute from droughts, for example, armed groups could fill the gap by providing the necessary assistance to affected communities, thereby garnering support and increasing recruitment. ...
... A frequently cited example is the 2007-2011 droughts in Syria, during which the militant group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was able to recruit a large portion of its fighters among impoverished farmers from the north-western region of Jazeera, where the droughts affected rural populations particularly hard (King 2016;Schwartzstein 2017). A similar dynamic has also been observed in southern Iraq, where past droughts and subsequent water shortages have not only led to armed tribal conflicts (Al Hasan 2020), but also increased the susceptibility of men from farming communities to join ISIS (Schwartzstein 2017). ...
... Global freshwater withdrawals might double during this century, which could also double the number of people living under high water stress. Dramatic socio-political consequences could be the result of this given that long-term water stress can lead to the destabilization of whole regions (King, 2015) and intra-basin conflicts over water use allocations (e.g. dam construction Wheeler et al. 2020) are on the rise. ...
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This thesis provides a first systematic assessment of 21st century global irrigation water demands for bioenergy production, for which the current body of literature projects a range of 128.4–9000 km3 yr−1. The numbers strongly depend on the parameters and assumptions chosen as well as methodologies and models applied. Systematic simulations for the identified key parameters in the dynamic global vegetation model LPJmL yield that even with optimal bioenergy plantation locations, 1.5°C can only be reached in scenarios with highly efficient bioenergy systems or strong irrigation expansion without withdrawal limitations. As a result of the large irrigation requirements, a conflict of interest arises between producing sufficient biomass and protecting environmental flows. A further dilemma is delineated by a comparison of the water stress resulting from the additional irrigation needed to limit climate change and the water stress in a 3°C warmer world without bioenergy. In both scenarios, the global area and the number of people experiencing water stress would increase severely by the end of the 21st century. The bioenergy scenario shows even higher water stress than the case of unmitigated climate change. Sustainable water management, as a combination of water withdrawal restrictions according to environmental flow requirements and improved on-field water management, has the potential to limit this additional water stress. But it would be a challenge to establish such strategies on a global scale. This work confirms that in order to provide large amounts of negative emissions, BECCS might lead to undesired deterioration of our environment and impacts for humanity. It further highlights the dilemma of rising water stress regardless whether climate change or climate change mitigation via irrigated bioenergy become a reality.
... De Goede and Randalls (2009) stated that there is a relationship between climate change and terrorism. It is known that facts like drought and precipitation regime are one of the bases of many conflicts, especially in the Middle East and North African countries such as Syria and Iraq (King 2015), Sudan (Verhoeven 2011), Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco (Schilling et al. 2012), Yemen (Weiss 2015). All of these countries are already fragile and vulnerable to climatic events. ...
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The study aimed to examine the relationship between climate change and civil disorder in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and North African countries. Countries are divided into two groups according to their political risk index (70 points). Accordingly, the first group of countries comprised France, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Croatia, Slovenia, Greece, Malta, and Cyprus, and the second are Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. While the first group represents European countries, the second group is generally the Middle East and North African countries. For the empirical analysis, Dumitrescu and Hurlin (Econ Model 29(4):1450–1460, 2012) panel causality test is utilized to test the causal relationship between precipitation, temperature, and civil disorder covering 2001–2016. According to the empirical results, a cross-sectional dependency in each country group which means a shock in one country affects the other countries in the panel. Causality test results show a causal relationship from temperature to civil disorder in Algeria, Tunisia, Italy, and Greece. However, there is no significant causal relationship from precipitation to civil disorder in any country. The findings show that economic policies and policy choices emerge as an essential tool to deal with climate change.
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Terrorism as a phenomenon has a complex structure in which ideological, social, religious, ethnic, psychological and other elements are intertwined. Modern terrorism is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that successfully adapts to the political and economic situation. In its modern manifestations, terrorism increasingly relies on synergy between different influences and approaches. This allows for the impact, the effect of which significantly exceeds the mechanical sum of the effects of the individual forms and approaches. The main component and motivational tool of terrorism is the process of radicalization. Despite the lack of consensus on the understanding of the phenomenon of radicalization, this phenomenon is imposed as a consequence and result of increasingly complex social processes in modern and postmodern societies. Effective counteraction is beyond the power of any independent specialized institution or individual country. Understanding of the concept of terrorism is linked to the analysis of the common features of modern terrorism. Based on the content of ideology and motivation, as well as the specifics of the methods of action, there are differences between terrorism based on left and right ideologies, on nationalism and separatism, and with different religious motivations.
Armed conflicts disrupt social, environmental and economic processes. This includes water resources management and the provision of water services, with numerous implications for human security and environmental sustainability. Such impacts go beyond direct, immediately visible effects and can have far-reaching, long-term consequences. However, the understanding of these indirect conflict impacts in different social and political contexts is still limited. In order to address this knowledge gap, we build on the social-ecological systems framework to differentiate between direct and indirect conflict impacts and to analyze their effects on the water system. We then apply the framework to map direct and indirect impacts of armed conflict on water resources management, using empirical data from eleven cases in Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Yemen. This allows us to identify pathways in which conflict impacts are propagated through the water system. The results show the central role of financial mechanisms in upholding water resources management throughout conflict and the importance of enforcing international humanitarian law on the protection of civilian infrastructure. They also highlight the value of system-based approaches in revealing cumulative effects that can reinforce conflict impacts within the system, and in identifying potential obstacles for coping strategies employed by local populations throughout the conflict.
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This study examines NATO’s CT partnerships with other international organizations like the UN and the EU as well as other partner countries, such as Australia and Japan in the Afghanistan case, and aims to answer how NATO can contribute to global cooperation further regarding Counter-Terrorism. You can reach it from this link.
The increasing complexity of critical infrastructure subjects it to problems that are even more wicked, unexpected, and unthinkable than the ones faced before. Hence, the lessons that are drawn from the previous experiences and absorbed into preparedness schemes and planning may well become part of the problem rather than core elements in their effective resolution. This article scrutinizes the potential for the emergence of such a mismatch in the case of a severe disruption to critical infrastructure. As a remedy, we suggest a more encompassing approach to learning, and essentially, a new mindset for training preparedness that would better equip emergency response actors when they come face-to-face with the unthinkable. Based on research, it is advisable to be cautious of relying too much on what is known with certainty. In addition, this study raises doubts as to whether training inevitably improves the ability to act in exceptional situations.
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Acechada por el régimen sirio, así como por un buen número de actores locales, regionales y extra-regionales que no ven con buenos ojos el afianzamiento de una forma de organización anti-sistémica y emancipatoria, la Administración Autónoma del Norte y Este de Siria (AANES) ha hecho frente a la actual crisis sanitaria mediante la práctica del comunalismo, el trabajo cooperativo y formas de vida que se apartan de la modernidad capitalista. Por ello, el artículo tiene como objetivo identificar la serie de estrategias implementadas por este ejercicio de democracia radical para hacer frente a la pandemia por Covid-19, al tiempo que sus detractores redoblan esfuerzos para desarticular su proyecto, basado en la ideología del Confederalismo Democrático.
The ongoing conflict in Syria has disastrously impacted the environment and public health. Fighting has destroyed cities with widespread damage to industrial sites and critical infrastructure. Analysis of the fighting, which is based on satellite imagery, social media monitoring, and the reports of International agencies, has identified that the cement industry has sustained severe damage; has been critical in the production of military works by all combatants, and will be critical in reconstruction. Quarries and cement factories have been seized by armed groups and fought over reducing or stopping production. In 2016, Turkey began closing the border with Syria completing 828 km of concrete wall by 2018. In the Afrin region, Kurdsh malitia built extensive networks of trenches, cut and cover hardened tunnels (CCHTs) and underground facilities (UGFs) using reinforced concrete to improve survivability. Airstrikes and artillery bombardment of urban areas throughout Syria have caused the destruction of a major part its housing stock. Millions of tonnes of conflict debris, some of which contains hazardous materials such as asbestos, heavy metals, and the toxic residues from weapons have been created. Cities will need to be reconstructed and to rebuild Aleppo city alone will require ca. 7.5 times the pre-war annual output of all the quarries in Syria. This will place an unprecedented demand on the quarrying and cement industry for concrete. The shortfall will require recycling and repurposing of conflict debris.
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The Euphrates River is of critical importance for water, food and energy security in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Flowing south-east for 2,700 kilometres from eastern Turkey to the Persian Gulf, it supports over 60 million people and – along with the Tigris, with which it runs almost in parallel – has a rich history of sustaining civilization on the Mesopotamian plains. This vast water resource is in crisis. Degradation of the river from over-exploitation, population growth, pollution and other factors has been a serious problem for many years. Now war and violent upheaval in Syria and Iraq are worsening the situation: threatening key infrastructure and preventing policy cooperation. Without urgent attention, stresses on the river’s resources will add to the already catastrophic humanitarian crisis created by the conflict. In the longer term, a vision for cross-border coordination is essential if the river is to retain its vital role in the region. Multiple threats The Euphrates has attracted international attention since 2013 as combatants in Syria and Iraq have competed for control of its vital structures. The forces of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (referred to as ISIS in this paper, though now widely known as ‘Islamic State’ or IS) have sought strategic strongholds along the river. Different sections of the river are in the hands of various state and non-state actors, and control of major dams is contested. In many places, it is not even clear who has authority over the river. The lack of security and blurred authority are compounding water challenges that predate the current conflict. Indeed the Euphrates was under serious stress long before the Syrian crisis erupted in 2011. Rapid and uncoordinated development in the riparian states (Turkey, Syria and Iraq) has changed the river’s flow regime, causing a 40–45 per cent reduction in downstream water flow since the early 1970s. In the past 50 years, some 32 dams and barrages have been built on the river. Their construction – along with growth in water-intensive agriculture, pesticide use and industry – has wreaked havoc on downstream water quality and ecology. The river is the main source of water for 27 million people across the three countries, with tens of millions more reliant on the food and energy it enables. Its deterioration, combined with last decade’s drought, has prompted mass migration from rural areas surrounding the Euphrates in Syria and Iraq. In southern Iraq, acute salinization and pollution have caused human illness and farm losses. In Syria, the resulting urban population pressures and food costs have increased social tensions. Incremental pressures related to population growth, industry and hydro-engineering now threaten conditions for human development more broadly throughout the Euphrates region. Of particular concern are plans for continued upstream dam and infrastructure building. Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, or GAP) – a major development on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their tributaries for hydropower and agricultural irrigation, which began in the 1970s – is particularly significant. The project aims to support economic development in Turkey’s southeast, but many Syrians and Iraqis have grave concerns about its impact on their water supplies. The Euphrates in Crisis: Channels of Cooperation for a Threatened River 3 | Chatham House Two overarching challenges concern all countries. One is climate change bringing both higher average temperatures and increased occurrence of extreme weather events. The World Resources Institute, for example, projects that in 2025 water conditions along the Euphrates will be up to eight times more stressed than in 2010.1 The other concern is the weak capacity of the riparian states to respond either individually or collectively to the increased challenges they face. Institutional capacity has been depleted by conflict in Syria and Iraq, and there remains no mechanism for information sharing or emergency response across the river basin. Yet the likelihood of events requiring such a response – from drought to wilful destruction of infrastructure – is increasing. The need for policy coordination between the riparian states and other stakeholders has never been greater.
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Before the Syrian uprising that began in 2011, the greater Fertile Crescent experienced the most severe drought in the instrumental record. For Syria, a country marked by poor governance and un- sustainable agricultural and environmental policies, the drought had a catalytic effect, contributing to political unrest. We show that the recent decrease in Syrian precipitation is a combination of natural variability and a long-term drying trend, and the unusual severity of the observed drought is here shown to be highly unlikely without this trend. Precipitation changes in Syria are linked to rising mean sea-level pressure in the Eastern Mediterranean, which also shows a long-term trend. There has been also a long-term warming trend in the Eastern Mediterranean, adding to the drawdown of soil moisture. No natural cause is apparent for these trends, whereas the observed drying and warming are consistent with model studies of the response to increases in greenhouse gases. Furthermore, model studies show an increasingly drier and hotter future mean climate for the Eastern Mediterranean. Analyses of observations and model simulations indicate that a drought of the severity and duration of the recent Syrian drought, which is implicated in the current conflict, has become more than twice as likely as a consequence of human interference in the climate system.
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A recent Climatic Change review article reports a remarkable convergence of scientific evidence for a link between climatic events and violent intergroup conflict, thus departing markedly from other contemporary assessments of the empirical literature. This commentary revisits the review in order to understand the discrepancy. We believe the origins of the disagreement can be traced back to the review article’s underlying quantitative meta-analysis, which suffers from shortcomings with respect to sample selection and analytical coherence. A modified assessment that addresses some of these problems suggests that scientific research on climate and conflict to date has produced mixed and inconclusive results.
The devastating civil war that began in Syria in March 2011 is the result of complex interrelated factors. The focus of the conflict is regime change, but the triggers include a broad set of religious and sociopolitical factors, the erosion of the economic health of the country, a wave of political reform sweeping over the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Levant region, and challenges associated with climate variability and change and the availability and use of freshwater. As described here, water and climatic conditions have played a direct role in the deterioration of Syria's economic conditions. There is a long history of conflicts over water in these regions because of the natural water scarcity, the early development of irrigated agriculture, and complex religious and ethnic diversity. In recent years, there has been an increase in incidences of water-related violence around the world at the subnational level attributable to the role that water plays in development disputes and economic activities. Because conflicts are rarely, if ever, attributable to single causes, conflict analysis and concomitant efforts at reducing the risks of conflict must consider a multitude of complex relationships and contributing factors. This paper assesses the complicated connections between water and conflict in Syria, looks more broadly at future climate-related risks for water systems, and offers some water management strategies for reducing those risks.
This article examines the role of drought and climate change as triggers of the Syrian uprising that started in March 2011. It frames the 2006–10 drought that struck north-eastern Syria in the context of rapid economic liberalization and long-standing resource mismanagement, and shows that the humanitarian crisis of the late 2000s largely predated the drought period. It argues that focusing on external factors like drought and climate change in the context of the Syrian uprising is counterproductive as it diverts attention from more fundamental political and economic motives behind the protests and shifts responsibility away from the Syrian government.
This research builds on conclusions of two Chatham House style dialogues at the Elliott School in 2012-2013 as part of a climate and water security initiative featuring over 60 leaders from government, think tanks, NGOs, and business. The workshop was animated by the findings of the
This research builds on conclusions of two Chatham House style dialogues at the Elliott School in 2012-2013 as part of a climate and water security initiative featuring over 60 leaders from government, think tanks, NGOs, and business. The workshop was animated by the findings of the 2012 National Intelligence Assessment on Global Water Security.
Drought Vulnerability in the Arab Region Special Case Study: Syria (Geneva: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2010), p. 5; Shahrzad Mohtadi
  • Wadid See For Example
  • Erian
See for example, Wadid Erian, Drought Vulnerability in the Arab Region Special Case Study: Syria (Geneva: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2010), p. 5; Shahrzad Mohtadi, "Climate Change and the Syrian Uprising," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 16, 2012.
The Syrian rebel groups pulling in foreign fighters
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "The Syrian rebel groups pulling in foreign fighters," Reuters, Dec 24, 2013,
How ISIS Territory Has Changed Since the U.S. Bombing Campaign Began
  • Kathy Gilsinan
Kathy Gilsinan, "How ISIS Territory Has Changed Since the U.S. Bombing Campaign Began," The Atlantic, September 11, 2015, international/archive/2015/09/isis-territory-map-us-campaign/404776/.