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The law and order debate in OHS
Abstract
Internationally there has been a shift towards greater criminalisation of breaches of OHS responsibilities, particularly when a death results. This new criminalisation in the form of revised manslaughter provisions is argued to potentially have important deterrent effects that could improve health and safety at work. However, the evidence that offences such as industrial manslaughter will act as a deterrent to those tolerating or explicitly condoning poor industrial health and safety standards is not strong. The following article reviews this evidence and then explores the expressive and symbolic dimension of the criminal law-elements often overlooked in discussions of organisational criminal liability although they are central to its appeal. Criminological and sociological literature is used to analyse the potential of symbolism as it relates to industrial manslaughter. The article argues that, while there is some potential for rich and transformative symbolism in the case of industrial manslaughter reform, expressive and emotional functions of criminal law are those most vulnerable to political manipulation and empty symbolism.
... Academic and policy debate regarding the legal response to work fatalities has been complicated by the two uses of criminal law to respond to OSH offending -what some refer to as 'regulatory' OSH law and 'mainstream' criminal law. The OSH statutes (regulatory OSH law) take a functional and instrumental approach to the use of the criminal law, and generally create 'inchoate' offences which focus on the creation of unacceptable risk at work, rather than the outcome (Haines and Hall 2004, Hall and Johnstone 2005, Almond 2006). OSH law aims to prevent injuries, disease and death at work by requiring organizations to take systematic measures to remove or at least minimize risks at work. ...
... Corporate homicide/industrial manslaughter laws have been introduced in the UK and some other European countries (Sarre and Richards 2005, Almond and Colover 2012, Tombs 2013). These laws not only address the problems of attributing liability to corporations and to corporate officers (Haines andHall 2004, Johnstone 2013a) but also render a moral judgement, which is considered by many commentators and public perception to be a necessary response to work-related fatalities (see Haines and Hall 2004) A study by Almond (2008), see also Almond and Colover (2010), examined public attitudes regarding the punishment of parties liable for work-related fatalities. Refuting the assumption that the opinions of members of the public would be influenced solely by their drive for retribution, or what Almond refers to as 'populist punitiveness', the study reveals that rational views highlighting prevention underpin public perceptions of appropriate punishment. ...
... Corporate homicide/industrial manslaughter laws have been introduced in the UK and some other European countries (Sarre and Richards 2005, Almond and Colover 2012, Tombs 2013). These laws not only address the problems of attributing liability to corporations and to corporate officers (Haines andHall 2004, Johnstone 2013a) but also render a moral judgement, which is considered by many commentators and public perception to be a necessary response to work-related fatalities (see Haines and Hall 2004) A study by Almond (2008), see also Almond and Colover (2010), examined public attitudes regarding the punishment of parties liable for work-related fatalities. Refuting the assumption that the opinions of members of the public would be influenced solely by their drive for retribution, or what Almond refers to as 'populist punitiveness', the study reveals that rational views highlighting prevention underpin public perceptions of appropriate punishment. ...
There has been considerable research and policy debate over the enforcement and decriminalization of occupational health and safety legislation, particularly regarding its capacity to deal with serious harm. Reference has been made to community attitudes to work fatalities, but the perspectives of those most directly affected, the bereaved families, have received little attention. Drawing on evidence from detailed interviews with 44 Australian family members, this article seeks to rectify this omission. Findings highlight the importance of investigative and prosecutorial processes to bereaved families who seek justice, some assurance that culpable behaviours are not condoned, and the implementation of measures to prevent a recurrence. However, reinforcing previous research critical of the degree of enforcement and advocating for a more readily implementable offence of industrial manslaughter, the vast majority of those interviewed were critical of the processes that occurred. Far from assisting, these processes generally left families very dissatisfied with their experiences.
... It imposes penalties that do not exceed those available under existing regulatory laws, is unlikely to be utilized widely (only one case has been brought in four years) 4 and appears set to be subsumed into the status quo in terms of enforcement practices. Second, there is evidence that a degree of political opportunism and a need to pacify influential lobby groups were more influential in the reform process than any commitment to change (Baldwin 2004;Gobert 2005;Haines and Hall 2004). Reform was a manifesto commitment for the post-1997 Labour Government, reflecting a need to satisfy an increasingly marginalized trade union constituency. ...
... In Harcourt's terms, 'neoliberal p enality … encourag[es] the belief that the legitimate space for government intervention is the penal spherethere and there alone' (Harcourt 2010: 80, original emphasis). The logic of this step also fitted the wider neo-liberal narrative of criminalization found elsewhere in the criminal law, though it differed significantly from it in terms of scope and focus (Garland 2001;Harcourt 2010;Wacquant 2009); its exclusionary dynamics deflected attention away from the structural causes of offending and onto 'responsibilized' individual actors, thereby reinforcing rather than challenging existing power relations (Garland 2001;Gray 2009;Haines and Hall 2004). Criminalization is not a particularly progressive social institution and has often proved to be ineffectual and damaging. ...
This paper addresses the movement towards criminalization as a tool for the regulation of work-related deaths in the United
Kingdom and elsewhere in the last 20 years. This can be seen as reflecting dissatisfaction with the relevant law, although
it is best understood in symbolic terms as a response to a disjunction between the instrumental nature and communicative aspirations
of regulatory law. This paper uses empirical data gathered from interviews with members of the public to explore the role
that such an offence might play. The findings demonstrate that the failures of regulatory law give rise to a desire for criminalization
as a means of framing work-related safety events in normative terms.
... However, as we have previously argued, OHS prosecutions do play an important role in the prevention of workplace deaths and injuries (Jamieson et al., 2010;Schofield et al., 2009). Rather than focus on a cause-and-effect relationship between prosecution and deterrence, this position draws upon communicative effects of the criminal law, whereby criminal prosecution operates to symbolize moral blameworthiness and condemnation (Haines and Hall, 2004). By sanctioning companies that have breached OHS legislation, the courts give voice to, and legitimate, community sentiment that an offender's behaviour is morally reprehensible, and reaffirm the importance of maintaining employee safety at work. ...
Drawing on interviews with judicial officers in two Australian states, this article examines the role of judges in sentencing occupational health and safety offenders. Specifically, it focuses on the deterrent impact of occupational health and safety prosecutions, including judges' understanding of deterrence and the judicial role in deterring serious breaches of occupational health and safety legislation. Judges thought that occupational health and safety prosecutions had some deterrent impact on prosecuted offenders, but were sceptical as to whether prosecutions led to lasting improvements in workplace safety, both in relation to the prosecuted offender and the wider community. Judges' scepticism related to the fact that they viewed deterrence as a complex process involving a range of social institutions, including occupational health and safety regulators and the media. Further, the judiciary's influence over sentencing outcomes was constrained by key elements of the judicial role, including the requirement that judges remain impartial and detached from other actors in the prosecution process. However, judges do play an important role in preventing workplace deaths and injuries, especially in relation to the constitutive or communicative effects of prosecution. By sentencing offenders, the judiciary acts as a key component in institutional processes that construct employers as bearing primary responsibility for the prevention of workplace deaths and injuries. © Australian Labour and Employment Relations Association (ALERA), SAGE Publications Ltd, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC.
... To date, only the Australian Capital Territorythe smallest of Australia's jurisdictions and the one with the fewest annual workplace fatalities -has followed this lead (see the paper in this issue by Johnstone). 7 Canada's corporate criminal liability legislation has its roots in a recommendation by the Westray disaster public inquiry that the federal government enact legislation 'to ensure that corporate executives and directors are held properly accountable for workplace safety'. 1 It took the government more than six years following this recommendation, and more than 10 years after the disaster, to introduce new legislation, with considerable resistance in Canada's parliament to the prospects of creating such measures (see the Bittle and Glasbeek papers in this issue). [8][9] What is more, since the introduction of the Westray Bill in 2004, although there have been more than 8,000 workplace fatalities in the intervening years, 10 there have been few charges and convictions, despite official promises by the state that it was ready to get tough on corporate criminals (again, see the Bittle and Glasbeek papers). ...
The Westray +20 conference held at the University of Ottawa brought together academics
from a variety of disciplines and jurisdictions, workplace parties, prosecutors, law enforcement
specialists, policy-makers and politicians. In this synthesis, we refer to the material presented
during the symposium and the ensuing discussions, as well as the papers in this issue, in order
to highlight converging themes to be considered in contemplating the regulatory effectiveness
of criminal law applied to workplace injuries and deaths.
... The evidence of the capacity of legal measures to produce general deterrence in relation to OH&S offences is even more inconclusive. According to a variety of researchers (for example, Haines & Hall 2004:267, Hutter 2002:21, Nichols 1999), this is largely attributable to the difficulties associated with identifying a causal link between punitive legal measures and indicators of objective " general effects " such as rates of workplace injuries and deaths. The latter, they suggest, are subject to various influences such as changes in technology and labour market factors. ...
Occupational health and safety (OHS) law and prosecution comprise the major public institutional response to redressing workplace deaths and serious injuries in Australia. Its main purpose is to deter the recurrence of such fatalities and injuries through the application of sanctions and penalties. Yet international research is inconclusive about how deterrence works in relation to OHS and in what ways it may be effective in preventing workplace deaths and serious injuries. Deterrence in the OHS field is informed primarily by criminological discourse and is generally understood in terms of a cause-and-effect relationship between sanctions and outcomes. In this paper I suggest that an alternative theoretical approach to understanding deterrence in relation to OHS – one that draws on recent sociological thinking about the dynamic organisational processes associated with it – may be more useful. I propose that deterrence in relation to OHS may be better understood as an institutional process that is played out in combinations of state-based, business and trade union organisations involved in the development and implementation of the law and penalties that address serious workplace injuries and deaths.
This paper seeks to bridge the disciplinary gap between regulation and governance studies, and criminology. Based on a review of theoretical and empirical work on corporate crime, this paper argues that divergent approaches to questions of individual agency, localized variety, and political context, have drawn these two disciplines in different directions. Regulatory governance scholarship has thrived as a discipline, but has also narrowed its focus around these issues. Corporate criminology offers a means of broadening this focus by drawing attention to the normative theorizing behind the regulatory project. At the same time, however, insights drawn from regulatory governance scholarship can prompt corporate criminology to innovate by broadening the scope of its engagement beyond the sphere of traditional criminal justice. The paper argues for the development of a research agenda to sit at their intersection, to engage with the challenges that exist at the interface between criminal and regulatory law.
This paper analyses recent Australian debates about the use of the criminal law in work health and safety regulation. It argues that these debates have to be seen in the context of the historical development of work health and safety regulation in the United Kingdom and Australia. The first part of the paper shows that, since the late 19th century, contraventions against the Australian work health and safety statutes have not been regarded as 'really criminal', and have largely been addressed by informal measures and, since the 1980s, by administrative sanctions. When prosecutions have taken place, work health and safety issues have been individualised and decontextualised, so that defendants have been able to reduce their culpability in the eyes of the court. Significant legal barriers have undermined the use of the crime of gross negligence manslaughter against corporations and individuals. The second part of the paper analyses recent debates about restructuring gross negligence manslaughter and bolstering the 'criminality' of offences under the work health and safety statutes. It argues that the latter debate has been constrained by the historical forces examined in the first part of the paper, and that the current position, embodied in the recently harmonised Work Health and Safety Acts, favours attempting to recriminalise the work health and safety legislation. The debate about reforming gross negligence manslaughter has stalled.
Comprising fourteen articles by leading international contributors, including some of the most prominent socio-legal and criminological scholars working in the field, this volume is currently the only work available that critically examines W.G. Carson and his crucial influence in the turn towards sociological approaches to criminology and a criminological interest in governance and social control. The 1970s witnessed an epiphany in the sociological understanding of crime in Britain. The correctional perspective, which assumed crimes had inherent or essential qualities that distinguished them from other acts, was superseded by the analysis of how social events came to be defined as so harmful and repugnant as to require criminalization. This shift in perspectives was exemplified in W.G. Carson's work, which combines a Marxist acknowledgement of the imperative for profit with a symbolic interactionist attention to the restraining effect of prestige and status among producers and regulators. This key work is an essential read for postgraduates and researchers studying and researching in the areas of criminology and law. © 2007 Augustine Brannigan and George Pavlich. All rights reserved.
This special issue of Policy and Practice in Health and Safety stems from a symposium held
at the University of Ottawa, Canada, on 24–25 October 2012 to mark the 20th anniversary
of the Westray mine disaster. It brings together papers that focus on trends in corporate
criminal liability in a variety of jurisdictions. In this introduction we provide context for the
papers and present reasons why they should be of interest to occupational safety and health
(OSH) professionals, regardless of their geographical provenance or disciplinary background.
This Review aims to explore the feasibility of a restorative justice service in the context of work-related deaths, specifically in Victoria, Australia.
This paper examines the general deterrent impact of OHS prosecutions in New South Wales and Victoria. Based on interviews with non-prosecuted employers from a range of industries and organisational sizes, it was found that prosecutions had some general deterrent impact in line with classical deterrence theory, with effects varying according to company size. Employers also outlined a range of other factors determining whether they complied with OHS legislation including legislative change and the general threat of prosecution. While prosecutions made participants more aware of their responsibilities under OHS legislation, many rejected the idea that they were responsible for employees’ own risky behaviour. The paper concludes with a reworking of deterrence theory which takes into account the contested nature of OHS legislation. Overall we argue that prosecutions play an important role in preventing serious workplace deaths and injuries primarily through their constitutive and symbolic effects, rather than employers’ fear of facing criminal conviction and sanctions.
In the context of political debate on prosecution’s role in deterring OHS breaches, this article investigates prosecuted employers’ responses to prosecution for serious workplace injuries and deaths in New South Wales and Victoria. Based on interviews with employers from a range of industries and company sizes, it was found that all participants took action to avoid the recurrence of workplace injuries/deaths. Prosecuted employers’ interventions varied according to the specific circumstances associated with the offence, but patterns of responses corresponded with differences in employer size. However, most employers (large and small) reported that, while OHS was a problem they were legally obliged to manage, it was not one of their making. Their conception of the causes of workplace injuries and deaths conflicted with that presented by the legal system during prosecution. In this context, it appears that routine prosecution for significant OHS offences is a crucial regulatory mechanism in deterring serious workplace injuries and deaths.
This article describes how criminal liability is contingent on two sets of factors: (1) criminal law's alternatives?civil, administrative and even non-legal strategies for addressing wrongdoing, and (2) choices in how we acknowledge social influences, instrumental goals, and the social costs of punishment. Moral culpability is weighed against utilitarian concerns in decisions to impose criminal sanctions. Further, even the assessment of culpability itself is mediated by utilitarian concerns driven by criminal law's alternatives. Conduct that can be effectively addressed non-criminally seems less culpable (despite explicit coverage by criminal law), and that makes utilitarian concerns?and civil sanctions and remedies?more likely to prevail when balanced against the need for retributive judgment of wrongdoing. This dynamic arises because criminal law's long-standing twin rationales, retributivism and deterrence, sometimes conflict in the response they counsel for culpable wrongdoing. In practice, criminal liability is not explained by culpability, nor by the familiar grounds for prosecutorial discretion?state resources limits, first-offense status, or marginal resulting harm. Neither do these considerations explain the wide variance in its use across the landscape of crime, from white-collar to "street" settings. The way we actually employ criminal liability demonstrates the contingency of criminal law, and culpability itself, on civil alternatives and social costs, and this has distributive implications. We use criminal liability for "street" wrongdoing much more than we do for white-collar wrongdoing; that variation cannot be explained by distinctions in those two settings, sets of offenders, or feasible alternative remedies. Yet reasons for it explain why we have yet to move street crime policy in the productive direction that increasingly characterizes white collar policy.
Soon after the passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court determined that horizontal minimum price fixing was so inherently injurious to consumer welfare that it should be illegal per se. Horizontal collusion has since become a major focus of federal antitrust enforcement. Through the use of criminal and civil sanctions the Department of Justice (DOJ) has sought not only to remedy specific instances of price fixing, but also to achieve general deterrence of potential price fixing. This paper is the first systematic attempt to estimate the impact of antitrust enforcement on horizontal minimum price fixing. We develop a simple theoretical model of the collusive pricing decision and then, using data on the bread industry, assess empirically the deterrent effect of public and private antitrust enforcement on the decision to collude. We show that a cartel's optimal price is likely to be neither the competitive price nor the price that the cartel would see in the absence of antitrust enforcement but rather an intermediate price that depends on the levels of antitrust enforcement efforts and penalties. Our empirical results reveal that increasing antitrust enforcement in the presence of a credible threat of large damage awards has the deterrent effect of reducing markups in the bread industry.
Enormous financial, social, and environmental harm is wrought by business activities that merit both the label white collar crime and strict punishment. Through analysis of Australian cases, this chapter shows how the harms that arise do so within a promise of broader benefits to both government and the community at large. Despite significant injustice in the distribution of benefits, they allow business to exert significant leverage over national governments and law, and to rationalise their capacity to generate profits on the global stage. Hence, social and political—not just legal—responses are needed to reduce the problem.
In this article we engage in an extended critique of the thesis that the illegal conduct of corporations necessarily calls for different forms of regulation than other kinds of law-breaking. The proponents of that view argue that the unique nature of such illegalities is one reason why they necessitate a particular type of enforcement attitude or response. They advocate a strategy that produces compliance through persuasion rather than through the threat of sanctions. Another reason advanced is that corporations are not, as many would have it, 'amoral calculators', but rather 'political citizens' who may indeed sometimes err but are more prone to organizational incompetence than deliberate wrongdoing. Thus they need advice rather than chastisement: regulatory agencies should act as consultants rather than policemen. We will take each element of this argument in turn and show that it is neither logically nor empirically persuasive. We will then turn to the issue of how to make corporate regulation more effective and show that this requires a consideration of both the most suitable strategies for the enforcement agencies to adopt and the most appropriate legal framework for determining the criminal responsibility of these corporations. © 1990 The Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency.
The aim of this study was to examine whether there were any significant changes in the number, rate and circumstances of work-related traumatic deaths over an 11-year period in Australia. The analysis used data from two separate studies of work-related fatalities that occured in Australia, one covering the three years 1982 to 1984 inclusive and the other 1989 to 1992 inclusive. Both studies were based on information from coronial files and used similar study methodologies, including almost identical definitions. The overall rate of workplace deaths declined steadily over the period 1982 to 1992, while the overall rate of work-road deaths also decreased over the same period, but not as smoothly as for workplace deaths. The average rate during the more recent period was 17% lower than the average rate for the first period (5.5 versus 6.7 deaths per 100,000 persons per year). Standardising for changes in industry and occupation distribution suggested that 30-40% of this apparent decline in working deaths was due to workforce changes, rather than to other factors.
This paper takes issue with those who are currently arguing in favor of recourse to charges of manslaughter in some cases of occupational fatality. Such a step, it is argued, would effec tively involve collusion with a protracted historical process which rendered occupational health and safety offences ambi guous with regard to their criminality. This historical process is summarised and the use of sanctions in this area of Victorian legislation is reviewed. While sympathising with the objec tives of those who support stronger action in the occupational health and safety field, the authors nonetheless argue that they have been duped into a position which, by treating some offences as unequivocally criminal, implies that the vast majority are not. Instead, it is suggested, an offence of causing death through violation of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985, should be created.
This article describes and analyses the evolving regulatory game in the post-privatized water industry. It highlights a regulatory environment that is more complex than that which existed under public ownership, and an industry which is subject to heavier regulation in the private sector than it was in the public sector. There has been erosion of the strict public/private divide following privatization. The article highlights an episodic and seemingly incongruous policy-making environment that defies consistent characterization: sometimes private consensus is the main feature and sometimes it is public conflict. It also illustrates that while there are two broad-based constituencies of interest active in the water sector — cost and environmental — the composition of these coalitions mutates depending on the issue being considered. Indeed, there are occasions when core constituency participants ‘defect’ and join the ‘opposing side’.
Both Sentencing and Prosecutorial Guidelines for Organizations provide distinct incentives for organizations to cooperate and accept responsibility in exchange for mitigation, exculpation or absolution. Ever increasing levels of corporate cooperation have become general proxies for organizational due diligence, because of these guidelines and a corresponding shift in regulatory orientation. In this Article, I question the fairness of trading corporate cooperation for government granted favors in certain cases. In Part I, guideline concerns raised by the white-collar defense bar are discussed in relation to organizational cooperation. Part II extends this discussion by highlighting a prototypic case that reveal the perils of crediting post-offense cooperation. Part III describes the government-business partnership in crime control in relation to cooperative models of regulatory oversight. Finally, I conclude that the "practical" partnership forged by the government and business through guideline incentives, a very positive achievement over pre-Guidelines adjudication, is at times compromised by the collaborative pursuit of culprits. One illustrative problem is with the trend toward "reverse whistleblowing" by corporations.
Using event history analysis, we examine the recidivism patterns of a sample of 38 corporations charged with one or more serious antitrust violations between 1928 and 1981 to see whether sanction experience decreases the likelihood of a firm's reoffending. Specifically, we analyze the effects of procedure type (e.g., civil, criminal, and administrative redress) and proxy measures of corporate deterrence while controlling for changes in antitrust law and the economic conditions of the firm, industry, and general economy. Though not robust, there is some evidence that past guilty verdicts and changes in penalties for lawbreaking from misdemeanors to felonies inhibit recidivism. We note, however, that industry characteristics are stronger by far in their effects on future illegality than formal sanction risk or consequence. The implications of these findings for organizational deterrence and corporate crime control are discussed.
In this paper I argue that competition law risks undermining institutional incentives toward higher corporate environmental performance. Firms are increasingly expected to influence the environmental standards of companies they invest in, lend to, or insure. This may be jeopardized if they are competing for those businesses, particularly in markets with information asymmetries. I examine the environmental implications of market competition, competition between regulators, and the particular case of insurance markets in which insurers fulfill both a market and a quasi-regulatory role. The core of the paper concerns an ongoing dispute between the European Commission and a group of mutual, non-profit-making marine insurers known as Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs, into which shipowners pool their environmental and other third-party liabilities. The Clubs try to allocate costs fairly so that the “polluter pays,” providing an incentive to minimize risk. Fourteen of these Clubs, containing about 90 percent of the world's merchant fleet, enter into a further scale of mutuality by collectively reinsuring one another. Mutuality at both scales, they claim, is dependent upon them not competing for members by setting unfairly low rates. The European Commission argues, in turn, that this agreement contravenes European competition law. Through an analysis of this case I demonstrate a potential conflict between competition law and “private” environmental regulation. I conclude by discussing the consequences of drawing disciplinary boundaries between policy areas and questioning the conceptualization of the economy which underpins competition law.
Regulatory analyses often assume that compliance is desirable, with literature focusing on strategies to encourage “excellence” in adherence to regulatory goals. Yet, it is not unusual for disparate regulatory goals to exist that are based on competing values of what constitutes the “good society.” It is this conflict that forms the substance of this paper. In cases of competing regulatory goals, techniques that encourage exemplary compliance in one area can create incentives to breach regulatory provisions of a competing regime. In such cases, generic regulatory techniques are unable to provide a useful means for resolving regulatory conflict but do allow a political delegation of conflict resolution to the “scientific” strategies of the regulator. In turn, the regulator places responsibility on companies for resolving competing regulatory demands. Successive delegation leads to juridification as well as regulators vying to retain primacy for their regime. This problem is examined through analysis of responsibilities for subcontractor safety under Australian health and safety law and sections of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 aimed at protecting competition.
The East Coast Forestry Project (ECFP) is a grant scheme introduced in 1991 to encourage the establishment of commercial forestry on erosion-prone land on the East Coast of the North Island, New Zealand. In that it is government subsidised, the project stands in stark contrast to New Zealand's recent restructuring programme. This in itself has been a basis for contestation of the ECFP, but conflict over the scheme has extended to other issues as well. We draw upon ideas that have been developed in the literature on regulation as a basis for analysing the social contestation of the ECFP. Themes of particular importance include the geography of regulation, the role of local agency, and the significance of private regulation. The study draws also on concepts of place, particularly as a basis for interpreting the role of local agency in the contestation of the ECFP.
The Supreme Court, in Chevron v Echazabal, ruled that risks to a disabled worker, if established by an individualized medical assessment, can disqualify the worker from protections offered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). This decision rejected the antipaternalist position of ADA advocates that workers with disabilities should be able to determine, through their own consent, the risks they will take.
Such strong antipaternalism may not be compatible with the underlying justification for the protection of workers against health hazards. Stringent regulation of workplace hazards involves restricting the scope of consent to risk.
Resolution of this conflict will depend on more careful examination of the degree to which individualized medical assessments avoid stereotyping and bias.
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