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Moral Expansiveness
Moral expansiveness: Examining variability in the extension of the
moral world
Daniel Crimston1, Paul G. Bain2, Matthew J. Hornsey1, & Brock Bastian3
1 University of Queensland, 2 Queensland University of Technology (QUT), 3 University of
Melbourne
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Moral Expansiveness
Abstract
The nature of our moral judgments – and the extent to which we treat others with care –
depend in part on the distinctions we make between entities deemed worthy or unworthy of
moral consideration – our moral boundaries. Philosophers, historians and social scientists
have noted that people’s moral boundaries have expanded over the last few centuries, but the
notion of moral expansiveness has received limited empirical attention in psychology. This
research explores variations in the size of individuals’ moral boundaries using the
psychological construct of moral expansiveness, and introduces the Moral Expansiveness
Scale (MES) designed to capture this variation. Across six studies we established the
reliability, convergent validity, and predictive validity of the MES. Moral expansiveness was
related (but not reducible) to existing moral constructs (moral foundations, moral identity,
“moral” universalism values), predictors of moral standing (moral patiency and warmth) and
other constructs associated with concern for others (empathy, identification with humanity,
connectedness to nature, and social responsibility). Importantly, the MES uniquely predicted
willingness to engage in pro-social intentions and behaviors at personal cost independently of
these established constructs. Specifically, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to
prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and national self-interest,
willingness to sacrifice one’s life to save others (ranging from human outgroups to animals
and plants), and volunteering behavior. Results demonstrate that moral expansiveness is a
distinct and important factor in understanding moral judgments and their consequences.
Keywords
Moral expansiveness, moral concern, moral circle, moral judgment, self-sacrifice.
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Moral Expansiveness
In 2008, Spain took steps to become the first country to extend basic “human” rights
to great apes (e.g., right to life, freedom from torture; Glendinning, 2008). In 2012, the
Whanganui River in New Zealand was officially granted legal personhood status, being
recognized as a “person” with its own “rights and interests” under law (Fairbrother, 2012).
More recently, Pope Francis addressed the United Nations general assembly on the inherent
rights of the environment, arguing that all living creatures possess intrinsic value
(Goldenberg & Kirchgaessne, 2015). These examples of granting rights typically reserved for
people to non-human entities illustrate a general point noted by prominent theorists: moral
boundaries – the distinction between those entities that are deemed worthy of moral
consideration and those that are not – are expanding over time (Bloom, 2010; Glover, 1999;
Lecky, 1869; Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981).
Although there may be a general trend towards more expansive moral boundaries,
people’s reactions to granting moral concern to entities such as rivers and animals are likely
to differ widely. Some people may view granting moral consideration to animals and rivers as
absurd and nonsensical, whereas others may believe that moral concern should extend even
further. The extent to which people are expansive in their moral concern is a critical issue, as
moral judgments and the ethical treatment of others depend on where people’s moral
boundaries end (Pizarro, Detweiler-Bedell, & Bloom, 2006). Entities outside the moral
boundary can be subjected to horrific treatment with little concern for their welfare (e.g., live-
cattle trade, the Holocaust), and important social and political debates often focus on entities
that may sit on the margins of moral boundaries (e.g., fetuses and abortion). Therefore, it is
important to develop an understanding of individual differences in the extension of moral
concern, and the correlates and consequences of being more or less morally expansive.
Although there have been philosophical (Singer, 1981) and historical (Pinker, 2011)
examinations of moral expansiveness, there is no established measure assessing individual
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Moral Expansiveness
differences in the size of a person’s moral world. In response to this, we develop an approach
to understanding moral expansiveness by measuring individual variation in the extent of
people’s moral concern for others, and identifying its psychological implications.
Specifically, the current research develops and validates a measure of moral expansiveness –
the Moral Expansiveness Scale – and demonstrates that moral expansiveness is an important
and unique predictor of moral attitudes and behavior.
What is Moral Expansiveness?
Moral expansiveness refers to the breadth of entities deemed worthy of moral concern
and treatment. A less morally expansive person restricts concern to those entities that are
considered ‘close’ (e.g., their family). A more morally expansive person extends moral care
and consideration beyond these boundaries to more ‘distant’ entities (e.g., animals or plants).
Therefore, moral expansiveness captures the willingness to extend moral concern to others
(the “breadth” of a person’s moral world).
Critical to our understanding of moral expansiveness is a graded approach to
measuring the intensity of people’s moral concern for different entities. Singer (1981)
characterized the moral circle as a boundary distinguishing those entities deemed worthy of
moral consideration from those that are not. However, as noted by Pizarro et al. (2006), an
either/or approach to understanding moral inclusion fails to account for the graded and
multifaceted nature of moral concern. “Moral concern” can span from believing an entity’s
rights and wellbeing take precedence over all other considerations, to a perception that their
needs and rights are worthy of limited consideration without being a primary concern. Our
approach to moral expansiveness recognizes this “depth” of a person’s moral world, such that
some people will show a higher level of moral concern than others for the same entity.
Accordingly, our approach to measuring moral expansiveness incorporates both breadth
(extending some moral concern to more types of entities) and depth (the level of moral
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Moral Expansiveness
concern extended to each entity). Maximal moral expansiveness is demonstrated by granting
the highest moral concern to all types of entities.
Further, we argue there is an intuitive link between expanding moral boundaries and a
willingness to make personal sacrifices for those granted moral inclusion. The potential costs
of moral inclusion, such as the use of time, money or other resources to benefit the welfare of
others, have often been noted (Opotow, 2011; Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981). Acknowledging
that another entity is worthy of moral standing is more meaningful when it involves a
commitment to defending or enacting those moral rights. Therefore, we argue that moral
expansiveness is a unique construct that captures the extent of a person’s moral world in a
way that also recognizes varying levels of moral concern. Other approaches to moral concern
have not directly assessed moral standing, or have focused on broad sets of entities (e.g., all
humanity). By focusing on how moral concern is applied across an extensive range of
entities, moral expansiveness can provide new insights into moral psychology. Below we
compare moral expansiveness with prominent existing constructs in moral psychology.
Moral foundations theory (MFT; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) focuses on the basic
foundations people rely on to make moral judgments, such as perceptions of care/harm or
sanctity/degradation, rather than who is an appropriate entity for moral consideration. Some
moral foundations, particularly ingroup/loyalty, suggest the extension of moral concern is
restricted (to the ingroup). Thus, moral foundations might indirectly predict moral
expansiveness, and perhaps especially the tendency to limit moral concern, but it does not
claim to be a measure of moral expansiveness.
Moral expansiveness is also different from moral identity; a self-conception organized
around the degree to which a set of desirable moral traits (e.g., caring, compassionate,
honest) are personally valued (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Hence, moral identity does not directly
capture the extent, or the targets, of moral concern. For example, a person can perceive
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Moral Expansiveness
themselves as holding moral values and being a moral person whether they apply moral
concern to many things, or to just a few. While moral expansiveness has a different focus to
moral identity, they may be linked empirically if having more expansive moral concern
provides a basis for a stronger moral identity.
Theories of values have identified that some values are typically described as “moral”
(Schwartz, 2007). For example, universalism values (e.g., protecting the environment,
equality, a world at peace) reflect an understanding, tolerance, and concern for the well-being
of all people and for nature. Although these values reflect moral concern, they are very
general (e.g., a world at peace) and do not empirically capture the extent to which moral
standing is afforded to a range of targets. The current research can help us understand how
moral values and moral expansiveness are linked.
Finally, a recent line of work by Gray and colleagues has established the vital role of
mind perception in moral decision making (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Gray & Schein,
2012; Gray & Wegner, 2011; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). Specifically, this research has
emphasized the dyadic nature of morality – that moral decision making involves perceptions
of moral agents (entities possessing moral responsibility) and moral patients (entities
deserving of moral rights). Relevant to the proposed work, research has determined that
perceptions of the capacity for sensation and feelings – moral patiency – predict attributions
of moral standing. However, while measures of patiency/experience have not previously been
applied to capture generalized concern for others, the current research can determine if the
tendency to extend moral concern to a greater number of entities corresponds with
perceptions of the capacity for experience. By directly capturing the breadth of a person’s
moral world and the relative moral weight attached to entities that reside within it, the
concept of moral expansiveness has the potential to provide important and novel insights into
each of these related moral constructs.
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Moral Expansiveness
Measuring Moral Expansiveness
As discussed above, our approach to measuring moral expansiveness incorporates
three important elements: (i) a graded approach to moral concern, (ii) a broad range of
entities, and (iii) the consideration of personal costs when granting moral inclusion. The
graded approach to our measure captures the reality that people do not make judgments about
moral concern in an all-or-nothing way, but have levels of concern varying from strong to
none (Opotow, 2011; Pizarro et al., 2006). This approach differs from earlier measures that
have involved dichotomous judgments, such as circling entities that are included in the
“moral circle” or crossing out those that are excluded (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, &
Hodson, 2012a; Laham, 2009). Such explicit choices of who is included-excluded as moral
entities offers a critical insight into the boundaries of moral concern, but should be
supplemented with recognition of the varying strength of moral concern people display (e.g.,
strong moral obligations vs. some acknowledgement of moral rights). Thus, we used a graded
approach to measure moral expansiveness that incorporates both the boundary of
inclusion/exclusion and different levels of moral concern.
Second, previous ‘moral circle' measures have targeted subsets of entities (e.g.,
'fringes of life' and animals; Bastian et al., 2012a; Laham, 2009; Opotow, 1993). Related
constructs such as identification with all humanity (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012) and
connectedness to nature (Mayer & Frantz, 2004) focus on a restricted set of entities. Moving
forward, instead of focusing on specific groups, the complex nature of the moral landscape
must be reflected with a representative spread of entities (e.g., incorporating various human
targets, animals, and the environment).
Third, as highlighted by (Opotow, 2011), an appropriate measure should incorporate a
willingness to make personal sacrifices, reflecting a realistic pursuit of moral inclusion.
Moral inclusion does not just involve cognitive judgments about moral standing, but should
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Moral Expansiveness
also have personal and behavioral consequences. Both Singer (1981) and Pinker (2011)
argued that expanding moral concern involves detaching ourselves from our own narrow
perspectives and self-interest: a move that can entail some level of personal cost and self-
sacrifice. If an entity is granted moral inclusion, then on some level it is acknowledged as
worthy to share in valuable (and often limited) resources. Thus, moral expansiveness goes
beyond abstract moral judgments relating to moral standing, and involves moral obligations
and commitments to actively protect the moral rights of others, even at personal cost.
The Moral Expansiveness Scale
Because existing constructs do not meet all the criteria we believe are necessary to
capture moral expansiveness, we constructed the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES). In the
MES, participants indicate the relative moral standing of a wide range of entities by placing
them within four defined boundaries: inner circle (entities worthy of the “highest level of
moral concern and standing … you have a moral obligation to ensure their welfare and feel a
sense of personal responsibility for their treatment”), an outer circle (“these entities deserve
moderate moral concern and consideration…you are still concerned about their moral
treatment; however, your sense of obligation and personal responsibility is greatly reduced”),
fringes of moral concern (“these entities deserve minimal moral concern and standing, but
you are not morally obliged or personally responsible for their treatment”), and outside the
moral boundary (“these entities deserve no moral concern or standing… feeling concern or
personal responsibility for their moral treatment is extreme or nonsensical”). The four
boundaries of morality are graded (inner circle = 3, outer circle = 2, fringes = 1, outside = 0),
and an aggregate score is calculated to reflect the expansiveness of an individual’s moral
world.
Using this measurement approach, the overall MES score summarizes the “breadth”
and the “depth” of a person’s moral world. Further, the potential cosequences of moral
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Moral Expansiveness
expansion are incorporated within this graded boundary approach, as it directs people to
consider the personal costs of moral inclusion. In order to provide an extensive map for how
people structure their moral worlds, 30 entities were included spanning 10 categories: ‘family
& friends’, ‘ingroup’, ‘outgroup’, ‘revered people’, ‘stigmatized’, ‘villains’, ‘high sentience
animals’, ‘low sentience animals’, ‘plants’, and ‘environment’. Three entities were included
in each of these categories (see Appendices A and B for the complete scale
1
).
Overview of Studies
The current research comprises six studies that establish the validity of the MES and
its contribution as a unique predictor of moral decision making. Study 1 establishes the
reliability of the MES, describes normative beliefs about which entities are central versus
distal in terms of moral concern, and examines the relationships between moral
expansiveness and demographic variables. Study 2 examines the convergent and predictive
validity of the MES compared to established “moral” constructs. Study 3 examines the
unique role of moral expansiveness – relative to “moral” and “generalized” constructs linked
with moral concern – in predicting intentions when individuals are faced with an extremely
costly ultimatum: to sacrifice one’s life to protect others. Studies 4 and 5 apply the self-
sacrifice criterion to determine the predictive utility of moral expansiveness against
alternative measures of moral standing (experience and warmth), and to establish that
expansiveness cannot be reduced to a general sense of personal responsibility. Finally, Study
6 demonstrates that the MES predicts behavior at a personal cost over and above a range of
existing constructs. The sample size for all studies met the recommendations for hierarchical
regression in relation to cases per IV according to (Brace, Kemp, & Snelgar, 2009; i.e., at
least 5 cases per variable).
Study 1 – Reliability and Structure of the MES
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Moral Expansiveness
Study 1 had three functions: (1) to test the reliability of the MES, (2) to map
normative patterns of the extent to which entities are central versus distal in people’s moral
worlds, and (3) to explore how moral expansiveness varies as a function of demographic
characteristics (age, political conservatism, religiosity, and gender). Strong relationships
between demographic variables and the MES were not expected. However, because political
conservatism is associated with less moral regard towards outgroup members (Bassett, 2010;
Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009) and less engagement in environmentalism (Neumayer, 2004),
we expected that there would be a negative association between moral expansiveness and
political conservatism.
Method
Participants and Measures. One-hundred and twenty-six U.S. participants (52.38%
Male, Mage = 34.59, SD = 11.89) were sourced through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Participants were first introduced to the concept of ‘moral circles’ and then completed the
MES
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, followed by demographic questions. These included two single-item measures of
political conservatism: economic conservatism (“please indicate your political beliefs from
left/liberal to right/conservative on issues of the economy, e.g., social welfare, government
spending, tax cuts”; 1 – left/liberal to 7 – right/conservative), and social conservatism
(“please indicate your political beliefs from left/liberal to right/conservative on social issues,
e.g., immigration, homosexual marriage, abortion”; 1 – left/liberal to 7 – right/conservative).
Also included was a four-item religiosity scale (e.g., “how religious are you?”; 1 – not at all
religious to 7 – very religious; α = .92; Cohen, Malka, Rozin, & Cherfas, 2006).
Results and Discussion
Nine participants (7.14%) were excluded on the basis of failed attention checks and
not engaging with the task appropriately
3
, leaving 117 participants. Each participant’s MES
score was calculated based on the placement of the target entities within the graded
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Moral Expansiveness
boundaries of concern (inner circle = 3, outer circle = 2, fringes = 1, outside = 0). Hence, the
aggregate MES score across the 30 entities could vary from 0 to 90, with higher scores
indicating greater moral expansiveness. The means, standard deviations and correlations
between the total MES and entity groups are displayed in Table 1. The 30 items formed an
MES scale with strong internal consistency (α = .92) with a mean of 44.21 (SD = 12.30) and
a range of 67.
The mean MES scores of the entity groups were plotted in order to illustrate the
normative structure of the moral world (Figure 1). Family and friends (ratings in this category
had very low variance) were consensually deemed to be worthy of the highest moral concern,
followed by the ingroup (α = .67), revered individuals (α = .61), stigmatized individuals (α =
.80), and the outgroup (α = .80). High-sentience animals (α = .89) held the highest moral
standing of non-human groups, followed by environmental targets (α = .92), low-sentience
animals (α = .86), and plants (α = .87). Villains (α = .92) appeared on the outer edges of the
moral world and held the lowest moral standing of all targets.
There were no significant relationships between the MES and demographic variables:
age (r = -.09, p = .35), conservatism – economic (r = -.18, p = .06), conservatism – social (r =
-.04, p = .29), or religiosity (r = .09, p = .34). There were also no differences in MES scores
between males (M = 44.00, SD = 12.77) and females (M = 44.44, SD = 11.85), t(115) = -.19,
p = .85, 95% CI [-4.97, 4.09].
The findings from Study 1 provide support for the reliability of the MES. Further,
these data revealed a normative structure of the moral world. Generally, human targets are
worthy of the greatest moral concern and consideration (unless they have committed an act to
lose this, i.e., ‘villains’). However, non-human targets (including animals, plants and the
environment) still consistently hold some moral standing. The MES produced no strong
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Moral Expansiveness
associations with key demographic variables, indicating that moral expansiveness is not
reducible to general political attitudes or religious beliefs.
Study 2 – Comparing Moral Expansiveness to Other Moral Constructs
Study 2 explored the unique convergent and predictive validity of moral
expansiveness compared to other constructs that focus on moral judgments and moral values:
moral foundations (Haidt & Joseph, 2004); moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002); and moral
(universalism) values (Schwartz, 2007). As described above, we expect moral expansiveness
assesses a unique aspect of moral cognition and will predict moral decision making after
controlling for these established morality constructs.
It is also important to establish convergent validity of the MES. It is expected that
there will be some overlap between moral expansiveness and the other moral constructs
because they all form a part of people’s moral judgments. For example, placing greater
emphasis on basic concerns for the suffering of others (care/harm of MFT), and concerns
relating to unfair treatment and inequality (fairness/cheating), may be associated with more
expansive moral boundaries. Therefore, positive correlations between the MES and
endorsement of the ‘harm’ and ‘fairness’ foundations were expected. Conversely, the
“binding foundations” of ‘ingroup’, ‘authority’ and ‘purity’ foundations are associated with
group loyalty, endorsement of traditional social hierarchies, and marking a group’s cultural
boundaries, respectively (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Therefore, endorsement of these
‘binding foundations’ suggests a greater focus on ingroup considerations at the expense of
more disadvantaged or ‘distant’ humans, as well as animals and the environment.
Consequently, negative relationships between MES and these foundations were expected.
Previous research has identified a relationship between moral identity and increased
moral regard toward outgroup members (Reed & Aquino, 2003). Moreover, endorsement of
universalism values such as equality and protecting the environment have been associated
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Moral Expansiveness
with greater moral inclusivity (Schwartz, 2007). Therefore, positive associations between
moral identity, universalism values, and the MES were predicted.
In terms of predictive utility, moral expansiveness should be particularly powerful in
predicting moral decision making and behavioral intentions in contexts where protecting the
rights and needs of others incurs some cost. One way to assess this is to create a context in
which this tendency might emerge, such as pitting ingroup concerns against outgroup
concerns. This is similar to the approach taken by (McFarland & Mathews, 2005), in which
participants judged the relative importance of national self-interest goals vs. broader human
rights goals (e.g., maintaining a strong national military vs. ending child prostitution
worldwide). We developed a similar measure that included not just concern for human
outgroups, but also extended to non-human animals and the environment. It was hypothesized
that moral expansiveness would predict willingness to support altruistic human and non-
human concerns against ingroup concerns, over and above established morality measures.
Method
Participants and Measures. One-hundred and twenty-three U.S. participants
(64.23% male, Mage = 34.01, SD = 11.57) were sourced through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Participants completed the MES, the three established morality constructs, and criterion
measures described below.
Morality Measures.
Moral Foundations. The short version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire
(MFQ20; Graham et al., 2009) assessed five moral foundations: care/harm (α = .77),
fairness/cheating (α = .65), ingroup/loyalty (α = .69), authority/subversion (α = .75), and
purity/degradation (α = .87). Within this scale, some items ask participants to consider the
relevance of a number of factors in deciding whether something is right or wrong (e.g.,
“whether or not someone suffered emotionally”; 0 – not at all relevant to 5 – extremely
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Moral Expansiveness
relevant), and other items ask participants to indicate their level of agreement with a range of
morally relevant statements (e.g., “compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial
virtue”; 0 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree).
Moral Identity. The 10-item Self-Importance of Moral Identity scale (Aquino & Reed,
2002) captures the extent to which a range of moral characteristics (e.g., caring,
compassionate, fair) are personally valued. The scale comprises two dimensions:
internalization (e.g., “it would make me feel good to be a person who has these
characteristics”; α = .79), and symbolization (e.g., “I am actively involved in activities that
communicate to others that I have these characteristics”; α = .88). All items used a 5-point
scale (1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree).
Universalism. Six universalism values (e.g., broadmindedness, equality) were
selected from Schwartz (1992). These were rated as guiding principles in one’s life (1 – not
at all important to 5 – extremely important; α = .83).
Criterion Measures.
The criterion measures captured willingness to engage in ingroup or personal sacrifice
for both human and non-human targets in situations such as policy making, donations, and
charitable giving.
Human and Non-Human Concern Judgments. We adapted and extended McFarland
et al.’s (2012) Human Rights Choices Questionnaire, which requires participants to make
choices about who should have priority in rights and welfare dilemmas. These items
examined concern for humans (e.g., “a – making medicines available overseas for those who
cannot afford them” vs. “b – making sure America has the best hospitals in the world”; 1 –
item a is much more important to 5 – item b is much more important); concern for non-
human animals (e.g., “a –protecting the habitats of chimpanzees and the other great apes
around the world”, vs. “b – ensuring the cost of living remains stable in America”); and
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Moral Expansiveness
concern for the environment (e.g., “a – protecting the world’s remaining old-growth forests”
vs. “b – preventing another U.S. recession”). Participants were required to choose the relative
importance of these nationalistic and self-interested concerns against concerns for more
distant targets, both human and non-human (8 items; α = .81).
Kidney Donation. This personal sacrifice measure was designed to capture concern
for human targets at a personal cost. It required participants to imagine an organ shortage at a
local hospital and to indicate how likely they would be to donate one of their kidneys to a
range of seven targets (e.g., charity worker, refugee, convicted murderer) on a 7-point scale
(1 – very unlikely, 7 – very likely; α = .92).
Financial Donation. Because kidney donation is restricted to human targets, a second
measure assessing financial donation was created for non-human animals and the
environment. This measure required participants to imagine they had recently inherited a
large sum of money. Participants were then asked how likely they would be to donate a
portion of it to a range of six charities (e.g., saving chimpanzee habitats, restore blue-fin tuna
populations, saving endangered plant species; 1 – very unlikely, 7 – very likely; α = .93).
Results and Discussion
Using the same exclusion criteria as Study 1, four participants (3.25%) were
excluded, leaving 119 participants for analysis. The mean MES score was 54.13 (SD =
13.00) with a range of 65.
Convergent Validity. Table 2 shows that the MES shared weak to moderate
correlations with other morality constructs (rs < .37), indicating that it shares meaningful
variance with other approaches to assessing morality, but not to the point of redundancy.
Scores on the MES were significantly correlated with four of the five moral foundations. As
predicted, those high in moral expansiveness were more likely to base their moral judgments
on considerations of the wellbeing of others and protecting them from harm (care/harm).
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Moral Expansiveness
Conversely, the MES was moderately negatively correlated with ‘binding’ foundations:
ingroup, authority, and purity. As predicted, those high in moral expansiveness reported
greater endorsement of universalism values. However, expansive moral concern was not
related to moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), both when it was operationalized as the
extent to which desirable moral traits are central to an individual’s self-concept
(internalization), and the extent to which people engaged in public expressions of these traits
(symbolization).
Predictive Validity. Correlations among the criterion measures and predictors can
also be found in Table 2. As predicted, the MES showed strong and statistically significant
correlations with all four criterion judgments. Universalism values and the
authority/subversion, ingroup/loyalty, and purity/degradation moral foundations subscales
were significantly associated with 2 of the 4 criterion variables, whereas the other moral
constructs correlated with just one of the criterion variables.
A set of hierarchical regressions was performed to determine whether moral
expansiveness could account for unique variance in moral decision making over and above
established measures. Demographic variables
4
(age, gender, and religiosity) were entered at
Step 1, the moral foundations dimensions, moral identity, and universalism values were
entered at Step 2, and the MES entered at Step 3. Collinearity diagnostics indicated no
problematic multi-collinearity (all VIFs < 3.6). Results for the human and non-human
concern criterion measures are shown in Table 3; results for kidney and financial donation
measures are shown in Table 4. As can be seen, moral expansiveness accounted for unique
variance over these established measures when predicting (1) prioritizing global humanitarian
concerns over ingroup concerns; (2) prioritizing animal and environmental concerns over
ingroup concerns; (3) a willingness to donate one’s kidneys to a range of non-kin targets, and
(4) financial donations to animal welfare and environmental causes. These findings, as well
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Moral Expansiveness
as the weak to moderate correlations between the MES and the other predictors, suggests that
moral expansiveness is capturing a distinct element of moral cognition, which can make a
unique contribution to our understanding of moral judgments and their consequences.
Study 3 – Willingness to Self-Sacrifice and Moral Expansiveness
In Study 3 we tested the limits of the relationship between moral expansiveness and
the willingness to sacrifice by examining whether moral expansiveness has a unique role in
predicting behavioral intentions when individuals are faced with an extremely costly
ultimatum: to sacrifice one’s life to protect others. Extrapolating from Study 2, we predicted
that those with more expansive moral boundaries should be more willing to sacrifice
themselves to save the lives of a range of human and non-human entities. Further, as in Study
2, we expected that this relationship would hold after controlling for the morality constructs
previously established in the literature.
In Study 3, we aimed to further establish the convergent and predictive validity of the
MES against measures not explicitly invoking morality, but that have been linked to moral
concern. Previous research has established that dispositional empathy has been related to
altruistic tendencies (Eisenberg, 2010; Paciello, Fida, Cerniglia, Tramontano, & Cole, 2013;
Pizarro et al., 2006), and at least conceptually linked to the notion of expansive moral
concern (Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981).Other relevant theories focus on specific entities, such
as humanity as a whole (identification with all humanity; McFarland et al., 2012) or nature
(connectedness to nature; Mayer & Frantz, 2004), which may be related to the extent of
moral concern afforded to particular targets. Therefore, while not explicitly evoking morality,
it is important to empirically demonstrate that moral expansiveness makes a unique practical
contribution over and above these constructs. Further, because these constructs are all
associated with the extension of concern, it is informative to understand whether they are
related to moral expansiveness.
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Moral Expansiveness
Consistent with Study 2, moral expansiveness should be associated with a willingness
to extend moral concern to both human and non-human targets. It was therefore anticipated
that greater moral expansiveness would be associated with a tendency to identify with all
humanity (McFarland et al., 2012) and with perceived connection to the natural world (Mayer
& Frantz, 2004). Moral expansiveness should also be associated with empathic traits,
specifically increased empathic concern and perspective taking (Davis, 1983; Pizarro et al.,
2006). However, it is expected that the MES will make a unique contribution over and above
these constructs in predicting a willingness to protect the rights and needs of others.
Finally, given the nature of the criterion judgments, we included five control
variables. These included three demographic control variables used in Study 2 – age, gender
and religiosity – and two additional control variables: belief in the afterlife and social
desirability. We surmised that people who believe in life after death might be more willing to
sacrifice their lives as it would be seen as less costly, and even potentially rewarding. The
need to control for a tendency to provide socially desirable responses was expected given the
potentially discomforting nature of the judgments.
Method
Participants and Measures. Three-hundred and sixteen U.S. participants (58.20%
female, Mage = 36.16, SD = 12.35) were sourced through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. They
completed an online questionnaire that included the MES, the willingness to self-sacrifice
measure (described below), the “morality” constructs from Study 2 (moral foundations, the
two dimensions of moral identity, and universalism values), and a set of ‘generalized
concern’ scales described below.
Additional Controls. As introduced above, measures of belief in the afterlife and
social desirability were included as additional controls. A 3-item version Belief in Afterlife
Scale (Osarchuk & Tatz, 1973) was used in order to control for perceptions of a life after
19
Moral Expansiveness
death (e.g., “There is no such thing as a life after death”; 1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly
agree; α = .95 . To account for the tendency to provide overtly desirable responses, an 11-
item version (Reynolds, 1982) of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne &
Marlowe, 1960) was used (e.g., "I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake"; 1 -
true, 2 - false; α = .80).
Generalized Concern Measures.
Empathy. To assess empathy, the empathic concern (7 items, α = .90) and perspective
taking (7 items, α = .90) sub-scales were included from Davis’s (1983) Interpersonal
Reactivity Index. These scales measure how well a set of empathic traits describes the
individual on a 5-point scale (e.g., “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less
fortunate than me”; 1 – does not describe me well to 5 – describes me very well).
Connectedness to Nature. Mayer and Frantz’s (2004) Connectedness to Nature Scale
(CNS; α = .90) comprises 14 items assessing trait levels of feeling emotionally connected to
the natural world. An example item is “I often feel a sense of oneness with the natural world
around me” (1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree).
Identification with All Humanity. The Identification with All Humanity Scale (IWAH,
McFarland et al., 2012) consists of 9 items that capture feelings of identification and concern
towards 3 groups of people: “the local community”, “Americans”, and “all humans
everywhere” (α = .89). An example item is “How much do you identify with (feel a part of,
feel love toward, have concern for) each of the following?”; 1 – not at all close to 5 – very
close.
Criterion Measure.
Willingness to self-sacrifice. To assess willingness to self-sacrifice, participants were
presented with the following scenario:
20
Moral Expansiveness
Imagine your powerful country is ruled by a ruthless dictator. This dictator has
ultimate power and is notorious for taking violent action for unknown reasons,
though he is always true to his word. This dictator has recently passed a set of
laws that has put a range of specific groups and entities at risk of being
completely wiped out, and unfortunately, all other world leaders are too afraid
to intervene. He has ordered that action against these groups will begin
immediately, however he has also decided that if somebody from his own
country volunteers to sacrifice themselves instead, the groups will be saved.
Eight entities were presented in random order: ‘people from your hometown’, ‘people
from the African continent’, people with an intellectual disability from your country’, ‘people
currently incarcerated in your country’, ‘chimpanzees’, ‘ants’, ‘redwood trees’, and ‘coral
reefs’. These entities were selected (four human and four non-human) as targets that ranged
from the centre to the peripheries of most people’s moral spheres. Participants were asked to
consider how many of a particular entity would need to be killed by the dictator for them to
sacrifice themselves in their place (e.g., 1 = ‘1-10’, 2 = ’10-100’, 3 = ‘100-1000’, 4 = ‘10%’,
5 = ‘25%’, 6 = ‘50%’, 7 = ‘75%’, 8 = ‘90%’, 9 = ‘100%’, to 10 = ‘I would never sacrifice
myself’). Each entity was presented individually with the following assumptions made clear:
(1) there are no other options and nobody else is going to volunteer, (2) your death would be
painless, and (3) sacrificing your life would definitely save the lives of the targets. These
targets were analysed both as individual items and as an overall construct capturing overall
willingness to self-sacrifice (α = .87).
Results and Discussion
21
Moral Expansiveness
Applying the same exclusion criteria as in the previous studies to both the MES and
self-sacrifice measure, 27 participants (8.54%) were excluded leaving a sample of 289
5
. The
mean MES score was 44.92 (SD = 13.12) with a range of 71.
Convergent Validity.
Correlations between the MES and the ‘generalized concern’ predictors included in
Study 3 are presented in Table 5. As predicted, higher scores on the MES were associated
with significantly greater empathic concern and perspective taking. Similarly, higher scores
on the MES were positively associated with identification with all humanity and
connectedness to nature, indicating that the MES spans both human and non-human domains.
As with Study 2, these correlations (rs < .40) indicate there is some overlap between these
constructs and moral expansiveness, but not to the point of redundancy.
Predictive Validity.
Correlations between all predictor scales and willingness to self-sacrifice – both
overall and for each entity – are also found in Table 5. As predicted, there was a significant
positive relationship between scores on the MES and overall willingness to self-sacrifice.
Across the individual entities, holding more expansive moral boundaries was associated with
an increased willingness to self-sacrifice (in one case marginally significant) for all of the
eight targets. Further, the MES produced a far more consistent pattern across the entities
(both human and non-human) than any other predictor. Of note, the care/harm dimension of
moral foundations, empathic concern, perspective taking, identification with all humanity,
and the internalization component of moral identity each produced significant correlations
across the human targets. For non-human targets, connectedness to nature and universalism
values each produced some positive correlations, whereas the authority/subversion and
purity/degradation dimensions of moral foundations were associated with a reluctance to
self-sacrifice.
22
Moral Expansiveness
A single hierarchical regression was performed, collapsing across the targets in order
to predict overall willingness to self-sacrifice. This regression consisted of four steps: the
demographic and control variables (age, gender, religiosity, belief in the afterlife, and social
desirability) at Step 1, morality predictors at Step 2, ‘generalized concern’ predictors at Step
3, and MES at Step 4 (see Table 6). Collinearity diagnostics indicated no problematic multi-
collinearity (all VIFs < 3.0). As can be seen, over and above the demographic and control
variables, the internalization subscale of moral identity was the only traditional morality
construct to significantly predict willingness to self-sacrifice at Step 2. When the ‘generalized
concern’ predictors were included at Step 3, identification with all humanity and
connectedness to nature became the only significant predictors. However, entering the MES
at Step 4 explained a significant amount of extra variance over and above these seventeen
predictors, with higher moral expansiveness associated with an increased overall willingness
to self-sacrifice across the targets, = .16, p = .015, 95% CI [0.03, 0.29].
In sum, Study 3 provides strong additional evidence for the relationship between
moral expansiveness and a willingness to overcome self-interest in the extension of moral
concern. These results move beyond the findings of Study 2 (e.g., ingroup vs. outgroup
policy decisions), because moral expansiveness was found to be a powerful predictor of a
willingness to protect others while making the ultimate sacrifice – one’s life. Further, the
MES made a unique contribution not just over established “morality” predictors, but also
over and above a set of ‘generalized concern’ constructs that have been empirically linked to
moral concern. Of all these relevant constructs, the MES produced the most consistent
correlations across the self-sacrifice target entities. While certain constructs (e.g.,
identification with all humanity, connectedness to nature) were associated with a willingness
to sacrifice one’s life for other human or non-human entities, the MES was the only construct
to consistently predict variance across both human and non-human targets. Further, moral
23
Moral Expansiveness
expansiveness was a unique predictor of the overall willingness to self-sacrifice even after the
explanatory contribution of these constructs had been accounted for.
Study 4 – Moral Expansiveness and Moral Patiency
In Study 4, we tested the relationship between moral expansiveness and an established
predictor of moral rights attribution, moral patiency. Unlike previous morality constructs
examined in Studies 2 and 3, the extent to which individual entities are perceived to hold
moral patiency (e.g., the capacity to experience suffering) has been directly linked with their
deservingness of moral rights (Gray et al., 2007). The mind survey (Gray et al., 2007) split
perceptions of minds along two independent dimensions: agency and experience. Perceptions
of agency (self-control, judgment, communication, thought, and memory) predict attributions
of moral responsibility, and perceptions of experience (hunger, fear, pain, pleasure and
consciousness) predict attributions of moral rights. Therefore, given the central role of the
experience dimension in predicting perceptions of moral rights, we sought to further examine
the convergent and predictive validity of moral expansiveness against this construct. Overall,
we predicted a moderate to strong relationship between holding more expansive moral
boundaries and perceptions of entity experience.
Method
Participants and Measures.
Ninety-six U.S. participants (51.00% female, Mage = 36.06, SD = 11.91) were sourced
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. They completed an online questionnaire that included
the MES, the willingness to self-sacrifice measure and controls (social desirability and belief
in the afterlife) from Study 3. In addition to these measures, perceived experience was
captured based on ratings of two metal capacities (Gray et al., 2007). Participants rated each
of the 30 entities contained in the MES individually on their ability to feel fear (e.g., “How
capable of feeling fear are the following targets?”; 0 – not at all, to 6 – very much) and pain
24
Moral Expansiveness
(e.g., “How capable of feeling pain are the following targets?”). The mean fear and pain
ratings across all targets were then averaged to create an overall experience scale (α = .81).
Results and Discussion
Applying the existing exclusion criteria, 5 participants (5.21%) were excluded leaving
a sample of 91 for analysis. The mean MES score was 44.12 (SD = 14.41) with a range of 69.
Convergent Validity.
As predicted, greater moral expansiveness was associated with increased perceptions
of entities’ capacity for experience (averaging across entities; r = .30, p = .004). Consistent
with previous studies, these data indicate some overlap between experience and moral
expansiveness, but not to the point of redundancy.
Predictive Validity.
Consistent with Study 3, the MES was significantly associated with overall
willingness to self-sacrifice (r = .27, p = .011). However, the association between willingness
to self-sacrifice and perceptions of experience was non-significant (r = .06, p = .58). As with
previous studies, a hierarchical regression was performed to predict an overall willingness to
self-sacrifice. The demographic and control variables were entered at Step 1 (age, gender,
religiosity, belief in the afterlife, and social desirability), experience at Step 2, and the MES
at Step 3. Collinearity diagnostics indicated no multi-collinearity concerns (all VIFs < 2.3).
As can be seen in Table 7, the control variables at Step 1 and experience at Step 2 did not
account for unique variance in willingness to self-sacrifice. However, the MES at Step 3 was
again a significant predictor, with higher moral expansiveness associated with an increased
willingness to self-sacrifice, = .24, p = .019, 95% CI [0.02, 0.47]. The results of Study 4
provide additional evidence for the convergent validity and unique predictive contribution of
the MES, this time against an established determinant of moral rights. Consistent with Study
25
Moral Expansiveness
3, moral expansiveness was again a unique predictor of moral decision making via the
willingness to protect others from harm at personal cost.
Study 5 – Moral Expansiveness, Warmth and Personal Responsibility
In Study 5 we examined the MES against another established measure of moral rights
– warmth. The stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) proposes two
primary dimensions along which outgroup members (e.g., gender, ethnicity) are judged:
warmth and competence. The position of social groups along these dimensions can predict
perceptions of status and associated prejudice. For example, those perceived as high in
competence but low in warmth may be high in status but viewed as cold and inhuman (e.g.,
rich people). In contrast, those low in competence but high in warmth can be perceived as
low status but sweet and harmless (e.g., housewives). Importantly, perceptions of warmth can
predict the moral standing of individuals and social groups (Fiske et al., 2002). Therefore, to
further highlight the contribution of moral expansiveness we examined the predictive power
of the MES against perceptions of target warmth.
We also aimed to show that the predictive power of moral expansiveness could not
simply be reduced to a general sense of personal/social responsibility (Penner, 2002; Penner,
Fritzsche, Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995). We have shown that moral expansiveness predicts
willingness to assume personal responsibility through willingness to sacrifice for others.
However, it is important to show that this reflects more than just being willing to take on
responsibility in any situation. Thus, we examined whether the predictive validity of the MES
went beyond a general sense of personal/social responsibility.
Method
Participants and Measures.
Ninety-seven U.S. participants (53.60% male, Mage = 35.65, SD = 12.57) were
sourced through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. They completed an online questionnaire that
26
Moral Expansiveness
included the MES, the willingness to self-sacrifice scale (Study 3), and control measures
(social desirability and belief in the afterlife). Applying the Fiske et al. (2002) approach
participants then rated the 30 MES entities on perceptions of warmth (“as viewed by society,
how warm – i.e., sincere, friendly – are the following targets?”; 1 – not at all to 5 – very
much; α = .92). In addition, participants completed the 7-item social responsibility subscale
of the prosocial personality battery (Penner, 2002; e.g., “no matter what a person has done to
us, there is no excuse for taking advantage of them”; 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly
agree; α = .67).
Results and Discussion
Applying the existing exclusion criteria, ten participants (10.31%) were excluded
leaving a sample of 87 for analysis. The mean MES score was 46.40 (SD = 13.48) with a
range of 77.
Convergent Validity.
As expected, holding more expansive moral boundaries was associated with
significantly greater perceptions of warmth across the 30 target entities (averaging across
entities; r = .33, p = .002). The MES held a positive but non-significant relationship with trait
levels of social responsibility (r = .16, p = .13). Again, these relationships do not indicate
redundancy between moral expansiveness and existing measures.
Predictive Validity.
Consistent with previous studies, the MES was significantly related to overall
willingness to self-sacrifice (r = .23, p = .03), whereas perceptions of warmth (r = .16, p =
.14) and social responsibility (r = .11, p = .32) produced positive yet non-significant trends.
In examining the predictive relationships, a hierarchical regression was performed on overall
willingness to self-sacrifice. Control variables were again entered at Step 1 (age, gender,
religiosity, belief in the afterlife, and social desirability), perceptions of warmth and social
27
Moral Expansiveness
responsibility at Step 2, and the MES at Step 3 (see Table 8). Collinearity diagnostics
indicated no multi-collinearity concerns (all VIFs < 2.9). Following the control variables at
Step 1, perceptions of warmth did not make a unique contribution, and social responsibility
was marginally significant. However, the MES entered at Step 3 was again a significant
predictor of willingness to sacrifice, = .23, p = .047, 95% CI [0.003, 0.453]. These results
lend further support to the unique contribution of moral expansiveness. The MES is able to
predict moral decision making over and above an established proxy of moral standing, and
the contribution of moral expansiveness cannot be explained by a general sense of
personal/social responsibility.
Study 6 – Moral Expansiveness and Behavior
In Studies 2-5 the utility of the MES in predicting moral decision making has been
demonstrated across various pro-social and sacrificial scenarios spanning both the human and
non-human domains. In Study 6 we examined the power of moral expansiveness in predicting
actual behavior – sacrificing one’s time in aid of a cause. As we have highlighted, there is an
intuitive link between expanding moral boundaries and a willingness to make personal
sacrifices for those perceived as holding moral standing. Further, others have argued the
moral inclusion of entities often involves potential resource costs (e.g., time; Opotow, 2011;
Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981). Consequently, we predicted that those with more expansive
moral boundaries will be more willing to donate their free time to defend the moral standing
of a non-human entity.
Method
Participants and Measures.
Ninety-nine (79.80% female, Mage = 19.66, SD = 3.00) first-year psychology students
from a large Australian university completed the study in exchange for course credit.
Participants arrived at the laboratory to complete a computer based questionnaire that
28
Moral Expansiveness
included the MES, demographics, and additional predictor measures. These additional
measures were selected as the most effective predictors of moral decision making from
Studies 2-5: the harm dimension of moral foundations, moral identity (internalization),
universalism values, empathic concern, and connectedness to nature
6
. While participants
were completing the survey, they were each handed a piece of paper which contained the
following information:
“Before you leave today I would like to give you the opportunity to join an important
cause that has motivated the current research. The Non-human Rights Project (NhRP)
is a civil rights organization working towards achieving actual legal rights for
members of species other than our own (e.g., chimpanzees). A campaign in support of
this initiative is currently underway, and I am going to provide you with an
opportunity to take part upon completion of this survey”
Following the completion of the survey participants were thanked for their
involvement and then asked if they would like to view the NhRP campaign (yes/no).
Participants that declined were then free to leave the lab following their debriefing. Those
that decided to view the campaign were directed to a new page where they were asked to join
a letter writing campaign in support of Tommy the chimpanzee (currently owned by a
research institution) being granted legal personhood status – a case that was soon to be heard
before the U.S. Supreme Court (ABC, 2015). Participants were instructed that the aim of the
cause was to narrow the gulf between human beings and our closest living relatives, and
specifically to grant Tommy the fundamental rights of bodily integrity and liberty. In
addition, in order to emphasize the costs of endorsing the NhRP campaign, participants were
informed of the potential for negative human consequences (e.g., disrupting animal-based
farming practices, and drawing into question the legal rights of animals used for human
consumption).
29
Moral Expansiveness
Following this information, participants were informed that if they wanted to join the
campaign (those that did not were again free to leave) they could do so by writing their
“opinions, endorsement, or general thoughts in support of the campaign” in a space provided,
and that responses would be forwarded on to the NhRP. Participants received no additional
credit for joining the letter writing campaign. Participants that joined the campaign as
reported below, were those who provided a written response in support after confirming they
would like to join (dummy coded; join campaign = 1, decline = 0)..
Results and Discussion
Nine participants (9.09%) were excluded from analysis based on the criteria used in
earlier studies. One additional participant was excluded as the methodological protocol was
not followed (i.e., participant was not provided with the handout containing information
about the NhRP campaign) resulting in 89 participants for analysis. The mean MES score
was 48.20 (SD = 11.55) with a range of 57.
Predictive Validity.
As predicted, there was a significantly positive relationship between moral
expansiveness and willingness to join the letter writing campaign (rpb = .29, p = .007). A
hierarchical logistic regression was performed predicting whether or not participants joining
the campaign. Age, gender and religiosity were entered as demographic controls in Step 1;
harm, moral identity (internalization), universalism values, empathic concern, and
connectedness to nature at Step 2; and the MES at Step 3 (see Table 9). The control variables
entered at Step 1 did not produce a significant overall model. When the established predictors
were entered at Step 2 there was a significant increase in variance accounted for, however
there were no significant predictors. As in previous studies, when the MES was entered at the
final step it produced a significant change over and above the established predictors.
30
Moral Expansiveness
Specifically, every one unit increase in moral expansiveness increased the likelihood of
joining the letter writing campaign by 6%, Exp(B) = 1.06, p = .041, 95% CI [1.00, 1.11].
These findings provide an important empirical leap in terms of the predictive utility of
moral expansiveness. Study 6 showed that the extent to which people are expansive in their
moral concern can predict actual behavioral responses relating to moral decision making and
concern for the well-being of other entities. Specifically, over and above the strongest
predictors of moral decision making from Studies 2-5, moral expansiveness was the only
unique predictor of whether or not individuals were willing to sacrifice their time to join a
letter writing campaign to uphold the moral rights of other entities. These findings provide
additional evidence for moral expansiveness as a unique factor in moral decision making, and
as a construct tapping into a new dimension of moral cognition.
General Discussion
The current research demonstrates that moral expansiveness is an important element
of moral cognition, and provides empirical support for the MES as a valid and reliable
measure of the extent to which people extend their moral boundaries. Crucially, these
findings show that variation in the tendency to extend moral boundaries is a key predictor of
moral decision making and behavior across both human and non-human domains. The MES
predicts willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and
national self-interest; willingness to donate a kidney to a range of non-kin human targets; and
willingness to make a financial contribution to a range of animal and environmental causes
(Study 2). Moral expansiveness also predicts willingness to sacrifice one’s life to protect
human and non-human others, (e.g., ingroup and outgroup members, animals, and
environmental entities; Studies 3-5). Lastly, the MES predicts willingness to sacrifice one’s
time to support a campaign to protect the moral standing of non-human entities (Study 6).
31
Moral Expansiveness
Demonstrating the distinct contribution of moral expansiveness in predicting moral
decision making, the MES explained unique variance in these tendencies and behaviors even
after controlling for a range of established morality and related ‘generalized concern’
constructs. Collectively, these studies have shown that moral expansiveness, as measured by
the MES, goes beyond a capacity for empathic concern and perspective taking, is more than
extended identification and connection with others, and is different from moral intuitions,
moral identity, moral patiency, endorsement of universalism values, or social/personal
responsibility.
Implications
Overall, these findings provide further evidence that the depth and breadth of people’s
moral boundaries hold important implications for decision making. Existing theories of moral
decision making and action have focused on the role of emotion vs. rational deliberation
(Batson, 1987; Haidt, 2001; Turiel, 1983), the divergent nature of our moral intuitions (Haidt,
2012), the importance of morality in our self-conception (Aquino & Reed, 2002), and the
dyadic nature of morality and mind perception (Gray & Wegner, 2011). Moral expansiveness
shows that, in addition to these factors, the extent to which we are expansive in granting
moral rights is uniquely influential.
The current research draws attention to altruistic aspects of moral inclusivity.
Although the self-sacrificing commitments of moral inclusion have been proposed (Opotow,
2011; Pinker, 2011; Singer, 1981), the current research establishes a robust link between
holding more expansive moral boundaries and a willingness to uphold the moral rights of
others even when it comes at a cost to oneself and one’s ingroup. While it could be argued
that reciprocity for such actions could still come in the form of enhanced reputation (i.e.,
indirect reciprocity and sexual selection; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Trivers, 1971), these
mechanisms struggle to account for the occurrence of anonymous altruism, or the recent
32
Moral Expansiveness
documented shifts in the expansion of moral concern (Bloom, 2010; Pinker, 2011).
Therefore, moral expansiveness may contribute to our understanding of altruism extending
beyond predictable limits.
Equally, these findings have substantial implications for real world pro-sociality, and
global humanitarian and environmental issues (e.g., foreign aid at the expense of ingroup
causes, or environmental protection at the expense of economic growth). Being morally
expansive in a world of finite resources (i.e., time, money, and physical) often requires self-
sacrifice, which can create tensions between one’s own needs and the needs of others
(Bastian & Crimston, in press). For example, an individual morally concerned for the welfare
of animals may oppose factory farming, but to do so must accept paying higher food prices.
Moral expansiveness captures a greater tendency and willingness to uphold such convictions,
even when doing so incurs personal cost.
Exploring Moral Expansiveness
Our data provide insight into factors that are related to a morally expansive
orientation to the world. Factors associated with moral expansiveness include: empathy,
perceptions of the capacity for others to experience suffering, a sense of self as both moral
and expansive in terms of belonging to superordinate identities, an inclusive value system,
and moral intuitions that are not limited by a motivation to protect ingroup interests. To this
extent, it appears that moral expansiveness may be associated with how we view the self, our
values, and our ability to put ourselves in others’ shoes. However, moral expansiveness is not
reducible to these constructs, leaving room for additional explanations for the variations and
origins of moral expansiveness.
One possibility worthy of further exploration is whether the origins of moral
expansiveness may be found in our cognitive and social development. There is recent
evidence to suggest we possess instinctual moral abilities essential for moral rights decision
33
Moral Expansiveness
making, these include: the ability to identify kindness from cruelty, to convey empathy and
compassion, and a preference for fairness (Bloom, 2013; Hamlin, 2014; Hamlin, Wynn, &
Bloom, 2007). Early in development these instincts operate within a more egocentric
orientation, however this tends to give way to an increasing recognition of the rights and
needs of others in line with an expanding social circle (Bloom, 2004, 2010). Such a process
may start with a simple recognition of fairness and reciprocity within interpersonal
interactions but can quickly extend to the emergence of care and concern for others more
distant. Illustrating this point, children as young as six have been shown to struggle with their
personal consumption of meat for moral reasons – acknowledging the ‘other entity’ suffering
that is relevant to this judgment (Hussar & Harris, 2010).
Therefore, it is possible that which entities we deem worthy of this expanded moral
concern are largely socially and culturally determined. As Hirschfeld (1995) has
demonstrated, preschool children see occupation to be as important as race in distinguishing
between people, but in the absence of social support abandon this idea. In addition, race
preference does not appear to be evident at birth, but instead develops as a result of learning
and exposure (Kelly et al., 2005). It is possible that young children differentiate between
specific categories in terms of moral judgments and value as a result of the moral distinctions
made within their particular cultural environment. This also suggests that insights into moral
expansiveness may be gained through cross-cultural comparisons of both children and adults.
Beyond the expanded application of our rudimentary moral instincts, some have
argued that creativity, cognitive flexibility, perspective taking, self-control, a desire for moral
consistency, and reason are largely responsible for variation in the expansion of moral
consideration and the concomitant reduction in violence across time (Bloom, 2010; Pinker,
2011; Pizarro et al., 2006; Singer, 1981). For example, Singer (1981) suggested that our
ability to reason could take us to a position of impartial morality, a vantage point from which
34
Moral Expansiveness
we are able to identify that our own interests are no more important than the interests of
others. Akin to this is the notion that applying moral standards consistently and
indiscriminately is critical to expanding one’s moral world (Singer, 1981). Whether the
emergence of moral expansiveness can be traced to the development of these capacities
would provide critical evidence for these claims.
A consideration that is central to the above questions is what factors may moderate
the extent of an individual’s moral concern. One possibility is that moral expansiveness is
evident in cases where people’s basic needs have been met, allowing them to turn their
attention and resources to more distant entities. In line with Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of
needs, it may be that moral expansiveness can be understood as fulfilling the need for self-
actualization. A further implication is that when more primary needs are not being met, our
moral worlds shrink. In line with this possibility, outgroup members are more likely to be
seen as exploitable and underserving when resources are scarce (Opotow, 1990, 2011; Tajfel,
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), and meat-eaters have been shown to lower their attributions
of moral value to a cow when they are about to consume beef (Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, &
Radke, 2012b). This suggestion is supported by the association between postmaterialism and
values, with materialists more likely to prioritize nationalistic social values (e.g., national
strength) and postmaterialists prioritizing universal values (e.g., equality) (Braithwaite,
Makkai, & Pittelkow, 1996). When our basic needs are fulfilled our moral worlds may
transform in ways that allow us to efficiently and effectively fulfill the needs of distant
others. Based on the potentially moderating impact of needs fulfilment and cultural level
materialism, moral expansiveness may be linearly associated with GDP in large cross-cultural
samples.
In our studies there was a relatively consistent order of moral priority: family, friends
and ingroup members were seen as relatively central, whereas outgroup members and non-
35
Moral Expansiveness
human targets were seen as relatively distal. This need not mean that people move along this
continuum of moral concern in a uniform manner, and some individuals may give particularly
high concern to some normatively distant entities, such as granting greater moral concern to
the environment than to outgroup members. Thus, an expansive moral world could take
multiple forms, and there may be particular patterns held by different sections of the
community (e.g., as a result of cultural differences, dogs may vary from anthropomorphized
companions to a food source). We expect nuances in moral priority may throw up additional
insights in terms of the predictive utility of the MES (e.g., human vs. nonhuman decision
making).
Finally, future research might further explore the relationship between moral
expansiveness and the dyadic approach to mind perception and morality (Gray et al., 2007).
Here we have examined the relationship between moral expansiveness and experience,
establishing a moderate association between the two constructs. However, in combination
with experience, the perceived agency of various entity groups may also contribute to their
placing within the moral world. For example, “villains” are consistently placed outside the
moral boundary: is this low moral standing a result of these targets being denied experience,
or alternatively are they perceived to be deserving of punishment for violating their moral
responsibility? Further exploring these relationships will no doubt form a compelling avenue
for future research.
Summary
The extent to which people are expansive in their moral concern is a critical issue.
Based on the findings of the current research and the questions still to be explored, moral
expansiveness can make a unique theoretical and practical contribution to the field of moral
psychology. We hope that this research will develop a new psychological understanding of
our boundaries of morality, and the consequences of moral inclusion. On a practical level, our
36
Moral Expansiveness
work provides a clearer picture of the factors that influence global humanitarian concern and
action, and greater care and protection for non-human animals and the environment. At a time
when these matters are increasingly at the forefront of the social and political landscape,
understanding moral expansiveness may be integral to addressing diverse social and moral
issues.
37
Moral Expansiveness
Note
1
Initially we also incorporated an “objects” category, including entities such as rocks. After
reviewing responses, it became clear that most participants struggled with thinking about the
moral standing of objects. As result of this, and due to the low alpha of the objects category
(α = .54), these entities were not included in the scale beyond this point. Note also that slight
adjustments were made to a small number of MES entities from Study 3 onwards; “parent”
was changed to “family member” in order to represent a non-specific member of kin, “friend”
was changed to “close friend” in order to emphasize a very close non-kin member.
2
MES instructions for Studies 1-3 can be found in Appendix A. Instructions for Studies 4-6
in Appendix B. MES instructions were streamlined from Study 4 onwards and the term
sacrifice was removed to reduce any potential overlap between the MES and criterion
measures.
3
Participants were deemed to not be engaging with the MES task where “villains” had higher
MES scores than family/and/or ingroup members.
4
Political conservatism was not included as a control variable in the regressions for Studies 2
and 3. Because political conservatism is known to be highly correlated with the “binding”
moral foundations, it was identified as a potential covariate. This allowed for a cleaner
interpretation of the predictive strength of the MES relative to moral foundations. However,
the inclusion of political conservatism does not change the conclusions drawn from Studies 2
and 3.
5
Participants were deemed to be not engaging with the self-sacrifice criterion task where
reported willingness to sacrifice themselves to save people in prison was greater than people
from their hometown. An additional case was removed prior to analysis outside of previous
exclusion criteria as this participant indicated that their responses, particularly to the key
criterion measure, were strongly influenced by their current personal circumstances (i.e.,
currently experiencing self-harming thoughts) – making their responses unreliable.
6
The identification with all humanity scale was not selected in Study 6 because the
behavioral criterion focused on non-humans.
38
Moral Expansiveness
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45
Moral Expansiveness
Table 1
Means, standard deviations and correlations between the MES and individual entity groups, Study 1
Mean/SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1. MES
44.21 (12.30)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2. Family/friends
8.90 (0.40)
.15
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3. Ingroup
6.40 (1.58)
.64***
.15
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4. Revered
5.39 (1.68)
.74***
.20*
.70***
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
5. Stigmatized
5.35 (2.00)
.71***
.13
.55***
.61***
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
6. Outgroup
4.52 (1.92)
.68***
.05
.64***
.66***
.66***
-
-
-
-
-
-
7. Animals (high
sentience)
3.85 (2.35)
.78***
.17✝
.32***
.37***
.48***
.36***
-
-
-
-
-
8. Environment
3.53 (2.39)
.67***
.08
.23*
.38***
.29**
.15
.52***
-
-
-
-
9. Animals (low
sentience)
2.64 (2.30)
.75***
.10
.22*
.33***
.34***
.26**
.81***
.54***
-
-
-
10. Plants
2.52 (2.20)
.71***
.06
.24*
.36***
.24*
.21*
.55***
.78***
.66***
-
-
11. Villains
1.10 (1.77)
.30**
-.25**
.23*
.21*
.25**
.42***
.03
-.13
.08
.02
-
***p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ✝ p<.10
46
Moral Expansiveness
Table 2
Relationships between the MES, morality measures, and four criterion judgments, Study 2
MES
Human Moral
Concern
Non-Human
Moral Concern
Kidney
Donation
(Human)
Financial
Donation
(Non-human)
MES
-
.42***
.44***
.25**
.35***
Moral Foundations
care/harm
.26**
-.01
.16✝
.09
.37***
fairness/cheating
.09
-.08
.01
-.09
.19*
ingroup/loyalty
-.31**
-.27**
-.26**
-.00
-.09
authority/subversion
-.27**
-.44***
-.34***
-.11
-.16✝
purity/degradation
-.24**
-.42***
-.16✝
-.26**
-.08
Moral identity
Internalization
.12
-.21*
.02
-.16✝
-.03
Symbolization
.08
-.04
.14
.09
.18*
Universalism Values
.36***
.14
.31**
-.05
.38***
***p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ✝ p<.10
47
Moral Expansiveness
Table 3
Hierarchical regression predicting human and non-human moral concern judgments, Study 2
Human Moral Concern
Non-Human Moral Concern
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
ΔR2
.00
.32***
.08***
.04
.21**
.08**
β 95% CI
β 95% CI
β
95% CI
β 95% CI
β 95% CI
β
95% CI
Age
-.02 [-0.21, 0.16]
-.01
[-0.17, 0.16]
-.05
[-0.20, 0.11]
-.02 [-0.20, 0.17]
.01 [-0.17, 0.19]
-.03
[-0.19, 0.14]
Gender
.01 [-0.19, 0.21]
-.01
[-0.19, 0.17]
-.02
[-0.19, 0.15]
-.19✝ [-0.01, 0.38]
.10 [-0.09, 0.28]
.08
[-0.09, 0.26]
Religiosity
-.06 [-0.26, 0.14]
.30**
[0.09, 0.50]
.24*
[0.05, 0.44]
-.16 [-0.35, 0.04]
-.08 [-0.29, 0.14]
-.13
[-0.34, 0.08]
Moral Foundations
care/harm
-
-.00
[-0.23, 0.22]
-.07
[-0.28, 0.15]
-
.14
[-0.10, 0.38]
.08
[-0.15, 0.31]
fairness/cheating
-
-.03
[-0.25, 0.19]
.02
[-0.19, 0.23]
-
-.17
[-0.40, 0.06]
-.12
[-0.34, 0.10]
ingroup/loyalty
-
.11
[-0.12, 0.34]
.19✝
[-0.03, 0.41]
-
-.07
[-0.31, 0.17]
.01
[-0.22, 0.24]
authority/subversion
-
-.43**
[-0.73, -0.13]
-.43**
[-0.71, -0.15]
-
-.36*
[-0.67, -0.05]
-.36*
[-0.66, -0.06]
purity/degradation
-
-.29*
[-0.54, -0.05]
-.22✝
[-0.46, 0.01]
-
.12
[-0.13, 0.38]
.19
[-0.06, 0.44]
Moral Identity
Internalization
-
-.23*
[-0.41, -0.05]
-.23*
[-0.40, -0.05]
-
-.05
[-0.24, 0.14]
-.04
[-0.23, 0.14]
Symbolization
-
.12
[-0.07, 0.31]
.10
[-0.08, 0.27]
-
.20*
[0.00, 0.40]
.18✝
[-0.01, 0.37]
Universalism
-
.08
[-0.12, 0.28]
-.00
[-0.20, 0.19]
-
.21✝
[0.00, 0.42]
.13
[-0.08, 0.33]
MES
-
-
.34***
[0.16, 0.51]
-
-
-
.33**
[0.14, 0.51]
***p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ✝ p<.10
48
Moral Expansiveness
Table 4
Hierarchical regression predicting kidney and financial donation judgments, Study 2
Kidney Donation (Human)
Financial Donation (Non-Human)
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
ΔR2
.01
.23***
.04*
.03
.26***
.03*
β 95% CI
β 95% CI
β
95% CI
β 95% CI
β 95% CI
β
95% CI
Age
.04 [-0.15, 0.23]
.06
[-0.12, 0.24]
.03
[-0.14, 0.21]
-.04 [-0.22, 0.15]
-.06 [-0.23, 0.12]
-.08
[-0.25, 0.09]
Gender
.06 [-0.14, 0.25]
.08
[-0.11, 0.27]
.07
[-0.12, 0.25]
.17✝ [-0.03, 0.37]
.08 [-0.11, 0.26]
.07
[-0.11, 0.25]
Religiosity
-.01 [-0.21, 0.19]
.15
[-0.07, 0.37]
.11
[-0.11, 0.33]
-.02 [-0.21, 0.18]
.03 [-0.18, 0.24]
-.00
[-0.21, 0.21]
Moral Foundations
care/harm
-
.29*
[0.05, 0.53]
.25*
[0.01, 0.49]
-
.38**
[0.14, 0.61]
.33**
[0.10, 0.57]
fairness/cheating
-
-.17
[-0.40, 0.06]
-.14
[-0.37, 0.09]
-
-.09
[-0.31, 0.13]
-.06
[-0.28, 0.16]
ingroup/loyalty
-
.15
[-0.09, 0.39]
.20✝
[-0.04, 0.44]
-
.01
[-0.23, 0.24]
.06
[-0.18, 0.29]
authority/subversion
-
-.01
[-0.32, 0.31]
-.01
[-0.32, 0.31]
-
-.13
[-0.44, 0.18]
-.13
[-0.43, 0.17]
purity/degradation
-
-.46**
[-0.72, -0.20]
-.41**
[-0.67, -0.16]
-
-.03
[-0.28, 0.22]
.02
[-0.23, 0.26]
Moral Identity
Internalization
-
-.23*
[-0.43, -0.04]
-.23*
[-0.42, -0.04]
-
-.24*
[-0.42, -0.05]
-.24*
[-0.42, -0.05]
Symbolization
-
.22*
[0.02, 0.42]
.21*
[0.01, 0.40]
-
.15
[-0.04, 0.34]
.14
[-0.05, 0.33]
Universalism Values
-
-.17
[-0.38, 0.05]
-.23*
[-0.44, -0.01]
-
.24*
[0.03, 0.44]
.18✝
[-0.03, 0.39]
MES
-
-
.23*
[0.04, 0.43]
-
-
-
.21*
[0.02, 0.40]
***p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ✝ p<.10
49
Moral Expansiveness
Table 5
Correlations among measures, Study 3
MES
Overall
SS
Home
town
African
Population
Intellectual
Disability
Prisoners
Chimps
Ants
Coral
Reefs
Redwood
Trees
MES
-
.25***
.17**
.24***
.18**
.20**
.19**
.11✝
.23***
.17**
Moral Foundations
care/harm
.28***
.17**
.18**
.17**
.14*
.15*
.15*
.01
.09
.01
fairness/cheating
.19**
.08
.10
.13*
.09
.09
.09
-.08
.00
-.09
ingroup/loyalty
-.10✝
-.04
.06
-.04
.00
-.06
-.05
-.06
-.08
-.13*
authority/subversion
-.22***
-.11✝
.00
-.11✝
-.04
-.09
-.12*
-.11✝
-.14*
-.17**
purity/degradation
-.13*
-.09
.01
-.07
-.05
-.06
-.14*
-.06
-.13*
-.14*
Moral Identity
Internalization
.26***
.21***
.24***
.28***
.26***
.13*
.12*
-.08
.02
-.02
Symbolization
.06
.11✝
.18**
. 12*
.13*
.01
.04
.06
.04
.01
Universalism Values
.38***
.16**
.08
.14*
.06
.10
.24***
.08
.21***
.13*
Empathic Concern
.24***
.28***
.29***
.33***
.29***
.25***
.17**
-.02
.05
.01
Perspective Taking
.22***
.20**
.22***
.25***
.19**
.17**
.08
-.03
.07
.05
50
Moral Expansiveness
Identification with
all Humanity
.39***
.28***
.25***
.32***
.25***
.29***
.16**
.07
.09
.08
Connectedness to
Nature
.39***
.06
-.04
-.01
-.02
-.04
.17**
.10✝
.20**
.13*
***p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ✝ p<.10
51
Moral Expansiveness
Table 6
Hierarchical regression predicting overall willingness to self-sacrifice, Study 3
Overall Willingness to Self-sacrifice
Step 1
ΔR2 β 95% CI
Step 2
ΔR2 β 95% CI
Step 3
ΔR2 β 95% CI
Step 4
ΔR2 β 95% CI
.02
.07**
.06***
.02*
Age
-.06
[-0.18, 0.06]
-.05
[-0.17, 0.08]
-.02
[-0.14, 0.11]
-.02
[-0.14, 0.10]
Gender
.05
[-0.07, 0.17]
-.02
[-0.14, 0.10]
-.03
[-0.15, 0.09]
-.03
[-0.15, 0.08]
Religiosity
-.05
[-0.21, 0.11]
-.05
[-0.21, 0.12]
-.10
[-0.26, 0.06]
-.10
[-0.26, 0.06]
Afterlife
.06
[-0.10, 0.22]
.07
[-0.09, 0.23]
.07
[-0.08, 0.23]
.07
[-0.08, 0.23]
Social Desirability
.10
[-0.02, 0.22]
.05
[-0.07, 0.17]
.04
[-0.09, 0.16]
.04
[-0.09, 0.17]
Moral Foundations
care/harm
-
-
.12
[-0.04, 0.28]
.08
[-0.08, 0.24]
.06
[-0.10, 0.22]
fairness/cheating
-
-
-.07
[-0.24, 0.09]
-.12
[-0.28, 0.04]
-.10
[-0.26, 0.05]
ingroup/loyalty
-
-
.04
[-0.13, 0.20]
-.01
[-0.18, 0.16]
-.02
[-0.18, 0.15]
authority/subversion
-
-
-.10
[-0.29, 0.09]
-.14
[-0.33, 0.05]
-.10
[-0.29, 0.09]
purity/degradation
-
-
-.11
[-0.27, 0.06]
-.03
[-0.20, 0.13]
-.04
[-0.20, 0.13]
Moral Identity
Internalization
-
-
.15*
[0.02, 0.28]
.09
[-0.05, 0.22]
.06
[-0.08, 0.20]
Symbolization
-
-
.09
[-0.04, 0.22]
.08
[-0.05, 0.21]
.09
[-0.04, 0.22]
Universalism Values
-
-
.06
[-0.09, 0.21]
.05
[-0.13, 0.23]
.03
[-0.15,0.20]
Empathic Concern
-
-
- -
.15✝
[-0.03, 0.34]
.18✝
[-0.01, 0.36]
Perspective Taking
-
-
- -
-.01
[-0.16, 0.14]
-.01
[-0.16, 0.14]
Identification with
all Humanity
-
-
- -
.21**
[0.06, 0.35]
.16*
[0.01, 0.31]
Connectedness to
Nature
-
-
- -
-.15*
[-0.30, -0.00]
-.18*
[-0.33, -0.03]
MES
-
-
- -
-
-
.16*
[0.03, 0.29]
***p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 ✝ p<.10
52
Moral Expansiveness
Table 7
Hierarchical regression predicting overall willingness to self-sacrifice, Study 4
Overall Willingness to Self-sacrifice
Step 1
ΔR2 β 95% CI
Step 2
ΔR2 β 95% CI
Step 3
ΔR2 β 95% CI
.07
.01
.05*
Age
.07
[-0.16, 0.29]
.06
[-0.17, 0.28]
.06
[-0.16, 0.28]
Gender
-.05
[-0.26, 0.17]
-.05
[-0.27, 0.16]
-.05
[-0.26, 0.16]
Religiosity
.18
[-0.14, 0.49]
.18
[-0.14, 0.50]
.19
[-0.12, 0.50]
Afterlife
-.28✝
[-0.59, 0.02]
-.28✝
[-0.59, 0.02]
-.27✝
[-0.57, 0.03]
Social Desirability
.14
[-0.08, 0.36]
.14
[-0.08, 0.36]
.08
[-0.14, 0.31]
Experience
-
-
.07
[-0.15, 0.28]
-.01
[-0.23, 0.21]
MES
-
-
- -
.24*
[0.02, 0.47]
* p<.05 ✝ p<.10
53
Moral Expansiveness
Table 8
Hierarchical regression predicting overall willingness to self-sacrifice, Study 5
Overall Willingness to Self-sacrifice
Step 1
ΔR2 β 95% CI
Step 2
ΔR2 β 95% CI
Step 3
ΔR2 β 95% CI
.07
.04
.05*
Age
-.27*
[-0.49, -0.05]
-.30**
[-0.52, -0.08]
-.32**
[-0.53, -0.10]
Gender
-.03
[-0.27, 0.21]
-.05
[-0.28, 0.18]
-.10
[-0.33, 0.14]
Religiosity
.18
[-0.16, 0.52]
.16
[-0.17, 0.49]
.19
[-0.15, 0.51]
Afterlife
-.10
[-0.45, 0.26]
-.13
[-0.47, 0.22]
-.12
[-0.46, 0.22]
Social Desirability
.03
[-0.19, 0.24]
.04
[-0.27, 0.19]
-.02
[-0.25, 0.20]
Warmth
-
-
.15
[-0.06, 0.36]
.07
[-0.15, 0.29]
Social Responsibility
-
-
.22✝
[-0.02, 0.45]
.18
[-0.05, 0.41]
MES
-
-
- -
.23*
[0.003, 0.45]
** p<.01 * p<.05 ✝ p<.10
54
Moral Expansiveness
Table 9
Hierarchical logistic regression predicting joining the letter writing campaign, Study 6
Joining the NhRP Letter Writing Campaign
Step 1
ΔR2 Exp(B) 95% CI
Step 2
ΔR2 Exp(B) 95% CI
Step 3
ΔR2 Exp(B) 95% CI
.00
.20*
.07*
Age
.99
[0.84, 1.15]
1.01
[0.85, 1.20]
1.00
[0.84, 1.20]
Gender
.81
[0.23, 2.82]
1.07
[0.26, 4.43]
1.24
[0.30, 5.17]
Religiosity
.94
[0.66, 1.33]
.87
[0.59, 1.26]
.85
[0.57, 1.27]
Moral Foundations - Harm
-
-
2.22
[0.80, 6.15]
2.35
[0.82, 6.73]
Moral Identity - Internalization
-
-
1.69
[0.41, 6.91]
1.62
[0.38, 6.94]
Universalism Values
3.98✝
[0.83, 19.17]
3.55
[0.67, 18.98]
Empathic Concern
1.93
[0.54, 6.98]
1.55
[0.42, 5.71]
Connectedness to Nature
.34
[0.08, 1.48]
.27
[0.06, 1.27]
MES
-
-
- -
1.06*
[1.00, 1.11]
* p<.05 ✝ p<.10
55
Moral Expansiveness
Figure 1. Normative pattern of entities on the MES, with more central positions indicating greater moral concern
Appendix A
The Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES) – Studies 1 - 3
The Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES) – Studies 4 – 6
57
Moral Expansiveness
Appendix B
MES Entity List (U.S.)
Family/Friends
Family member
Close friend
Partner/spouse
Ingroup
American citizen
Somebody from your neighborhood
Co-worker
Outgroup
Foreign citizen
Member of opposing political party
Somebody with different religious
beliefs
Revered
U.S. President (position not
specific individual)
U.S. Soldier
Charity worker
Stigmatized
Homosexual
Mentally challenged individual
Refugee
Villains
Murderer
Terrorist
Child molester
Animals high-sentient
Chimpanzee
Dolphin
Cow
Animals low-sentient
Chicken
Fish
Bee
Plants Redwood tree
Apple tree
Rose bush
Environment
Coral reef
Old-growth forest
Grand Canyon National Park
MES Entity List (Australian)
Family/Friends
Family member
Close friend
Partner/spouse
Ingroup
Australian citizen
Somebody from your neighborhood
Co-worker
Outgroup
Foreign citizen
Member of opposing political party
Somebody with different religious
beliefs
Revered
Prime Minister of Australia
(position not specific individual)
Australian Soldier
Charity worker
Stigmatized
Homosexual
Mentally challenged individual
Refugee
Villains
Murderer
Terrorist
Child molester
Animals high-sentient
Chimpanzee
Dolphin
Cow
Animals low-sentient
Chicken
Fish
Bee
Plants Redwood tree
Apple tree
Rose bush
Environment
Coral reef
Old-growth forest
Uluru (Ayers Rock)
58
Moral Expansiveness
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