We must now attempt to assess the force of various objections that have been raised against the principal classical formulations of the Positivist criterion of factual significance. In part, no doubt, because of errors involved in its early formulation, many philosophers have recently shown a tendency, almost a predisposition, to reject all formulations of a criterion of factual significance ... [Show full abstract] fashioned along lines of testability, and perhaps all general formulations of a criterion of factual significance whatsoever. The dominant empirical temper of the age notwithstanding, there has never been less professional sympathy with the attempt, characteristic of the Positivists, to fashion a viable formulation of the quite possibly widely held intuition that meaningfulness and testability are two sides of the same coin. If all such formulations are deficient or, more gravely, misguided from the start, then the principal weapon of the Positivist attack upon metaphysics is disarmed. It is crucial, then, to examine those serious attempts to remove the stinger from the bee, or rather, to discover whether it had one in the first place.