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Knowl. Org. 39(2012)No.5
M. J. Fox, A. Reece. Which Ethics? Whose Morality?: An Analysis of Ethical Standards for Information Organization
377
Which Ethics? Whose Morality?:
An Analysis of Ethical Standards
for Information Organization
Melodie J. Fox* and Austin Reece**
*School of Information Studies, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
PO Box 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA <msjoblad@uwm.edu>
**Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, PO Box 1881,
Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA <austin.reece@marquette.edu>
Melodie J. Fox is a doctoral candidate at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee’s School of Informa-
tion Studies, where she also earned an MLIS, and is a member of the Information Organization Re-
search Group. She also holds a Master’s in English from the University of Illinois-Chicago. Her re-
search interests include the relationship between epistemology and subject access, with a particular in-
terest in the categorization of race and gender.
Austin Reece is currently a Ph.D. candidate in philosophy at Marquette University. He holds a Master's
in contemporary European philosophy from University College Dublin and a Bachelor's in philosophy
from Boston College. His research interests include philosophy of religion and ethics.
Fox, Melodie J. and Reece, Austin. Which Ethics? Whose Morality?: An Analysis of Ethical Stan-
dards for Information Organization. Knowledge Organization. 39(5), 377-383. 31 references.
ABSTRACT: Ethical standards are required at both the individual and system levels of the information
organization enterprise, but are those standards the same? For example, are the ethical responsibilities
of DDC’s editorial board fundamentally the same as for an individual cataloger? And, what are the con-
sequences of decisions made using different ethical frameworks to the users of knowledge organization
systems? A selection of ethical theories suitable for evaluating moral dilemmas at all levels in informa-
tion organization is presented, including utilitarianism, deontology, and pragmatism, as well as the more
contemporary approaches of justice, feminist, and Derridean ethics. Finally, a selection of criteria is out-
lined, taken from the existing ethical frameworks, to use as a starting point for development of an ethical framework specifically
for information organization.
Received 16 July 2012; Accepted 16 July 2012
1.0 Ethics and information organization (IO)
The creators of tools such as OPAC interfaces, classi-
fication systems, and thesauri that provide access to
information, and those who apply those tools, such as
catalogers and indexers, are all subject to ethical deci-
sion-making and consequently to ethical lapses, both
intentional and unintentional. These lapses can result
in harm to users, either through the inability to access
information or through conceptual violence. Concep-
tual violence consists of harm through linguistic or
structural misrepresentation and can occur, for exam-
ple, when topics in a knowledge organization system
(KOS) are assigned derogatory language or subordi-
nate structure. Numerous critiques of KOS’s exist,
but often do not explicitly mention ethics (such as
those summarized in Olson and Schlegl 2001). Other
works explicitly focusing on ethics cover professional
Knowl. Org. 39(2012)No.5
M. J. Fox, A. Reece. Which Ethics? Whose Morality?: An Analysis of Ethical Standards for Information Organization
378
codes of ethics and ethical decision-making pertain-
ing to access (Beghtol 2002, 2005; Jacobs 2007; Ferris
2008; Skekel 2008). Yet, most research on ethics in
IO tends to rely on a premise of “ethicalness” not ad-
hering to a particular philosophical framework, but
rather a sense of right and wrong not rigorously de-
fined. Beghtol (2005, 903), for example, admits that
her steps in ethical decision-making “do not depend
on the foundational assumptions of a particular
school of ethical analysis or a particular ethical the-
ory.” Bair (2005), one of the few who does refer to
ethical theories, suggests a code of ethics but focuses
on catalogers only. In order to make ethical judg-
ments, what is meant by “ethical” must be sufficiently
defined, with the required criteria delineated to dis-
tinguish between better and worse practices within
the field at all levels of the IO enterprise. If a reason-
able set of ethical standards can be sketched out, then
the only moral task remaining will be mainly interpre-
tive, that is, applying the standards to the work to be
done by systems-level vendors and classificationists
as well as practitioners in the field.
2.0 Epistemological assumptions
The ultimate goal for IO is access, through means
that do not oppress. Consequently, decisions in IO
need to be examined through the application of eth-
ics, or guidelines used to make reasoned judgments
about questions of morality. Because of a changing
epistemological landscape, classical and universalist
epistemologies have suffered a critical beating. The
evolution to postmodern thought holds profound
consequences for classification, since the idea that no
underlying truth exists undermines the bedrock of in-
formation organization (Miksa 1998). Likewise, the
underlying epistemological assumption for this paper
is skepticism of universal knowledge. A more detailed
examination of the connection between epistemology
and ethics offers an opportunity for further research,
but is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.0 Collective, system and individual
In IO, the collective includes the entire enterprise,
from catalogers, indexers, and other individual inter-
mediaries, to the system level that includes classifica-
tionists, vendors, and bibliographic utilities. Systems-
level entities create and maintain structures to facili-
tate access and protect users from conceptual vio-
lence. A system such as OCLC or Library of Con-
gress can be considered a “corporate person,” which
in turn has moral rights and responsibilities (Ger-
encser 2005). They provide tools and resources, but
hold the greatest amount of agency because of size
and power. A corporate person is ultimately a group
of people who control a special medium of expres-
sion, i.e., certain individuals have a special, state-
created, stakeholder-funded mechanism for speaking
more loudly than others, such as through classifica-
tion systems. And, “more loudly” does not necessar-
ily equate to “more truthfully” or “more ethically.”
Individual intermediaries, such as catalogers and
indexers, also work to maximize access and minimize
harm. Since intermediaries simply apply preexisting
standards, ethics are applied through cataloger’s
judgment and feedback methods such as requesting
changes to classification systems. Ethical failures can
also occur through errors (Bade 2002), personal
agendas that lead to purposeful miscataloging, or na-
ïve trust in the system. Systems and individual cata-
logers generally have the same interests, but the im-
balanced distribution of power and agency can lead to
excesses and abuses of power at the expense of the
weaker. Because of this imbalance, a singular ethical
framework does not always hold the same conse-
quences for user, cataloger, and system, and, at times,
frameworks may conflict. This danger highlights the
need for a sustained reflection on the appropriate
ethical standards that protect all persons: both the in-
dividuals acting within the domain of corporate
power and the corporate persons themselves.
4.0 Existing ethical frameworks
Examining traditional ethical frameworks can provide
insight into these issues, but none are wholly suffi-
cient. All ethical frameworks prescribe actions as we
would like them to be practiced, but which often
prove different than what occurs in reality. In this
context, they offer methods to discern what actions
ought to be done, as distinguished from studies that
are primarily descriptive or examine real actions. Each
framework below is presented in a necessarily reduc-
tive way, but addresses aspects relevant to IO. Exam-
ples are merely illustrative; many other situations ap-
ply. Though the chosen frameworks are, for the most
part, traditional, western-centric ethics, in the interest
of space and fairness of coverage, discussion of non-
western frameworks such as Buddhist and African
ethics have been saved for future research.
Knowl. Org. 39(2012)No.5
M. J. Fox, A. Reece. Which Ethics? Whose Morality?: An Analysis of Ethical Standards for Information Organization
379
4.1 The utilitarian model
For the utilitarian, only consequences matter in de-
termining the moral worth of an action. The principle
of utility makes up the sole criterion, which states
that an action is right only insofar as it produces the
greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount
of people (Mill 2001). Each individual’s happiness is
of equal worth: the same standards apply for collec-
tives as for individuals, but actions should not be mo-
tivated by power or profit, only greater good for the
collective. Goodness is usually understood as pleasure
and the absence of pain with the belief that some
pleasures are qualitatively superior to others.
J.S. Mill (2001) believed an experienced person,
i.e., someone acquainted with both higher and lower
pleasures, will recognize and prefer higher ones as
more desirable. Thus, the judgment of the reflective
person of experience becomes another criterion for
demarcating right and wrong actions. In IO, good-
ness could be equated with the provision of access,
which requires a master’s degreed professional—an
experienced person—to make decisions for the
masses. Both systems and individual catalogers can
serve as the experienced person, albeit in different ca-
pacities and with differing amounts of agency.
Despite the obvious value of an ethical model that
promotes the welfare of all people, a serious limita-
tion of utilitarianism is the justification of immoral
means to maximize happiness. If an action serves the
greater good and requires lying or killing, the action
retains moral worth and could even be seen as manda-
tory in certain contexts. In the cases of say, DDC’s
200 “Religion” class that focuses mainly on Christi-
anity, or any of the XX9 “other” categories, if it could
be shown that the highest amount of users benefit
from those arrangements, they therefore support the
principle of utility, which consequently should be
permitted and even praised. The unquestioned acts of
the “experienced person” perhaps are most evident in
the dearth of user studies in IO (Hoffman 2009).
Despite the limitations, utilitarianism appears to be
the ethical framework in action in IO, with standardi-
zation as the principal manifestation. The system cre-
ates KOS’s that provide the greatest good for the
dominant culture, and the cataloger can user cata-
loger’s judgment or local policies to adapt that stan-
dard for its local audience. The question arises if, in
the case of IO, the current system actually works for
all users or if minority views and terminology become
collateral damage to the greater good.
4.2 Deontology: the Kantian model
Kant’s theory of ethics is deontological, meaning cri-
terion for identifying right actions lies in something
other than the consequences of the act itself. For
Kant, an action is ethical if done from duty, which
means following the categorical imperative (CI). The
first version of the CI amounts to only acting on
those personal rules that can be universalized for eve-
ryone. This provides a procedure for determining
what actions are universally applicable and rationally
consistent (Kant 1998). For example, a cataloguer
might decide, that when he encounters a resource he
finds personally offensive, he will deliberately mis-
classify it. What Kant’s model requires of the cata-
loguer is an imaginative act where the subjective rule
is envisioned as a moral law for everyone, which
would mean rephrasing it to say, “all people should
hide books from others when they find them person-
ally offensive.” If one can envision this without con-
tradiction, then the act is permissible. Kant’s point is
that to want something (that one’s views not be chal-
lenged) and its opposite (that one’s views be chal-
lenged) at the same time is contradictory and irra-
tional, and thus intrinsically bad.
Limitations to Kant’s model include the insistence
on exceptionless rules and reliance on individuals to
choose what is best, given people’s limited imagina-
tions, the complexity of any given situation, and the
difficulty of resolving conflicts of duty. The most
ominous limitation in a service-oriented field is that if
bad things happen as a result of your dutiful actions,
you are blameless. This suggests that at the system or
individual level, to try is enough. As long as the effort
was put forth by convening committees of experts
and making some attempt, there would be no need to
test the efforts through user studies or be concerned
if the ultimate goal of access remains unattained.
4.3 The Rawlsian model: justice ethics
For John Rawls, the central question of ethics is de-
ciding what is just. More concretely, he is concerned
with how goods, such as access to information, ought
to be distributed in society. Like Kant, his axiomatic
starting point is that people are rational, autonomous
and free, which means they are dignified beings wor-
thy of respect and equal treatment. His method for
generating principles that will preserve the dignity of
persons and minimize injustice is expressed through a
hypothetical social contract called the “original posi-
tion” (2005). To insure impartiality and fairness to all
Knowl. Org. 39(2012)No.5
M. J. Fox, A. Reece. Which Ethics? Whose Morality?: An Analysis of Ethical Standards for Information Organization
380
members of the social contract, the original position
is imagined under a “veil of ignorance” where certain
limits are placed on the subjects’ self-knowledge, e.g.,
race, gender, economic class, and natural abilities.
Ideally, this veil of ignorance will act as a safeguard
against the arbitrary manipulation of social structures
by one group over and against another. The attempt
to remove prejudice ostensibly places the disadvan-
taged on a level plane. However, this approach can ig-
nore past injustices to marginalized groups.
Given the limits of the original position and the
human desire to further self-interest, this fictional
thought experiment asks members to adopt two prin-
ciples of justice, namely, the principle of equal liberty
and the principle of difference. The principle of equal
liberty seeks to maximize the level of individual lib-
erty that is roughly equal to the liberty of all others.
The principle of difference seeks to establish an ap-
propriate distribution of wealth where some inequali-
ties are tolerated only if they benefit the worst off in
society. Rawlsian justice also assumes decisions will
be made in a “reasonable” unself-interested way and
can bear the “burden of judgment,” which means it
would be able to be justified (Rawls 1996). Another
stipulation is that if an end is willed, so must be the
means to achieve it, so if a change or rule is man-
dated, it necessarily must be accompanied by re-
sources and tools for implementation.
The American Library Association (ALA’s) (2008)
Code of Ethics and Core Values of Librarianship exem-
plify Rawls’s conception of justice. The first principle
of the Code of Ethics requires “equitable service poli-
cies; equitable access; and accurate, unbiased, and
courteous responses to all requests.” The emphasis on
“equitable” indicates distributive justice, and “unbi-
ased” assumes a type of original position. The Core
Val ue s (2004) defines equity of access to mean “that all
people have the information they need-regardless of
age, education, ethnicity, language, income, physical
limitations or geographic barriers…It also means they
are free to exercise their right to know without fear of
censorship or reprisal,” again, a veil of ignorance.
Abiding by Rawlsian justice means that, similarly
to Kantian deontology, a normative sense of neutral-
ity would govern the domain through standards.
Ethical dilemmas are not viewed in context, but
rather only in light of the norms of the domain.
Therefore, no need exists to consider each individ-
ual’s situation: normativity would determine under
what rules the decision would abide, and any differen-
tiating details would be erased from the decision-
making process. The systems and rules remain, and
users must adapt to them, rather than the other way
around. The catalogers’ need to make decisions is re-
moved as they would be directed to follow standards,
which have been determined as the universal for the
domain. When exercising cataloger’s judgment, the
veil of ignorance removes contextual disadvantage.
Therefore, if bias is desired, such as through localized
records, it cannot be done.
4.4 Feminist ethics: ethic of care
The ethic of care framework arose as a feminist re-
sponse by Carol Gilligan (1982) to Lawrence Kohl-
berg’s interpretation of justice ethics, which she
found to be based on sexist studies that favored strict
rationality. Despite its feminist origins, it has since
been interpreted as gender-neutral (Tronto 1987).
“Care” does not imply affection or loving emotion,
but rather is a strategy that values collaboration, rela-
tionships, and context in ethical decision-making.
Rather than decontextualizing moral dilemmas, a care
framework views dilemmas in their specific contexts
and accommodates exceptions. Unlike the infallible
rules of a justice ethic, rules are bendable, and the de-
cision maker must consider the needs of each indi-
vidual and work collaboratively to find the best solu-
tion to preserve the relationship between institution,
service-provider, and user.
The reference interview demonstrates use of the
ethic of care in a library setting, but can it be recre-
ated in an environment governed by authority con-
trol? Standardization at a system level would be diffi-
cult if using the ethic of care, since it tends to be rela-
tivistic; however, it aligns with the current paradigm
in IO research in that it seeks creative ways to ac-
commodate context for users while still maintaining
bibliographic control. For an individual cataloger, it
would be time consuming if not impossible to con-
sider or know all factors of each individual user who
might possibly search for the resource; however, with
some reasonable limitations, the results would be lo-
calized records or other innovations that could seek
out contextual information at the local level.
4.5 Derridean ethics
For Derrida, “the Other” is a singular existent having
an inalienable mode of being that can never be re-
peated (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000; Derrida
2004). Derrida envisions a “right to difference” that
would allow the other to remain other and not be re-
duced to the “same” by any totalizing system. Thus,
Knowl. Org. 39(2012)No.5
M. J. Fox, A. Reece. Which Ethics? Whose Morality?: An Analysis of Ethical Standards for Information Organization
381
an ethical subject must be committed to an ideal of
unconditional hospitality for all others, which can
never be fully realized. Every “Other” is welcome
across the threshold into the system or category. But
this involves a perpetual risk, as everyone is a poten-
tial threat or menace, as hospitality can lead to hostil-
ity, so, in reality, limits are always set on who is wel-
come. Every time a constraint is put in place, a door
closes for someone; the goal of Derridean ethics is to
keep borders porous.
KOS’s governed by a Derridean ethical framework
would be hospitable to the extreme, where any and all
viewpoints or terminology would be welcome. What
Derrida would call “violence” would occur at the
border of categories—if borders exist—resulting in
little to no categorical stability. Therefore, the system
would not be much more than a loose structure that
houses unregulated subject and descriptive terms,
much like a social tagging environment. Similarly to
tagging, intermediaries such as catalogers would be
seen as door-closing constraints, rendering them un-
necessary. For the user, however, Derridean ethics of-
fer the greatest amount of agency. Users are exposed
to a wider selection of terminology and viewpoints,
sometimes conflicting and sometimes distasteful, but
the trust falls to the user to judge what fulfills the in-
formation need.
4.6 Pragmatic ethics of John Dewey
For the pragmatist, efficacy of action is the sole crite-
rion for determining rightness. Like the hard sciences,
pragmatism stresses the need for observable results,
predictive success, and revising current practices in
light of new experiential evidence. “Concrete reason-
ableness,” the ideal for rightness, is that which makes
the world more intelligible, controllable, and orderly
(Serra 2009). Serious deliberation is required of a moral
agent to test which actions are more likely to conform
to this ideal. The agent must imagine various acts and
their consequences, being careful to think through all
the logical possibilities that pertain to the context of
the act. This testing should be done with the help of
the “community,” however defined. A special concern
also exists for inculcating habits that make living the
moral life sustainable, e.g., critical thinking, empathetic
imagination, and experimentation. For Dewey, educa-
tion was revered as a primary tool for the development
of moral habits (Dewey 1983).
Naturally, pragmatic ethics resemble pragmatic
epistemology as imagined by Hjørland and Hartel
(2003) in domain analysis. Pragmatists also believe
that no one comprehensive view of reality or set of
theories and laws exists and that no philosophical in-
quiry can be separated from day-to-day life. Because
of the lack of universal reality, meaning is unstable and
created socially. Pragmatism requires that concepts are
developed in relation to a particular need or task.
Concepts would be defined by domain’s “commu-
nity” and would ethically require continual revision
and empirical validation through user studies to en-
sure utmost accuracy. The cataloger’s decisions are
solitary acts, but must be socially verified to ensure
they are consistent with the ideal of concrete reason-
ableness. When using cataloger’s judgment, they must
play out the possible consequences to the user before
acting, similarly to how Christensen (2011) recom-
mends a classificatory position for the term “intersex.”
The decision would then be followed up by a user
study. Ultimately, for the user, system and intermedi-
ary, actions result in better efficacy of KOS’s.
5.0 Our model
In an attempt to glean the best features from major
ethical theories while circumnavigating some of the
obvious weaknesses in any one of them taken indi-
vidually, we have outlined a selection of criteria to use
as a starting point for development of an ethical
framework specifically for information organization,
applicable to both individual and corporate persons:
– A duty to care: Miller (2005) uses Kant’s Principle
of Beneficence combined with the ethic of care to
illustrate how a binding sense of duty exists to help
others in need. She writes that all humans have po-
tential for vulnerability and interdependency, so
care can be an integral part of the categorical im-
perative. A duty to care would involve imaginative,
empathetic application of standards through cata-
loger’s judgment and an obligation to cater to con-
text to preserve agency.
– Hospitable, with mitigation: Derridean hospital-
ity in itself would render the system unusable, so
with some vigilance for harm, hospitality could be
combined with a more restrictive system. For ex-
ample, tags could be used in tandem with con-
trolled vocabularies (Kipp and Campbell, 2010).
Also, an ideal of unconditional hospitality would
be a perpetual counterbalance to practices relying
on invasive surveillance and (bibliographic) control
as outlined in Foucault’s work (1994, 1995).
– Consequence-driven, emphasizing improvement
of practice: In a practical setting like IO, results
Knowl. Org. 39(2012)No.5
M. J. Fox, A. Reece. Which Ethics? Whose Morality?: An Analysis of Ethical Standards for Information Organization
382
matter, and a functioning system that promotes
user satisfaction is a priority. Thus, consequences
of justice, care, hospitality, practical efficacy, and so
forth must be regularly monitored and maintained
through iterative feedback and testing mecha-
nisms.
– Treats people as ends with basic rights and re-
sponsibilities: Regardless of whether a theoretical
foundation for rights can ever be established, the
practical necessity to take rights seriously stems
from the historical realities of discrimination and
genocide and forms of conceptual violence that
support such atrocities.
– Prescribes no action we are certain is wrong: This
prevents overt offenses such as the use of termi-
nology like “idiots asylums” for homes for the
mentally ill, as in historical versions of Library of
Congress Subject Headings. It also prevents the de-
liberate misapplying of standards to inhibit access.
6.0 Conclusion
Budd (2006, 257) reminds us, “If there are conflicts
and contests among … forces, we as professionals
have to address them;” thus, an ethical model for IO
must address conflicts of duty, such as those between
systems and individuals. No diffusion of responsibil-
ity should occur, but rather all persons acting in the
collective must be committed to a shared, living con-
ception of goodness, which, in the case of IO, is ac-
cess without harm. Researchers both as theorists and
practitioners have recognized the moral tasks at hand
and work toward solutions. However, because of the
inability to directly affect outcomes, researchers can
work in a Kantian framework where the work is done
out of internal morality but may be inconsequential.
But nonetheless, all of the collective must work to at-
tain the end of benevolent user access, which should
be the shared axiomatic starting point of any ethical
model of IO.
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