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Rocznik
Instytutu Europy
Środkowo-Wschodniej
Rok 13 (2015)
Zeszyt 5
Yearbook
of the Institute of East-Central Europe
Volume 13 (2014)
Issue 5
Rada Naukowa
„Rocznika Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej”
Natalia Yakovenko (Kijów), Adolf Juzwenko (Wrocław), Jūratė Kiaupienė (Wilno),
Rūstis Kamuntavičius (Litwa), Andreas Lawaty (Lüneburg), Alexei Miller (Moskwa),
Antony Polonsky (Boston), Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Warszawa),
Henryk Samsonowicz (Warszawa), Aleksander Smolar (Warszawa),
Oleksiy Tolochko (Kijów), Piotr S. Wandycz (New Haven), Jerzy Wyrozumski (Kraków)
Komitet Redakcyjny
„Rocznika Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej”
Mirosław Filipowicz (przewodniczący), Paweł Jarosz (sekretarz redakcji),
Anna Paprocka (sekretarz wydawnictwa), Andrzej Gil, Jerzy Kłoczowski, Hubert Łaszkiewicz,
Marek Radziwon, Tomasz Stępniewski, Agata Stolarz, Anna Visvizi
EDITED BY
Jan Muś
Lublin 2015
Rocznik
Instytutu Europy
Środkowo-Wschodniej
Rok 13 (2015)
Zeszyt 5
Russia in the Balkans.
Threat or Opportunity?
Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe
Volume 13 (2015), Issue 5
TheYearbook
oftheInstitute ofEast-Central Europe
isapeer-reviewed journal
Bartek Czuwara
Amadeusz Targoński
www.targonski.pl
Cover photo
© photosmatic | Shutterstock.com
This publication appears thanks tothesupport
oftheMinistry ofForeign Aairs ofPoland
Theopinions expressed inthebook are theauthors’ own
and do not necessarily represent theview
oftheMinistry ofForeign Aairs ofPoland
© Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, Lublin
All rights reserved
ISSN -
Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej
ul. Niecała , - Lublin
www.iesw.lublin.pl
Editorial Assistant
Paweł Jarosz, tel. (+)
e-mail: pj@iesw.lublin.pl
Publishing Assistant
Anna Paprocka, tel. (+)
e-mail: ap@iesw.lublin.pl
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ul. Tokarska , - Lublin, Polska
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Language editors and proofreading
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Table of contents
ARTICLES
Krassen Stanchev
Russia's State-Owned Companies and Contemporary Bulgarian Political
and Economic Landscape 9
Vassilios Grammatikas
A Different Perspective?
Russian Interpretation of the International Law in the Post-Cold War Era 35
Tomasz Stępniewski
Russia in Global Politics in the Context of the Western Balkans 47
Abit Hoxha, Arbër Ahmeti, and Agim Musliu
Russian Influence in the Western Balkans. Carrot or Stick? 61
Orlanda Obad
Mental Maps on the Negotiating Table.
Symbolic Geographies in Croatian Accession to the European Union 87
Jan Muś
Peripheral Position of the Balkans and its Future Relations with Russia 107
Anatoly Adamishin
The Yugoslav Prelude.
A Prototype for Modern Approaches to “Peacemaking” 123
DOCUMENTS
Načertanije (the Draft): The Programme of Serbian Foreign and National
Policy at the End of 1844 141
About the Authors 159
Articles
Krassen Stanchev
Russia's State-Owned Companies
and Contemporary Bulgarian Political
and Economic Landscape
Introduction
Asconventional explanation ofRussian Federation goes, state-owned
companies like Gazprom serve ashandy instrument ofgovernment
geopolitical games.
See: E. Lucas, Pipeline Politics: Treat and Reality, chapter inhis TheNew Cold War: Putin’ s Treat
toRussian and theWest, Palgrave McMillan, New York (revised edition); the rst edition
ofthebook appeared inPolish in, and istranslated into all Central and East European lan-
guages. See also: R. Orttung, J. Perović, H. Pleines, H.-H. Schröder, Russia’s Energy Sector between
Abstract: The paper represents and attempt to link energy projects of gov-
ernment companies of the Russian Federation with nowadays Bulgaria’s po-
litical and economic environment. It focuses on the last ten years and gives
deeper historical background (e.g. Bulgaria defaults on its foreign debt to So-
viet banks, nuclear projects of the Communist era, etc.) only when relevant for
the understanding of the contemporary situation. The rst section of the pa-
per summarizes a 2002-2015 energy project in its controversial policy environ-
ment. The second section explains the impacts on Bulgarian power sector
policies, especially delays in its liberalisation, controversies around EU policies
related to renewable energy and environment policies, plus public and po-
litical attitudes towards FDI’s and energy resources. The power sector policies
have had negative side-eects on the country’s banking sector, a bank run
and a bankruptcy of one bank in 2014; this experience is reviewed in the third
section of the paper. The forth part describes the impacts on Bulgaria’s po-
litical establishment in 2007-2014, and attempts, instead of conclusion, a de-
scription of peculiarities of the contemporary Russia-Bulgaria controversies.
The paper uses several documents and sources that are almost unknown
to the international audience.
Keywords: Russia and Bulgaria, Russian state-owned companies, Russian in-
uence and the EU
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Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Krassen Stanchev
Since , Bulgaria has stopped three projects: one oil, one pipe-
line, and a nuclear power station. Originally, all of them were praised
as major pro-economic growth projects and/or game-changers of Bul-
garia’s power sector; then, they underwent an expert and public scru-
tiny, motivating resentment, criticism and eventual decision to stop
and search for ways to tackle negative consequences.
Constructing a causal link between such projects and domestic
and/or political constellations is a daunting task but Bulgaria may
facilitate such an analysis as an interesting laboratory. is concen-
tration of government business, domestic and international politics
in a period of about seven years packaged in Russian energy projects
attracted media and diplomatic circles attention but was rarely re-
flected and analyzed in academic fashion.
e next section of this article summarizes the nature and the his-
tory of these projects, with a reference to economic policy controver-
sies they raised at the time. e last three parts of the article deal with
economic, banking and political impacts of the package.
. Russian Energy Related Projects in Bulgaria
e purpose of this paragraph is to outline the technical and
economic nature of the projects. ey differ in many respects, but
especially in the area of economic justification all of them have one
common feature: they were poorly designed and had far reaching neg-
ative consequences. What is also characteristic to all of them is that
they keep reoccurring in one form of another, even after activities and
contracts were officially and formally terminated.
. Oil Pipeline
e first project to be stopped, on December was the oil pipeline
between the Black Sea port of Burgas and the Greek port of Alexan-
Politics and Business, Forschungsstelle Osteuropa Bremen, “Arbeitspapiere und Materialien”, ,
no. , http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de/UserFiles/le/-Publikationen/Arbeitspa-
piere/fsoAP.pdf [..].
11
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Russia's State-Owned Companies and Contemporary Bulgarian Political and Economic Landscape
droupoli, in eastern Greece, on the border with Turkey. e estimated
capex of the project was originally about USD bln, and its function
would be to bypass the Bosporus and Dardanelle straits supplying Cas-
pian and Russian oil to the West. e government of Bulgaria (GOB)
withdrew from the project referring to environmental and supply con-
cerns, and the resentment of the local population (expressed in a ref-
erendum). e intergovernmental agreement with Russia and Greece
was terminated by Bulgaria’s parliament in March .
e investment scheme was not agreed upon or no details were
disclosed. What was clear is the following: In the company to build
and operate the pipeline, Trans Balkan Pipeline, Russian state-owned
Rosneft, Transneft and Gazprom Neft had of the pipeline, while
Greece and Bulgaria would share equally the remaining . Greece’s
share were distributed by the state-owned Helenic Petroleum and TH-
RAKI ( share was reserved for the government of Greece); Bulgaria
needed either to establish a new company – all companies in the sec-
tor were already private – or sell its stakes. e GOB chose the for-
mer approach and registered a new Burgas-Alexandroupoli Project
Company BG, owned / by state-owned companies from other
sectors, TechnoExportStroy and Bulgargas Holding, a Bulgarian ana-
logue of Gazprom (although without any production of oil or natural
gas). en, there was a minor controversy about which companies
would have the right to buy the respective . of the overall pipe-
line business, and the agreement was that Chevron, KazMunajGas
(proposed by the Russian party) and TNT BP would be allowed to be-
come shareholders.
Facing early general election inMay that year, theGOB decided that thelegislature should
renounce theagreement. Similar were thetactics with thedecision to stop theconstruction
ofthenuclear power plan “Belene”: theGOB announced itresigns from theproject for nan-
cial and economic reasons inMarch , and one year later itproposed amotion intheparlia-
ment toterminate theagreement between theRussian and Bulgarian state-owned companies
involved intheproject.
Originally theidea was that theRussian stake is.
After theproject was closed inDecember , thecompany has become aproperty ofthemin-
istry ofnance ofBulgaria; before this article went into print, at theend ofSeptember , Bur-
gas-Alexandroupoli Project Co BG still existed. InMay , itwas re-equipped with anew CEO
and aBoard ofDirectors (see: Bulgarian Project Company for Oil Pipeline Burgas-Alexandroupolis
Welcomes New CEO, “Novinite”, .., http://www.novinite.com/articles//Bulgarian+
Project+Company+for+Oil+Pipeline+Burgas-Alexandroupolis+Welcomes+New+CEOsthash.
IRpRmYM.dpuf [..]).
12
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Krassen Stanchev
ere was a vocal political support on the Bulgarian side for the pro-
ject. After the signing of the general Cooperation Agreement between
President Putin and PMs of Bulgaria, Stanishev, and of Greece, Kara-
manlis, in March , Bulgarian promoters of the project focused on
selling it to the public. President Parvanov, the ex-Chairman of the PM
Stanishev’s Socialist Party, praised the pipeline as “the first part of Bul-
garian Grand Slam in the power sector,” the other two parts being
the second nuclear power station and the new gas pipeline, all in-
volving Russian companies as investors, suppliers, providers of core
technology and energy resources, and as creditors. Mr Parvanov still
repeats from time to time that the said “Grand Slam will convert Bul-
garia into an energy Power House of South-Eastern Europe.”
e “Grand Slam” rhetoric was not enough to convince the pub-
lic, which started asking questions about the costs of the project, its
environmental dimensions, and sought access to the recordings from
the meetings of the President of Bulgaria with his Russian counterpart.
Unlike the socio-economic impact study on the Greek rout of TBP
(about km), neither Bulgarian authorities nor the academia at-
tempted to assess the effects of the pipeline on its km of territo-
ry. e authorities focused on the EIA, and requested from TBP two
Originally, Mr. Parvanov named this way thethree-set Russian energy package on January ,
, on theoccasion ofsigning theSouth Stream Agreement. Thefact ofthesigning did not trig-
ger much ofimmediate enthusiasm inBulgaria or abroad, rather theopposite: itwas interpreted
asan alternative oftheEU sponsored Nabucco Pipeline. For agood summar y oftheinternation-
al reactions see: Russia–Bulgaria Package Deals Arouse Energy Concern, “ChinaView”, ..,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/-//content_.htm [..]; Y. Dachk-
ov, D. Trankova, Doomed toFriendship: Bulgaria Torpedoes theWest's Eorts toDiversify its Energy
Sources, “Vagabond”, .. (thearticle contain background information on Bulgaria–Rus-
sia relations and on thethree projects), http://www.vagabond.bg/politics/item/-doomed-
to-friendship.html [..].
Themeeting ofboth presidents, held on November , reportedly boosted thedormant
pre-investment activities; ajournalist from arather extreme patriotic newspaper from thecity
ofBurgas (which was preparing for amunicipal referendum on thepipeline) requested access
totherecords ofthemeeting but therequest was left with asilent refusal; thejournalist, assisted
by thenon-government access toinformation watch-dog, Access toInformation Program (AIP),
had taken thepresident’s refusal tothecourt, and, on November , theSoa Administra-
tive Court ordered thepresident topublish therequested le (see for details on thecourt case:
AIP, Lachezar Lisicov (Desant daily) vs. thePresident of Bulgaria, http://www.aip-bg.org/library/
dela/case.htm [..]).
See: K. J. Hazakis, J. C. Mourmouris, Social Impact Assessment ofFDI in Energy Projects: Burgas-
Alexandroupolis Oil Pipeline asaCase Study, “International Journal ofTrade and Global Markets”,
vol. , , no. /, p. -.
13
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Russia's State-Owned Companies and Contemporary Bulgarian Political and Economic Landscape
updates on technical matters. e EIA found no significant environ-
mental risks but it caused delays for the take-off of the construction
and the findings did not have any convincing effect on the public opin-
ion. In Burgas and two neighbouring municipalities making leaving
of summer tourism (Pomorie and Sozopol) the residents who took part
in the vote overwhelmingly rejected the construction of the pipeline.
e delays and technology changes had raised, naturally, the costs
of the TBP investment. According to independent assessments,
the costs went up to USD .-. bln. e GOB focused on the so called
benefits, and project proponents quoted USD - mln revenue an-
nually from transit fees, and expected , jobs to be created. ere
was no disclosure of details on how the calculations were made and
where the jobs could come from. A closer look by independent econ-
omists, including the author, has led to more realistic conclusions
about the project benefits: the annual net budget revenue would be
below the daily government expenditure, the return on investment
period is - years, and the total job creation could be - less
than the GOB expectations.
In February and June , Russian authorities announced
they would seek a reopening of the project.
. Belene Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)
In s, Bulgaria’s planned economy invested in creation of nuclear
power sector in order to supply electricity to centrally planned and
inefficient heavy industries. en, the economy was functioning on
recycling subsidies, raw materials and energy resources supplied by
the USSR and selling the output to the international market at nor-
mal prices. e profits, price differentials between COMECON and
the global market, were partially used (especially in the s) to set
companies outside Bulgaria to bypass technology transfer and arms-
trade embargoes, like CoCom, to repay government debts to the So-
viet Union and to support friendly to the Communist camp regimes
in Africa and Latin America. e nuclear power station of Kozloduy,
Thecommunist Bulgaria defaulted on its foreign debt three times: in and on its debts
toMoscow, and inlate s – on its debts toaLondon club ofprivate lenders.
14
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Krassen Stanchev
with four MW and two MW VVER reactors, which became
fully operational in late s, was believed to be insufficient for such
a “strategic plan,” so a second NPP, again on the river Danube, near
a small town of Belene was planned. It spanned for more than years,
but in a nutshell the history is as follows.
Following the earthquake in nearby Vrancha (in Romania),
Soviet designers dropped the project for seismic risks in . It was
restarted in , on the insistence of GOB, with VVER/, the site
was constructed and the first reactor bought, of the original in-
vestment was completed by , when economic difficulties and
lack of financing necessitated a redesign of the NPP for two reactors
instead of four.
In early , the BAS socio-economic review had found the en-
tire investment unreasonable for radiological, seismic and economic
risks (the country already defaulted of its foreign debts). At the same
time, the population from neighbouring Belene Danube districts and
environment groups launched protests, petitioned the parliament and
threatened civil disobedience campaign against the project. Following
committee hearing in the parliament, the first post-Communist gov-
ernment decided in August to freeze the construction for pre-
dominantly financial and economic considerations.
In the s, there was a brief attempt to revisit the plan for a sec-
ond nuclear plant, but the idea was dropped because of a lack of any
economic justification – the economy had already a new structure and
there was a persistent excess of production capacity, electricity that
the country could not consume or export.
In April , without required justification, Belene NPP was an-
nounced for reopening. At some point, a reason was found in the fact
that the first four (small) Kozloduy reactors must be closed with formal
accession of Bulgaria in the EU – those reactors lacked overhead pro-
Ipersonally had numerous occasions todeal with the“Belene”: rst, for purely academic curiosity
Ifollowed theeconomic eciency oftheproject since ; then Iwas amember oftheBulgar-
ian Academy ofSciences team (socio-economic sub-team) toassess NPS “Belene” in-;
later, aschairman oftheEnvironment Committee oftheConstitutional Assembly (-),
Iwas involved inthedecision making todiscontinue theconstruction; and, inmore recent years,
on behalf oftheI nstitute for market Economics (IME) Iwas responsible for assessing thereopen-
ing oftheproject in-, and for leading an interdisciplinary team ofexperts toconduct
acost-benet analysis of“Belene” inJanuary-May .
15
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Russia's State-Owned Companies and Contemporary Bulgarian Political and Economic Landscape
tective construction and did not comply with EU standards. e cost
of the early shutdowns has been estimated at EUR bln, and, in prin-
ciple, it would have made sense operating at least two of those reactors
until - (a scenario that was being negotiated with the EU).
In other words, Belene with two MW reactors was con-
ceived as a substitute of the closed Kozloduy capacity some time after
the formal entry in the EU (scheduled for ). Two months earlier,
the ex-king, then PM, Simeon Sax-Cobourg-Gotta, committed to im-
mediate (i.e. before the EU accession) closure of Kozloduy reactors at
a meeting with his Greek counterpart, Kostas Simitis. e motion
to restart Belene contradicted both the independent and GOB assess-
ment of the country’s energy balance (calculated by non-government
experts) which demonstrated that power sector investment, thermal
power plans (TTP) on domestic lignite fuel, would fully serve the needs
of both domestic consumptions and exports (as the GOB calculated
in its Energy Strategy). A year earlier, the construction of two
TTPs was contracted with Italian and US companies, Enel and AES;
the project financing was committed through power purchasing agree-
ments and the takeoff deadlines of the TTPs were for set to coincide
with the closure of Kozloduy small reactors.
is tactics motivated critics from environment groups, independ-
ent economic think tanks, non-government energy experts and other
civic organization. In order to respond to the critics, the GOB granted
some access to information on the project, organized hastily public
hearings at which independent experts had restricted access to in-
formation and limited opportunities to take the floor, and redrafted
Thedecision torestart Belene was rst ocially announced by Simeon Sax-Cobourg-Gotta on
April , at aconvention ofhis party, National Movement Simeon theSecond (Natzionalno
Dvizhenie Simeon Vtori – NDSV).
By theend of both plants became fully operational, and were therst inBulgaria tofully
comply with EU environment standards.
Infact, therst disclosure was aresponse totheInstitute for Market Economics (IME) request
for information: IME was given adisc with dierent presentations on theproject with awarning
“not for distribution” – theles were immediately made public. Thefull access toinformation
was not granted for thepublic hearings, only after them thecourt ordered theCouncil ofMin-
isters toopen thedossier oftheproject, but theauthorities never fully complied with access
topublic information standards; AIP had won four court cases dealing with access toinforma-
tion about Belene NPP (see aselection ofpublications describing thesaga available at: http://
www.aip-bg.org/search.php?lang=en-us&q=Belene [..]).
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Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Krassen Stanchev
the energy balance forecasts using newly and post-factum produced
data by the state-owned National Electric Company, NEK.
e following table demonstrates the difference between the real
electricity consumption and the forecasts of NERA Economic Con-
sulting (a UK based company that assisted Energy Strategy) and
of NEK.
Table: Real electricity consumption and forecast
Source: Ministry ofEconomy.
NEK forecast obviously exaggerates the need for an extensive de-
velopment of Bulgaria’s power sector. Its interest in the Belene project
was one of ROSATOM project partner with of the shares. By
that time NEK has already borrowed EUR mln from BNP Paribas
to finance its stake and desperately needed a continuation of the pro-
ject. NERA’s forecast is much closer to reality, although the actual
consumption after hovers below TWh, and has little pros-
pects of exceeding this threshold in the foreseeable future. e mac-
roeconomic data also suggested that electricity consumption would
ROSATOM isaRussian state-owned holding, established in and uniting some compa-
nies and organizations, infact areregistered Ministry ofNuclear Energy.
17
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Russia's State-Owned Companies and Contemporary Bulgarian Political and Economic Landscape
remain flat: the real GDP growth between and was ,
while the real electricity consumption (which includes also exports)
fluctuated around TWh.
In this situation, the GOB took for granted the NEK forecast, which
was above the available outsiders’ forecast for and above
the actual consumption for the same year.
Similar to Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline Belene project had no
clear and up-to-date economic or technical feasibility study. Accord-
ing to Bulgaria Nuclear Energy Law, Article , such a study along
the assessment of socioeconomic impacts, seismic and radiation risks
is a precondition to decide whether to plan construction of a NPP
or not. Similarly, the Energy Law stipulates that new power stations
should be built only when it is determined that there is a need to meet
domestic consumption.
ree governments of the period - failed to deliver those
studies in any acceptable and convincing version. Typically, they re-
ferred to different ideas like president Parvanov’s “Grand Slam,” of “Bul-
garia as an Energy Hub,” etc. One of the consultants, Parsons Europe,
referred in to an estimate of project costs in the range between
USD and bln. In support of the “Hub” argument, the proponents
of the project spoke of “great export opportunities,” irrespectively
of the fact that foreign demand (exports) is a dubious justification for
building a NPP with taxpayers money and for handling nuclear waste
fuels at citizens’ risk (the above quoted legal framework explicitly en-
visages a different approach).
e preparatory period for the project took some time, the formal
decision was taken by the GOB in , the assumed costs of the in-
vestment then were at the level of EUR bln. e tender specifica-
tion envisaged reactor type VVER/; no international supplier
took part but Atomstroyexport (ASE), a subsidiary of ROSATOM;
in it won a contract to build Belene. In RWE, German utility
investor and operator, won a bid (with ten competitors) to contribute
of then estimated EUR . bln. After sixteen months of negotia-
tion, in October RWE resigned from the project, referring to its
Inthefall of, parliamentary hearing on “Belene” had made GOB toadmit that “theexpecta-
tions were way too optimistic” and torecalculate more optimistic energy balance.
18
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Krassen Stanchev
high integrity standards and unclear terms of financing. As World
Nuclear News (WNN) reported: “Bulgarian national utility NEK was
to take the controlling stake, but the company and government
have been unable to keep to the terms of a pre-construction finance
deal with BNP Paribas, leading to penalties, and RWE had been un-
able to find a junior partner to share its stake.” is, continued WNN,
is what “leaves a strange situation where private finance has turned its
back on a large investment that has full government support. Further-
more, there is a total support from Russia for its reactor exports, and
the leaders are happy to authorize loans to Bulgaria to make the pro-
ject happen. Contracts for major components for the reactors were
announced only yesterday, indicating very strong Russian confidence
that Belene will still go ahead.”
In early , ASE asked for EUR . bln of loans and then, in ,
reassessed the investment costs at EUR . bln. By that time, the pro-
ject was already a full responsibility of NEK, its principal state-owned
umbrella, the Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH) and the GOB.
e obvious lack of transparency enthused independent experts
as early as in to start working on its own cost-benefit analysis
of the project. e first fully-fledged report on the subject was pub-
lished on March . It estimated the total construction costs
of Belene at EUR . bln, assuming no delays, no kick-backs and
no price increases due to post-Fukushima nuclear safety updates.
See: RWE Pulls out ofBelene, “ World Nuclear News”, .., http://www.world-nuclear-news.
org/C_RWE_pulls_out_of_Belene_.html [..].
BEH was established inSeptember , when Bulgargaz Holding was renamed BEH and its
capital was increased through an in-kind contribution at par value ofall theshares inthecapital
ofNEK, NPP Kozloduy, thelignite TPP Maritsa East and Mini Maritsa Iztok (lignite coal mine).
Theidea toestablish BEH was promoted by president Parvanov, besides public criticism, inor-
der topromote the“Grand Slam.” Infact, theGOB needed acompany with clean balance sheet
toborrow from international private creditors because NEK, due mainly toits failing shareholding
agreement with ASE and other ineective projects, was brought eectively toastate ofbank-
ruptcy.
This approach generated diplomatic attention totheways GOB handled theproject, see, e.g.
Wikileaks: US Embassy Cables; More Troubles at Bulgarian Nuclear Power Plant, “Novinite”, ..,
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id= [..], areprint from TheGuardian.
Thecable mentions, between other things, that “theBulgarians are still inthedark on actual
details. Tosheva [CEO ofBulgaria Energy Holding] told us that she expects Russian PM Putin will
dictate theloans terms directly toBulgarian PM Stanishev.”
19
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Russia's State-Owned Companies and Contemporary Bulgarian Political and Economic Landscape
e IME report gave also a full account of the side effects and the his-
tory of the project from s to present days.
Public debates sparked by IME, AIP court cases against GOB refusals
to disclose information on the project, activities of the Institute for Re-
gional and International Studies (IRIS), Centre for the Study of Democ-
racy (CSD) and a Belene-motivated pressure group, Movement for
Energy Independence, eventually led to GOB reassessment of the pro-
ject, for which it selected HSBC as a consultant (in April ).
In mid-July , another private think tank, specializing in energy
affairs, the Institute for Energy Management Institute (EMI), a pri-
vate think tank supported by the power sector companies, published
its Belene price estimate EUR bln but used a different methodology.
Around the same time, Russia’s ex-Minister of Nuclear Energy and
Deputy Chairman of the Institute of Natural Monopolies, Bulat Nig-
matulin, calculated the project investment costs at EUR . bln. He
too used a different methodology and took into account possible delays
and updated security standards. In February , he reconfirmed his
calculations and provided a broader background assessment on Rus-
sia–Bulgaria energy projects in a speech before the Economic Policy
Committee of the Parliament of Bulgaria.
Eventually, in April , HSBC submitted its assessment to GOB,
which published the bank presentation but not the report; the costs
were found to be at least EUR . bln or . bln (with added se-
curity costs).
See, inBulgarian: Институт за пазарна икономика, Какво да се прави с проекта АЕЦ «Белене».
(Оценка на необходимостта, рисковете, разходите и въздействията) [What todo with NPP
Belene: Assessment ofNeeds, Risks, Costs and Impacts], София, ИПИ, .., http://ime.bg/var/
images/NPS_Belene_Assesment_WTD.pdf [..].
See: IRIS publications on thetopic available at: http://iris-bg.org/index/currentprojects/catid//
itemid/, and alist ofCSD publication and events available at: http://www.csd.bg [..].
See: EMI assessment available at: http://www.emi-bg.com/en/index.php?id= [..].
See: Н. Нигматулин, Правда об АЭС «Белене», “Pro-Atom”, .., http://www.proatom.ru/
modules.php?name=News&le=article&sid=&mode=at&order=&thold= [..].
Itneeds tomention that HSBC contracts included asuccess fee of thetotal investment, pro-
vided theproject iscompleted and theNPP isbuilt. See estimates: HSBC Project Finance, Project
Belene Presentation oftheOperational Model (prepared for BEH), Soa-London , http://www.
mi.government.bg/les/useruploads/les/vop/belleville_nancial_modelling_presentation_
to_beh.pdf [..]. Thefull text oftheHSBC report was eventually published in, after
Soa District Court, on July decided positively on access toinformation claim by NDSV,
Sax-Courburg-Gotta’ s political party (its government was therst access toBelene -related stud-
ies and reports), ordering GOB topublish it.
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e story did not end here. e Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP),
whose previous chairman Parvanov believed Belene was a part of his
Grand Slam whose incumbent chairman Stanishev was PM when
the framework agreement with ASE/ROSATOM was signed, in or-
der to boost its pre-electoral discipline and organization, collected
, signatures and initiated a referendum on the continuation
of the project. e question was misleading, merging two points – an
approval for atomic energy as such and for the “new” NPP (without
explicit mentioning of Belene). Before the campaign, which coincid-
ed with Christmas and New Year holidays, some public opinion polls
indicated about approval rate for Belene. e vote took place on
January , but was not valid: the law requires voters’ turn-
out, only actually voted (the result was “yes” and “no”).
In such cases, the legislature should decide, and on February it vot-
ed against Belene, the cabinet decision to stop the project was taken
a month later, on March .
In the meantime, on February , in Sofia public protest started
against “high” electricity prices; in a few days it grew into a protest
about everything, and several young men were beaten by someone,
allegedly the police. e incumbent PM used the occasion to resign
and fresh election were scheduled for May .
. South Stream
e preliminary agreement between Russia and Bulgaria on the South
Stream was signed in January , and ratified by the parliament
Voters were asked thequestion “Should nuclear energy be developed inBulgaria through con-
struction ofanew nuclear power plant?”
Ithas never become clear what exactly motivated thestreet protests, Bulgaria electricity prices
are thelowest inEU. They were raised by theregulator inJuly , by -, because itwas ob-
vious that prices were kept articially low, not covering production, large investment and distri-
bution costs inthepower sector. There was no major discontent until February next year, when
for therst time three-month electricity bills were sent toconsumers. Therhetoric about “poor
Bulgarians” looted by “foreign electricity distribution monopolies become widespread” (Czech,
German and Austrian companies operate theelectricity retail). Several facts were omitted from
theheated debates on electricity bills that February: a) thedistribution companies do not set
theelectricity prices. Theregulator does; b) apart ofthe“high” costs resulted from grandiose
projects like Belene; and c) in- electricity prices were picking up by per annum,
while thereal income ofthehouseholds was almost higher than in.
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in July that year. Bulgaria was the first EU country to reach such a con-
tract. It was concluded by then PM Stanishev, leader of BSP then, now
– of the European Socialists. is happened in some rush, again with
little preliminary assessment of costs and benefits and with unclear
financing.
e core idea of this element of the Grand Slam was to bypass
Ukraine and a transit country in transporting natural gas to EU, create
a leverage to exercise pressure on Kiev, and set a fast-track alternative
to Nabucco. Last but not least, the Stream could increase the falling
Russian export of natural gas to Europe.
Between and the average EU natural gas import depend-
ency on Russia has been going down by almost /, from . to .
However, for five EU countries – Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Baltic
countries – it was above for the same period, according to EU-
ROSTAT.
For GAZPROM and other Russian exporters, this was a reasonable
strategy to boost trade before the entry into force of the so called ird
EU Energy Package (TEP), which requires liberalization of-, and third
party access to the energy distribution infrastructure. In order to suc-
ceed, the ultimate prerequisite of this approach was to own the pipe-
line and have the right to exclude both competitors and “unfriendly”
governments; control the volumes, prices and transit fees. ose who
planned to invest in domestic natural gas exploration and production,
conventional or shale, would be then required either to build their own
pipeline or pay the existing operators.
In reality, however, the deeper and more tacit presupposition for
the project was that in the countries on route there should be coop-
erative, “friendly” leaders and politically controlled companies ready
to grasp the opportunity and launch the pipeline before the imple-
mentation of the (TEP). Since exclusive ownership and discrimina-
tion of access contradict the EU law (scheduled for implementation
from January onwards), these collaborative politicians should
secure the legal framework for the stability of the pipeline operation.
See: Eurostat Statistics Explained, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/
Main_Page [..].
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It is disputable whether such expectation on behalf of GASPROM
is at all reasonable in the first place, but this is exactly what happened
in Bulgaria. In , two Socialist MPs, both with high government
post in the energy sector in the past, proposed amendments to the En-
ergy Law, which: a) refer to “EU pilot projects” in the justification
of the amendments; b) introduce a new concept of “sea gas-pipelines,”
defined as “inter-systemic gas-pipeline;” and c) excludes form the EU
jurisdiction the sea-rout and on-shore infrastructure of such pipelines.
e draft was adopted at the first hearing, with almost no debate by
the parliament on April .
is prompted extra-parliamentary opposition to look closely into
the background of the initiative, and using procedures of the access
to information law they obtained records from BEH-GAZPROM
about December talks regarding “South Stream Transit Co.” –
the company set to build the pipeline, majority owned by GAZPROM.
According to the record, the parties admit they are not obliged to give
access to the pipeline to any third party. e wording and the argu-
ment of this agreement resembled to the very letter the justification
and provisions of the law adopted in April.
e finding created a public outrage and the European Com-
mission declared it is launching an investigation on alleged breach
of the EU law and jurisdiction.
All these happened after the official start of South Stream construc-
tion, with a ceremony involving Bulgaria’s PM Oresharski, the Energy
Minister Stoynev and Russia’s Energy Minister, Novak, on Octo-
ber . e construction on Bulgarian soil, judging from the tender
documentation, is . to times more expensive than the construc-
tion of a similar North Stream pipeline on German territory. In order
See for some details: Bulgaria’s Energy Minister Troubled by EU’ s Procedure against South Stream,
“TheBanker”, .., http://www.banker.bg/briefs/read/bulgarias-energy-minister-troubled-
by-eus-procedure-against-south-stream [..].
From June toearly August , Bulgaria wasgoverned by aminority government sponsored
by theSocialist, theMovement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF, aparty which Bulgaria Muslims
vote for) and nationalist and openly pro-Russian (itisan obvious contradiction interms) politi-
cal party ATAKA. Theperiod inoce ofthis government was accompanied by every-day street
protests, denouncing one ofits policy after another. See for details on political parties, leaders
and public discontents related tothat period: K. Stanchev, Another Sort ofOccupy Movement:
Bulgaria, “Liberty”, .., http://liberty.eu/another-sort-of-occupy-movement-bulgaria/
[..], an earlier version ofthis article was published inPolish.
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to start the project, in July BEH (the ultimate principal of Bulgar-
ian companies involved in the project) borrowed EUR mln from
private lenders.
Eventually, in early June , bending to pressures from the EU,
the constructor of the pipeline, PM Oresharski ordered all activi-
ties to stop. Later in the year, during a press conference in Decem-
ber in Turkey, President Putin announced Russia’s withdrawal from
the South Stream and its conversion into a Turk Stream, blaming
the lack of success on the EU and Bulgarians. Besides all these public
moves and rhetoric, the state-owned firm “South Stream Bulgaria,”
a junior partner in the GAZPROM consortium, is still in operation.
It was not deregistered because there was no legal document by
the main shareholder that operations had stopped and pipeline was
not to be built. Meanwhile, July Turk Stream talks were put
in the freezer, until November.
. Impact on the Power Sector
Not so much the oil pipeline but Belene NPP and South Stream
projects have had a long term negative impact on Bulgaria's economy
and its energy policy framework.
Designed for servicing a huge heavy industrial sector, Bulgaria’s in-
stalled electricity production capacity has become rather obsolete with
the disappearance of the COMECON protected market and bankrupt-
ed, loss making enterprises (as early as in the mid-s). Bulgaria’s
electricity distribution network was detached from that of COME-
CON/USSR in , so the starting year of Bulgaria’s electricity meter”
is . Since then, the country “enjoyed” electricity surpluses of at least
on average, which were difficult to consume or export. Strangely
enough, in per capita terms Bulgaria still produces more electricity than
European part of Russia (. KWh per person versus . KWh in Rus-
See for detailed background EuroActiv list ofpublications on Turk Stream: http://www.euractiv.
com/topics/turkish-stream [..]. Asomewhat optimistic assessment oftheTurk Stream
prospects has been recently published by Stratfor, see reprint by Natural Gas Europe, How
theGame IsPlayed: TheLife and Death ofSouth Stream, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/how-
the-game-is-played-the-life-and-death-of-south-stream- [..].
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sia), even more than the neighbouring countries (Greece production
is . KWh per person, Italy’s – KWh, Serbia – . KWh, Hungary –
. KWh, Turkey . KWh and Romania . KWh).
. Institutions
is legacy had three institutional impacts, which determined the con-
text of the Russian energy project in Bulgaria.
First, there was little pressure to privatize and seek efficiency,
prices were kept artificially low for years and still are relatively low
in comparison to those in the EU. Compared to the regional electric-
ity market, in Bulgaria’s still administratively determined prices
were lower than in the Czech Republic, less than in Turkey,
below the Greek prices, lower than electricity prices in Hun-
gary and about below Romanian. is situation, on one hand,
created incentives to waste electricity: Bulgaria is the most energy
wasting economy in Europe, with a relatively very high degree of im-
port dependency. On the other hand, there is a disincentive to invest:
the inputs in terms of technology, grid-line, equipment and meters are
available on the international market but the domestic price hardly
covers the costs.
Second, there was little reason to liberalize the electricity market,
NEK as a single buyer remained and still is in place. Until the pric-
es remained virtually untouched or at last they were not covering
investment and maintenance costs. e electricity price was set
to rise for the period -, thus opening doors to privat-
ize (the electricity distribution was privatized in ) and liberalize
(the respective preparation started, frameworks were adopted; and
the start of the free market was planned for July ). is did not
happen.
ird, the wrong set of incentives made it all but impossible to in-
vest and modernize, except in extensive projects requiring more ca-
pacity and resources, and financed on project-by-project bases (since
See above quoted article by Bulat Nigmatulin.
See: Eurostat Statistics Explained, Energy Prices Statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Energy_price_statistics (thecomparison for later years would be mislead-
ing because inmost ofthecountries markets are already inan advanced stage ofliberalization).
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bankability was risky in a non-market environment). After more than
years of no development, in - power purchasing con-
tracts were used to finance clean and state-of-the-art lignite TPPs.
As mentioned above, they were planned substitution for the closure
of old Kozloduy reactors and to comply with EU environment stand-
ards. Later, in -, Bulgaria opted to comply with EU energy
policy and set for subsidized wind and solar power plants. e NEK
was and still is the single buyer of this new capacity.
In this situation, Russian state-owned companies were sort
of a “dream partner,” ready to operate in such an environment. But
the outcome was that these projects further worsened the perfor-
mance and the governance of the sector.
e most important negative institutional impact of the Belene pro-
ject. Launching it at the time of preparation of the electricity market
for liberalization, the GOB needed a structure like NEK to play the role
of both a core single buyer and a partner of ROSATOM in the pro-
ject. If liberalization were really to happen in , NEK would lose
the position in the system which could guarantee power purchasing
from the new NPP plant. So, the system and NEK became a hostage
of the project.
. Energy Dependency and Ineciency
Bulgaria imports from Russia of the nuclear fuel, and Russia
(ROSATOM) recycles the fuel used in Kozloduy.
In -, the largest oil refinery on the Balkan Peninsula,
Neftochim in Burgas originally designed in s to refine crude oil
from Russia, was sold to Lukoil. Between and Bulgaria im-
ports of oil from Russia.
GAZPROM supplies of natural gas; Russian and Ukrainian
companies supply of solid fuels, mostly non-lignite coal.
Currently, the overall energy import dependency from Russia is -
. If Belene were to be built and operated, the dependency would
rise to approximately , with . of the electricity produced from
Russian nuclear and gas with . Russian equipment.
Speaking energy dependency, we should also take into account
the impact of the South Steam project. is should be considered first
of all an institutional impact.
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In -, three concessions were granted to explore natural gas
deposits, one of them for natural gas shale (Chevron won the tender)
in North East Bulgaria, one from coal, and one unspecified. In Janu-
ary , responding to a week of media campaign and one week-
end of street actions by environmentalists in Sofia and some other
big cities, the parliament overwhelmingly voted a ban on fracking.
It happened without any specific discussion of pros and cons, with no
account for costs and the side effects. e penalty of USD mln was
imposed, three times above signature fee for the concession permit.
Even the geophysical and seismological tests and information gath-
ering, totally harmless from environmental standpoint but needed
for at least knowing the commercial viability of the deposits, became
unreasonable.
e assessment of the probable socio-economic costs and impacts
of Bulgaria’s natural gas from shale potential was produced by a pri-
vate team of experts (led by the author) only one year later, in March
. It found that, depending on the actual deposits, the natural gas
dependency could be reduced to or even -. In retrospect,
it is obvious that the ban cleared the prospect for GAZPROM domi-
nance and set potential South Stream advantages.
After RWE pulled out of the Belene project and NEK remained
the sole ROSATOM partner, the company balance sheet deterio-
rated. e full completion of Belene, even of the lowest ever quoted
price of EUR bln, would have meant nothing less than bankruptcy
– by end of , NEK’s total assets were EUR . bln. By that time
it has a debt to BNP Paribas of EUR mln, a work and equipment
on Belene of roughly EUR . bln, EUR mln costs of hydro power
station (completed in ) and, on top of it, outstanding payments
on power purchasing agreements with newly build and put in opera-
tion TPP, solar and wind farms. It is difficult to access the exact vol-
ume of these areas, because regulations and prices changed several
times and there are several court disputes on payments and regula-
See: K. Stanchev (ed. and team leader), Natural Gas from Shale Socio Economic Impacts for Bul-
garia, KC Ltd., Institute for Management ofEnergy Soa , http://ime.bg/var/images/Natu-
ral_Gas_from_Shale_for_Bulgaria_KC_Study_--_EditedENG.pdf [..].
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tions. In any event, the outstanding payments are estimated at the lev-
el of EUR . bln.
e continuation of the project would have led to immediate bank-
ruptcy of NEK and the entire system. e closure of the project was
justified only by this situation. However, even if we assume that NEK’s
financial condition was perfect, the operation of a second NPP sta-
tion would mean closure of existing production capacity in the non-
nuclear segment of the power sector, and social costs in terms of lost
jobs and investment, plus a mess in the banking sector as the new TPP
were built with roughly EUR bln of syndicated loans (domestic and
international banks) and, in their turn, the renewable sector has been
financed with another bln.
e reason is very simple: the system with four , MW reactors
(two in Kozloduy and two at Belene NPP), with little to no opportunity
to export at a price that covers the costs on investment in the system
(Belene was totally unnecessary from the standpoint of the domestic
consumption until at last and probably until ), the more flex-
ible segments (coal and water power plants plus the renewables) would
have to be non-operational for a period of four to five months a year.
Another dubious alternative would have been to close Kozloduy.
. Energy Sector and Bank Failures
was a very odd year for the Bulgarian banking industry. e sec-
tor used to be very stable and well capitalized, deposits covered (and
still do) all extended credits, saving rates are higher than ever (pri-
vate savings are at the level of of GDP), non-performing loans are
the level of and steadily go down after the buts of , reserves
are three times higher that EU average, and capital adequacy ratio was
also better than the average. Unexpectedly, one bank – Corporate and
Commercial Bank (CCB), the fourth bank in the country collapsed
and there was a bank run on the third bank, First Investment Bank.
e majority owner of CCB had fled the country, allegedly stripping
it of EUR bln of liquidity. CCB was declared bankrupt in October
, after four months of special supervision by the central bank.
See for details: Институт за пазарна икономика.
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In an intricate manner, the story emerged from the ways by which
the public sector of the country is governed and resulted from the dif-
ficulties of the above discussed energy project.
CCB, originally a boutique-agent in settling debt between Bulgar-
ia and the Russian Federation, was capitalized and grew three times
for a period of three-four years (-) by political and person-
al-political means.
e utilization of political connections in banking rested upon
a -year old institutional arrangement; in the coalition govern-
ment of monarchist NDSV and MRF, decided to stop the privatization
of state-owned enterprises: electricity, gas and tobacco monopoly
along with Railways and a couple of military SOEs were suddenly be-
lieved so “important” that they were listed as enterprises that could
only be privatized by an act of the parliament.
e rise of CCB began with the next coalition of Bulgaria Socialist
Party (BSP), NDSV and MRF that governed Bulgaria between and
; and then it continued under the new government of GERB.
e engine of this growth was a series of GOB decisions, as principal
of above mentioned NEK, BEH, the companies to serve Belene and
“South Stream” to transfer their accounts to CCB. In fact, two Social-
ists and centre-left (that of GERB) GOBs have been driving this engine.
e owner of CCB – it should be noted that the bank is almost
a sole proprietorship – had a hobby of financing individual politi-
cians and political parties and, due to old ties, had invited as a mi-
nority shareholder the Russian Vnesh-Torg Bank. VTB was the agent
of the other side of the debt-settlement deal with the Russian Federa-
tion. e bank obtained a heavy political weight which helped in both
attracting private depositors (announcing, at times, above on de-
posits, while the average was hovering around ) and over-competing
everyone else as a custodian of future large, government-sponsored
projects, mostly in the power sector, and sponsored by Russian state-
owned firms like GASPROM or ROSATOM. Or at least, CCB hoped
it will be servicing such projects and companies.
GERB isan abbreviation of“Grazhdani za Evropejsko Badeshte za Balgaria” ofCitizens for Euro-
pean Future ofBulgaria, GERB isamember oftheEuropean People Party.
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e prime CCB political helper in these efforts, coordinator
of the above efforts to rechannel government accounts to the bank,
was and still is the MRF’s MP who in served as a senior GOB
executive in an insignificant ministry and whose nomination in June
triggered the protest against then incumbent government.
is political clout that helped CCB growing from one of the small-
est to the fourth bank of the country had recently entered into an in-
ternal conflict between the owner and the political helper in April
to early May : the conflict was over the credits of the helper, con-
trols over some former public enterprises privatized and partially
owned by VTB (e.g. the ex-tobacco and telecommunications monop-
oly). e bleak prospect for prompt construction of the South Steam
pipeline by GAZPROM and eventual closure of the project was also
an important factor: CCB was the custodian bank for the project.
e account of the pro-GAZPROM construction arm is owned by
one of the sanctioned Russian subjects in relation to the annexation
of Crimea. e design of the contracts and the pipeline construc-
tion procurement contradicts the EU law, and triggered penalties
from the Commission in Brussels. e project seems to have been put
on hold, while Bulgarian subcontractors of GAZPROM were hoped
to bring in more cash into the CCB.
e risks associated with these projects and conflict forced the GOB
to withdraw some of the SOE accounts from CCB. e conflict and
spitting between the two CCB gentlemen hit the media fan, private
depositors panicked, asked for their saving and caused a liquidity
problem.
It is now anybody’s guess how deep the whole is: CCB’s political
connection meant that its projects and credits were allocated to non-
competitive ventures. e incumbent GOB promises forensic audits
report to be published by the end of . However, CCB, because
of the peculiar manner of its banking, had almost no exposure to other
banks, especially foreign owned. When CCB was declared bankrupt
See greater details and statistics on theCCB case: K. Stanchev, Reputation Matters: ANot-S o-Typical
June 2014 Bank Run inBulgaria (APublic Choice Perspective), “Liberty”, .., http://liberty.
eu/reputation-matters-a-not-so-typical-june--bank-run-in-bulgaria-a-public-choice-per-
spective/ [..].
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and guaranteed depositors were paid by the Guarantee Fund, all these
saving were redeposit in the system.
. Instead of Conclusions: Impacts on the Political System
e above description of Bulgaria-Russian energy project al-
lows for some conclusions. By no means is the analysis sufficient for
revealing undisputable causality links. But there are some common
and repeated phenomena that deserve further attention, not only
in the Bulgarian context.
It is obvious that the main promoters of Russian state-owned com-
panies’ interest were a handful number of individuals around Social-
ist party leaders like president Parvanov and ex-PM Stanishev. ese
few individuals, however, because of democratically determined posts
and the coalition nature of the political establishment, were and still
are able to mobilize lairs of government, the legislature and other po-
litical parties in the pursuit of same or similar objectives. us, not
only has the BSP (which is an heir of the former Bulgarian Commu-
nist Party, a proud hair) been involved in the promotion of the said
interests. e ex-king and his party, besides the reasonable power
sector reform they initiated, managed to destroy its own prospect for
success and launched Belene and oil pipeline projects that eventually
put at risk the entire economy of the country. Irrespectively the fact
that the Socialist pushed for South Stream in the first place and at-
tempted an infringement of the EU jurisdiction under GAZPROM
dictation, all other political parties tried their best to keep it afloat for
about four-five years. e Belene project is around for already years,
while Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline, the least harmful project, has
been in the responsibility domains of three ordinary cabinets and two
caretaker governments.
Once projects were set in motion, the next set of government typ-
ically sustains those using similar techniques of miss-governance
of public interest. Typical techniques are the lack of analysis of socio-
economic impacts, lack of information and/or refusal to grant access
to public information, exaggeration of possible benefits and purpose-
ful misleading of the public opinion.
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Russia's State-Owned Companies and Contemporary Bulgarian Political and Economic Landscape
It is also obvious, that the country has an immune system. In all
cases, irrespectively the difficulties the above listed ways of public
mismanagement and deceive of voters were overcome by strong and
reasonable public opinion, which provided needed analytical exper-
tise and organized resistance to crony ideas.
Needless to say, the EU law and democratic tradition had played
a key role in fixing challenges related to Russian state-owned compa-
nies’ interests. Some specific regulatory and energy policies of the EU,
like those to subsidize renewables, have added much complication
to the system: but they did so only because the domestic political es-
tablishment made the system inefficient in the first place, and then
further mismanaged the complications.
During the period in question, the EU was an important player
in rehabilitating the mess created by the South Stream project. But
has, and could not have, any impact on the tacit connections between
Bulgarian politicians and Russian company interests and politicians.
In the background of Mr. Stanishev as PM there was an interesting
experience: he had run the country during its first two years in the EU.
His image, however, soon suffered from alleged crony deals and nep-
otism related to EU subsidies when he attempted to cover up some
irregularities of his administration. In order to overcome difficulties,
he called an international advisory group to help improve Bulgaria’s
public governance, on the eve of the general elections of .
e group was led by Dominique DeVillepin, and included experi-
ence politicians like Paul Demaret, Josep Pique, Aunus Salmi, Anto-
nio Vitorino, and Casimir de Dalmau. e group worked in Bulgarian
in April and delivered a report that made several key points about
links between Bulgaria and Russian political establishments.
It mentions that Bulgaria-Russia relations, and underlines that:
“it is particularly important for the EU to be able to rely on all its
Eastern members when trying to develop a constructive approach
towards Russia. On the other hand, a situation where some of these
countries would fall again under strong Russian influence could cause
a rift among EU members and need to be avoided.”
D. DeVillepin et. al., Bulgaria intheEU: Building aNew Partnership, May , p. . Thereport
isnot available on the Internet, and itwas not disseminated by thePM ofBulgaria who invited.
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Mr. Stanishev has hid the report from the public. As a sponsor
of the cabinet of Mr. Oresharski in , his fellow MP, in relation
to South Stream attempted exactly this – a rift among EU members.
For those who are familiar with the history of Bulgaria, the reviews
experience should be additional evidence disavowing the myths about
Bulgaria being a “close ally of Russia.”
Bibliography
BOOKS, CHAPTERS, ARTICLES:
Bulgarian Project Company for Oil Pipeline Burgas-Alexandroupolis Wel-
comes New CEO, “Novinite”, .., http://www.novinite.com/ar-
ticles//Bulgarian+Project+Company+for+Oil+Pipeline+Burg
as-Alexandroupolis+Welcomes+New+CEOsthash.IRpRmYM.dpuf
Bulgaria’s Energy Minister Troubled by EU’s Procedure against South Stream,
“e Banker”, .., http://www.banker.bg/briefs/read/bulgarias-en-
ergy-minister-troubled-by-eus-procedure-against-south-stream
Dachkov Y., Trankova D., Doomed to Friendship: Bulgaria Torpedoes the West’s
Efforts to Diversify its Energy Sources, “Vagabond”, .., http://www.
vagabond.bg/politics/item/-doomed-to-friendship.html
Hazakis K. J., Mourmouris J. C., Social Impact Assessment of FDI in Energy
Projects: Burgas-Alexandroupolis Oil Pipeline as a Case Study, “Interna-
tional Journal of Trade and Global Markets”, vol. , , no. /.
Lucas E., e New Cold War: Putin’s Treat to Russian and the West, Palgrave
McMillan, New York .
More Troubles at Bulgarian Nuclear Power Plant, “Novinite”, ..,
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id= (a reprint from
e Guardian).
Natural Gas Europe, How the Game Is Played: e Life and Death of South
Stream, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/how-the-game-is-played-the-
life-and-death-of-south-stream- (reprinted from Startfor).
Orttung R., Perović J., Pleines H., Schröder H. H., Russia’s Energy Sector be-
tween Politics and Business, Forschungsstelle Osteuropa Bremen, “Arbe-
itspapiere und Materialien”, , no. , http://www.forschungsstelle.
uni-bremen.de/UserFiles/file/-Publikationen/Arbeitspapiere/fsoAP.
pdf
Russia-Bulgaria Package Deals Arouse Energy Concern, “ChinaView”,
.., http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/-//con-
tent_.htm
RWE Pulls out of Belene, “World Nuclear News”, .., http://www.
world-nuclear-news.org/C_RWE_pulls_out_of_Belene_.html
Stanchev K., Another Sort of Occupy Movement: Bulgaria, “Liberty”, ..,
http://liberty.eu/another-sort-of-occupy-movement-bulgaria/
33
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Russia's State-Owned Companies and Contemporary Bulgarian Political and Economic Landscape
Stanchev K., Natural Gas from Shale Socio Economic Impacts for Bulgaria,
KC Ltd., Institute for Management of Energy, Sofia , http://ime.bg/
var/images/Natural_Gas_from_Shale_for_Bulgaria_KC_Study_--_
EditedENG.pdf
Stanchev K., Reputation Matters: A Not-So-Typical June 2014 Bank Run in Bul-
garia (A Public Choice Perspective), “Liberty”, .., http://liberty.
eu/reputation-matters-a-not-so-typical-june--bank-run-in-bulgaria-
a-public-choice-perspective/
DOCUMENTS:
Court case: AIP, Lachezar Lisicov (Desant daily) vs. the President of Bulgaria,
http://www.aip-bg.org/library/dela/case.htm
OTHERS:
Centre for Study on Democracy publications, http://www.csd.bg
Energy Management Institute assessment, http://www.emi-bg.com/en/in-
dex.php?id=
EuroActiv list of publications on Turk Stream, http://www.euractiv.com/top-
ics/turkish-stream
Eurostat Statistics Explained, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-ex-
plained/index.php/Main_Page
Eurostat Statistics Explained, Energy Prices Statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_price_statistics
HSBC Project Finance, Project Belene Presentation of the Operational Mod-
el (prepared for BEH), Sofia-London , http://www.mi.government.
bg/files/useruploads/files/vop/belleville_financial_modelling_presenta-
tion_to_beh.pdf
Institute for Regional and Institutional Studies publications on the topic of nu-
clear energy, http://iris-bg.org/index/currentprojects/catid//itemid/
Selection of publications describing the Belene saga, http://www.aip-bg.org/
search.php?lang=en-us&q=Belene
SOURCES IN CYRILLIC ALPHABET:
Институт за пазарна икономика, Какво да се прави с проекта АЕЦ «Бе-
лене». (Оценка на необходимостта, рисковете, разходите и въздей-
ствията) [What to do with NPP Belene: Assessment of Needs, Risks, Costs
and Impacts], София, .., http://ime.bg/var/images/NPS_Belene_
Assesment_WTD.pdf
Нигматулин H., Правда об АЭС «Белене», “Pro-Atom”, .., http://
www.proatom.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=&m
ode=flat&order=&thold=
Vassilios Grammatikas
A Different Perspective?
Russian Interpretation
of the International Law
in the Post-Cold War Era
Abstract: Despite the fact that both the US and the USSR systematically vio-
lated the international law and more specically Art. 2 § 4 during the Cold War
period, the attitude of the Russian Federation, after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, changed towards the latter becoming a “champion” of the interna-
tional law, slamming the West in cases of unilateral actions that constituted
violations of the international law, with Kosovo being the most characteristic
case. However, as Russia grew stronger it started itself acting according to its
wider interests totally disregarding the international law (South Ossetia, Abk-
hazia – 2008, and Crimea – 2014) being the most characteristic cases. The ar-
ticle investigates into this behaviour and tries to draw conclusions regarding
the future conduct of the Russian Federation vis-à-vis fundamental principles
of the international law.
Keywords: The international law, Russian Federation, Kosovo, South Ossetia,
just war
Political scientists often refer to the international law as a “paradox”
of international relations. Nevertheless, even those states who tend
to frequently disregard the international law, usually aim at justifying
their actions by reference to applicable norms of the international law.
us, the attitude of states, especially the main international actors,
See inter alia: C. Reus-Smit, TheInternational Law, [in:] J. Baylis, S. Smith (eds.), TheGlobaliza-
tion ofWorld Politics: An Introduction toInternational Relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford
, p. -.
36
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Vassilios Grammatikas
towards the volume of the international law is still considered to be
an important driving force towards the formulation of their interna-
tional relations.
Introduction
It is probably beyond any doubt that the two superpowers, during
the Cold War era, showed very little – if any – respect to the obser-
vation of fundamental principles of the international law. A few illus-
trative examples are sufficient to display this attitude.
As for the USA, one could refer to the invasion of Grenada (),
the invasion of Panama (), and the military and paramilitary ac-
tivities in Nicaragua (s), while the USSR has been… credited with
the invasions in Hungary () and Czechoslovakia () as well
as Afghanistan (-). e reference is confined to the viola-
tions of the territorial integrity of other states for two main reasons:
(a) it is considered to be the ultimate challenge to the UN system and
values as it goes contrary to the cornerstone of the UN Charter, Art.
§ and (b) such activities are more comparable if one wishes to eval-
uate the behaviour of the authors of such violations.
If we wish to go further with portraying the attitude of the super-
powers vis-à-vis the fundamental principles of the international law,
one could also refer to the systematic vetoing by the US that blocked
UNGA Res. /, , adopted by -- votes, “deeply deplores that US led intervention
asaagrant violation oftheinternational law.”
During thePanama invasion, theUS President Mr George Bush justied theAmerican action on
four grounds: “tosafeguard thelives ofAmericans, todefend democracy inPanama, tocombat
drug tracking and toprotect theintegrity ofthePanama Canal Treaty ” (source: President Bush,
Address totheNation Announcing United States Military Action inPanama, .., [in:] Bush
Papers, , p. – para. ). However, thevast majority oftheinternational community was
not touched by the… moral causes and two consecutive GA Resolutions that were adopted on
theoccasion oftheAmerican invasion inPanama condemned theUS action. UNGA Res. /,
, adopted by -- and UNGA Res. /,, adopted by -- votes.
Theillegality of the US conduct against Nicaragua was armed at the most ocial manner
through thejudgment oftheInternational Court ofJustice, which convicted theUS for awide
range ofactivities, including arming and providing logistical support to theantigovernment
guerillas (Contras) and mining ports ofNicaragua. Text oftheJudgment: Nicaragua vs United
States [Military and Paramilitary Activities inand against Nicaragua], ICJ Reports, , p. et
seq., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/?sum=&p=&p=&case=&p= [..].
37
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
A Different Perspective? Russian Interpretation of the International Law in the Post-Cold War Era
multiple attempts of the SC to condemn Israeli armed reprisals against
neighbouring Arab states during a period of more than two decades.
In a brief comment on the overall conduct of the USSR and the US,
one can conclude that they advocated for the application of the inter-
national law only when it was in their favour (or to the disadvantage
of the opponent). On the contrary, we can observe multiple, flagrant
violations of the international law, on occasions when it was conveni-
ent for them. e impunity offered through the veto power in the UN
Security Council ensured that such actions would not entail any in-
ternational responsibility, but merely a manageable degree of politi-
cal condemnation.
. The Post-Cold War Attitude of the Russian Federation
e collapse of the Soviet Union had a devastating effect upon
its successor state – the Russian Federation (RF) – on all conceiva-
ble levels. It lost ,, km of the former territory of the USSR,
around ,, Russians were left outside its borders and the tran-
sition period had multiple adverse effects on the political, economic
and military levels.
Being in a very difficult position, for several years the Russian Fed-
eration submitted to the basic parameters of decision-making process-
es dictated by the West. us, the Dayton agreements that “ended”
the war in Bosnia & Herzegovina had the explicit approval of the RF,
while the use of force against the Bosnian Serbs during the late phases
of the Bosnian war was rendered legal through the consent of the RF
in the Security Council.
S/RES/, which, among other provisions, condemned theBosnian Serbs (only) for eth-
nic cleansing was adopted unanimously, while S/RES/, that imposed heavy sanc-
tions against theFRY was adopted through theabstention ofRussia and China. Furthermore,
S/RES/ which authorized theuse offorce by theUNPROFOR forces was accepted by Russia,
aswell asS/RES/, which authorized theadditional use ofair power toimplement thepro -
visions ofRes. . Itishighly doubtful whether Russia would adhere tothese resolutions under
dierent circumstances. For an overview oftherelevant SC decision making process on Bosnia
see: S. L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after theCold War, Brookings Insti-
tution Press, Washington D.C. , p. et seq.; D. Sarooshi, TheUnited Nations and theDevel-
opment ofCollective Security: TheDelegation by theUN Security Council ofits Chapter VII Powers,
Oxford University Press, Oxford , p..
38
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Vassilios Grammatikas
e fact that for a number of years after the collapse of the USSR
there was only one superpower (the US) and given the very difficult
position of the RF, it was extremely difficult for the latter to formu-
late an individual international law doctrine (or a foreign policy con-
cept). e Russian Military Doctrine of refers to international
cooperation to prevent conflicts and participation in the development
of the international law efforts to prevent conflicts.
is passive attitude of the RF gradually changed and this may be
attributed to two major contributing factors: () Despite assurances
given to Russia by various western stakeholders that NATO would not
expand to Eastern Europe eventually NATO aggressively expanded
to the east and south borders of the RF ( onwards), () e “sym-
pathy” of the West to the Chechen separatist movement which, accom-
panied by the humiliating defeat of the RF during the first Chechen
War (), probably gave a signal to the Russians that the West would
be willing to accept or even promote further fragmentation of the RF.
.Kosovo and Beyond
TheImpact ofKosovo on theRussian Foreign Policy
However, it is accepted that the catalyst in the formation of the subse-
quent attitude of the RF on major issues of the international law was
the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia over Kosovo. Just after the air
campaign commenced, Russia submitted a draft resolution demand-
Therelevant paragraphs read asfollows: “[theRF] – cooperates intheeorts oftheworld com-
munity and various collective security organs inpreventing wars and armed conicts and main-
taining or restoring peace; – participates inthefurther development oftheinternational law and
inthedrafting, adoption, and implementation by all countries ofarange ofeective measures
toprevent wars and armed conicts,” http://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.
html [..].
On theissue ofbroken (?) promises and its history see inter alia: M. E. Sarotte, ABroken Promise?
What theWest Really Told Moscow about NATO Expansion, “Foreign Aairs”, vol. , , no. ,
https://www.foreignaairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/--/broken-promise [..], but
see contra theocial NATO view on theissue, http://www.nato.int/docu/review//Rus-
sia-Ukraine-Nato-crisis/Nato-enlargement-Russia/EN/index.htm [..].
39
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
A Different Perspective? Russian Interpretation of the International Law in the Post-Cold War Era
ing “an immediate cessation of the use of force against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.”
During the discussion the Russian representative (and current for-
eign minister) Sergey Lavrov directly attacked the NATO countries
saying that: “the aggressive military action unleashed by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against a sovereign State was
a real threat to international peace and security, and grossly violated
the key provisions of the United Nations Charter.” Russia maintained
the same position throughout the duration of the bombings.
us, suddenly, Russia portrayed itself as a champion of the inter-
national law against the “opportunism and lawlessness” of NATO. At
the time, it seems that Russia’s stand in defence of the international
law had a dual purpose: Initially, Russia wanted to back its close ally
Yugoslavia but lacked the resources and the will to do so through a di-
rect confrontation with NATO. Even if Russia had the military capa-
bility, it is highly doubtful whether anyone in the Russian political or
military establishment would be willing to risk a military confronta-
tion with the US. erefore, it supported the fundamental principles
of the territorial integrity and political independence of states, which
NATO flagrantly violated. Additionally, Russia probably saw support
for the international law as a way to upgrade its international appeal
and get rid of its Soviet past.
It is true that, despite achieving its short-term military and politi-
cal aims (i.e. the removal of any Serbian authority on Kosovo) NATO
countries found themselves in a difficult position in justifying – on
legal grounds – their military campaign against the FRY, when com-
pelled to do so. When Yugoslavia filed applications before the ICJ
against the NATO countries that participated in the bombing cam-
paign, very few NATO countries bothered to offer legal explanations
on their actions. e most comprehensive justification was put for-
ward by Belgium, which formulated an argument basing NATO ac-
tion on the grounds of compelling humanitarian necessity, classifying
it as: “an armed humanitarian intervention, compatible with Art.
UN Doc. S// of... Theresolution was defeated asitattracted only positive votes
(Russian Federation, China, and Namibia) and negative.
SC Press Release SC/ of.., http://www.un.org/press/en//.sc.html
[..].
40
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Vassilios Grammatikas
§ of the Charter.” Similar explanations trying to apply a concept
of humanitarian intervention as legitimizing resource to force were
advanced by many western officials. However, all were citing that Ko-
sovo was a unique case and should not be used as a precedent.
ere were also scientific efforts aimed at providing the NATO ac-
tion with a veil of legitimacy. In , the Swedish Prime Minister set
up a Commission to investigate the legal nature of the Kosovo cam-
paign. e outcome was a lengthy report, the findings of which may be
summarized in the phrase used by the Commission: “the NATO mili-
tary intervention was illegal but legitimate.” is Commission, as well
as other western stakeholders, attempted to re-introduce a modern
concept of the just war theories (bellum justum), which was predomi-
nant in the medieval era, but was left aside in favour of the bellum le-
gale concept that followed the development of the international law
norms to regulate interstate relations.
http://icj-cij.org [..]; D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, Sweet & Max-
well, London , p. .
TheIndependent International Commission on Kosovo, TheKosovo Report, Oxford University
Press, Oxford , p. . TheCommission concluded that: “theNATO military intervention was
illegal but legitimate. Itwas illegal because itdid not receive prior approval from theUnited Na-
tions Security Council. However, theCommission considers that theintervention was justied
because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and because theintervention had theef-
fect ofliberating themajorit y population ofKosovo from along period ofoppression under Ser-
bian rule.” Also inp. theCommission underlines that it“also puts forward an interpretation
oftheemerging doctrine ofhumanitarian intervention. This interpretation issituated inagray
zone ofambiguity between an extension oftheinternational law and aproposal for an inter-
national moral consensus. Inessence, this gray zone goes beyond strict ideas oflegality toin-
corporate more exible views oflegitimacy.”
Thejust war theories derive from theRoman law, itwas sanctioned by Catholic scholars like St.
Augustine (
th
century AD) and St. Thomas Aquinates (
th
century AD), but itwas ocially con-
doned by theCatholic Church inthecourse oftheCrusades. Pope Urbanus declared therst
Crusade himself in AD, while thePapal Decretum Gratianum of AD ocially condoned
theconcept ofjust war. Thejust war theory was “undermined” by thecreation ofethnic states
who did not recognize a“higher authority” ofreligious or moral origin, such asthePope. Theevo-
lution ofthenotion ofsovereign equality between states resulted tothefact that states were
theonly competent authorities tojudge thecircumstances under which they could go towar
without any control or authorization by ahierarchically superior organ. Thejust war theory
was abandoned by theTreaty ofWestfalia (), which ended the Year War, and established
apeace system based on thebalance ofpower (principe d’equilibre). Thetreaty also recognized
thesovereign equality ofstates, thereby accepting theexistence ofan international community
comprising equal members, governed by acommon legal system called “Law ofNations” or “In-
ternational Law.” Thus, theCatholic Church and thePope were ocially removed from thecon-
duct ofinternational relations between states (see inter alia J. L. Kunz, Bellum Justum and Bellum
Legale, AJIL , , p. et seq.).
41
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
A Different Perspective? Russian Interpretation of the International Law in the Post-Cold War Era
At about the same time, the Canadian Government set up another
ad hoc organ the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) to assess more general questions arising from
the conduct of western states in Kosovo. e outcome of that initiative
was the creation of a concept entitled “responsibility to protect” (RP),
which advocated that, in extreme cases and after all other means have
been exhausted, unilateral armed humanitarian intervention would
be acceptable. is concept became very influential in the attitude
of states and, in , RP was incorporated in the UN World Sum-
mit Outcome Document (WSOD) but with two significant changes:
() e WSOD limits the application of RP to genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. On the other hand,
the ICISS report refers to a more general concept of “human secu-
rity,” also using the terms “crimes and atrocities” without any further
qualifications and () e ICISS report explicitly sanctions the unilat-
eral use of force in enforcing RP, while the WSOD renders any such
possibility subject to the authorization of the SC (para. ), thus re-
taining the Charter framework regarding the permissible uses of force.
Russia consistently stood against any attempt to introduce a right
of unilateral humanitarian intervention. In an often quoted statement,
the former Russian Prime Minister Mr Yevgeny Primakov said that
“UN process, not humanitarian intervention is world’s new hope.” is
position was reinforced by the fact that the vast majority of states re-
jected any reference to unilateral armed forces outside the UN Charter.
Russia (as well as other states) fiercely opposed the exten-
sion of the RP concept in situations beyond the ones mentioned
in the WSOD. us, when France tried to use RP in order to per-
suade the SC to authorize the forcible distribution of humanitarian
assistance to the victims of the cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (Burma)
in , the attempt was met with strong opposition not only from
China and Russia but also from Panama, Slovenia and Japan.
ICISS, TheResponsibility toProtect: Report oftheInternational Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty, International Development Research Centre, .
UN Doc. A/RES// of... TheResolution was adopted unanimously, thus reecting
theglobal consensus on theissues covered.
“New Perspectives Quarterly”, .., http://www.digitalnpq.org/global_services/ global
viewpoint/--primakov.html [..].
UN Doc. S/PRST//.
42
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Vassilios Grammatikas
Even in the case of Libya, SC Res. () which authorized
the use of force to protect civilians invoking RP, Russia merely toler-
ated it by abstaining from the voting procedure. e subsequent abuse
of the resolution that led to a full scale offensive against the Libyan
regime and eventually led to its collapse was severely criticized by
Russia and was also used as an argument against the adoption of any
similar resolution on Syria.
Although Kosovo has not been the only focal point of Russian for-
eign policy vis-à-vis the Balkans, it dictated, and still does, its official
position regarding the preservation of the territorial integrity of Ser-
bia and upholding the fundamental principles of the UN in general.
Despite the fact that states have recognized Kosovo so far it has
not yet been accepted to any International Organizations and this
is mainly because of the firm position of Russia (and China as well).
Russian Conduct “On theGround”
Apart from becoming an advocate for the international law, the case
of Kosovo was also the turning point for a new, more active presence
of the RF in international affairs not close, but resembling the US con-
duct in many cases. An incident indicative of this change that has not
attracted a lot of international attention is the occupation of the Pris-
tina airport by Russian paratroopers, just prior to the deployment
of NATO troops in Kosovo, which led to a near military confronta-
tion between Russian and NATO troops. e deployment of troops
as such was not meant to occupy the airport or establish an occupa-
tion zone in Kosovo but mainly to demonstrate that form that point
onwards Russia would not be a bystander in international affairs but
would assume a far more proactive role.
is attitude reached its peak in when, after the attack
of Georgia upon the breakaway territory of South Ossetia Russia re-
Avery interesting account ofthefacts isprovided by one oftheprotagonists inthat incident Gen.
Mike Jackson, [in:] M. Jackson, Soldier: TheAutobiography, Transworld Publishers, , p. -.
General Jackson (commander ofKFOR) isquoted tohave said tothesupreme NATO command-
er for Europe Wesley Clarke that “I’m not going tostart theThird World War for you” inresponse
tothedemand ofthelatter that NATO troops should block therunways inorder toprevent fur-
ther deployment ofRussian troops, http://news.bbc.co.uk//hi/europe/.stm [..].
43
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
A Different Perspective? Russian Interpretation of the International Law in the Post-Cold War Era
acted in a manner the west probably never anticipated, secured the ter-
ritory and even advanced deep into Georgian territory (in Abkhazia,
too). e subsequent recognition of the two territories as independ-
ent states by Moscow displayed an effort to secure the vital interests
of Russia regardless of the legal or political implications. is trend
culminated in the annexation of Crimea in .
Since the case of Kosovo, the actual conduct of Russia resembles
that of the United States in the sense that, when the RF considered that
a certain move would serve its strategic or broader geopolitical inter-
ests, it moved forward totally disregarding the principles of the inter-
national law that it so frequently advocated.
e main difference in the conduct of the Russian federation and
the US in this respect is that the US is based on strong political sup-
port at various levels, while Russia has a very limited leverage. is
is evident if one compares the cases of Kosovo and Abkhazia/South
Ossetia. Kosovo has been recognized by states so far, while, on
the contrary, despite pressure exerted upon former Soviet states by
Russia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia were recognized by
states (including Russia). In terms of the international law, all cas-
es constitute flagrant violations of the principle of territorial integrity
but the different approach shows a rather limited political influence
of Moscow in contrast to the US.
ANew Approach totheInternational Law
Back in , Sergey Lavrov stated that: “e Russian Federation
reaffirmed the urgent need for a multilateral world order in which
there would be no room for unilateral diktat.” is multipolar world
concept has since been included in all strategic and foreign policy
concepts of the Russian Federation, thus demonstrating the will
http://www.kosovothanksyou.com [..].
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Abkhazia_and_South_Ossetia
[..].
SC Press release SC/ of.., http://ww w.un.org/press/en//.SC.html
[..].
http://www.idsa.in/eurasia/resources.html [..]. Also see thelatest Foreign Policy Con-
cept adopted in, http://archive.mid.ru//brp_.nsf//FECEDBEBD
[..].
44
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Vassilios Grammatikas
of the Russians to restore the position of Russia as a superpower but
also to challenge the dominating position of the US in global affairs
and its monopolar approach.
In reality, however, the more power the Russian Federation asserts,
the more disregard for principles of the international law we can ob-
serve. Given the low international influence, Moscow frequently uses
other types of “unconventional weapons” such as its energy resources
to impose or facilitate its positions. e energy crises with Ukraine
in and (and with Moldova as well) are indicative of this
trend, which usually works due to its broader impact.
At the doctrinal level, Russia still advocates in favour of the interna-
tional law but only when it is convenient. Its actual conduct comprises
profound disregard of fundamental principles of the international law,
which is evident in the violation of the territorial integrity of Georgia
and Ukraine. When compelled to do so, it also applies moral arguments
such as that the annexation of Crimea – in the words of president Pu-
tin – “corrected a historical mistake.” e most basic argument how-
ever is the assimilation of these cases to Kosovo. In Putin said
that: “If someone considers that Kosovo should be granted full inde-
pendence, then why should the peoples of Abkhazia and South Osse-
tia not have the same right to statehood?” Since there is no plausible
response from the West (the theory of “illegal but legitimate” cannot
be put forward as a serious response) this type of argumentation ap-
pears, in the eyes of Moscow, to be sufficient for justifying previous
actions and a solid basis for its future conduct.
In reality, given the fact that is not and that Russia cannot
tolerate the behavior of the West at that time, it seems that the Rus-
sian foreign policy dogma moves towards some kind of “equality in il-
legality” with the US and the West in general. If Kosovo is justified,
so is Abkhazia and South Ossetia. e current foreign policy aspira-
tions of Russia are described in the best way by the former US under-
secretary of State Ronald Asmus: “the international community, and
above all, the United States and the EU, did not take seriously Mos-
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe- [..].
Press Conference of .., The Kremlin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/tran-
scripts/ [..].
45
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
A Different Perspective? Russian Interpretation of the International Law in the Post-Cold War Era
cow’s threats that it would retaliate against Kosovo’s independence
by moving against Georgia … How the conflict in Kosovo on the one
hand, and in Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other, became linked
is a saga involving the international law, changing Western diplomatic
priorities, and the dynamics of a resurgent Russia seeking to challenge
the United States and Europe.”
Unless some kind of rules – even in dealing with international ille-
galities in an equal manner – are found between Moscow and the US
(or the west in general), this confrontation will continue with potential
serious consequences for international peace and security.
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Asmus R., A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia Russia and the Future
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46
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Vassilios Grammatikas
DOCUMENTS:
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Activities in and against Nicaragua], ICJ Reports, .
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port of) e Responsibility to Protect, International Development Re-
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UNGA Res. /,
UNGA Res. /,
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United Nations Security Council Resolutions:
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S/RES/,
Other UN documents:
UN Doc. A/RES//
UN Doc. S/PRST//
Official view of the NATO in the crisis in Ukraine, , http://www.nato.
int/docu/review//Russia-Ukraine-Nato-crisis/Nato-enlargement-
Russia/EN/index.htm
e Russian Military Doctrine, , http://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doc-
trine/russia-mil-doc.html
e Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, , http://archive.mid.ru//
brp_.nsf//FECEDBEBD)
OTHER:
Interview with Jevgieni Primakov, “New Perspectives Quarterly”, ..,
http://www.digitalnpq.org/global_services/ globalviewpoint/-
-primakov.html
List ofstates recognizing independent Kosovo, http://www.kosovothank-
syou.com
Tomasz Stępniewski
Russia in Global Politics
in the Context of the Western
Balkans
Abstract: The aim of this article is to look at the Western Balkan region from
the perspective of foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Russia’s political
presence in the Balkans has a long tradition. Throughout the centuries as well
as today, Russian interests were focused on the following issues: geopolitical
rivalry with other powers, economic, security and cultural-religious aspects –
Orthodox religion was followed by the Balkan nations. However, the Western
Balkans is not the area of Russia’s most vital interests. We can notice that Rus-
sian engagement in resolving contentious issues in the Balkans – mediation
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo – was instrumental and manifested
its hypocrisy. On the one hand, Russia helped to stabilize the situation and
guarantee security in the region. On the other hand, it defended the territo-
rial integrity of Serbia and opposed the recognition of Kosovo’s independ-
ence. Yet, the opposition did not prevent Russia to announce the independ-
ence of Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008 (six
months after Kosovo’s declaration of independence).
Keywords: Western Balkans, Russia foreign policy, Russia’s Balkan policy, se-
curity
Introduction
e aim of this article is to look at the Western Balkan region from
the perspective of foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Rus-
sia’s political presence in the Balkans has a long tradition. rough-
This paper was written while theauthor was undergoing research training at Harvard University
inJune–August .
TheWestern Balkans composed ofAlbania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, theFormer Yugo-
slav Republic ofMacedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo.
48
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Tomasz Stępniewski
out the centuries as well as today, Russian interests were focused on
the following issues: geopolitical rivalry with other powers, economic,
security and cultural-religious aspects – Orthodox religion was fol-
lowed by the Balkan nations. However, the Western Balkans is not
the area of Russia’s most vital interests. We can notice that Russian
engagement in resolving contentious issues in the Balkans – media-
tion in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo – was instrumental and
manifested its hypocrisy. On the one hand, Russia helped to stabilize
the situation and guarantee security in the region. On the other hand,
it defended the territorial integrity of Serbia and opposed the recog-
nition of Kosovo’s independence. Yet, the opposition did not prevent
Russia to announce the independence of Georgian provinces of Ab-
khazia and South Ossetia in August (six months after Kosovo’s
declaration of independence).
At the turn of the century, geopolitical situation of the Western Bal-
kans changed dramatically. Integration with Euro-Atlantic structures
– in particular with the EU, but also with NATO became a strategic
objective of the states created after the collapse of the former Yugosla-
via. e condition for integration with Western structures is to resolve
the conflicts and disputes faced by individual countries of the Balkans
– the problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, etc. It seems that
without Russia’s involvement it will be hard to resolve these regional
conflicts, and thus to change the situation in the region.
. Russia’s Relations with the West – General Observations
Generally speaking, the relations between the West (European
Union, United States of America and NATO) and the Russian Fed-
A. Włodkowska, Rosja na Bałkanach, „Rocznik Inst ytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej”, T. Kapuśniak
(Stępniewski), A. Gil (eds.), (), no. : Region czarnomorski, p. . See also: „Rocznik Instytutu
Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej”, J. Olchowski, T. Stępniewski, B. Bojarczyk, A. S obol (eds.), (),
no. : Bosnia and Herzegovina and theWestern Balkans; Bałkany Zachodnie aintegracja europe-
jska. Perspektywy iimplikacje, R. Sadowski, J. Muś (red.), Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej,
Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Warszawa .
M. Babić, Rosja na Bałkanach Zachodnich. Interesy narodowe iwpływy polityczne, [in:] M. Babić, I. Jaki-
mowicz-Ostrowska (eds.), Bałkany wXXI wieku. Problemy konsolidacji iintegracji, Warszawa
, p. -.
49
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Russia in Global Politics in the Context of the Western Balkans
eration collapsed in the last two years. e war between Russia and
Ukraine, destabilisation of the south-eastern regions of Ukraine and
Crimea annexation by Russia violated the previous logic of the re-
lations between the West and Russia. is is due to the changes
on the political scene of the Russian Federation, as well as the need
to adapt NATO to new challenges and threats of the twenty-first cen-
tury, USA’s search for its place in an increasingly complicated structure
of international relations and changes in the institutional structure
of the European Union. A rivalry for the “common unstable neigh-
bourhood” or the area of Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus
is also significant for EU–Russia relations. Launched in May ,
the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative is a long-term project which
is to contribute to strengthening political and economic relations be-
tween the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova
and Ukraine. is does not change the fact that the Eastern Partnership
is very often seen by Russian policy makers as an attempt to compete
for the shared neighbourhood. Changes in EU–Russia relations that
took place in the years - partially result from the enlargement
of the EU in towards the East, as well as from the aspirations
of newly admitted countries from Central Europe to develop a com-
mon EU position towards Russia. erefore, one cannot be surprised
that the Eastern Partnership initiative was proposed by Poland (along
with Sweden) in order to change and develop the existing relationship
between the EU and the six Eastern partners.
Another challenge related to the relations between the West and
Russia is associated with security issues, including energy security. Un-
til the outbreak of the war between Russia and Ukraine we were wit-
nessing a debate on new security architecture in Europe. On the one
Wider: A. Wilson, Ukraine Crisis. What it Means for the West, New Haven and London
; R. Menon, E. Rumer, Conict inUkraine: TheUnwinding of thePost-Cold War Order, Cam-
bridge ; R. Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine. Crisis intheBorderlands, London-New York .
More in: H. Haukkala, From Cooperative toContested Europe? TheConict in Ukraine asa Cul-
mination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations, “Journal of Contemporary Euro-
pean Studies”, vol. , , no. , p. -; N. Witney, S. Dennison, Europe’s Neighbourhood:
Crisis asthe New Normal, “Policy Memo”, no. , June , European Council on Foreign Re-
lations, www.ecfr.eu; З. Станкевич, Т. Стемпневски, А. Шабацюк (ред.), Безопасность
постсоветского пространства: новые вызовы и угрозы, Люблин-Москва / Z. Stankie-
wicz, T. Stępniewski, A. Szabaciuk (eds.), Security ofthePost-Soviet Region: New Challenges and
Threats, Lublin-Moscow .
50
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Tomasz Stępniewski
hand, we had a strong position of the majority of European countries
(in particular the Central European countries) concerning the need
to maintain the existing status quo, which is the current security ar-
chitecture in which various organizations responsible for security are
independent, but cooperate with one another. On the other hand,
it was proposed to modify this architecture by a decision-making cen-
tre in the Kremlin and Russian intellectuals who indicate the need for
a new European security architecture involving Russia. It is worth not-
ing that the decreasing tendency of the USA to get involved in Europe-
an security issues also contributes to raising the problem of the future
shape of European security. As a result of Russia’s wars, the percep-
tion of safety by individual EU and NATO member states, but also by
the countries which are not members of military organizations, has
changed.
On the other hand, the problem of energy security refers to, among
others, attempts to create a common EU energy policy. In addition,
energy issues emphasise the importance of transit countries (e.g.
Ukraine), their potential and possibilities to influence the situation
in the region. e sooner we succeed in creating a common EU energy
policy (“interconnectors” can be the first step), the more independ-
ent and less vulnerable the Union will become in case energy issues
are used as a tool to fight for the interests of third actors (e.g. Russia).
A “reset” in the relations between the USA and Russia from the be-
ginning of Barack Obama’s term was a consequence of redefining
strategic priorities and pragmatism of the United States of America
in contemporary international relations. However, the significance
of this “reset” turned out to be a failure from the point of view of Rus-
sia’s interests in the region. is does not change the fact that Russia
is trying to use the weakening of the USA’s hegemony to push back
the USA and NATO from the borders of Russia and the post-Soviet
area, but also the Western Balkans. Russia’s strategic goal is to weak-
en transatlantic ties.
Concluding, the West–Russia relations are based, on the one hand,
on cooperation (e.g. non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
More in: M. M. Balmaceda, ThePolitics ofEnergy Dependency. Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania be-
tween Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure, Toronto-Bualo-London .
51
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Russia in Global Politics in the Context of the Western Balkans
tion, successful completion of operations in Afghanistan, or solving
the crisis of Iran’s nuclear program), on the other hand, on confronta-
tion (post-Soviet region and maintaining the zones of influences, Rus-
sia’s opposition to NATO enlargement to the East, “gas wars,” the war
between Russia and Georgia in , the war between Russia and
Ukraine in -, the development of the USA’s missile defence
shield in Central Europe, etc.). is does not change the fact that Eu-
ropeanization (westernization) of Russia is in the interests of the West.
In order to achieve this objective, Russia needs to be committed and
willing to reform. Yet, it must be modernization in Western European,
not Russian meaning. If Russia wants to fully participate in the newly
emerging structure of international relations and it wants to make up
for the lost time (technological and even civilization lagging) in relation
to the most developed countries of the West and the world, it must
engage in modernization that will bring benefits to Russia itself and
its relationships with the West and the rest of the world.
. Putin’s Russia and its Foreign Policy
Upon Vladimir Putin’s coming to power (officially in ) for-
eign policy of the Russian Federation changed. It is worth noting that
the strong position of the President in the Russian political system
makes the president exert a large impact on both the internal situa-
tion as well as the external activity of this state, i.e. its foreign policy.
Strong position of the president in relation to the government, and
weak position of the parliament, result in the president being the head
of the whole decision-making apparatus. Gleb Pavlovsky, former advi-
sor to President Vladimir Putin, rightly noticed that political scienc-
es know a position of a player who is neither a pawn nor a king, but
the one that organizes the rules of the game and its space. is is how
he referred to President Putin, who – according to Pavlovsky – is not
only a player, but a master of the game, and its host.
Russia–Ukraine war resulted innumerous West-Russia joint projects tobe cancelled or post-
poned.
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Tomasz Stępniewski
Bearing in mind the position of the president in Russia’s politi-
cal system, he serves as a principal architect of the foreign policy
of the Russian Federation, while – under the constitution – the im-
plementation of guidelines and directions of this policy rest with
the government. Considering the position of the president of the po-
litical system, the personality of the Kremlin’s ruler is also signifi-
cant. When Vladimir Putin took the office after his predecessor
Boris Yeltsin, many politicians from Yeltsin’s environment perceived
him as a harmless person, a kind of puppet on the board of the state
power. Analysing the first weeks in the office one could also have
such a feeling. However, President Putin was the embodiment of will
and energy as both the president and prime minister, a key role on
the Russian political scene. Putin’s taking up the power (or more
accurately, with his team taking up the power) brought changes
to Russia’s policy. More emphasis is placed on pragmatism, bilater-
al relations with individual countries of the CIS (in terms of “near
abroad”), as well as individual countries and/or regions of interest
(including the Balkans). erefore, in the foreign policy assumptions
of June a statement that “the primary area of Russia’s foreign
policy is a multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the Member
States of the CIS” can be found. After taking the office, President
Putin pays an official visit to Kiev, Minsk, and then to London (May
). In politics, Putin was also a pragmatist, thus he quit the poli-
cy of concessions and even subsidies to Ukraine (i.e. limiting the ex-
port of Ukrainian pipes).
Russia’s foreign policy – breaking up with the doctrine of Yevgeny
Primakov’s multipolarity after September – openly changes
the vector of efforts to pro-Western policies, while strengthening
economic and political relations with selected CIS countries, particu-
larly Ukraine. It should be noted that after September , a qual-
A. Moshes, TheEvolution ofRelations within theSlavic Triangle: AView from Russia, [in:] A. Mosh-
es, B. Nygren (eds.), ASlavic Triangle?, Stockholm , p. -. See also: N. Babayan, TheReturn
ofthe Empire? Russia’s Counteraction toTransatlantic Democracy Promotion inits Near Abroad,
“Democratization”, vol. , , no. , p. -.
Pro-western vector ofRussia’s activities eected mainly inthe relations with USA, and less
inthepolicy towards Ukraine.
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Russia in Global Politics in the Context of the Western Balkans
itative change in relations between Russia and the NATO arose.
In addition, Putin’s team put the foremost emphasis on strengthen-
ing Russia, raising it from ’s crises – as it is commonly a period
of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency – strengthening its international po-
sition as an active player, which not only has its own interests but
is also able to defend them. An example of radical change in Russia’s
foreign policy can be seen in the recent developments in the East –
the war with Georgia in and the separation of two Georgian
provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the war with Ukraine and
the annexation of the Crimea. erefore, Russia violated the princi-
ples of international law and the logic of the contemporary interna-
tional system.
. Russia in the Western Balkans
According to Dušan Reljić, we can identify three pillars of Rus-
sia’s commitment in the Western Balkans. e first pillar is to have
a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and therefore the ability
to block all processes and activities in the Western Balkans which are
contrary to the interests of Russia. e second pillar concerns a grow-
ing economic importance of Russia in the region – particularly on en-
ergy issues, but also as an investor and trading partner. e third pillar
is the historical backgrounds, cultural and political ties between Russia
and the countries of the Western Balkans. e countries which are par-
ticularly vulnerable to Russian influence are Serbia and Montenegro.
When analysing Russian influence in the Western Balkans –
in the opinion of Marko Babić – one should keep in mind the existence
of a kind of EU–Western Balkans–Russia triangle, where the weaken-
ing of relations with the EU entail an increased involvement of Rus-
sia in this area. is regularity concerns particularly Serbia – a key
Balkan state for Russia’s interests.
We should mention Vladimir Putin’s speech on March when he stated that „political mem-
bership ofRussia inNATO isnot impossible inthefuture” (source: http://www.president.kremlin.
ru/). Interestingly, in itseems literally impossible.
For reference see: M. Babić, op. cit., p. .
Ibidem, p. .
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Tomasz Stępniewski
One might also look at the energy situation of the Western Bal-
kans. Maps of oil pipelines and pipeline projects, as well as natural
gas pipelines and main pipeline of projects in the Western Balkan are
presented below (Map and ).
Importantly, energy plays an important role in Russia’s foreign
policy. By making individual Balkan states dependent on Russian
raw materials, Russia increases its political influence in the region.
It also uses energy dependence of each of the Balkan countries in or-
der to boost further energy projects that have maintained a dominant
position of Russia in the region of South-Eastern Europe. In addi-
tion, various energy projects submitted by Russia (such as the South
Stream, the Blue Stream) are also directed against the projects planned
by the European Union (Nabucco, whose implementation seems un-
likely). erefore, the rivalry between the powers in the Western Bal-
kans is particularly evident in the energy and planned energy routes
in the area.
. Conclusions: Russia in the Claws of Geopolitics
and the Western Balkan Issues
e beginning of the twenty-first century is marked by the global
struggle for energy, and Russia is known as one of the countries leading
“petro-policy.” But the main purpose of this geo-strategy at the time
of Putin’s Russia was to rebuild influence on their periphery, lost due
to the collapse of the USSR, including the Western Balkans. One pos-
sible way to stop the imperialist tendencies of Russia – according
to Zbigniew Brzeziński – is the emphasis on the creation of European
security along the lines of: Paris–Berlin–Warsaw–Kiev. It is therefore
vital to support the authorities in Kiev, Minsk, Chisinau in building
democratic states, which may contribute to the containment of Russia.
Cf. M. M. Balmaceda, Energy Dependency, Politics and Corruption intheFormer Soviet Union. Russia’s
Power, Oligarchs’ Prots and Ukraine’s Missing Energy Policy, 1995-2006, London–New York .
Z. Brzeziński, Skazani na współpracę, “Rzeczpospolita”, , no. ; idem, Historia Europy toczy
się dalej, “Tygodnik Powszechny”, , no. . More in: M. Klatt, T. Stępniewski, Normative Inu-
ence. TheEuropean Union, Eastern Europe and Russia, Lublin-Melbourne , p. -.
55
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Russia in Global Politics in the Context of the Western Balkans
Map 1: Oil pipelines and pipeline projects intheWestern Balkan region
Source: Energy intheWestern Balkans. ThePath toReform and Reconstructions, TheInternational Energy Agency (IEA), inco-operation with theUnited Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), Paris , http://www.iea.org, p. .
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Tomasz Stępniewski
Source: Energy intheWestern Balkans. ThePath toReform and Reconstructions, TheInternational Energy Agency (IEA), inco-operation with theUnited Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), Paris , http://www.iea.org, p. .
Map 2: Natural gas pipelines and main pipeline projects intheWestern Balkan region
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Russia in Global Politics in the Context of the Western Balkans
Conflicts with Russia’s neighbours – in particular the war with
Georgia in August , and Ukraine and now – support the the-
sis that Russia still reaches willingly for the old methods, the means
of pressure and blackmail in order to pursue its optimal strategies.
e evolution of Russian policy, based on the ideology of military
strength and the use energy as a lever, forces the actors (in particular
the countries of “near abroad”) to accept new rules of the game. A stra-
tegic goal of Russia is to use these opportunities to enlarge its politi-
cal influences in other states. Speaking about the Balkans, it should
be noted that, on the one hand, we have to deal with an increasing
importance of Euro-Atlantic institutions in the Western Balkans and
thereby weakening the position of Russia. On the other hand, as noted
by M. Babić, Russia has some plans for the future membership of some
of the Balkan countries in the European Union and thus the possibility
to gain certain political and economic benefits from such a situation.
is is due to historical, cultural, religious reasons, which result in Rus-
sia being perceived by some countries of the Balkans as a fairly close
ally and makes them open to working with it in the future.
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.
Abit Hoxha, Arbër Ahmeti, and Agim Musliu
Russian Influence
in the Western Balkans.
Carrot or Stick?
Abstract: This paper illustrates the inuences that the Russian Federation has
in the Balkans and particularly through using the Kosovo situation and Serbi-
an implication. The Russian Federation attempts to oppose the EU and the US
through using Serbia and Kosovo, often using soft and hard power by oering
both humanitarian aid for Serbia but also by helping Serbia in military and
defence aspects. This paper uses international relations theories to explain
the development of Russia’s inuence in the Balkans from a historic perspec-
tive to continue with modernization of such relations through Russian rep-
resentation in international organizations such as a UN permanent seat and
an observation seat on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Furthermore, this
paper will use game theory to explain the international relations and indirect
inuence through Kosovo and Serbia in the EU and US.
Keywords: Russia, Serbia, Kosovo, military, peace, soft power, interventionist,
realism, constructivism, doctrine of state responsibility, game theory
Introduction
Vladimir Putin’s Russia is definitely the elephant that nobody likes
to talk about in the international relations context and yet certainly
in the Balkans it plays a crucial role in Serbia’s behaviour toward its
neighbours. As such, it influences the entire Balkans. Russian Foreign
Policy in the region has two approaches that interlink among each
other in the form of doing favours to one another. ese approaches
have been developed for a longer period of time and were manifested
also under the former Yugoslavia.
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e first approach is that of military presence and hard politics,
which has its genesis both in cultural and military terms with Serbia
but also with Yugoslavia as the leader and founding state of the Non-
alignment Movement. Russian ambitions however for the Balkans date
even before that; after the fall of Berlin Wall, Russia reinvented itself
in the Balkans with the strong presence in diplomacy during the war
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. e real involvement and clash
between the Russian Foreign Policy in the Balkans as hard politics has
happened in the middle of with the early unauthorised deploy-
ment of Russian military in Prishtina Airport. After avoiding World
War III, NATO and the Russian Federation agreed on a small military
presence in Kosovo under the NATO command which in a way illus-
trates also Boris Jeltzin’s foreign policy.
e second approach is that of soft power through covert humani-
tarian aid which is camouflaged to look like a humanitarian aid but
is military aid. When Serbia declared “neutrality” vis-à-vis NATO,
it did not keep the same neutrality with the Russian Federation be-
cause according to media coverage, Russia is building a military base
in Serbia. ese information have been denied by the Serbian Gov-
ernment but situation on the ground is contradicting.
Both approaches have been amalgamated in the Russian foreign
policy with regard to the Balkans being in the United Nations, NATO
or in the European Council. When Kosovo was admitted in the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly in , a Russian representative announced
Russia’s withdrawal from such institution as a sign of protest. Natu-
rally, Serbia does play a huge role in the process but it is not one-sided
interest of Serbia only. Russian interests in the Balkans are guarded
via Serbian government by opposing NATO and American presence
in the region.
Vladimir Putin’s unpredictability scares the Balkans leaders, in-
cluding Serbia, because the scenarios of Georgia and Ukraine are
easily copied to the Balkans through Serbia. During the last visit
of Putin in Belgrade, Prime Minister of Serbia Aleksandar Vucić
E. Tota, Kosovo isOcially Accepted intheNATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Independent Balkan
News Agency”, .., http://www.balkaneu.com/kosovo-ocially-accepted-nato-parlia-
mentary-assembly/ [..].
Current Prime Minister ofSerbia.
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Russian Influence in the Western Balkans. Carrot or Stick?
asked the Russian President for his permission to speak in a public
gathering. is shows that fear from Russia is practically manifested
in many aspects because Serbia benefits from Russian support and
gains from European Union demands to fulfil conditions to align to-
ward the EU goals. A regional cold war has developed throughout
the ’s and the ’s with the dismantling of Yugoslavia and
NATO interventions through Russian foreign policy both in the form
of carrot and as a stick. erefore, this paper sheds light to a new
analysis of the Russian foreign policy, looking at it from theoretical
perspectives, and strategic and policy viewpoints, trying to explain
Russia’s impact on the politics, economy and international relations
in the region.
. Theoretical Framework
e involvement of Russia in the Balkans constitutes a challeng-
ing research topic, on the one hand, and a thrilling process of in-
quiry to widen the understanding of world politics, on the other hand.
As the paper explores the interaction between Serbia and Russia, ef-
fects on the region, their common activities and interests, choosing
the appropriate ontological approach within the theories of interna-
tional relations and philosophy of science, remains an important pro-
cess toward understanding and explaining the outcomes of growing
influence of Russia in the Balkans.
On the light of recent developments on International Politics,
the growing involvement of Russia in the Balkans is a “Trojan Horse”
against the influence of the Western Powers and with negative im-
pact on integration of Western the Balkans in European Union, while
the former is on an offensive campaign to increase its influence
in the strategic realm of world politics, the latter are on the defen-
sive mode to maintain the actual influence in the world. Such influ-
ence and implication, as we will conclude in this paper, is a threat
that may result in a breach of regional peace and security. In Katzen-
stein’s words, Western such Balkans states as Albania or Kosovo are
on “Grotian” state of nature trying to eradicate Russian influence
in the region and cooperating with EU to maintain peace and secu-
rity and rule of democratic values and international law.
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Abit Hoxha, Arbër Ahmeti, and Agim Musliu
erefore, to create a clear idea of Russian influence and its possi-
ble outcomes, interaction of Russia with Serbia will be tackled through
constructivism as scientific ontology in the sense of the theoretical
framing of this paper. Constructivism, as more an approach than
a theory, gives one more chance to navigate and produce a clearer
image in the epistemological context.
In the view of constructivism, states are principal units for in-
ternational political theory, with intersubjective key structures
in the state system, with identities and interests constructed by the so-
cial structures, and if we go further to holistic constructivism, states
interests are not only shaped by social structures but also by global
cultural and political phenomena. According to the constructivist
approach, states interests are based on social determinants of social
and political agency in action. Furthermore, Finnemore stipulates
that understanding of state interests and state behaviour is achieved
through investigating meanings, social values and structures of power
constructed through social interaction.
While “identities are the basis of interests,” a view on the history
of Russian Foreign Policy and its implications in the Balkans since
the nineteenth century, and Russian-Serbian cooperation and their
territorial claims toward other states, the idea of so called “Slavic
Brotherhood,” can explain the Serbian hesitation to shift its interests
toward “the Western hemisphere.”
us, we can go even further assuming that the use of similar meth-
ods to achieve strategic goals can establish such a common identity
and create not only systems, but a society as constructivists believe.
P. Th. Jackson, TheConduct ofInquiry inInternational Relations, Routledge, London , p. .
A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
; N. Onuf, World ofOur Making:Rules and Rule inSocial Theory and International Relations,
University ofSouth Carolina Press, ; P. J. Katzenchtein, TheCulture ofNational Security Norms
and Identity inWorld Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; F. V. Kratochvil, Y. Lapid
(eds.), TheReturn ofCulture and Identity inIR Theory, Lynne Rienner Publishers, .
A. Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and theInternational State, “American Political Science
Review”, vol., , no. , p. .
C. Weber, International Relations Theory, ACritical Introduction, Routledge, London , p. .
Ibidem, p. .
M. Finnemore, National Interests inInternational Society,Cornell University Press, New York
, p. .
A. Wendt, Anarchy isWhat States Make ofIt: TheSocial Construction ofPower Politics, “International
Organization”, vol. , , no. , p. .
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Russian Influence in the Western Balkans. Carrot or Stick?
Similar practices used by Serbia and Russia, outsourcing unlawful
activities to private actors, such as Serbia’s political and logistic sup-
port to Republica Srpska in Bosnia, and Russia’s support separatists
in Ukraine, and mutual support between Russia and Serbia, consti-
tutes in Kratochwil words “political action in terms of meaningful
rather than purely instrumental action.”
While states “act toward objects and actors on the basis of the mean-
ings that objects have for them” the meaning arises out of interaction
producing identities and interests out of “situated activity.” us, Rus-
sian interests in the Balkan energy sector, .... to balance the powers in
the region, Serbian profit from Russian humanitarian aid, direct in-
vestments and its supports toward Serbia’s political goals, produces
identities and interests out of “situated activity.”
e Russian goals to influence the Balkans through the use of soft
power is clearly emphasized in the Declaration on Strategic Part-
nership between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Ser-
bia, which indicated cooperation from political coordination and
cooperation, defence and military technical support, to the econ-
omy, trade exchanges and investments, culture, education and lin-
guistic affairs.
rough such a wide cooperation, in Finnemore’s words, Russia
and Serbia have constructed social values and a structure of powers
through social interactions. e problem overcomes the effects of Rus-
sia’s implication on the Balkans, at the concern of the EU states that
such influence will have negative impact on the regions integration
in the EU. Nevertheless, even if such integration happens, Elmar Brock,
Chairman of Committee on Foreign Affairs of European Parliament
said for Der Spiegel that: “Putin’s goal is to exert so much pressure on
the Balkan states that they either back away from EU membership or
that, once they become members they will influence EU resolutions
in a pro-Russian manner.”
F. V. Kratochwil, TheEmbarrassment ofChanges: Neo-Realism astheScience ofRealpolitik without
Politics, “Review ofInternational Studies”, vol. , , no. , p. .
A. Wendt, Anarchy isWhat States Make ofIt, p. .
Ibidem, p. .
Ibidem, p. .
Putin’s Reach: Merkel Concerned about Russian Inuence intheBalkans, “Spiegel Online Interna-
tional”, .., http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/germany-worried-about-russian-
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Abit Hoxha, Arbër Ahmeti, and Agim Musliu
e Balkans, as a fragile region where consociational democracy
has failed, with ethnically divided societies in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and Kosovo, remain a concern but also a tool with high chances
of destabilization.
e outcomes of Russian influence remain unknown for the re-
gion; however there exists a dose of predictability. rough adding
assumptions and using game theory, we will model possible effects
and outcomes of Russian involvement in the Balkans. Russian pres-
ence in the Balkans, humanitarian and military aid of Russia toward
Serbia, Russian Energy interests, and impact of Russian involvement
in the Balkans toward other actors, will be evaluated in the following
chapters, using theoretical approach explained in this chapter.
. The Escape from State Responsibility
Regardless of its involvement in threats and breach of peace and
security in Eastern Europe, Russia is not being held responsible for its
involvement in Ukraine Crisis and for a breach of international law,
and it uses outsourcing doctrine to accomplish its political interests.
According to the Article on State Responsibility for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, a wrongful act of the state entails international respon-
sibility of the state in case of an action or omission that is attribut-
able to the state under the international law and constitutes a breach
of international obligation of the state.
Moreover, Article stipulates that there is a breach of an inter-
national obligation by a state when an act of that state is not in con-
formity with what is required by that obligation regardless of its origin
or character.
inuence-in-the-balkans-a-.html [.. ].
“Every internationally wrongful act ofaState entails theinternational responsibility ofthat State.”
Article , Articles on Responsibility ofStates for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentar-
ies, [in:] Report oftheInternational Law Commission on theWork ofits Fifty-third Session, O-
cial Records oftheGeneral Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement no. (A//), chp.IV.E..
Ibidem, article .
Ibidem, article .
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Russian Influence in the Western Balkans. Carrot or Stick?
Articles , , and establish the formula that activates state re-
sponsibility in case of a wrongful act.
According to the Articles, states are considered legal abstractions
and are capable to act wrongfully only through their agents and repre-
sentatives. In this spirit, when persons committing an international
wrongful act are not qualified as agents of the state and do not have
any link with the state, the conduct is not attributable to the state.
According to Article of ILC Articles on state responsibility for in-
ternationally wrongful acts, “conduct of any State organ shall be con-
sidered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ
exercises legislative, executive, and judicial or any other functions,
whatever position it holds in the organization of the State.”
Article covers the conduct of private actors “empowered by
the law to exercise governmental functions.” But Article is limited
to the duties performed on the capacity of the governmental functions
and cannot be applied in other circumstances.
Article attributes responsibility to the state for all violations of in-
ternational law committed by the organs of the state or persons em-
powered to exercise elements of governmental authority even if they
exceed authority transferred by the state, therefore, all acts commit-
ted by private actors with directives and instruction of the states will
be attributed to the state.
Hence, Article stipulates that “the conduct of a person or group
of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international
law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instruc-
tions of, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out
the conduct.”
See: M. N. Shaw, International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge , p. -.
Draft Articles on Responsibility ofStates for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries,
[in:] Report oftheInternational Law Commission on theWork ofits Fifty-third Session, Ocial
Records oftheGeneral Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement no. (A//), p. ; see
also: M. N. Shaw, op. cit., p. .
Thestate isnot responsible under International Law for all acts performed by its nationals; see:
ibidem.
Ibidem, p. .
Article , Articles on Responsibility ofStates for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commen-
taries, [in:] Report oftheInternational Law Commission on theWork ofits Fifty-third Session,
Ocial Records oftheGeneral Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement no. (A//).
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Abit Hoxha, Arbër Ahmeti, and Agim Musliu
Commentary on Article of ILC Articles on State Responsibil-
ity identifies two situations where misconduct can be attributed
to the state and engage responsibility of the state.
The first involves private persons acting on the instructions
of the states in carrying out the wrongful act, and the second deals
with the situation where private actors act under the state direc-
tion or control. To make it more difficult, the Commentary em-
phasizes that “such conduct will be attributable to state only if
it directed or controlled the specific operation and the conduct
complained of was an integral part of the operation.” In the same
time the Commentary suggests while the link between private
persons and state exists, it is not important if they conduct quali-
fies as exercising governmental authority or not. Furthermore,
the main problem to be solved with regard to this issue is whether
the “instructions” of the state are sufficient to hold the state respon-
sible under the international law or there should be direct control
of the state over private entity.
Even with sufficient case law on determining an attribution rule
to the state of acts performed by private actors not in the capacity
of exercising governmental functions, the main issue to this matter
consists on different contradictory practices of International Court
of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
ICTY. ICJ applies the effective control test in order to attribute acts
committed by private actors, setting a high threshold almost impos-
sible to address positively to the problem of attributing separatists’
misconduct to the state supporting them.
e later is the approach of ICTY which applies overall control, an
approach which is used to establish individual criminal liability and
does not require as high threshold as ICJ approach, and the both tests
are disjunctive to each other.
Draft Articles on Responsibility ofStates for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries,
[in:] Report oftheInternational Law Commission on theWork ofits Fifty-third Session, Ocial Re-
cords oftheGeneral Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement no. (A//), chp.IV.E., p. .
ILC Commentary , p. , para. ; cited at: M. N. Shaw, op. cit., p. .
Ibidem, para. .
A. Cassese, TheNicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited intheLight ofICJ Judgment on Genocide inBos-
nia, “European Journal ofInternational Law”, vol. , , no. , p. , .
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Russian Influence in the Western Balkans. Carrot or Stick?
Two grounds for attribution set by Article – the first one is the “in-
structions” given by the state and the second one is “direction” and
“control” by the state taken apart – are supportive to the effective con-
trol test and overall control test.
e ground for attribution for conduct under the direction and
control of the state was evaluated by ICJ in several cases.
In the Nicaragua Case, even that instructions and support by Unit-
ed States to Contras was proved, the court held that:
[T ]o give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have
to be proved that that State had eective control of the military or paramilitary
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.
Court goes further by adding that:
The Court does not consider that the assistance given by the United States
to the contras warrants the conclusion that these forces are subject to the United
States to such an extent that any acts they have committed are imputable to that
State. It takes the view that the contras remain responsible for their acts, and that
the United States is not responsible for the acts of the contras, but for its own
conduct vis-à-vis Nicaragua, including conduct related to the acts of the contras.
erefore, the court set a very high threshold to attribute conduct
of Contras to USA and to hold USA responsible for the Contras acts.
According to the ICJ approach in the Nicaragua Case, in order
to attribute wrongful acts to a state, the private parties conducting
them must be completely dependent and under state’s direction and
control, even in case of violation of human rights and humanitarian
law, a state is not responsible until it is proven that the conduct was
under its direction and enforcement.
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities inand against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs
United States ofAmerica), Merits, ICJ Rep. , para. ; see also: para. .
Ibidem, para. .
Ibidem, para. .
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Moreover, ICTY rejected the ICJ approach considering it as un-
convincing toward the logic of the entire system of the international
law on state responsibility.
In order to prevent the undermining the applicability of Article ,
ICTY took the overall approach by arguing that:
[In] organized and hierarchically structured group, such as a military unit or,
in case of war or civil strife, armed bands of irregulars or rebels. ... [for] the attri-
bution to a State of acts of these groups it is sucient to require that the group
as a whole be under the overall control of the State.
e ICTY went further by adding that:
Control by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias or paramilitary units
may be of an overall character (and must comprise more than the mere provision
of nancial assistance or military equipment or training). This requirement, how-
ever, does not go so far as to include the issuing of specic orders by the State
... The control required by the international law may be deemed to exist when
a State (or, in the context of an armed conict, the Par ty to the conict) has a role
in organizing, coordinating or planning the military ac tions of the military group,
in addition to nancing, training and equipping or providing operational support
to that group. Acts performed by the group or members thereof may be regarded
as acts of de facto State organs regardless of any specic instruction by the con-
trolling State concerning the commission of each of those acts.
e approach of ICTY on the rules of attribution is more conveni-
ent with the recent developments in the international law. e overall
control test is positively applicable in order to attribute the breaches
of international law to Serbia in Bosnia and Croatia, and to Russia
in case of Ukraine.
On the other hand, an overall control test lowers the threshold set
by ICJ in Nicaragua case; therefore, the issue of state responsibility
Prosecutor vs Tadic, Case No. IT---A, ICTY, Judgment, para. .
Ibidem, para. .
Ibidem, para. .
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Russian Influence in the Western Balkans. Carrot or Stick?
for actions of private actors under instruction but not in the capac-
ity of exercising governmental functions would be more accessible.
e problem remains while ICJ reconfirmed its position on the rules
of attribution in the Case concerning armed activities in the territory
of Congo and in Bosnian Genocide Case.
us, use of outsourcing doctrine by the states, in this case by Rus-
sia in Ukraine, and possible use of Serbian minorities in the Balkans
as tactic to diminish western influence in the region, keeps Russia and
Serbia outside the scope of international law, however not outside
the scope of possible sanctions.
. Russian Foreign Policy in the Balkans
When NATO began its air campaign in Kosovo without
the UN Security Council approval, Russians perceived this as a part
of “NATO’s drive for unilateral security in Europe” (Blank ).
e Russian Federation feared that this military campaign signalled
U.S. and European domination in the international system, but also
a breach of the norm of sovereignty in international relations. is
is the moment when tensions between NATO and the Russian Fed-
eration started to rise and the impact is still long term, affecting Ko-
sovo’s foreign relations.
With the most recent mediation of the European Union between
Kosovo and Serbia in February, Kosovo is in a much better situa-
tion in negotiating and being represented in regional initiatives. is
shows that “the carrot and the stick” game played by the EU in Serbia
is working well and that Serbia has no choice but to move incremen-
tally toward the EU. In the constructive relationship between Serbia
and the EU, Kosovo plays a very important role, as Serbia cannot join
the EU without resolving the issue of Kosovo.
e Russian position over Kosovo hasn’t changed at all, even after
such agreements with Serbia have been reached. is shows that Rus-
sian policy toward Kosovo is not only to support Serbia but to (mis)
Case Concerning Armed Activities intheTerritory ofCongo (DRC vs Uganda), ICJ, Judgment,
, para. .
See: Application oftheConvention on thePrevention and Punishment oftheCrime ofGenocide
(Bosnia & Herz. vs Serbia), ICJ, , para. , , , , .
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Abit Hoxha, Arbër Ahmeti, and Agim Musliu
use Serbia for its own great power ambitions in international rela-
tions. e Russian position seeks to continue blocking any decision
in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and not only to block
Kosovo as entity but to demonstrate its veto power against the other
permanent members of the UNSC.
Russia seeks to play the role of a watchdog of the international law
in international affairs. It wants to be seen as the antidote to the failures
of international law in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a barrier to a wave
of democracy-promotion and the Arab Spring. Kosovo plays a very
important role in shaping Russian foreign policy, as it was the first in-
ternational intervention carried out without the authorization from
the UN and despite Russia’s absence in the UNSC.
In November , Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s ambassador
to NATO, announced at the NATO headquarters that about ,
(quoting Serb sources only) Kosovo Serbs are seeking to get Rus-
sian citizenship. However, this policy changed slightly after a series
of senior governmental meetings dealing with this issue, as reported
in a briefing by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs o: “We will
continue to help secure through politico-diplomatic means the le-
gitimate rights and interests of the Serbs living in Kosovo.” By do-
ing this, Russia shows how it uses Serbia as its own stick to flex its
power while at the same time guaranteeing Kosovo Serbs’ well-being
according to the Foreign Policy Concept “to provide comprehensive
protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and
compatriots abroad.”
When he visited Kosovo Serbs in , Rogozin posted on his Twit-
ter account that: “Local Serbs have lived [in Kosovo] isolated from
Serbia for a long time and trust no one but Russians.” He was repre-
B. Barlovac, Kosovo Serbs Urged toEmigrate toRussia, “BalkanInsight”, .., http://www.bal-
kaninsight.com/en/article/russia-reviews-kosovo-serbs-request-for-citizenship [..].
Eurasian Law, 21,000 Kosovo Serbs Seek Russian Citizenship, .., http://eurasian-law-breaking-
news.blogspot.de///-kosovo-serbs-seek-russian.html [..] and Ocial Website
oftheMinistry ofForeign Aairs oftheRussian Federation, Brieng by Russian MFA Spokesman
Alexander Lukashevich, .., http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_.nsf/eafab
bcbb/dbadeadda!OpenDocument [..].
Foreign Policy Concept oftheRussian Federation, .., http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/
docs///.shtml [..].
D. Rogozin, Местные сербы давно живут в изоляции от остальной Сербии и верят только
России, Twitter release https://twitter.com/!/Rogozin/status//pho-
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Russian Influence in the Western Balkans. Carrot or Stick?
senting Putin whilst meeting with the Kosovo Serbs, and did not meet
anyone from the Kosovo Government. is also shows how Russia’s
policy in Kosovo has developed, and how states use ethnic minori-
ties to exert influence in the international system. If Rogozin had re-
ally been interested in settling issues between Serbs and Albanians
in Kosovo, he would at least have met with both sides.
Even today, when Kosovo and Serbia agree day-to-day on many
things, including the Integrated Border Management and regional
representation of Kosovo, Russia still doesn’t agree. From the Russian
point of view, no human right or any other legal right is more impor-
tant than the concept of “sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Ser-
bia as prescribed by the UNSC Resolution .
During UN Security Council meetings, Russia has held very strong
positions against Kosovo. With such a stance, Russia opposes not only
Kosovo but also the US, the UK and other EU states which support its
independence. Kosovo is only represented in the UN by the Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and can only speak
through the SRSG.
In fact, not only does Russia oppose all progress that has happened
in Kosovo, but it has also tried to physically stop the Foreign Minister
of Kosovo, Hoxhaj, from speaking in the UN media corner. While Hox-
haj was addressing the media, Churkin, the Permanent Representative
of Russia to the UN, told Hoxhaj: “You are not able to talk here at all
without UNMIK person, I’m sorry sir.” Hoxhaj smiled and replied:
“Ok, then you can ask UNMIK to come here” and Churkin admitted
later that “it was just a friendly reminder.”
is anecdote shows how Russia is even physically opposing Ko-
sovo’s diplomatic representation on the international stage, not pure-
ly because of Kosovo, but because the United States supports it. is
is also illustrated by Rogozin’s view of global relations, as exemplified
to/ [..].
Resolution (), adopted by theSecurity Council at its
th
meeting, .., http://
www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/ua.htm [..].
Ambasadori Rus, Churkin, pengon ministrin Hoxhaj ne konferencen per Media, “Daily Motion”,
.., http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xlv_ambasadori-rus-churkin-pengon-min-
istrin-hoxhaj-ne-konferencen-per-media_news [..].
Russian Ambassador Churkin at theSC Media stakeout talking tojournalist, “You Tube”, ..,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OCtjTRuScIg [..].
74
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Abit Hoxha, Arbër Ahmeti, and Agim Musliu
in his Twitter post: “e world is ruled by fear and interests. Every-
thing else is propaganda.”
Russian foreign policy in the Balkans can be seen as a part of the tra-
ditional international relations approach of deterrence. Eventually Ser-
bia’s stand on Kosovo will change in an incremental manner and this,
by definition, will have an impact on Russia’s policy toward Kosovo.
However, Russia will still maintain a high-profile denial of Kosovo’s
independence, attempting to stop Kosovo by any means from access-
ing the international stage.
. Russian Security Implications in the Balkans
John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, issued a stark warn-
ing that Kosovo is one of a number of European countries which are
in line of fire when it comes to relations between the US and Russia.
While this message, delivered when he appeared before a US Senate
sub-committee in February , may or may not be true, Russia re-
mains very much involved in the Western Balkans, on both political
and operational level.
Politically, Russia considers the Rusosphere to comprise the entire
former Yugoslavia – particularly Serbia. e conflict in Kosovo is an
issue which divides the international community, despite its undoubt-
ed progress since NATO’s military intervention in and its decla-
ration of independence from Serbia in .
Russia has been seen as a potential threat to NATO since it deployed
troops in Kosovo in June without NATO’s permission. e inci-
dent almost led to World War III, according to the British Lieutenant
General Sir Mike Jackson, who over-ruled the then NATO supreme
commander General Wesley Clark by refusing to block the runways
of Pristina Airport, which would have isolated Russian troops there.
Russia has attempted to expand its sphere of influence in Kosovo
because it counters both American and European interests. Russia’s
D. Rogozin, TheWorld isRuled by Fear and Interests. Everything Else isPropaganda, Twitter release,
.., http://twitter.com/!/DRogozin/status/ [..].
Serbia and Russia Stage Joint Military Exercise, “BalkanInsight”, .., http://www.balkanin-
sight.com/en/article/serbia-russia-stage-a-join-military-drill [..].
75
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Russian Influence in the Western Balkans. Carrot or Stick?
position on Kosovo remains unchanged, despite Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s comparisons of the country with South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, in Georgia. It also seeks to block politically any progress
of Kosovo on the international and regional stages, both through
the United Nations Security Council and through Serbia.
Russia did not veto the decision to approve UNSCR , which was
adopted in June and established Kosovo as a state, but it is now
using this resolution to stop progress in Kosovo. With this, Russia
is using Serbia as a carrot and stick in Eastern Europe. In , Zlati-
bor Djordjevic, a spokesman for the Old Serbia movement, claimed
that about , Kosovo Serbs were seeking Russian citizenship. is
demonstrates how Russia focuses very closely on Kosovo both from
a strategic and political point of view.
In , Russia built the largest military base outside Russia since
the end of the Cold War. is military base in Nis in the southeast
of Serbia was established as a humanitarian base from which a Rus-
sian aircraft would operate in times of natural disasters.
It has the capacity to undertake surveillance and espionage on
the US military base in Romania, as well as accommodate Russian forc-
es in an eventual deployment to cooperate with special units of the Ser-
bian military in Nis. Added to that, being able to co-ordinate with two
other brigades in Raska and Vranje in Serbia, where each brigade has
battalions of combined forces which are already on the border with
Kosovo, demonstrates that there is significant capacity for collabora-
tion. In fact, joint military exercise has already occurred in the mu-
nicipality of Ruma in the form of a joint anti-terrorist drill.
is Russian Bondsteel (the US Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo was
the biggest newly-built US foreign base since the Vietnam War) is built
strategically close to Kosovo. Military experts claim that there are
more than humanitarian reasons behind the base at Nis just km
from the Kosovo border. According to a Serbian journalist, Dimitri-
je Boarov, “is is an example of one of those bases that goes hand
in hand with major geopolitical and/or energy projects, such as link-
ing gas pipelines.”
Kosovo presents an ideal scenario for Russian interests to initi-
ate another conflict: there is international presence; Serbia’s terri-
torial claims can be fuelled by Russian influence in the region for
another conflict – as it did in Ukraine. While the rest of the world
76
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Abit Hoxha, Arbër Ahmeti, and Agim Musliu
is preoccupied with both ISIS threats and the conflict in Ukraine,
the threat that Russia will initiate another conflict in the Balkans
remains high.
. The Economic Dimension
During the visit in Moscow in September , Serbian Presi-
dent Tomislav Nikolić said: “e only thing I love more than Russia
is Serbia.” e declaration of Serbian President, and promises of Pres-
ident Putin, confirm the good relations between two countries and
political will of Serbia to attract Russia interests toward the Balkans.
erefore, Russia’s use of soft power in the Balkans can be detected
by analyzing three main categories of Russian involvement, in three
countries in the Balkans. Russia has found cooperation with three
states, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the ex-
ception that in Bosnia its activities have been focused on the territory
of the autonomous Republica Srpska.
e Balkans as a politically fragmented region, with multiethnic
states like Bosnia and Macedonia that are politically unstable and with
a fragile security, create an comfortable environment for Russian in-
fluence. For Serbia, Russia remains one of primary partners in trade
and investment, overpassed only by CEFTA countries and the EU.
In , bilateral trade between Serbia and Russia reached
US$ , million, compared to US$ , in . Moreover, Rus-
sian direct investment in Serbia only from to amounts
US$ million. In , struggling to cut budgetary deficit, Serbia
ToRussia with Love, “TheEconomist”,.., http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternap-
proaches///russia-and-serbia [..].
J. Simic, Economic Aspects ofStrategic Partnership between Serbia and Russia, “TheNew Century ”,
, no. , p. -.
Multiple authors, Serbia Honours Russia’s Putin with Military Parade, “Bloomberg”, ..,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/--/serbia-to-honor-putin-with-military-pa-
rade [..].
77
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Russian Influence in the Western Balkans. Carrot or Stick?
received by Russia a loan on the amount of million Euros, ignor-
ing the less favourable terms than the loan offered by China.
Russian-Serbian economic relations are an object to the Free Trade
Agreement signed in . Even though European countries remain
the most important partners of Serbia in economic relations, the grow-
ing cooperation between two countries is promising for growth of Rus-
sian involvement in the Balkans. Moreover, Russian Lukoil owns
of Serbian gas stations chain Beopetrol with Gasprom as distributor,
and of gas in Serbia is supplied by Russia.
One of major projects involving two countries is South Stream pro-
ject, an oil pipeline that used to pass through the Balkans, particularly
through Bulgaria, Serbia and so on, to the EU member states. With
respect to the South Stream project, Gazprom would invest . billion,
creating jobs in Serbia – a project that was strongly opposed
from European Union and was cancelled in .
e involvement of Russia in Montenegro is of a significant lev-
el as well, one third of companies are controlled by Russians, and
Russian citizens have permanent residence. Russian state-run
Sberbank has a clientele of , people from Serbia, Montenegro,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, thus providing loans
and development aid in the states of the region with focus in agricul-
ture and infrastructure.
Given the economic dimension of economic relations between Ser-
bia and abovementioned Balkan countries, a very important aspect
of Russia’s involvement in the Balkans is humanitarian aid, specifically
humanitarian aid given to Serbian communities living in Kosovo and
Bosnia Herzegovina.
M. Szpala, Russia inSerbia – Soft Power and Hard Interests, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Com-
mentary, , http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/--/russia-ser-
bia-soft-power-and-hard-interests_ftn [..].
Putin’s Reach: Merkel Concerned about Russian Inuence.
M. Szpala, op. cit.
South Stream, http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/deposits/serbia/
[..].
Ibidem.
Russia intheBalkans, Conference Report 2015, LSE Research on South-Eastern Europe and SEESOX
South East European Studies at Oxford, p. .
Ch. T. Barber, Russian Soft Power inBalkan Peninsula, p. , https://www.academia.edu//
Russian_Soft_Power_in_the_Balkan_Peninsula [..].
78
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Abit Hoxha, Arbër Ahmeti, and Agim Musliu
During the floods of , Russia sent about tons of humanitar-
ian aid and teams of rescuer units only in Serbia, thus strengthening
the public impression toward Russia. In , beneficiaries of Russian
aid were also Kosovo Serbs, where cargo trucks entered Kosovo
territory to deliver the aid to the Serbian minority. While Serbian
Minorities remain the main tool of Serbia to influence Kosovo and
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the same time profiting from the dis-
pute with Kosovo to gain advantage in international affairs, they also
remain as a tool of Russia to blackmail and balance the West.
Russian involvement in the Balkans, more than a “Slavic Broth-
erhood,” is a strategic move to counter the spreading influence
of European Union in the Eastern Europe. erefore, in the design
of Russian Soft Power policies, the Balkans are nothing more than stick
in the hands of Russia to threaten the west. In the other hand, coop-
eration of Balkan states and the possible shift of their policies toward
Russia, not only would diminish the European future of the Balkans,
but also would create a battleground between the Russian and the Eu-
ropean and American interests.
e effects of Russia’s influence in the Balkans in terms of economy,
and the coordinated interests of Russia and Serbia in the internation-
al milieu, military cooperation and support given to Serbian entities
in other Balkan states for the Greater Serbia cause, create the terrain
of uncertainty in the region.
. Discussion
Kremlin under the leadership of Vladimir Putin established
expansionist policies as a counter effect to the European Union and
the United States growing influence in Eastern Europe. However,
the Russian expansionist policies do not have a territorial limitation,
as in their application they intent to create a more favourable envi-
ronment for Russia to succeed on its game with the West. ose poli-
Aid Delayed: Russian Convoy Blocked at Kosovo Border, RT.com, .., https://www.rt.com/
news/russia-aid-serbia-kosovo-/ [..].
79
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Russian Influence in the Western Balkans. Carrot or Stick?
cies, differ in nature with regard to the territories they are applied to,
as in Eastern Europe Russia has used hard power and military power
to achieve its interests. But in the Balkans Russia is using soft pow-
er to expand its influence as a tool for domination toward the West.
e conflict in Eastern Ukraine is only one side of the Putin’s ap-
proach that Western states have failed to address appropriately, and
they are doing the same in the Balkans by not using all pressure meas-
ures to pre-empt the growing influence of Russia in the Balkans. On
the other hand, Russia is using all legal loopholes in the international
legal order, by using private actors to initiate internationally wrong-
ful acts.
Also, Russia remains one of very few supporters of Assad’s regime,
opposing the Western approach toward the Syrian Government, and
thus by blocking any possible authorization for intervention under
Article of United Nations Charter, and by supplying the Assad’s
regime with weapons in the other hand.
Furthermore, the threat against the territorial integrity and in-
dependence of the Baltic States came in another form – the form
of questioning the legality of their independence. Even though Krem-
lin distanced itself by this initiative, when in June the Russian
Prosecutor-General’s office accepted a request to review the decision
by the Soviet Union’s State Council, the highest organ of state pow-
er, in the last months of the Soviet empire that recognized the break
of the Baltic States from the Soviet Union. Even though there are no
legal consequences of this review in the international setting, the re-
view itself is a means to spread fear in the Baltic States as, even though
they are part of NATO and the EU, they have a considerable percent-
age of Russian minority in their territories.
Given that the Baltic States form a part to two treaties of Collec-
tive Self-defence, NATO and the European Union, the only region that
fulfils the condition of Russia to act and confront the Western influ-
ence remains the Balkans. Ethnically divided, struggling with a post-
K. Golubkova, Russia to“Continue Supplying Arms” toAssad, “Independent”, .., http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/russia-to-continue-supplying-arms-to-syr-
ia-.html [..].
M. Tsvetkova, Russia Tries toSoothe Baltic States over Independence Review, “Reuters”, .., http://
www.reuters.com/article////us-russia-baltics-idUSKCNPBM [..].
80
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Abit Hoxha, Arbër Ahmeti, and Agim Musliu
conflict management situation, with territorial claims and separatist
movements within the Balkan states where a part of the population
welcomes the Russian influence in the region, and with internation-
al presence, the Balkans are the next Russian battlefield in Putin’s
quest for domination in the world. erefore, Russia’s ties with Ser-
bian minorities in Kosovo and Bosnia, and the support of Moscow
and Belgrade to the cause of Greater Serbia, especially with the open
declaration opposing Kosovo’s independence, fuel the minorities ide-
als for separatism.
However, since a confrontation between the West and Russia
is of low intensity, the Balkans will be the arena for the establishment
of Russian instruments to keep the pressure of the West toward Krem-
lin low. is is because of a threat that the use of the Serbian minorities
in Kosovo and Bosnia may destabilize the region and so throw away
years and billions of dollars of Western spending on the peacekeep-
ing, post-conflict management and state-building programs.
As a separated autonomous Serbian society has emerged in Bosnia
since the end of the war, Kosovo is still struggling to integrate Serbian
community and to establish state sovereignty over the northern part,
a part with a Serbian majority that functions separated from the rest
of Kosovo. Even though there has been progress since the negotia-
tions between Kosovo and Serbia began, there is a dark side that opens
possibilities of constituency of Serbian governance autonomous from
central state authority that could fuel a new conflict of limited nature
in the region.
ose possibilities do not affect any of the supporting states, Ser-
bia and Russia, since, according to the international law, states cannot
be held responsible for action of actors not affiliated with the states.
us, outsourcing of military activities to private actors is a method
that Serbia and Russia have used in the past.
e method overpasses the concept of Limited War, since it dic-
tates to use only limited resources to conduct a war in a limited ter-
ritorial scope, in Clausewitz words, to achieve limited political goals,
brings us to the development of new approaches toward conflicts, con-
cluding that the new forms of warfare are developed under the pres-
sure of international legal norms on war prohibition.
us, since the International Court of Justice has established the ef-
fective control test as rules of attribution of internationally wrongful
81
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Russian Influence in the Western Balkans. Carrot or Stick?
acts to states, the use of private actors such as separatist movements,
private military companies and other possible actors not affiliated
with the state, it is very hard to attribute responsibility to the states
according to the doctrine on the state responsibilities.
Conclusion
According to Collier, societies at greatest risk from a civil war are
the societies that have just had a civil war. us, after the fall of Yu-
goslavia and the end of Kosovo war, the Balkans represent a delicate
region that needed positive action with regard to post-conflict manage-
ment. e necessity of involvement of other actors shows the fragility
of peace of security in the Balkans, since few of the Balkans states are
in an ongoing process of state building.
Except for a region where positive action to maintain peace and
security is required, the Balkans also are a vulnerable region for an
outbreak of violence and a breach of peace and security. In a -year
period, from to , only the EU donated to Kosovo . billion
euro in its involvement in a post conflict management and state build-
ing process, and an initial million donated in its Common Secu-
rity and Defence Policy mission on the rule of law (EULEX). e EU,
NATO and the US’s involvement, and their investment in peace and
security in the Balkans, entails a -year long campaign, with the cost
of billions of dollars from the West.
In the eyes of Russia, the Balkans are an opportunity to black-
mail the West, since the region is politically unstable, and its states
are hostile toward each other with little progress toward cooperation
and establishment of friendly relations. Considering Putin’s aggres-
sive foreign policies, the shift of the US interests to Eastern Europe
and the Pacific, the Balkans are a perfect environment for a confron-
tation between Russian and Euro-Atlantic interests.
P. Collier, Development and Security. 12
th
International Bradfrod Development Lecture, Bradford Cen-
tre for International Development, , p. , http://www.brad.ac.uk/ssis/media/ssis/ssisnew/-
Bradford-Devlopment-Lecture,-Professor-Paul-Collier-(-Nov.-).pdf [..].
J. Hughes, Paying for Peace: Comparing theEU’s Role intheConicts ofNorthern Ireland and Kosovo,
“Ethnopolitics”, vol. , , no. -, p. .
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Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Abit Hoxha, Arbër Ahmeti, and Agim Musliu
However, the European Union, as an actor that would be the or-
ganization most affected by a successful russianization of the Balkans,
should be the first to take positive actions against a consolidation
of Russian influence in the Balkans. Pressure toward the govern-
ments of the Balkan states to follow pro-European policies and to be
in the EU agenda should emerge with the growth of Russian influence
in the Balkans.
Integration of the region is one of the most important tools that
would prevent a possible use of the instability of the Balkans by
Putin to achieve his goals. On the other hand, the Balkan states
should create a spirit of cooperation between each other and take
positive steps toward normalization of the region as a whole. Poli-
cies of denial toward the existence of neighbouring states only feed
the insecurity and possibility of another conflict, and do not con-
tribute to the peace and security in the region. A common agenda
of the region should contribute to the stabilization of the Balkans,
since it is not in the interest of the Balkan states to create an arena
for a Clash of the Titans.
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Orlanda Obad
Mental Maps on
the Negotiating Table.
Symbolic Geographies
in Croatian Accession
to the European Union1
Abstract: Some of the seminal concepts which examined the “patterns
of representation” in and of the Balkan region within the “critique of Balkan-
ism” in the 1990s were once again used and interpreted in the following dec-
ade within the body of literature that critically approached the era of the two
enlargements of the European Union. A number of authors attempted to ex-
amine the EU’s application of the conditionality policy in relation to the dis-
courses which perpetuated various “gradations of Europeanness”, but also
in relation to the national myths of many East-Central European countries,
according to which their own eastern border is envisaged as Europe’s “last
outpost”. Even today, when many of the formerly “Eastern European” coun-
tries have been EU members for more than a decade, the discursive threads
related to the symbolic power relations retain their relevance. This paper will
draw upon the examples from research performed in the pre-accession pe-
riod in Croatia in order to demonstrate how the fuzzy and porous cultural and
civilizational borders of Central Europe and the Balkans are envisaged and de-
ployed in national, regional and continental symbolic geographies. It will also
engage with the metaphor of “tidemarks” (Green), which attempts to include
both space and historical time in the analysis of the border-related practices.
Keywords: symbolic geography, European Union, Croatian accession process,
Central Europe, the Balkans
This study was originally developed and written asaworking paper within COST Action IS Re-
making Eastern borders inEurope: Anetwork exploring social, moral and material relocations ofEu-
rope’s Eastern Peripheries (-). This chapter isasomewhat altered version ofthat text.
See: O. Obad, TheImportance ofBeing Central European: Traces ofImperial Border(s) inCroatian
Accession totheEU, “EastBordNet Working Papers”, , http://www.eastbordnet.org/working_
papers/open/documents/Obad_Importance_of_being_Central_European_ [..].
88
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Orlanda Obad
At one point in her book titled Imagining the Balkans, Maria Todoro-
va, the author who first named and described Balkanism as a discur-
sive formation of a decisive impact on the perception of the Balkans
in the West, states that: “[i]n the ambiguous relation between geog-
raphy and politics within the concept of geopolitics, the latter seems
to have the upper hand.” “Europe,” after all, “ends where politicians
want it to end,” is Todorova’s conclusion in a passage which primar-
ily addressed the perils of political abuse of irresponsible scholarship,
and which later became a popular quote in various academic accounts
of the relationship between symbolic geography and politics. Among
others, there is Liotta’s assertion according to which “the mental maps
that decision makers use have everything to do with how and where
they draw the line.”
e changed political context, as I will attempt to demonstrate
in this chapter, may elicit changes in the interpretations of historical
and cultural legacies and it may also lead to the introduction of en-
tirely new notions related to national/regional symbolic geographies.
Some notions demonstrate resilience even in the face of transformed
political and societal circumstances, or they continue to function, al-
beit with slightly altered, mutated meanings. At other times, they are
dormant until a new opportunity, one which will put them back into
public circulation, arises. In this paper I will present some of the modes
in which several key notions related to national, regional and conti-
nental symbolic geographies – such as Central Europe or the Balkans
– were deployed in discourses which accompanied the political and
bureaucratic process of Croatia’s accession to the European Union.
Instead of following the diverse discursive threads which were uncov-
ered throughout my long-term research into perceptions of the Euro-
pean Union, I will focus on the ways in which borders are imagined,
employed and maintained within the different levels of symbolic ge-
ographies.
Since , I conducted several sets of semi-structured inter-
views with groups of interviewees who were in various ways related
M. Todorova, Imagining theBalkans, Oxford University Press, New York , p. .
Ibidem.
P. H. Liotta, Imagining Europe: Symbolic Geography and theFuture, “Mediterranean Quarterly ”, vol.
, , no. , p. .
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Mental Maps on the Negotiating Table. Symbolic Geographies in Croatian Accession to the European Union
to the European Union: from the Croatian negotiators with the EU,
via the law students who attended a class on the European Public Law,
to agricultural entrepreneurs who applied to the EU pre-accession
funds in agriculture, and Croatian EU officials, who were employed
in EU institutions since the country became member of the Union
in . I deliberately chose groups of interviewees who varied great-
ly in terms of age, gender, education and social status. e prob-
lem with narrowing the research solely to the groups of eloquent and
well-informed collocutors such are “intellectuals of statecraft,” is that
they “tend to draw on and embellish a loosely coherent set of myths
about nature, culture, and geography, even when they do not work
in the same end of the political spectrum.” My research confirmed
such claims: some of the most intriguing – and, also, most difficult
to analyze – “imaginings” came from students and agricultural entre-
preneurs, who related to the predominant discourses in indirect and
unexpected ways. Nonetheless, since I intend to examine the over-
lap between the symbolic and the political, and especially in relation
to the border-making practices, this chapter will primarily be based
upon the examples from the interviews with Croatian negotiators
with the EU, since they offer the richest material for such analytical
purposes.
In all of the interviews I guaranteed anonymity to the interview-
ees, for many times throughout the conversation their responses
would have most likely been phrased more carefully or diplomatically
had they not been promised such confidentiality. At times, I also left
out certain parts of the interviews which could have, and especially
in the case of negotiators, exposed the interviewees’ identity through
circumstantial information, such as their area of expertise or career
trajectories.
Gusterson and Besteman referred toin: M. Kuus, Critical Geopolitics, TheInternational Studies
Association Compendium Project, http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/criticalgeopoli-
tics_sample.pdf [..].
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. Lesser, Semi-developed, Liminal … Europe
Several key studies, which analyzed the discourse within and
about the Balkans, were published throughout the s in the con-
text of wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, which reinforced
these works’ academic prominence. For the purposes of this text,
I will examine several works which have, in the past decade, confirmed
their interpretive value in a number of critical analyses of the EU en-
largements. First is the aforementioned Todorova’s work on Balkan-
ism, in which she traces the origins of stereotypes about the Balkan
Peninsula, represented as “a bridge between stages of growth, which
invokes labels such as semi-developed, semi-colonial, semi-civilized,
and semi-oriental.”
Geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed
as “the other,” the Balkans became, over time, the object of a number
of externalized political, ideological and cultural frustrations and have
served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a posi-
tive and self-congratulatory image of the “European” and “the West”
has been constructed.
Mapping out the representations of the Balkans in various stag-
es, such as the “discovery” of the peninsula by European travellers
in the late th century, the Balkan Wars (-) which incited
news of the barbarities that upset the neighbouring, Western “civilized
world,” all the way to the more recent accounts of the wars on the ter-
ritory of ex-Yugoslavia in the s, Todorova comes to a conclusion
that the legacy of the Ottoman rule has been decisive for the Bal-
kan peninsula and that the Ottoman elements, or at least those fea-
tures which were perceived as such, “have mostly invoked the current
stereotypes.” And unlike Orientalism, “which is a discourse about
an imputed opposition,” Balkanism is “a discourse about an imput-
Cf. O. Obad, On thePrivilege ofthePeripheral Point ofView: A Beginner’s Guide tothe Study and
Practice ofBalkanism, [in:] T. Petrović (ed.), Mirroring Europe: Ideas ofEurope and Europeanization
inBalkan Societies, Brill, Leiden-Boston , p. -.
M. Todorova, Imagining theBalkans, p. .
Eadem, TheBalkans: From Discovery toInvention, “Slavic Review”, vol. , , no. , p. .
N. Lindstrom, Between Europe and theBalkans: Mapping Slovenia and Croatia’s “Return toEurope”
inthe1990s, “Dialectical Anthropology”, vol. , , no. -, p. .
M. Todorova, Imagining theBalkans.
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Mental Maps on the Negotiating Table. Symbolic Geographies in Croatian Accession to the European Union
ed ambiguity.” While Orientalism deals with “a difference between
(imputed) types, Balkanism treats the differences within one type”
so that, from the Balkanist perspective, people in the Balkans are not
necessarily regarded as essentially different from Europe, but less, or
incompletely European.
In the examining of the symbolic geography of Europe, several au-
thors have depicted a hegemonic discourse in which notions of “Euro-
peanness” and civilization gradually diminish from the West toward
the East. Related to them is the concept of “nesting orientalisms,”
which was first applied in the context of the breakup of Yugoslavia
by Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert Hayden. e concept refers
to a discursive mechanism through which the Western Orientalizing
gaze, with its tendency to instil various dehumanizing stereotypes such
as “primitivism” or “backwardness” is continuously passed on and re-
produced, predominantly in the (south)-eastern direction.
e gradation of “Orients” that I call “nesting orientalisms” is a pat-
tern of reproduction of the original dichotomy upon which Oriental-
ism is premised. In this pattern, Asia is more “East” or “other” than
eastern Europe; within eastern Europe itself this gradation is repro-
duced with the Balkans perceived as most “eastern”; within the Bal-
kans there are similarly constructed hierarchies.
Among other things, these studies present the ways in which Hab-
sburg legacy, along with other “markers” of Westerness, was used
as a proof of higher developmental rank among the nationalist elites
in Slovenia and Croatia. On the other hand, citizens of those parts
of former Yugoslavia who were placed lower on that same scale in-
vented their very “own ‘others’, whom they perceive as even lower.”
us, for example, “Eastern Orthodox peoples perceive themselves
as more European than those who assumed identities of European
Ibidem, p. .
Ibidem, p. .
M. Bakic-Hayden, R. Hayden, Orientalist Variations on theTheme “Balkans”: Symbolic Geography
inRecent Yugoslav Cultural Politics, “Slavic Review”, vol. , , no. , p. -; M. Bakic-Hayden,
Nesting Orientalisms: TheCase ofFormer Yugoslavia, “Slavic Review ”, vol. , , no. , p. -.
M. Bakic-Hayden, op. cit., p. .
Ibidem, p. .
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Muslims and who further distinguish themselves from the ultimate
orientals, non-Europeans.”
e aforementioned importance of Habsburg legacy in the na-
tional and regional symbolic geography is intertwined with the no-
tion of Central Europe. In his essay on the “tragedy of Central Europe,”
originally published in , a Czech writer Milan Kundera describes
the predicament of the Central European nations in the following
manner: politically, they are subject to Soviet domination, yet cultur-
ally they still belong to the West, which had abandoned them in spite
of their enormous contribution to “Western” or “European” cul-
ture, or, precisely because the West itself no longer cared for culture
as the fulfilment of its highest civilizational values. Interestingly, most
of the peoples mentioned by Kundera as the ones belonging to Central
Europe at the time are today among the “newer” – or, as in the case
of Croatia – “newest” members of the European Union.
Some of the authors who have attempted to deconstruct the ro-
manticized imaginings of Central Europe emphasize that it is a sort
of region which is “not a place, but an intellectual and political project
that functions to pass alterity further east,” and that its distinguishing
from Eastern Europe was based on the “moral superiority of the civi-
lized Central Europe over the less civilized Russia.” Attila Melegh, on
the other hand, asserts that the notion of Central Europe reappeared
in public discussions “in the late s and early s.” e notion
played an important – although not uncontested – role in the po-
litical call for the “return to Europe” in Eastern European countries,
and “is linked to the hierarchization of Eastern Europe, with practi-
cal consequences for the more ‘Eastern’ parts of Europe such as Rus-
sia and the Balkans.”
In the studies which discuss the usage of Central European identi-
ty in the predominant discourse of Croatian social and political elites
in the s, it may be noted that the call for the “return to Europe” –
Ibidem, p. .
M. Kuus, Europe’s Eastern Expansion and theReinscription ofOtherness inEast-Central Europe, “Pro-
gress inHuman Geography”, vol. , , no. , p. .
A. Melegh, On theEast-West Slope: Globalization, Nationalism, Racism and Discourses on Central
and Eastern Europe, CEU Press, Budapest, New York , p. .
Ibidem, p. .
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Mental Maps on the Negotiating Table. Symbolic Geographies in Croatian Accession to the European Union
which was, in case of Croatia, interrupted by the war – acquired an even
more important meaning of the “escape from the Balkans”. Rihtman-
Auguštin, in an article published in the second half of the s, as-
serts that the Balkans were abhorred not only by the ruling party, but
by the representatives of the opposition as well. e author puts it this
way: “while the ruling party threatened the people and the opposition
with the Balkan black hole, the opposition proved that it was the gov-
ernment itself that behaved in a Balkan manner, which led into that
same black hole.”
As it may be observable from the literature review presented this
far, in order to understand multiple levels of symbolic geographies
in Croatian context, one needs to take into account entities of vari-
ous sorts: imaginary as well as geographical regions, the once-existing
empires as well as the politically-produced entities, such as the West-
ern Balkans. However, in what ways such heterogeneous entities are
called upon to participate in the border-making processes, and, even
more, what is the nature of such borders, remains somewhat unclear.
is is why I will apply in the following analysis the conceptualization
of borders as “tidemarks,” a notion proposed by Sarah Green, which
challenges the understanding of border as a line – “a static entity, fixed
in place, without time.” Tidemarks should be thought of as a meta-
phor which “combines space and historical time, and envisages both
space and time as being lively and contingent.” ey simultaneously
represent “what is left after some kind of past activity has occurred,
and imply more activity to come,” a feature which, in my opinion,
makes them particularly suitable in the analyses related to symbolic
geographies.
Cf. N. Lindstrom, op. cit., p. -; D. Rihtman-Auguštin, Zašto iotkad segrozimo Balkana?, “Er-
asmus” , vol. , , p. -.
D. Rihtman-Auguštin, op. cit., p. .
Cf. T. Petrović, Dolga pot domov: reprezentacije zahodnega Balkana v političnem inmedijskem dis-
kurzu / ALong Way Home: Representations oftheWestern Balkans inPolitical and Media Discourses,
Mirovni inštitut, Ljubljana , p. -.
S. Green, Lines, Traces and Tidemarks: Reections on Forms ofBorderli-ness, “EastBordNet Working
Papers”, , http://www.eastbordnet.org/working_papers/open/documents/Green_Lines_
Traces_and_Tidemarks_.pdf [..].
Ibidem, p. -.
Ibidem, p. .
Ibidem, p. .
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Tidemarks still preserve a certain sense of line inherent in borders,
albeit “in the sense of connection and relation, in the sense of move-
ment and trajectory, and in the sense of marking differences that make
a difference,” and unlike the ways in which borders are commonly
thought about, they are not necessarily located on the territorial edges.
In the following analysis, I will attempt to examine the ways in which
tidemarks may contribute to the analysis of national, regional and con-
tinental symbolic geographies, which were present in the narratives
of my interviewees.
. EU as a Mentor
In my research of the perception of the European Union in Cro-
atia, I was inspired by the body of literature which focused on the sym-
bolic power relations in the political processes of EU enlargements
in the ’s. Such a critical perspective, among other things, in-
sisted that the issues of culture and history, pertinent to the symbol-
ic geography of the whole continent, should not be extricated from
academic research in this area. And a number of authors, who ex-
amined the EU expansion toward the East, were inspired, or, at least,
informed by earlier analyses of discourse on Eastern Europe, and, es-
pecially, the Balkans.
e relationship of the EU towards the candidate countries
in the accession process evoked colonial metaphors, which, in some
opinions, pointed to the imperial past of some of the key Western Eu-
ropean members of the Union, a legacy largely absent from the “offi-
cial” politics of representation of the EU. More often, though, a more
abstract sort of coloniality was evoked, one which does not nec-
Ibidem, p. .
Cf. J. Böröcz, From Empire and Coloniality in the “Eastern Enlargement” of the European Union,
[in:] J. Böröcz, M. Kovács (eds.), Empire’s New Clothes: Unveiling EU Enlargement, Central Europe
Review e-books, , p. -; B. Busch, M. Krzyżanowski, From Inside/Outside theEuropean Union:
Enlargement, Migration Policy and theSearch for Europe’s Identity, [in:] W. Armstrong, J. Anderson
(eds.), Geopolitics ofEuropean Union Enlargement: TheFortress Empire, Routledge, London, New
York , p. -; M. Kuus, Europe’s Eastern Expansion and theReinscription ofOtherness inEast-
-Central Europe, p. ; A. Melegh, op. cit.; J. Zielonka, Europe asEmpire: TheNature oftheEnlarged
European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford .
Cf. J. Böröcz, op. cit., p. -.
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Mental Maps on the Negotiating Table. Symbolic Geographies in Croatian Accession to the European Union
essarily imply “territorial occupation and direct exploitation,” but
rather “a complex form of domination, including the hierarchical clas-
sification of the populations of the planet, the reformulation of lo-
cal concepts of space and time, the export of sexual energies into
the East, the imperial gaze and most importantly the colonization
of consciousness.”
In a similar vein, Merje Kuus, asserts that “[t]he lack of an ex-
plicit Western colonial domination does not preclude the relevance
of postcolonial theory to East-Central Europe,” and that a critical ex-
amination of the EU enlargement through such a theoretical perspec-
tive would “highlight the dichotomy of Europe and the East” which
is seminal in this political process. e suggested dichotomy does
not function through “clear-cut dichotomies,” but, instead, through
the mechanism of gradation, which operates within and outside Eu-
rope through similar “inscriptions of otherness” – it is about the parts
of the world which are defined as “not yet” or “not fully” European.
Such a discursive mechanism, this “gradation of Europeanness”, is pre-
sent in the discourse in which EU enlargement is embedded. It enables
the discussion of certain East-Central European countries in terms
of their “proximity to, or likeness of, an idealized Europe.” And in-
stead of being encouraged to “challenge the East/West dichotomy,”
the candidate countries are only encouraged to “align themselves with
the right side.”
Attila Melegh imagines a similar gradation in the form of a slope –
an “East/West slope” or a “civilizational slope” – which is based upon
the notion of the diminishing levels of civilization in the eastward di-
rection. Such a discourse “prescribes the gradual Westernization of dif-
ferent areas of the world;” it incites “a drive to climb higher” through
the process of “upward emancipation.” Melegh traces symptoms
of such discourse within the EU enlargement criteria. In the following
passage, he comments on the Copenhagen criteria, the “essen-
A. Melegh, op. cit., p. .
M. Kuus, Europe’s Eastern Expansion and theReinscription ofOtherness inEast-Central Europe, p. .
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
Ibidem, p. .
Ibidem.
Ibidem, p. .
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tial conditions” that the candidate countries need to satisfy in order
to become member states.
It can clearly be seen that the EU enlargement process is not im-
agined as a negotiation between the assigned political body of the EU
and certain nation states, with a deadline to be met, but as a timeless
process (the question being when), of achieving certain capacities
like the “stability of institutions guaranteeing” humanitarian liberal
ideas such as the “rule of law,” “human rights” etc., or the “existence”
of a “functioning market economy” or the “capacity to cope with” cer-
tain “pressures within the Union.” Even at first glance it can be seen
that the criteria are vague and imply processes with no real end.
In an attempt to empirically research how the “core” EU voice reso-
nates among the newer EU member states, Busch and Krzyżanowski
conducted interviews with the members of the so-called European
convention, in which the representatives of then-accession and candi-
date countries, such as Hungary or Romania, participated in “drawing
up a constitutional reform plan for the EU and sketching its future”
along with the “representatives of the pre- member states and
the EU’s central institutions.” Based on the analysis of the interviews,
the authors predicted “that the incorporation of new member states
will continue the further reproduction of exclusive visions of Europe,”
which were previously conveyed by the core members of the EU.
In these exclusive visions, the EU is, for example, viewed as an entity
which should maintain the highest standards within its territory and,
simultaneously, enforce strict control over its outside borders. Even
more importantly, the authors assert that such notions of Europe fit
well within the nation-building myths of the “newer” member states,
according to which “they constitute Europe’s last outpost” while “non-
Europe starts the other side of their own eastern borders.”
Since the analysis I will present in this chapter is primarily focused
on the discourses which arise in EU’s antechamber, before the acces-
sion, I will only briefly touch upon the findings of the more recent re-
Ibidem, p. .
B. Busch, M. Krzyżanowski, op. cit., p. -.
Ibidem, p. .
Ibidem, p. .
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Mental Maps on the Negotiating Table. Symbolic Geographies in Croatian Accession to the European Union
search performed by Kuus with the EU civil servants in Brussels. is
study claims that the discursive articulations of East-West divisions
– within the EU institutions, therefore on the very elite end of the so-
cietal spectrum at least – are increasingly subsiding, or that this divi-
sion is one among “many axes of differentiation” which arise between
Northern and Southern, rich and poor, big and small countries, etc.
Or, to be more precise, the distinctions pervade, albeit they should be
sought on more subtle, class-related levels. ey may be, for example,
discernible in the matters related to personal style and taste, in which
the former Eastern European are still recognized through the lacks
thereof, while “[a] certain casual self-confidence in movement, pos-
ture, and approach, with clothing and accessories only in a supporting
role – a certain urbanity of continental noblesse de robe – still marks
a person who is unlikely to come from central Europe.”
. Mental Maps and the Negotiating Table
In the interviews with the Croatian negotiators with the EU
I attempted to follow the thread of research which examines, as Li-
otta writes, how “divisions and linkages that history, culture, religion,
politics, and empire have drawn for Europe are still forces at play to-
day in the mental maps that decision makers bring to their policies.”
e question in my research with Croatian negotiators with the EU
which elicited most answers concerning such “divisions and linkages”
M. Kuus, Geopolitics and Expertise: Knowledge and Authority inEuropean Diplomacy, Wiley-Black-
well, Oxford .
Ibidem, p. .
Ibidem, p. -.
Theset ofinterviews which will be examined inthis chapter was conducted at theend of and
thebeginning of. I nthis period, Iinterviewed six negotiators who belonged totheso -called
Negotiating Team for theAccession oftheRepublic ofCroatia totheEuropean Union. At thetime
this set ofinterviews was performed, there were negotiators intheteam, headed by theso-
called chief negotiator. Each oftheinterviewees included inthis research was responsible for
negotiations inone or more oftheso-called chapters – each ofthem covering aspecic area
ofpolicy such as“science and research” or “judiciary and fundamental rights.” Ialso performed
asecond set ofinterviews with negotiators in and , theanalysis ofwhich will not be
included inthis chapter.
P. H. Liotta, op. cit., p. .
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asked the interviewees to situate Croatia according to its regional af-
filiation.
In many parts of the interviews, negotiators expressed very prag-
matic notions in their perception of the EU. As one of the interview-
ees succinctly put it, the Union was not to be understood as a “magic
wand,” one which would make things right at the very moment of Cro-
atia’s accession. e European Union was, as some of the interview-
ees said, a community of ordinary people, who are made of “flesh and
blood,” and the Union itself does not “function flawlessly” as an or-
ganization. Another rather common argument which favoured the EU
accession emerged in the interviews: as Croatia cannot remain iso-
lated regardless of the accession, it makes more sense for the coun-
try to “participate in the making of these decisions, than to be left
out,” and still be expected to act according to the decisions decided
upon elsewhere. In such notions, there were no traces of discursive
mechanisms which essentialize differences and turn them into val-
ues. However, as it turned out, those mechanisms were not inexist-
ent, but rather inactive, and the question regarding Croatia’s regional
affiliation clearly revealed that underlying such politically pragmatic
perceptions of the EU there was another level of different, hierarchi-
cal notions of culture and identity.
A typical example of such change of levels in the notions related
to Europe and the EU was an interviewee who first stated that the EU
was based upon, among other things, the economic interest of its
members to strengthen their position on the global market. e argu-
ment in favour of Croatia’s joining the EU is clear: as a small country
of five million people, it could use its membership to make its position
stronger. In another part of the interview, however, the same negotia-
tor explains that Croatia is positioned on the crossroads of different
cultures, and that its future success depends upon the country’s abil-
ity to move away from “the Balkan” in its identity, and “apply the way
in which the organized states of Central Europe” function.
For amore detailed account oftheresearch with theCroatian negotiators with theEU, please
see: O. Obad, Imperij kao uzvraćanje udarca: predodžbe okulturi iidentitetu uhr vatskih pregovarača
s Europskom unijom, “Narodna umjetnost”, vol. , , no. , p. -.
Cf. A. Melegh, op. cit., p. .
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C: … In this, we were greatly helped by Austrians and Hungar-
ians, when they enslaved us a couple of hundred of years ago, so that
… it did leave a deep trace, and especially in the perception of cul-
ture, and so on.
X: e perception of culture?
C: Among our people, no?
X: Oh. And how do our people perceive culture?
C: Culture, the meaning of culture, regardless of the fact that ma-
terial poverty, which lasted for a long time, probably did make a lot
of impact here. But, our people have the tendency to consume culture,
even the one … traditionally Austro-Hungarian, no? ere are a lot
of people who want that, no?
X: What do you mean by that concretely?
C: Well, theatre, such fine things, no?
e question of regional affiliation led the interviewees to talk
about culture and history, and it is in this realm that this negotiator
switches from the pragmatic rhetoric of “mutual interests” to a clear
example of a “civilizational slope.” Suddenly, Croats are not all that
equal to other EU members, but placed somewhere in-between
the more civilized nations of Central Europe and its threatening Bal-
kan surrounding. ese statements point to the importance of impe-
rial legacy in the current political context: faced with the discourse
of EU enlargement, in which historical ties with the West are highly
valued, even the “cultural enslavement” by the civilizationally more
advanced nations may be interpreted as a lucky twist of Balkan fate.
Most of negotiators that I interviewed placed Croatia in the region
of Central Europe, which seemed to be a regional affiliation perceived
as shorthand for “European” in the context of EU accession. When
asked the same question regarding the country’s regional affiliation,
another negotiator answered that Croatia could be seen as related
to three different regions: the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and Cen-
tral Europe. Still, in the part of the interview in which she explains
the symbolic importance of EU accession, she underlines the coun-
try’s belonging to Central Europe as a region which is part of “Western
culture and civilization.” In the following answer, the same negotiator
M. Kuus, Europe’s Eastern Expansion and theReinscription ofOtherness inEast-Central Europe, p. .
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reveals how the supposedly strictly political process of accession in-
tersects with symbolic geography.
D: We always try to emphasize that we are a part of Central Eu-
rope, that we are a part of that Western culture and civilization, that
we are significant and important – which we are – and it [Croatia’s ac-
cession to the EU] will be that icing on the cake, I would say. So that:
yes, the answer is definitely yes. We deserve to be in the Union because
we are like that already, and we will be, in a few years, even better, and
that definitely is … merit for the people, no? You know … e formal
recognition of Croatia as a country that we already recognize it to be,
and on that symbolic-cultural, culturological level that date will defi-
nitely be … it.
While joining the EU is a matter of formal recognition of the coun-
try’s already-existing achievements, belonging to Central Europe
and the Western civilization seems to be linked to the perception
of the country’s overall importance, which is reminiscent of the “gen-
erative doubts” which are, in Kiossev’s opinion, characteristic of pe-
ripheral European cultures. It is the pervasive sense that “they have
appeared too late and that their life is a reser voir of lacks of civilization,”
which stimulates the periphery to ceaselessly attempt to catch up with
the West, or devise other strategies of coping with this sense of lack.
Another recurrent theme in the interviews was the notion of Cro-
atia as more advanced and adjusted to “Western culture and civi-
lization” than its South-Eastern neighbours, which is reminiscent
of the overlap of symbolic geography and politics that Busch and
Krzyżanowski point to: the reproduction of “exclusive visions of Eu-
rope,” which is present in the “core” EU voice, finds its fertile ground
in the national myths of newer EU members, according to which “non-
Europe starts on the other side of their own eastern borders.” Ref-
erences to Croatia’s Habsburg legacy were, at times, surrounded by
examples of such an overlap in my interviews, as well.
A. Kiossev, Notes on Self-Colonising Cultures, http://www.kultura.bg/media/my_html/biblioteka/
bgvntgrd/e_ak.htm [..].
Ibidem.
B. Busch and M. Krzyżanowski, op. cit., p. -.
Ibidem, p. .
101
Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej • Rok 13 (2015) • Zeszyt 5
Mental Maps on the Negotiating Table. Symbolic Geographies in Croatian Accession to the European Union
In the following example, the interviewee asserts that it is the coun-
try’s Central European background which makes Croatia more ad-
vanced than its immediate South-Eastern surrounding, even
in the sphere of the economy. And the “future” date of EU accession
is related to “going back” in time, and amending the disruption which
occurred with the dissolution of the Austria-Hungary.
A: We have no use in making comparisons with Bosnia, Serbia,
Montenegro, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, which will, in nine out
of ten analytical showings, demonstrate that Croatia is in the first
place. at was clear to me even before somebody started such an
analysis. But, through its economic structure and history, economic
position even in the time of Yugoslavia, Croatia is somewhere close
to the countries of Central Europe, so that the membership in the Eu-
ropean Union will, in a way, close that chapter which was started with
the dissolution of the Austria-Hungary.
In a somewhat more meandering argument, another negotiator
points out that Croatia is placed “in that South European surround-
ing,” a designation which bypasses the more symbolically burdened
regional affiliations. And although he does mention the country’s
“common history” with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Italy,
this negotiator maintains that fulfilling the EU requirements is, none-
theless, more important.
B: So, probably a land-registry which we use since, which was great,
since Maria eresa, qualifies us to have some, I don’t know, maybe
to have books in a better order than, maybe, Serbia or Bosnia or, I don’t
know, maybe, Greece. I don’t know how much it will contribute. But
we definitely are in that South European surrounding, and there are
no question marks about it, we are here.
Apart from the workings of the discursive mechanism of “nested
orientalism,” which, more often than not, deployed Croatia’s Habsburg
legacy in the essentializing of differences between Central Europe
and the Balkans, the aforementioned land-registry may be interpret-