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Before Forgiveness: The Origins of a Moral Idea
Abstract
In this book, David Konstan argues that the modern concept of interpersonal forgiveness, in the full sense of the term, did not exist in ancient Greece and Rome. Even more startlingly, it is not fully present in the Hebrew Bible, nor again in the New Testament, or in the early Jewish and Christian commentaries on the Holy Scriptures. It would still be centuries-- many centuries-- before the idea of interpersonal forgiveness, with its accompanying ideas of apology, remorse, and a change of heart on the part of the wrongdoer, would emerge. For all its vast importance today in religion, law, politics, and psychotherapy, interpersonal forgiveness is creation of the 18th and 19th centuries, when the Christian concept of divine forgiveness was finally secularized. Forgiveness was God’s province, and it took a revolution in thought to bring it to earth and make it a human trait.
... De acuerdo con Platón el sabio es invulnerable a las acciones de los otros y, por lo tanto, no tiene nada que perdonar; por otro lado, el sabio tampoco actúa mal, así que no hay razón para que sea perdonado (Griswold, 2007). Y algo semejante proponen la ética estoica y epicúrea, que desdeñan esta actitud y la consideran poco valiosa (Griswold, 2007;Konstan, 2010;Nussbaum, 2016). ...
... Mientras que el único sujeto del verbo salakh es Dios, el término nasa (en griego aphes) se usa para referirse al perdón entre personas. Pero en la traducción del Antiguo Testamento al griego, se introduce además el término sungnômê, que se utiliza seis veces, aunque ninguno de sus significados se traslapa (Konstan, 2010). ...
... Ahora bien, la consideración de este conjunto de casos impide ver al perdón como un subproducto de la tradición judeocristiana, como sugieren Nietzsche y Nussbaum, y/o reducirlo a una actitud interna de renuncia al resentimiento por parte de quien sufre una ofensa, tal como se define en el Diccionario Oxford de filosofía, en el que se lee: perdón es la «renuncia al resentimiento, ira u otras reacciones hacia quien ha hecho algo que justifica tales respuestas» (Blackburn, 2005, p. 37). Esta definición y las teorías que de ella se desprenden tiene su origen específico en la propuesta moral de Joseph Butler, concretamente, la que se expone en los Sermones VIII y IX, sobre la ira y el perdón (Konstan, 2010). En gran medida, se debe a estos sermones que generalmente se entrelacen los conceptos de resentimiento y perdón (Griswold, 2007). ...
Este artículo propone considerar el perdón como un acto social y muestra las ventajas explicativas de dicha perspectiva. En la primera parte del trabajo se revisa la definición de acto social planteada por Adolf Reinach, se presentan algunas objeciones a la consideración del perdón como acto social y se responde a ellas. En la segunda parte se exploran tres ventajas explicativas de esta propuesta: la primera, frente a la crítica de Nussbaum al perdón perverso, la segunda, frente a la crítica de Serrano y Cázares al perdón moralista, y, la tercera, en atención a la polisemia del perdón.
... Было показано, как понятие, которое принято ассоциировать с религиозной картиной мира, а также такими добродетелями как смирение, покорность, а также такими психологическими чертами как слабость, боязливость, было помещено в новый контекст и рассмотрено с научной точки зрения (напр. Konstan, 2010;Nussbaum, 2016). В результате обществу могут быть открыты совершенно новые горизонты пользования прощением как феноменом и языковым конструктом. ...
... У отцов церкви божественное прощение -отмена греха, как если бы это был прощеный долг, достигаемый через покаяние и изменение сердца. Однако долгое время понятие оставалось четко отделенным от межличностного прощения (Konstan, 2010). ...
Прощение часто рассматривается как социально желательный ответ на проступки, характерный для женщин. Однако в связи с переосмыслением образа женщины в современном дискурсе возникает вопрос о психологических, социальных, политических последствиях прощения для женщин, а также роли стереотипов и общественного давления в выборе простить. Данное исследование призвано обосновать прощение как состоятельную копинг-стратегию для женщин в межличностных отношениях, перечислить основные преимущества выбора простить обидчика. Анализ произведен на пересечении двух областей знания: философии и психологии, на основании методов аспектного анализа литературы, деконструкции привычных смыслов понятия, поиска новых атрибутов понятия «прощение». В следствии исследования было выявлено, что хотя в психологии прощение обидчика является положительным, но не обязательным результатом, такая стратегия выхода из положения имеет более глобальные позитивные влияния на личность и ее мироощущение. Прощение способствует возрастанию чувства смысла жизни, уверенности в своих действиях и целях, ощущение силы, свободы. Оно является рациональным и свободным решением, способствующем сохранению человеком субъективности, т.е. статуса самосознательной, автономной, самопознающей, ответственной деятельной личности. На основании этого было сделано выводы о преимуществах использования стратегии прощения женщинами, а также дальнейших эмпирических исследований влияния прощения на психологическое состояние прощающего. В то же время, в культурно-политическом дискурсе необходимо создавать новые представления о прощающей женщине, позволяющие ей смело прощать, не будучи воспринятой слабой, несмелой, униженной. Прощение не должно мешать самореализации женщины и быть исторически должной моделью поведения. Наоборот, оно может помогать женщине достигать своих целей.
... 8 The Christian scriptures contain numerous and varied perspectives on forgiveness. It is undeniably an important concept in the New Testament as recent studies in the field have shown (Nel, 2002;Konstan, 2010;c.f., Hägerland, 2011;Mbabazi, 2013;Forster, 2017b). Moreover, there are many texts that deal with the notion of forgiveness from a variety of perspectives (theological, social, restitution, grace, developmental). ...
... The most recent and extensive project on forgiveness in the New Testament is Jesus and the Forgiveness of Sins of Hägerland (2011). Within the Matthew studies, the most complete studies on forgiveness are by Nel (2002;2015b), Konstan (2010), Mbabazi (2013), Eubank (2013), andForster (2017b). 9 Matthew 18:15-35 was, chosen for this project, since it presents a set of three narratives that approach the complex topic of forgiveness from differing perspectives. ...
... I will try to summarize in a few words how he approached the problem of demarcation without denying it, but also without making it absolute. On forgiveness, for example, David followed a model developed by Charles Griswold (2007;Konstan 2011). The model is complex, the concept and the related ethicalemotional background rather strictly determined. ...
My idea is that there are important differences between modern and ancient epistemologies, but they can hardly be treated in general terms (taking ancient epistemology as a whole and opposing it to modern). Specific differences need to be evaluated almost case by case, while the hermeneutic practice itself turns the very idea of demarcation into something problematic, if not paradoxical. I analyze Lloyd Gerson's view, driven by a general intent of demarcation between ancient and modern knowledge, its strengths and weaknesses. Then I compare it with the more complex approach that David Konstan proposed for the demarcation between different cultural contexts. In the second part, I introduce the volume's contributions, placing them into three thematic groups, Theology, Praxis and Hermeneutics, which identify as many relevant points regarding the problem of demarcation.
... Co może stać się punktem odniesienia dla decyzji o przebaczeniu? W pierwszym momencie uwaga zdaje się kierować w stronę sprawcy, bo przecież przebaczenie udzielane jest konkretnej osobie (Konstan, 2010). Jednak w wielu przypadkach nie o sprawcę chodzi. ...
Przebaczenie jest decyzją ofiary, która postanawia zmienić swą postawę z wrogiej wobec krzywdziciela na uwzględniającą troskę o jego dobro. Przyjęcie tej postawy może oznaczać podjęcie wysiłku, by winny poniósł konsekwencje swych czynów, włącznie z wymierzeniem kary, która nie może jednak być wyrazem zakamuflowanej zemsty. Pierwszym beneficjentem decyzji o przebaczeniu jest zazwyczaj sama ofiara, która dzięki temu przezwycięża swe negatywne emocje.
... 1. The heroes of the Greek novels are not perceived as offending the gods, so they don't need to show repentance, conversion and beseech forgiveness (Konstan 2010). 2. In Christianity, the incarnation, passion and death of Christ on the cross are understood as the greatest expressions of God's love for people (Martini 2019), but this topic is deliberately omitted because it would require a broader theological interpretation. ...
https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/M8NA8JN2FG7NZPGW4F3U/full?target=10.1080/01416200.2023.2262773
... 1. The heroes of the Greek novels are not perceived as offending the gods, so they don't need to show repentance, conversion and beseech forgiveness (Konstan 2010). 2. In Christianity, the incarnation, passion and death of Christ on the cross are understood as the greatest expressions of God's love for people (Martini 2019), but this topic is deliberately omitted because it would require a broader theological interpretation. ...
... esp. Konstan and Rutter 2003, Konstan 2006, Konstan 2010, Konstan 2011, Ure and Frost 2014 On reconciliation in general cf. also Moloney and Williams 2017 and Raaflaub 2007. ...
Even though scholars are yet to agree on the authorship of the epistolary collection "Erotic Letters", it is usually ascribed to Aristaenetus and it was probably written in the 6th century AD. The letters of the collection mostly depict extramarital affairs (with "hetairai", slaves or married women), often accompanied by conflicts fuelled by (sometimes justified) jealousy or either partner’s lack of interest because there are better options: e.g. a "hetaira" gets a richer client, a client is seduced by a younger or better-looking girl, etc. Therefore, most reconciliation efforts in the "Letters" are in fact the lovers’ attempts to either get back together and improve their relationships or to end them in a civilised manner or otherwise. The focus of the research is on the analysis of the protagonists’ reconciliation strategies and methods (such as verbal persuasion, lying, causing sympathy, projecting guilt onto somebody else, letter-writing, the use of male or female mediators, etc.) and their effectiveness. The final goals are: to point out the most common reconciliation methods employed, to investigate whether or not the men and women use similar methods, to check which gender is more likely to choose indirect reconciliation methods, such as the use of mediators or writing and sending letters, and to examine which gender is generally more successful at reconciliation (as well as to explain why that is so). Additionally, the author’s depictions of reconciliation and his use of reconciliation as a narrative tool are put into a wider context through a comparison with other epistolary collections of this type, the originality of these depictions is scrutinised and probable models (within and outside of the subgenre) are proposed.
... For this reason, when confronted by the problem of description, the philosopher who wants to avoid giving a revisionary account might adopt a functional and historical approach, asking: 'In what ways, and to what ends, have we employed the concept of forgiveness?' And if someone were inclined to pursue such a path, then they could do much worse than to start with David Konstan's wonderful prehistory of the Judeo-Christian tradition of forgiveness, Before Forgiveness (Konstan 2010). ...
Today is Forgiveness Sunday. But we cannot forgive the hundreds upon hundreds of victims. Nor the thousands upon thousands who have suffered… And God will not forgive. Not today. Not tomorrow. Never. And instead of Forgiveness, there will be Judgment.
(Volodymyr Zelensky, March 6th, 2022)
1. Introduction
One of the oldest traditions in the Eastern Orthodox church is Forgiveness Sunday. It’s a festive occasion: the last day to eat dairy before the onset of the fasting season that precedes Easter. It’s also the day on which the faithful are enjoined to seek and extend forgiveness in hope of a happy outcome to the conditional set forth in Matthew 6:14–15:
For if you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you: But if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.
This year, Forgiveness Sunday fell on March 6th, only a few days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and even Ukrainian clerics were somewhat muted in their celebration of the festival. One bishop in Lviv suggested that members of the armed forces forgive the Russians, but only so that they would have ‘clearer hearts and minds’ when they fought them. Alexandra, a 52 year-old soldier who listened to this address, confided in a reporter shortly afterwards that: ‘It will be a sin for what I will tell you next…I will forgive them only if they will be in the ground. Only then will I forgive them’ (Brown 2022).
... This study is limited to a New Testament text. Even though forgiveness is presented as an important concept in the New Testament, its presentation and understanding is by no means uniform or singular as recent studies in the field have shown (Nel, 2002;Konstan, 2010; c.f., Hägerland, 2011;Mbabazi, 2013). In the Gospels, in particular, the concept of forgiveness is frequently viewed as both a teaching and a practice. ...
... But if you do not forgive others their sins, your Father will not forgive your sins" (Matthew 6,14-15 NIV). It is perhaps worthy of note that the modern concept of reciprocal forgiveness did not exist in ancient Greece and Rome, as David Konstan (2010) argues. Forgiveness as a human trait, with its accompanying ideas of apology, remorse, and a change of heart on the part of the wrongdoer, emerged only in the 18 th and 19 th centuries, as the Christian concept of divine forgiveness was secularized. ...
Forgiveness is mostly seen as a virtuous human response to wrongful conduct. But what happens when there is no acknowledgement of wrongdoing on the part of the wrongdoer? Does the forgiveness of the unrepentant still count as forgiveness? The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, for instance, is a figure who highly promotes the value of forgiveness. His homeland has been occupied by China since 1950, yet he maintains that he forgives and feels no enmity towards the Chinese government. The Chinese authorities for their part, have never admitted to wrongful invasion of the “roof of the world,” hence there has been no acceptance of the Dalai Lama’s forgiveness. Can the Dalai Lama’s forgiving under these circumstances however still be seen as forgiveness? In this paper, I shed light on the Buddhist view on forgiveness in the hope of inspiring ideas that might contribute to pursuit of peace. Firstly, I explore certain matters surrounding the general idea of forgiveness and subsequently introduce Buddhist perspectives. Secondly, I respond to the key question of this paper by highlighting the Dalai Lama’s views as a means to elaborate on the Buddhist stance. Lastly, I compare Buddhist points of view with some contemporary philosophical perspectives and illustrate some distinguishing features of the Buddhist notion of forgiveness. From the above, I endeavor to establish that the Buddhist take on forgiveness is ultimately unconditional.
... Dominik Hoffmann in this volume) and grounds the church's practices surrounding repentance. Not only is contritio cordis (contrition of the heart) a precondition for forgiveness (Konstan 2010(Konstan , 2018, but it must be followed by confessio oris (oral confession) as well as satisfactio operis (penance in the narrow sense), in order to expiate guilt that would allow the sinner to be accepted back into a state of divine grace (Enxing and Gautier 2019). Interestingly, while in the English language the terms "penance" and "repentance" derive from Latin poena and are therefore connected with punishment and suffering (cf. ...
The obligation of satisfaction (satisfactio operis) in the Christian sacrament of penance made guilt productive in the Middle Ages because it required charitable and good works. These acts did not necessarily have to benefit the concrete victims but could also support other needy persons or society. Moreover, they could be performed on behalf of other sinners in acts of vicarious penance. Martin Luther fundamentally disputed this way of dealing with guilt in his doctrine of justification. In the wake of the Reformation, attempts to relieve a guilty conscience through action remain controversial, and a possible motivation for socially good deeds is lost. After a brief overview of the basic ideas of Christian penance, this chapter outlines the critiques of the mystic Meister Eckhart and the reformer Luther and describes the social consequences of the Reformation. The last section discusses the possibility of making guilt productive today using three current examples: volunteer service, vicarious activism, and charitable donations
... Other philosophers and historians note important distinctions between forgiveness and reconciliation (Jackson, 2009;Potts, 2019) and highlight the way that social, religious, and philosophical movements in modern Western history influence notions of self-and divine forgiveness. For example, the Reformation in the sixteenth century and the Enlightenment in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries both contributed to Western society's move away from an emphasis on religious institutional structures and sacramental rites toward an emphasis on the individual and an inward experience of religion (Konstan, 2012). By extension, these historical movements influence concepts like self-forgiveness and divine forgiveness by emphasizing the affective dimension of forgiveness ("I feel forgiven by God/myself ") more so than behavior change predicated on ritualized forms of forgiveness ("because I confessed, I am forgiven and will now do X"). ...
Background: Interest in the relationship between forgiveness and health is steadily growing across disciplines within the research community. While there are multiple forms of forgiveness, past research has focused principally on studying forgiveness of others, whereas longitudinal evidence on the associations between other forms of forgiveness and health remains scarce. Methods: Using longitudinal data from the Nurses’ Health Study II (from the 2008 Trauma Exposure and Post-traumatic Stress Supplementary Survey to 2015 questionnaire wave), this study employed an outcome-wide analytic approach to prospectively examine the association between two forms of religiously or spiritually motivated forgiveness, namely, self-forgiveness and divine forgiveness, and a wide array of subsequent psychosocial well-being, mental health, health behavior, and physical health outcomes among middle-aged female nurses (N = 54,703 for self-forgiveness; N = 51,661 for divine forgiveness). All models controlled for sociodemographic factors, prior religious service attendance, and prior values of all outcome variables wherever data were available. Bonferroni correction was used to account for multiple testing. Results: Self-forgiveness was strongly associated with greater psychosocial well-being (e.g., for top vs. bottom level of self-forgiveness, β = 0.23, 95% CI: 0.20, 0.25 for positive affect) and lower psychological distress (e.g., β = −0.21, 95% CI: −0.23, −0.18 for depressive symptoms). To a lesser extent, divine forgiveness was also associated with higher levels of psychological well-being and lower psychological distress. For both forgiveness types, there was little evidence of association with physical health or health behavior outcomes, though possible marginal evidence for an association of self-forgiveness with increased mortality. Discussion: This study provides novel evidence that religiously or spiritually motivated self-forgiveness and divine forgiveness are both positively related to several indicators of psychosocial well-being and inversely associated with psychological distress outcomes, whereas the associations with physical health and health behaviors are less clear. Further longitudinal investigation of the dynamics between these types of forgiveness and health and well-being is warranted.
Romans appreciated reconciliation and even celebrated and advertised it by dedicating temples and coins to Concordia. Accordingly, Caesar’s Commentarii value reconciliation as well. Indeed, I will argue that, in spite of the war-bulletin tone that often pervades the Commentarii, reconciliation plays a key-role in Caesar’s accounts both of the Gallic and of the Civil War. In particular, in the first part of my paper I consider some narrative strategies whereby Caesar advertises his openness toward reconciliation in BG. Caesar’s self-fashioning in his dealings with Dumnorix and Ariovistus in BG 1 exemplifies a typical script: Caesar (says he) is willing to extend his gratia, but some enemies refuse it, and Caesar’s biased narrative presents such refusal as highly unreasonable; but their stubbornness voids any attempt at reconciliation, and war ensues. Other episodes from the BG confirm this pattern. In part two, through an analysis of the siege at Brundisium (BC 1.26) and of the blockade at Oricum (3.15), I suggest that, in the BC, Caesar follows the same script as in the BG; but the BC presents a more rich and technical vocabulary of reconciliation along with some exceptional narratological devices. I try to show how the artful narrator sharpens his tools to deal with the thorny topic of reconciliation in a civil war. In the third and last part of my paper, I place Caesar’s representation against two contemporary letters found in Cicero’s correspondence with Atticus; briefly, I consider some contemporary responses to Caesar’s narratives of reconciliation.
This paper examines the tension between Cyrus and Cyaxares in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia , and the ways in which Cyrus succeeds in mollifying the Median king (and his maternal uncle), who is angry because Cyrus has usurped his authority. It argues that, although Cyrus has been charged with deceit in his effort to conciliate Cyaxares, in fact such dissembling is ineliminable where there is a genuine offense to another’s honor. It suggests further that the episode is a deliberate rejoinder to the conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon, as described in the Iliad , and is intended to show how properly to resolve a clash between a king and his more warlike subordinate.
The action on board Lichas’s ship in Petronius’s Satyrica presents a rich, repetitive, and multilayered parody of mediation, treaty-making, and the role of emotion in conflict and its aftermath, played out on the most personal level. When Encolpius and Giton are discovered, having accidentally taken passage with Lichas and Tryphaena whom they have egregiously betrayed, the poet Eumolpus seizes the role of mediator and attempts to defend them with an entirely fictitious account of their actions and motivations. His rhetoric only enrages Lichas and produces open warfare on shipboard. Ingenious role-playing by Giton (staging an attempted self-castration) drives Tryphaena to desperate pity and epic parody in appealing for peace, allowing Eumolpus to dictate and conclude a formal treaty among the parties.
Initial performances of the actions and emotions of peacemaking amidst a halcyon calm at sea seem successful, but jealousies quickly reemerge, requiring further efforts by Eumolpus to restore harmony. His poetic efforts during the banquet failing, Eumolpus then narrates the story of the Widow of Ephesus, whose misogynistic comedy elicits laughter from all – except for Lichas and Tryphaena. Crosscurrents of jealousy reemerge, and Eumolpus seems to resort to new diplomacy and oaths ( iurat Eumolpus verbis conceptissimis , 113) as the text becomes more fragmentary – and the ship is suddenly overwhelmed and wrecked by storm.
Prospects for reconciliation founder with the ship (of state?) and its captain, while the perpetually inventive manipulators of language survive to perform again.
Reconciliation is not a rhetorical nuance; rather, it implies several actions that must be carried out for it to be affected. Reconciliation as an ancient practice was something that ancient people could feel, touch and experience. Examining reconciliation as an ancient practice becomes necessary to shed light on this ancient and important practice. The practice of this process in the Greco-Roman world was carried out using several actions. These actions, and how such actions were used in defining the reconciliation process, were carefully examined. It was discovered that actions such as healing, rituals, eating of meals and exchange of gifts were some of the actions that ancient Greco-Romans used to achieve reconciliation. Examining some of these actions in the Greco-Roman world will help in the hermeneutical understating of the contemporary literature that existed during that period. The Gospel of Luke naturally fits into such ancient documents and its examination showed that the process of reconciliation was similar both in the Greco-Roman and the Gospel of Luke. Many actions of Jesus in Luke's Gospel are aimed at achieving the process of reconciliation. Keywords: Reconciliation, Greco-Roman, Rituals, Healing, Luke’s Gospel, Exchange, Meal
Jacques Derrida afirma que el perdón está envuelto en una aporía según la cual solo se puede perdonar lo que es imperdonable. Perdonar lo perdonable sería tan solo un modo de excusar o de saldar una deuda. Si entonces únicamente hay perdón de lo imperdonable, el perdón debe hacer lo imposible y atravesar su propia imposibilidad. Esta manera de aproximarse al perdón cuestiona la lógica de las condiciones que determinan cuándo algo es perdonable, pero también toda certeza en cuanto a su tener lugar, a la posibilidad de su teorización, objetivación o presentación. En este artículo expondré algunos de los aspectos en los que Derrida se separa tanto de Hannah Arendt como de Vladimir Jankélévitch en torno al límite entre el perdón y lo imperdonable. A partir de esto abordaré el «si lo hay» que acompaña al perdón derridiano, no tanto como una duda sobre su existencia, sino como la marca de un «indecidible», una instancia secreta, irreductible e inapropiable a toda forma de determinación. Se llega así a plantear que Derrida no aspira a elaborar una teoría sobre el perdón y sus posibilidades, sino que más bien lo inscribe en una reflexión sobre la justicia, heterogénea al derecho o a la ley, pero no obstante indisociable de sus formas. Este desajuste abre un amplio campo de interrogación sobre lo que pueda implicar tornar posible la imposibilidad del perdón.
"In many respects, postmodernity resembles paganism, but certainly it does not totally overlap with it. People around us are searching, but they do not search for answers and explanations as much as they are searching for people who are living answers. If prayer is a metanarrative, then my life must be a metanarrative too. In this context, I find helpful the analogy drawn by Crossan between Paul’s metaphor of spiritual maturation and that of an individual Christian growing in prayer. Paul says, “When I was a child, I spoke as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things” (1 Cor 13:11). A Christian who wants to grow in prayer is a person “working more and more from prayers of requests (complaint and petition), through prayers of gratitude (thanksgiving or praise), and on to prayers of empowerment (participation and collaboration)— with God who is absolutely transcendent and immanent at the same time” (Crossan 2010:28)."
En los últimos años ha quedado en evidencia el profuso interés que ha despertado en las Ciencias Sociales el mundo interior del ser humano, es decir, sus emociones, afectos, pasiones o sentires a través del tiempo. El presente artículo analiza la vida cotidiana de los monasterios de Santiago durante la época colonial desde la perspectiva teórica de la historia de las emociones, específicamente a partir de las aproximaciones conceptuales de Barbara H. Rosenwein. Utilizando un corpus documental muy poco trabajado por la historiografía nacional, como son los manuscritos contenidos en las bibliotecas y los archivos conventuales de esta ciudad (reglas, constituciones, visitas pas- torales, libros de cuentas, correspondencia, escritos confesionales y autobiografías); la investigación da cuenta de las principales características del sistema de sentimientos de estas comunidades emocionales femeninas, estipulando, por una parte, las normativas eclesiásticas que determinaban los modos de expresión permitidos y vedados a las mon- jas y, por otra, las prácticas sociales y culturales que contribuían a transgredirlas. Asimismo, se propone la existencia de sub-comunidades emocionales dentro de la clausura, establecidas según las diferentes mujeres que la habitaban.
This article investigates how to understand interpersonal forgiveness from a Christian perspective through content analysis of research-based literature on forgiveness. The analysis is supported by theory of power approach, and the science of diaconia is used as a lens to describe a Christian perspective. The focus is on how forgiveness can be used and misused when encountering people with traumatic experiences of violation manifested by sexual misconduct in church context. The aim is to discuss an understanding of forgiveness that conveys freedom and redresses for the offended, but also for the offender.The content analysis led to the following thematic categories: (1) forgiveness of fellow humans related to God’s forgiving of human, (2) the role and function of forgiveness in the personal life of human, and (3) forgiveness as an issue between people. Here, an important aspect is the necessity of exploring the three perspectives in dialogue with each other, to decrease the risk of misusing forgiveness by not addressing the issue of responsibility. Forgiveness must be conceptualized within the preconditions for God’s forgiving of humans by considering how the violation has influenced the violated’s self-understanding (the inner relational dimension) and the contextual status of the violator’s position of power (the outer dimension). This provides a basis from which to consider whether forgiveness will contribute to an uplifting and liberating outcome or is misused by avoiding clarification of the party responsible for the violation.
In recent decades, research on emotions has gained greater relevance within the field of classical studies. An outstanding and innovative point of this perspective –with regard specifically to the literary sphere– is that the notions of emotion and affect help to conceptualize the frame of reference that governs the reception of a given text. To a certain extent, this implies understanding the emotional dimension that arises and manifests itself in the instance of poetic or dramatic performance as a constitutive element of the literary genre –beyond formal and normative characterizations.This paper aims to examine in archaic Greek iambography (Archilochus of Paros and Hipponax of Ephesus) and in ancient comedy (Aristophanes) the forms of manipulation of emotions in the laughable ἐχθρός construction through ψόγος
For some time interest has been growing in a dialogue between modern scientific research into human cognition and research in the humanities. This ground-breaking volume focuses this dialogue on the religious experience of men and women in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds. Each chapter examines a particular historical problem arising from an ancient religious activity and the contributions range across a wide variety of both ancient contexts and sources, exploring and integrating literary, epigraphic, visual and archaeological evidence. In order to avoid a simple polarity between physical aspects (ritual) and mental aspects (belief) of religion, the contributors draw on theories of cognition as embodied, emergent, enactive and extended, accepting the complexity, multimodality and multicausality of human life. Through this interdisciplinary approach, the chapters open up new questions around and develop new insights into the physical, emotional, and cognitive aspects of ancient religions.
In this book, eminent scholars of classical antiquity and ancient and medieval Judaism and Christianity explore the nature and place of forgiveness in the pre-modern Western world. They discuss whether the concept of forgiveness, as it is often understood today, was absent, or at all events more restricted in scope than has been commonly supposed, and what related ideas (such as clemency or reconciliation) may have taken the place of forgiveness. An introductory chapter reviews the conceptual territory of forgiveness and illuminates the potential breadth of the idea, enumerating the important questions a theory of the subject should explore. The following chapters examine forgiveness in the contexts of classical Greece and Rome; the Hebrew Bible, the Talmud, and Moses Maimonides; and the New Testament, the Church Fathers, and Thomas Aquinas.
In this book, eminent scholars of classical antiquity and ancient and medieval Judaism and Christianity explore the nature and place of forgiveness in the pre-modern Western world. They discuss whether the concept of forgiveness, as it is often understood today, was absent, or at all events more restricted in scope than has been commonly supposed, and what related ideas (such as clemency or reconciliation) may have taken the place of forgiveness. An introductory chapter reviews the conceptual territory of forgiveness and illuminates the potential breadth of the idea, enumerating the important questions a theory of the subject should explore. The following chapters examine forgiveness in the contexts of classical Greece and Rome; the Hebrew Bible, the Talmud, and Moses Maimonides; and the New Testament, the Church Fathers, and Thomas Aquinas.
In this book, eminent scholars of classical antiquity and ancient and medieval Judaism and Christianity explore the nature and place of forgiveness in the pre-modern Western world. They discuss whether the concept of forgiveness, as it is often understood today, was absent, or at all events more restricted in scope than has been commonly supposed, and what related ideas (such as clemency or reconciliation) may have taken the place of forgiveness. An introductory chapter reviews the conceptual territory of forgiveness and illuminates the potential breadth of the idea, enumerating the important questions a theory of the subject should explore. The following chapters examine forgiveness in the contexts of classical Greece and Rome; the Hebrew Bible, the Talmud, and Moses Maimonides; and the New Testament, the Church Fathers, and Thomas Aquinas.
In this book, eminent scholars of classical antiquity and ancient and medieval Judaism and Christianity explore the nature and place of forgiveness in the pre-modern Western world. They discuss whether the concept of forgiveness, as it is often understood today, was absent, or at all events more restricted in scope than has been commonly supposed, and what related ideas (such as clemency or reconciliation) may have taken the place of forgiveness. An introductory chapter reviews the conceptual territory of forgiveness and illuminates the potential breadth of the idea, enumerating the important questions a theory of the subject should explore. The following chapters examine forgiveness in the contexts of classical Greece and Rome; the Hebrew Bible, the Talmud, and Moses Maimonides; and the New Testament, the Church Fathers, and Thomas Aquinas.
Preventing violence and fostering peaceful relationships is something the world needs urgently. In the quest for truly lasting peace, there is perhaps growing recognition of fostering and restoring peace at macro-levels and micro-levels in formal and informal institutions. Crucially, however, it is important to achieve a state of peace within before any attempt to be at peace with others and the world at large is made. This chapter contributes to bringing into focus the relationship between peaceful identities and internal psychological states and the concept of restorative justice. The chapter’s premise is that one can develop resilience and have the ability to cope and be emotionally stronger and be an empathetic individual by shining a light on what causes a state of unhappiness or a lack of equilibrium. This chapter reflects on how the act of healing relationships with self and others, drawing on peace psychology and restorative justice, will help resolve conflict and in turn reduce feelings of personal shame, which can often be crippling to personal growth and development. The chapter begins by conceptualizing self-fulfilment and the importance of striving to be congruent and true to oneself. This is followed by a discussion on personal coping and resilience within the context of broken relationships one has with others and, indeed, oneself. This chapter also considers the psychological and restorative aspects of forgiveness, particularly the importance of forgiving oneself despite the potential difficulties in doing this. This raises the idea that such healing can promote inner strength and help one be better able to cope with internal and external conflicts. Finally, the chapter discusses forgiveness in some religious traditions and outlines strategies to develop internal coping mechanisms drawing on them.
For some time interest has been growing in a dialogue between modern scientific research into human cognition and research in the humanities. This ground-breaking volume focuses this dialogue on the religious experience of men and women in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds. Each chapter examines a particular historical problem arising from an ancient religious activity and the contributions range across a wide variety of both ancient contexts and sources, exploring and integrating literary, epigraphic, visual and archaeological evidence. In order to avoid a simple polarity between physical aspects (ritual) and mental aspects (belief) of religion, the contributors draw on theories of cognition as embodied, emergent, enactive and extended, accepting the complexity, multimodality and multicausality of human life. Through this interdisciplinary approach, the chapters open up new questions around and develop new insights into the physical, emotional, and cognitive aspects of ancient religions.
Most philosophers acknowledge ways of overcoming blame, even blame directed at a culpable offender, that are not forgiving. Sometimes continuing to blame a friend for their offensive comment just isn't worth it, so we let go instead. However, despite being a common and widely recognised experience, no one has offered a positive account of letting go. Instead, it tends to be characterised negatively and superficially, usually in order to delineate the boundaries of forgiveness. This paper gives a more complete and systematic account of this important practice. We argue that the basic distinction between forgiving and letting go of blame follows from distinctions that many philosophers already accept. We then develop a positive account in terms of the reasons one has to let go rather than forgive and show that letting go is as valuable a part of our shared moral lives as forgiveness.
Con base en la conceptualización de Fricker sobre la injusticia epistémica y la práctica del perdón como justicia moral, se hace un análisis de la relación entre injusticia epistémica e inculpación redundante. Se argumenta que, en el contexto del posconflicto colombiano, los prejuicios identitarios negativos aplicados a los excombatientes producen un caso de injusticia epistémica e inculpación redundante que ha generado un tipo de violencia estructural. Se sugiere que una apropiada comprensión de la función de la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) y la Comisión de la Verdad, así como del significado de la justicia transicional, aportaría recursos interpretativos que favorecerían la credibilidad testimonial de los excombatientes. Finalmente, se concluye que el ejercicio de poder, que manipula los recursos interpretativos disponibles para una comprensión colectiva de las prácticas de justicia y perdón en el posconflicto, es la causa de la violencia estructural contra los excombatientes.
This chapter argues that we forgive for reasons and that not just any reason is a reason to forgive. A complete account of forgiveness must explain which reasons are reasons to forgive and which are not and the aim of this chapter is to offer such an explanation. I suggest that distinguishing between forgiving and ceasing to blame for the wrong kind of reasons helps to solve some perennial problems about forgiveness. And I argue that the only reason to forgive is an apparent change of heart on the part of the offender about their offence and the quality of will behind it. At the same time, ceasing to blame for the wrong kind of reason is not necessarily a bad thing to do. No less than forgiving, it can be a valuable and important way of responding to the moral conflicts that shape our shared moral lives.
For Aristotle, some wrongdoers do not deserve blame, and the virtuous judge should extend sungnōmē, a correct judgment about what is equitable, under the appropriate excusing circumstances. Aristotle’s virtuous judge, however, does not forgive; the wrongdoer is excused from blame in the first place, rather than being forgiven precisely because she is blameworthy. Additionally, the judge does not fail to blame because she wishes to be merciful or from natural feeling, but instead, because that is the equitable action to take under the circumstances. Moreover, while Aristotle does claim in his discussions of the virtues of megalopsychia and praotēs that the virtuous person will sometimes fail to become angry at blameworthy wrongdoers, Aristotle’s reasons for repudiating anger or forestalling blame have little to do with the sorts of reasons that one would or could be forgiving for. Although an Aristotelian virtuous agent does let go of anger for her own reasons, she does not forgive. As a result, I argue that since Aristotle’s account of equity entails that forgiveness is positively vicious, forgivingness is not merely a virtue left out of Aristotle’s account, but is in fact incompatible with his account.
The modern theory of forgiveness states that in a certain sense it cannot be understood what is being forgiven. It thereby stands in opposition to the old Buddhist wisdom “to understand all means to forgive all,” which has also been espoused by famous writers such as Leo Tolstoy or Theodor Fontane. Hence we face the problem of how the relation of understanding or recognition on the one hand, and on the other forgiving or pardoning is to be conceived. This problem is not new, but age-old. It is already discernible in the Greek expression for forgiveness being syngnome that is co-recognition. If we wish to ponder this problem, we have to also take into consideration its historical development.
This paper critically examines practices that follow violence in the Bible and early Jewish literature. It focuses on the story of Joseph, often read in different faith communities and in scholarship as a narrative of forgiveness. I analyze the story as it is told in the Hebrew Bible and in one of its late antique reinterpretations, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. These texts illustrate different ways of interrupting the cycle of violence. In contrast with modern conceptions, interpersonal forgiveness and reconciliation are absent (also Konstan, Before Forgiveness: The Origins of a Moral Idea, Cambridge University Press, 2010; Morgan, Mercy, Repentance, and Forgiveness in Ancient Judaism. In Ancient Forgiveness, ed. Charles L. Griswold and David Konstan, 137–157, Cambridge University Press, 2012). Instead, the texts describe other kinds of techniques, such as a complex set of role plays or reenactments in the Hebrew Bible and an inner softening of the self in the Testaments.
“Western” notions of forgiving, which have come under some criticism in recent years, do not by any means contrast so sharply with the ancient Greek ways of dealing with guilt as is often claimed. At least the picture is a bit more complex if we take a closer look at the semantic repertoire in this domain. The German language suggests itself for this, since alongside the word vergeben, which etymologically corresponds to the English forgive, there is another word for this process: verzeihen. This involves the prefixed form of the now-obsolete verb zeihen in the sense of charging, accusing: one no longer accuses or charges the offender, one withdraws any claim to compensation or vengeance, no longer accuses him or her of any misdeed. Someone who speaks of Verzeihen in German is not evoking the theological language of Christianity, and thus is not shouldering in the same semantic bundle the Christian conception of sin and forgiveness of sin that might contrast with the ancient notion of guilt.
In current debates about coming to terms with individual and collective wrongdoing, the concept of forgiveness has played an important but controversial role. For a long time, the idea was widespread that a forgiving attitude—overcoming feelings of resentment and the wish for revenge—was always virtuous. Recently, however, this idea has been questioned. In this volume, we neither take sides for nor against forgiveness, but rather examine its meaning and function against the backdrop of a more complex understanding of moral repair in a variety of social, circumstantial, and cultural contexts. On the one hand, the volume aims to gain a differentiated understanding of the European traditions regarding forgiveness, revenge, and moral repair that have shaped our moral intuitions today. On the other, we will examine examples from other cultural contexts (Asia and Africa, in particular) to explore how different cultural traditions deal with the need for moral repair after wrongdoing.
The modern idea of forgiveness has its roots in the Biblical conception of sin, which may be forgiven by God on condition of confession and repentance. Repentance represents a profound change of heart and rejection of one’s sinful self. Classical Greek and Roman texts record various forms of reconciliation, for example the payment of reparations, but apologies take the form of excusing the offense as in some sense involuntary. One may appeal to external agencies such as the gods or madness, or internal forces such as passion; but this is represented as a lapse rather than as the sign of a moral deficiency. The secularization of Biblical forgiveness, treated as interpersonal rather than in relation to God, has given rise to complex problems in psychotherapy, restorative justice, truth and reconciliation commissions, domestic violence, and more. The sincerity of an apology may be questioned, and the offended party may insist on extreme conditions before granting forgiveness. The role of forgiveness, with its Biblical echoes, is illustrated across several domains.
This volume is a collection of chapters on contemporary issues within African philosophy. They are issues African philosophy must grapple with in order to demonstrate its readiness to make a stand against some of the challenges society faces in the coming decade. Examples of such issues are xenophobia, Afro-phobia, extreme poverty, democratic failure and migration. This text covers new methodical directions and there is focus on the conversationalist, complementarist and consolationist movements within the field as well as the place of Local and Indigenous Knowledge Systems (LINKS). The collection speaks to African philosophy’s place in intellectual history with coverage of African Ethics and African socio-political philosophy.
Contributors come from a variety of backgrounds, institutions and countries. Through their innovative ideas, they provide fresh insight and intellectual energy. The book appeals to students and researchers in philosophy and African studies.
Forgiveness is a serious and significant issue in both the secular and religious worlds. It remains one of the most critical social aspects which most world religions have found legitimate spaces in their theological arenas to attend to. In spite of the socio-centric nature of forgiveness in practice, scholars seem to have paid only diminutive attention to it beyond being an aspect of religion. As a result, there has been very insignificant theorising into it as a concept, theory or practice. Most scholars who interrogate forgiveness mostly do so from the point of view of religion and theology until a renewed attention was drawn to it in recent time by scholars such as Arendt, Derrida and Kasper who even considers it criminally neglected. Though this discussion is motivated particularly by three disciplines: philosophy, theology and psychology towards interrogating the existing dominant theory of forgiveness; it nevertheless problematised the concept of forgiveness mainly from philosophical and theological perspectives. It is argued that true and sincere apology is not just saying ‘sorry’ but entails following some prerequisites including contrite, confession, remorse, and responsibility. Employing the illustrative example of the incident of the ‘Reitz Four’ the paper explored the theoretical blend of hermeneutics, phenomenology, and logic towards interrogating previous conceptions of forgiveness and suggesting an alternative theoretical approach.
This article argues that Christianity has the potential to strengthen people’s health when solving the forgiveness dilemma. However—paradoxically—the starting point for the analysis is the presumption that a hasty and imprudent decision to forgive may negatively impact the health of the decision-maker, and that Christianity may contribute to people making unconsidered decisions by prompting them to forgive. In the first part of the analysis, the concept of health and its biblical understanding are discussed. The second part includes both a reflection on forgiveness-related dilemmas and the tension between the decision to forgive and the feeling of regret that may negatively influence health. In the third part, the Christian concept of forgiveness with reference to the aforementioned issues is discussed.
The reciprocal relationship between law and emotion is a question about the relationship between culture and nature, or the evolutionary underpinnings of human social interaction. Behaviours originating as functional survival strategies have become dysfunctional social infringements, out of context, in need of moral repair. Law as a cultural construct attempts to regulate interaction, infringement, and repair, so as to ensure continued cooperation within a hierarchical social structure, and based on our emotional capacity. The article focuses on sexual infringements and property infringements, conceptualised by the metaphorical frameworks of MEASURE and SIZE, and appraised by various emotions. I trace the influence of emotions in biblical legal texts and their interaction with legal reasoning and moral exhortation. I discuss how law regulates and balances moral emotions, curbing excess and avoiding disproportionate revenge. I point to the rhetorical function of law to direct emotions in the service of moral values and social cohesion.
Is it a virtue to forgive? This question is answered in the negative: it is not a virtue to forgive. Such an answer can however be understood in two ways, either as a criticism of the moral significance of forgiveness or as a criticism of the moral significance of the concept of virtue. It is in the latter way that the answer should be understood. The concept of virtue is, however, not used in only one, uniform way, so saying that it is or is not a virtue to forgive does not mean much until one has explained in more detail what one means when saying such a thing. In the chapter, some of the main features of Aristotle’s way of using the concept are referred to. The question asked thus concerns the relation between forgiveness and the most salient features of ἀρετή in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
Ancient Greek and Roman emotions have become a field of increasing academic interest over the last few decades. We can particularly refer to such formative scholars in the field as David Konstan, Douglas Cairns, Robert Kaster, and more recently Angelos Chaniotis – though the cast list goes much wider. Early interest in emotions prevalent across classical genres, such as shame, anger, pity, envy/jealousy, and erôs (erotic love, desire), has more recently expanded to include more peripheral emotions such as forgiveness, remorse, and disgust. A number of studies, too, have focused on specific genres. This research has been conducted against a background of much wider interest in emotion studies in fields as diverse as neuroscience, cognitive psychology, anthropology, medicine, philosophy, jurisprudence, history, literary studies, and the performing arts. Many publications by Classicists have demonstrated awareness of this wider body of research, and some of them directly incorporate theoretical findings – particularly from cognitive psychology, but from other disciplines too – into exploration of classical texts and other media.
O objetivo deste artigo é examinar o desenvolvimento do tema do perdão na obra de Hannah Arendt, principalmente nos textos da década de 1950. Ao longo da década a autora modifica substancialmente sua compreensão da relação do perdão com o cristianismo e progressivamente situa o perdão, assim como a promessa e o poder, no centro de sua análise da ação e de suas fragilidades. Realizamos uma análise bibliográfica que percorre obras publicadas e textos inéditos e buscamos realizar uma síntese conceitual das várias características do perdão na obra da autora a partir do exame da relação da ação com a necessária reconciliação com sua imprevisibilidade.
This article deals with two specific letters written by Ambrose after the civil war between the usurper Eugenius and the emperor Theodosius I in 394. In both letters, which are directed to Theodosius I to urge him to grant pardon to the defeated party of Eugenius, we read Ambrose praising venia (mercy) as a virtue that needs to be practised in imitation of the Christian God. When taken at face value, the letters and the bishop appear to have played a major role in influencing Theodosius I’s decision of pardon which followed shortly after the battle. When the history of granting pardon is examined, however, it becomes apparent that Ambrose’s venia is in fact not very different from the mercy which had been practised by the Roman emperors, Theodosius I included, towards their enemies since the days of Julius Caesar. With the assertion of this practice, the self-declared intercessor Ambrose’s letters, which were written in the vein of other letters of antiquity that almost always pursued the goal of showing off one’s literary skills and therefore should be read with caution, should be considered no more than two letters gilded with Christian rhetoric to convey the bishop’s version of events to posterity.
This article considers the role of emotion, memory, and trauma in literature. It analyzes the lead characters in Salman Rushdie's novel Fury and Homer's Iliad and suggests that the traumatic childhood experiences of Professor Malik Solanka and Achilles significantly influenced their anger and rage in their adult lives. It also discusses Sigmund Freud's thoughts about trauma and explains that his theory is based on the three basic concepts of repression, deferral, and overdetermination.
The question explored in this article pertains to the type of exchange specific to human relations we call forgiveness. Hannah Arendt's comments on the subject provide a compelling justification for its necessity: “Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike the sorcerer's apprentice who lacks the magic formula to break the spell.” Yet, precisely the imperative nature of forgiveness may be a source of epistemic conundrums. To elaborate this point, the author begins with a reference to a striking key episode at the heart of the South Korean film Miryang [Secret Sunshine] (2007), which stages forgiveness in the context of Christian evangelism. The article goes on to argue, through a discussion of the writings of Derrida and Auerbach, among others, that the connotations of forgiveness extend considerably beyond a strictly religious dimension, going so far as to bear on contemporary theoretical questions about translation and the secularization of representation.
In this article, it is argued that the Lydian and Phrygian inscriptions known as the 'confession inscriptions' should be regarded as 'reconciliation inscriptions'. Through analysis of the narrative and syntactical structure it appears that the inscriptions were written as testimonies of appeasement of divine wrath, rather than admittances of guilt. The divine intervention and the acts of piety are emphasized in the texts, while the accounts of transgression often have a secondary position. In particular, the verbs describing the dedication of the stele are stressed, being placed as a conclusion of the text. In addition, the concept of 'reconciliation inscription' is in accordance with the cults surrounding this genre and explains the purpose of raising these inscriptions.
Sophocles' Philoctetes , first performed in 409 BCE, is a complex play, engaging with a number of issues that have guaranteed it a great deal of attention through the ages. Among other things, from what we know about the Aeschylean and Euripidean versions, Sophocles offers a far more dynamic work than either of the other two playwrights, involving many plot twists, false resolutions, and, all-but uniquely, a character who seems to grow up in the course of the play. Although Philoctetes is generally considered the key figure of the play, as it revolves around his willingness to use his bow in the service of his enemies, Neoptolemus too is of great interest to many (modern) readers, as it is in him that we see the clearest case in extant tragedy of a decision rethought on moral grounds; Neoptolemus' struggle may well render him one of the most compelling characters in Greek tragedy (Reinhardt (1979) 166; cf. Gill (1996) 1–18).
The Lydian and Phrygian confession inscriptions dating mostly to the 2nd and 3rd centuries C.E. have provoked less discussion than one would expect. This paper focuses on what was probably the main reason for the pressure to confess sins publicly. A major cause for public confession seems to have been the perceived necessity to reinforce the control of the local god over his or her devotees. The impetus may have been the spreading of the Christian faith in Lydia and Phrygia. It is suggested that the local religious functionaries may have responded by heightening the people's awe concerning the power of the gods, requiring public confessions of specific sins that highlight the frightful power of the gods over all aspects of life, and by requiring the erection of steles in the hope of establishing the permanent loyalty of the people for the god who ruled over the village.
In a powerfully engaging and wide-ranging lecture ‘On Forgiveness’, Jacques Derrida suggests that forgiveness plays an essential, yet necessarily paradoxical, role in the fraught politics of reconciliation and in the legal, political and moral responses to crimes against humanity. He argues with awareness of the paradoxicality of his argument, and seemingly without irony, that forgiveness exists only for (because of and in response to) those acts that are unforgivable. By contrast, Hannah Arendt has argued that we are simply incapable of forgiving the most serious of crimes against persons qua persons, crimes against humanity, quintessentially the crimes of genocide. For her such crimes are strictly unforgivable and in that status they throw light on boundaries intrinsic to human action, and hence to political and moral life. Not only do such crimes not call forth forgiveness but, for Arendt, they point to a space (or a chaos) that seems to lie outside of human action or response, defying judgment and thought itself. In this paper, I discuss the idea of forgiveness in light of these very different approaches. The principal objective of the paper is to clarify whether and how the moral notion of forgiveness stands in relation to the political meanings of action and violence.
Journal of the History of Ideas 62.2 (2001) 233-244
Mrs. Dale in Anthony Trollope's The Last Chronicle of Barset, 1867.
In the recent philosophical literature on forgiveness, a topic of great concern is the proper characterization of forgiveness or, said in another way, the proper definition of forgiveness. Forgiveness has been defined in a multitude of ways: among others, as the overcoming of resentment, the overcoming of moral hatred, as a speech act, and as forbearance. Of these definitions the one that enjoys anything close to a kind of consensus is that forgiveness is the overcoming of resentment. This position, with various qualifications and stipulations, is held by numerous philosophers, among them R. S. Downie, Kathleen Dean Moore, A. C. Ewing, Martin Hughes, and Jeffrie Murphy. The progenitor of this view is widely acknowledged to be Joseph Butler, who wrote sermons on both resentment and forgiveness nearly three hundred years ago.
In this paper I will demonstrate that the attribution of this definition of forgiveness to Butler is in error: he did not define forgiveness as the overcoming of resentment but rather as the checking of revenge, or forbearance. Aside from the goal of setting the historical record straight, I have a broader and more important purpose in this essay. One sees that such an interpretation of Butler must provoke two questions. First, why did Butler define forgiveness only in terms of how one is to act, therefore paying no attention, apparently, to how one feels? Second, how do Murphy and the others incorrectly attribute this view to Butler? I contend that these answers can be addressed if we take a close look at the role of emotions and theories of emotion in the definitions offered by Butler and Murphy (as representative of the group). I will attempt to establish that Butler's definition of forgiveness as the checking of revenge presupposes a feeling theory of emotions which is distinct from and in conflict with -- in many ways pertinent to forgiveness -- the cognitive theory of emotions presupposed by Murphy's definition. If I am successful in showing this claim to be plausible, then I will also have demonstrated that more attention needs to be paid to theories of emotion underlying work on forgiveness. But since the misinterpretation of Butler is widespread among contemporary writers on forgiveness and not peculiar to Murphy, my claim is a gesture toward what I take to be a problem greater than mere misinterpretation. Given the fact that a feeling theory of emotions was the predominant theory among philosophers in Butler's day until the end of the nineteenth century and that cognitive theory is currently a dominant philosophical theory, I fear that what has happened is that modern commentators on Butler are unaware that they are imposing their own presupposed theories of emotion onto a text from an earlier historical period.
The plan of the paper is first to show by careful exegesis how Butler characterizes forgiveness and then, after a brief sketch of the difference between feeling theory and cognitive theory, to demonstrate how Butler's definition presupposes the former and Murphy's the latter. I will conclude with a few remarks about the import of these findings.
Joseph Butler's treatment of forgiveness is found in a collection of his sermons first published as Fifteen Sermons in 1726. Included in this collection are two sermons of primary importance to the topic of forgiveness: a sermon on resentment (Sermon VIII) and a subsequent sermon on forgiveness (Sermon IX). An understanding of Butler's definition of forgiveness properly begins with his sermon on resentment in which he distinguishes between two different kinds of resentment. One kind he calls "hasty and sudden" resentment, the other "settled and deliberate" resentment. Hasty and sudden resentment is generally (and naturally) the result of sudden hurt or violence. In hasty and sudden resentment no thought is given to the "real demerit or fault of him who offers that violence" (VIII, 5). Rather, it is often merely instinctive: hasty and sudden resentment is an emotion we share with lower animals.
Settled and deliberate...
Through a comparison of several examples of divine repentance in Ovid's Metamorphoses to their closest human analogue (Apollo/Phaethon and Apollo/Coronis, each in book 2, Apollo/Hyacinthus and Cyparissus, each in book 10) this study attempts both to illustrate the characterization of Apollo in the poem and to raise questions about why Apollo is the god so portrayed. I will suggest that Apollo's paenitentia highlights a key difference between gods and mortals, and also that Ovid may be using the figure of Apollo to remark upon that of Augustus.
The aim of this article is twofold. Both Origen and Gregory of Nyssa treat of the Lord’s Prayer, the former in his own treatise On Prayer, the latter in the course of five sermons on the same prayer. By means of an analysis of the methods of both writers and of the results at which they arrive I hope to illustrate their respective treatments of the same text and so to show how what began life as an eschatological prayer became in the course of three or four centuries something rather different. A major difficulty faced by both writers is how to understand the coming of the kingdom, if it is already there.
My second intention, beyond that of comparison is to assess what influence, if any, was exercised by Origen on Gregory. The answer arrived at is rather disappointing, above all for those who believe in a strong influence on Gregory of his predecessor, by way of his grandmother, Macrina. Not only are the styles of the two men quite different, but also, apart from a sort of common Platonism, their answers are often quite distinct.
The importance of apology as acknowledgment of injury is familiar in some forms of mediation, including victim-offender mediation, but it has been much less understood in divorce mediation. The act of apology represents one of the core reparative opportunities in damaged relations. But it's not easy. This article describes the opportunity that apology presents, the difficulty we have in seizing that opportunity, and the role that third parties can play in inviting apology. It identifies (1) what is involved in a genuine apology, including three essential components; (2) the place of apology in mediation, including recognizing it as an acknowledgment of injury and identifying how to assist clients in offering an apology; and (3) the relation of apology to the adversarial system.
This paper examines Plutarch's treatment of education in the Parallel Lives. Beginning with a close reading of Them. 2, it identifies two distinct ways in which Plutarch exploits the education of his subjects: in the first, a subject's attitude to education is used to illustrate a character presented as basically static (a ‘static/illustrative’ model); in the second, a subject's education is looked at in order to explain his adult character, and education is assumed to affect character (a ‘developmental’ model). These two models are often associated with two different forms of discourse: anecdotal for the static/illustrative model and analytical for the developmental. The developmental model, furthermore, is closer to Plutarch's thinking in theoretical discussions of character in the Moralia; the static/illustrative model to Plutarch's treatment of character in the Lives more generally, where anecdotal treatments predominate. The coexistence of these two models is probably to be seen as the result of a tension between Plutarch's philosophical thinking and his biographical practice: those few passages in the Lives which assume a developmental model occur in contexts where either Platonic texts or the activity of philosophers are being discussed.
This paper critically examines Hannah Arendt's claim that we should conceive forgiveness as a specifically political or worldly virtue. According to Arendt, the virtue of forgiveness is necessary if we are to halt the reactive rancour that always threatens to destroy the space of politics. This paper suggests that in building her case for the politics of forgiveness Arendt confusingly intermingles three conceptual threads - mercy, Christian forgiveness and forgiveness driven by eros. Drawing on Nietzsche's scattered analyses of these threads, it argues that all three of these modalities of forgiveness jeopardize rather than restore the circuits of mutual recognition that are integral to democratic communities. Nietzsche shows that these shadings of unconditional or unilateral forgiveness do not necessarily arise from a will to live together, as Arendt assumes, but are anchored in and oriented by our need to console ourselves for the narcissistic wounding we inevitably suffer in the struggle for recognition.
This paper shows the striking affinity between the spokesmen of both Judaism and Islam, within the medieval “Arabic” milieu,
in their understanding of the nature of both man and the world. This correspondence is exemplified by the teachings of three
major religious personalities, Maimonides (b. 1135) and Ibn Paquda (eleventh and twelfth centuries) from within the Jewish
tradition, and al-Ghazzälï (d. 1111) from within the Islamic tradition, on repentance as a basic spiritual imperative.
The concept of repentance, as taught by these three figures, is systematically outlined. Their views on the nature of man,
sin, and repentance are examined together with their perceptions of the process of motivation. The essay then attempts to
measure the similarities, in form and substance, in these presentations and to evaluate the possibility of direct influence
or borrowing from one tradition to the other. By this means the author is drawn to the conclusion that the parallels are the
result of a common perception of the psychological processes inherent in man and a shared world view.