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Abstract
The politics of legitimacy is central to international relations. When states perceive an international organization as legitimate, they defer to it, associate themselves with it, and invoke its symbols. Examining the United Nations Security Council, Ian Hurd demonstrates how legitimacy is created, used, and contested in international relations. The Council's authority depends on its legitimacy, and therefore its legitimation and delegitimation are of the highest importance to states. Through an examination of the politics of the Security Council, including the Iraq invasion and the negotiating history of the United Nations Charter, Hurd shows that when states use the Council's legitimacy for their own purposes, they reaffirm its stature and find themselves contributing to its authority. Case studies of the Libyan sanctions, peacekeeping efforts, and the symbolic politics of the Council demonstrate how the legitimacy of the Council shapes world politics and how legitimated authority can be transferred from states to international organizations. With authority shared between states and other institutions, the interstate system is not a realm of anarchy. Sovereignty is distributed among institutions that have power because they are perceived as legitimate.
... Religion's influence in International Relations is one of the twenty-first century's most significant, yet least understood security challenges. While some scholars have strived to study the recent rise in religion worldwide, across ideological divides, it continues to remain an unexplored domain, leaving many questions unanswered (Huntington 1993;Albright 2006;Mearsheimer and Walt 2006;Haynes 2008;Hurd 2008;Inboden 2008). ...
... The role of religion in foreign policy remains a controversial topic for scholars (mostly because of the secular origins/premise of traditional IR theory). While its limited involvement in IR analysis has existed for a while, a decisive role of religion in foreign policy is a relatively unexplored domain (Huntington 1993;Albright 2006;Mearsheimer & Walt 2006;Haynes 2008;Hurd 2008;Inboden 2008). ...
... Religion was regarded as the exact opposite of all these 'prized' values and therefore relegated from the IR domain. (Hurd, 2008). ...
Religion has a quantifiable role in shaping Foreign Policies and failing to acknowledge this would undermine the scope and effectivity of the discipline of IR. This study attempts to put Religion as an important factor in the decision-making process, which defines and orients a state's foreign policy. This paper aims to inspect, establish, and analyze the nature of the role of religion in foreign policy decision-making. A significant body of scholarship has questioned the exclusion of religion from the discipline of International Relations and foreign policy decision-making by traditional paradigms. This study aims to understand and address to what degree does religion affect International Relations? What does religion's role in triggering and escalating conflict signify? Therefore, this is a qualitative interpretative study that uses the methodology of discourse analysis. Content analysis of both sources was conducted to understand the meanings. It presents a framework that would lay the groundwork for policymakers and analysts to qualify and quantify the role of religion in foreign policy decision-making.
... Broadly speaking, the term 'legitimacy' is normally defined in relation to political and societal aspects. It is commonly associated with the features of 'hierarchical power relations' between the authoritative body and the sub-ordinated, particularly in a state context that allows the former to rule and exercise power over the latter for collective compliance (See Weber, 1978;p, 575;Hurd, 2007;Billerbeck and Gippert, 2017). Hurd (2007) suggested that the term 'legitimacy' does not necessarily coincide with 'legality' as not all legal acts are considered legitimate. ...
... It is commonly associated with the features of 'hierarchical power relations' between the authoritative body and the sub-ordinated, particularly in a state context that allows the former to rule and exercise power over the latter for collective compliance (See Weber, 1978;p, 575;Hurd, 2007;Billerbeck and Gippert, 2017). Hurd (2007) suggested that the term 'legitimacy' does not necessarily coincide with 'legality' as not all legal acts are considered legitimate. The two terms could hardly become one when the ruler, institution or actor cannot prove their own legitimacy, and social regulation is considered more difficult and costly (Taylor, 2001, p.416). ...
... Furthermore, Hurd (2007) mentioned strategies to legitimise and de-legitimise power to use the existing norms and values of society to justify one's position (p.3) According to Van Leeuwen and Wodak (2007, p.92), there are four legitimation strategies: (i) authorisation by referring to the authority of tradition, custom and law; and of persons in whom institutional authority;(ii) moral evaluation by referring to value systems; (iii) rationalisation by referring to goals and uses of institutionalised social action, and the knowledge of society that has been constructed to endow them with cognitive validity; (iv) mythopoesis, by referring to narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions. ...
The research explores how the meanings of ‘legitimacy’ are interpreted and constructed by two bhikkhuni communities in Thailand, namely Songdhammakalyani and Nirodharam, through multimodality. Thailand is the biggest (Theravada) Buddhist country, and it is believed that the Buddha had allowed women to be ordained as members of the fourfold Buddhist assemblies in order to sustain Buddhism. However, currently, the existing bhikkhuni are not considered as part of the official Thai monastic order as chiefly demonstrated via the mainstream discourse of Thai religious authorities.
This project refers to Multimodal Social Semiotic Analysis (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006), to (i) provide a comparative analysis on how notions of ‘legitimacy’ are interpreted and (re)disseminated; (ii) identify similar and disparate utilisation of employed multimodal resources in the meaning-making of ‘legitimacy’; and (iii) discuss how this study can link the ideas of ‘multimodality’ and ‘legitimacy’ in the localised Thai context. The thesis mainly analyses the multimodal discourse of ‘legitimacy’ constructed via Facebook websites, excluding audience comments, in the three major Buddhist events in 2012, 2014, and 2016 - 2017, in connection with their offline communication consisting of (i) publications, (ii) speeches; and (iii) activities organised and attended by them for the same timeline, along with interview, focus-group discussion and participatory observation. The findings show their dissimilar interpretations of 'legitimacy' in Thai Buddhism and utilisation of semiotic resources in the meaning making of their 'legitimacy'. The project underlines how multimodality helps in manifesting the ‘legitimacy’ of bhikkhuni communities, who are considered as a non-mainstream group, to sustain Buddhism locally.
Keywords: Multimodality, Social Semiotics, bhikkhuni communities, Thai Buddhism, Facebook
... The conventional resource theory of legitimacy's effects has accumulated empirical support in international studies ( Ruggie 1982 ;Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990 ;Hurd 2008 ;Rauh and Zürn 2020 ), in cross-country comparisons ( Booth and Seligson 2009 ;Gilley 2009 ), and in research on legal compliance among citizens within states ( Levi 1997 ;Sunshine and Tyler 2003 ). Other studies find little support for, or contradict, the conventional theory. ...
... Information that a real audience hold such beliefs may be gathered in empirical research from sur veys, inter views, and public declarations that reveal political beliefs ( Booth and Seligson 2009 ;Gilley 2009 ;Sommerer et al. 2022 ). The political institution will then be ineffective because coercion is a costly and ineffective means of steering and coordinating behavior while also not available to all political institutions (particularly not to international ones) ( Hurd 2008 ). If the political institution has limited coercive powers and a legitimacy audience does not expect the institution to promote collective goods, its audience (which may include governments, citizens, and/or civil society, depending on the situation) may simply ignore the political institution, rebel against it, or exit. ...
... Still, we do not replace one orthodoxy with another. The conventional resource theory applies in particular settings ( Levi 1997 ;Hurd 2008 ;Gilley 2009 ). Instead, our approach has been to subsume both costs and benefits of legitimacy in a single theory, to specify original hypotheses and causal mechanisms pertaining to the costs of legitimacy, and finally to illustrate these hypotheses and mechanisms empirically. ...
Can political institutions be too legitimate for their own good? The standard view of legitimacy treats it purely as a resource—political institutions that enjoy legitimacy can draw on voluntary cooperation among their subjects to reach their aims, which is believed to make them more effective than institutions that lack legitimacy and must instead use coercion or bribery to reach aims. We challenge this conventional wisdom by advancing a more general theory that is sensitive also to the costs of legitimacy. High levels of legitimacy, we suggest, can make political actors complacent about the status quo and cause them to pay insufficient attention to problems related to implementation. In contrast, low levels of legitimacy—or legitimacy crises—can serve as a wake-up call and motivate actors to work harder to reach their original or wider goals. We illustrate this theory through a case study of the African Union, assessing when and how legitimacy serves as a cost or as a resource for political institutions, with implications for decision-making, implementation, and effectiveness.
... Third, what the Council decides to take up for deliberation, and leave out, has implications for perceptions about legitimacy. Insufficient or biased attention is a recurring concern in policy debates and agenda-setting is the first step in the Council's legitimizing function in international politics (Coleman 2007;Hurd 2008). Finally, largely flowing from the aforementioned reasons, agenda-setting is frequently viewed as an exercise of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). ...
... interests are associated with agenda inclusion. If members use the UN instrumentally, to share the burdens of action across a wider coalition (Voeten 2001) or to legitimize an intervention (Hurd 2008;Voeten 2005), they will need to place their concerns on the agenda. American attempts to cultivate the Council's support for military campaigns against Iraq in the 1990s and early 2000s serve as example for this dynamic. ...
... Third, what the Council decides to take up for deliberation, and leave out, has implications for perceptions about legitimacy. Insufficient or biased attention is a recurring concern in policy debates and agenda-setting is the first step in the Council's legitimizing function in international politics (Coleman 2007;Hurd 2008). Finally, largely flowing from the aforementioned reasons, agenda-setting is frequently viewed as an exercise of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). ...
... interests are associated with agenda inclusion. If members use the UN instrumentally, to share the burdens of action across a wider coalition (Voeten 2001) or to legitimize an intervention (Hurd 2008;Voeten 2005), they will need to place their concerns on the agenda. American attempts to cultivate the Council's support for military campaigns against Iraq in the 1990s and early 2000s serve as example for this dynamic. ...
What explains why United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meets and deliberates on some armed conflicts but not others? We advance a theoretical argument centered on the role of conflict externalities, state interests, and interest heterogeneity. We investigate data on the Council's deliberation on armed conflicts in the 1989-2019 period and make three key findings: (1) Conflicts that generate substantive military or civilian deaths are more likely to attract the Council's attention; (2) Permanent members are varyingly likely to involve the Council when their interests are at stake; and (3) In contrast to the conventional wisdom, conflicts over which members have divergent interests are more likely to enter the agenda than other conflicts. The findings have important implications for debates about the Council's attention, responsiveness to problems, and role in world politics.
... Realists argue that the Security Council, with its permanent members and veto power, reflects power disparities among states (Hurd, 2007). The influence of major powers, such as the United States, China, and Russia, shapes the decision-making process and can hinder the effectiveness of the U.N. in maintaining international peace and security. ...
This article titled "Rights in a 'Might' System: The United Nations Approach to Self-Determination in the Case of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)" examines the role of the United Nations in addressing self-determination movements, particularly focusing on the IPOB's agitation for independence from Nigeria. The study adopts a qualitative research method, utilising a descriptive design to explore the complex interplay between international law, state sovereignty, and human rights. The research relies on a documentary method for data collection and employs content analysis to systematically examine the subject matter through predefined themes. The study reveals a significant disconnect between international principles of self-determination and the Nigerian government's rigid stance on sovereignty. The United Nations, while generally supportive of self-determination, has remained indifferent to IPOB's call for a UN-supervised referendum. This inaction, rooted in the interests of powerful member states on the UN, has emboldened the Nigerian government to continue its repressive tactics against IPOB, resulting in human rights violations, mass atrocities, etc. The study also highlights how economic and geopolitical interests, particularly of key UN member states such as the U.S. and China, have led to the international community's reluctance to intervene in the IPOB situation.
... For instance, Raimi (2016) describes the Security Council as the UN's vital organ and a kind of upper house of the legislature where crucial decisions that affect the organization are taken. Adebajo (2005) and Hurd (2007) view the UNSC as the most powerful international organization as its influence extends beyond formal authority. The UNSC's role in global governance is shaped by the interplay of legitimacy and power which affects how international norms and policies are formed. ...
The development of international order based on cooperation manifested in bilateral and later multilateral relations led to the establishment of the League of Nations and later the United Nations. The major foundation on which the United Nations was based is cooperation and collaboration that was filtered in the veto right of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Agreement among the five permanent members was considered essential to global peace. The study aims to examine the use of the veto power by the five permanent members of the Security Council to determine its effectiveness in promoting international peace from the unfolding world politics. The study finds that the old ways of multilateral negotiations which were based on defending national interests are no longer adequate in addressing the problems of the rapidly changing world.Pembangunan orde antarabangsa berdasarkan kerjasama global, awalnya melalui hubungan dua hala dan kemudian beralih ke hubungan pelbagai hala, membawa kepada pembentukan Liga Bangsa-bangsa dan kemudian Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (PBB). Asas utama penubuhan PBB berdasarkan semangat kerjasama dan kolaborasi tercermin dalam hak veto yang diberikan kepada lima anggota tetap Majlis Keselamatan. Kesepakatan antara lima anggota ini dianggap penting untuk keamanan global. Kajian ini bertujuan menilai penggunaan kuasa veto oleh anggota tetap tersebut untuk menilai keberkesanannya dalam memelihara keamanan antarabangsa di tengah politik dunia yang terus berubah. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahawa pendekatan rundingan multilateral yang lama, yang berfokus pada kepentingan nasional, tidak lagi memadai dalam menangani cabaran dunia yang berkembang pesat.
... Legitimate social structures limit the scope of free action of powerful countries, and so do weak countries. [14] The military strategic needs, domestic political influence and economic interest friction of overseas military bases of leasing countries and host countries are the key factors affecting the development of alliances. First of all, the strategic needs of the leasing country are a necessary condition for the establishment and subsequent development of the alliance. ...
Legitimacy, legality and conceptual factors are vital variables that affect the security and defense mechanism of overseas military bases. Based on the resolutions of international military organizations and universal documents, international soft law coordinates the political conflicts of interests between the leasing countries of overseas military bases and the host countries, which can safeguard the “legitimacy” of overseas military bases. International hard law focuses on the “legality” of the security and defense mechanism of overseas military bases. In addition, legality requires that the acquisition and operation of overseas military bases not only comply with the constituent elements of modern international law, but also respect the domestic laws of the host country. The conceptual factor emphasizes the host country’s recognition of the base leasing country based on legitimacy and legality. Countries leasing overseas military bases need to coordinate the effectiveness of soft law and hard law based on actual conditions to build a security and defense mechanism for overseas military bases.
... Indeed, in a time where the UNSC is criticized for its ineffectiveness, and its permanent members (P5) for instrumentalizing it for national interests, a thematic resolution on PERAC would impact positively the UNSC's credibility. By reaffirming its capacity to safeguard a common good, it would strengthen its legitimacy and raison d'être, creating a virtuous circle between legitimacy and action capacities (Hurd, 2007;Scott & Ku, 2018). Thus, such a resolution responds to both environmental and security aspects as well as the criticism of the UNSC regarding its credibility and legitimacy. ...
... The importance of reform is explained through several arguments. First, a lack of reform may erode legitimacy and induce states and regional organizations that cannot influence the decision-making process to move away from the global organization and tacitly or publicly refuse to abide by binding resolutions (Hurd 2008;Kennedy 2006;Mingst et al. 2022). For example, in 1998, a number of African countries defied the UNSC's sanctions against Libya (Mahbubani 2021, p. 59). ...
The UN reform movement calls for the UN Security Council to be changed. The underlying assumption is that it will create thicker decision-making that will allow more views on the causes of, dynamics of, and solutions to conflicts. This paper adopts a comparative analysis of three cycles of narratives in the UN Security Council and emergency sessions of the UN General Assembly when both bodies debated the same issue of violence in the Gaza Strip. The findings reveal that, unlike its public image, the emergency sessions of the UN General Assembly were used to make the analysis thinner and less descriptive. Another finding is that it was predominantly Arab, Muslim, and revisionist Latin American countries that influenced the majority to adopt the thin narrative.
... Legitimacy is thus a social construct that relates a group of presumptive experts to an audience willing to accede to their expertise. Ian Hurd writes that "legitimacy is the belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed" (Hurd, 2008). Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane speak of "the right to rule" (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, p. 405). ...
Governments rely extensively on expertise, and arguably many of the major accomplishments over the last 50 years reflect the ideas and involvement of experts. Yet expertise in world politics is increasingly contested. This chapter looks at the role of science and expertise in the world politics, and the multiple criteria of legitimacy that frame its reception. It concludes with a discussion of how scientific legitimacy can be defended.KeywordsLegitimacyExpertiseScienceUnited NationsClimate change
... Legitimacy is thus a social construct that relates a group of presumptive experts to an audience willing to accede to their expertise. Ian Hurd writes that "legitimacy is the belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed" (Hurd, 2008). Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane speak of "the right to rule" (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, p. 405). ...
Academics generally present the acquisition of academic proficiency as a learning process dedicated to specializing in an area of expertise. During their careers, scholars are expected to develop their academic profile by progressively building on their knowledge and their professional networks in their chosen specialty. However, prompted by reflections on their own experiences and by exploratory conversations with colleagues, the authors find that this portrayal of streamlined professionalization in academia hides playful deviations from the primary path into new intellectual and social spaces. They introduce the notion of a Spielwiese [literally: playing meadow] to describe these spaces, how they emerge, and how academics engage with them. The authors conclude by laying the groundwork for a typology and outline a research agenda for Spielwiesen in academia, whose utilizers should consider national career systems, disciplinary contexts, and different cohorts and career stages.
... Seitdem besteht der SR aus 15 Mitgliedern. Resolutionen des Rats erfordern neun zustimmende Stimmen, logischerweise ohne Veto (Prantl, 2006;Hurd, 2007). Alle Versuche, die Struktur des SR den sich wandelnden internationalen Machtverhältnissen anzupassen und eine repräsentativere (Indien, Lateinamerika/Brasilien, Afrika) Vertretungsstruktur zu ermöglichen oder gar das Vetorecht zu reformieren, scheiterten an den Vetomächten (Luck, 2018;Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). ...
Im Zentrum des nachfolgenden Kapitels stehen die für die Untersuchung von GG-Systemen basalen Konzepte von Legitimität und Macht. Dabei werden die beiden Konzepte aus jeweils unterschiedlichen Perspektiven analysiert. Global-Governance-Institutionen (GGIs) handeln in einem Konfliktfeld, das sich aus legitimatorischen und delegitimatorischen Komponenten speist. Es werden verschiedene Dimensionen von Macht untersucht, über die GG-Systeme verfügen. Beide Konzepte werden an Beispielen illustriert. Weitere analytische Merkmale von GG-Systemen sind deren Effektivität sowie deren Wandlungsfähigkeit. Bei der Analyse von GG-Systemen darf auch nicht die Perspektive von unten vergessen werden und die Beantwortung der Frage, welche Folgen Global Governance für Betroffene hat.
... Un actor político o institución que confiere legitimidad a su autoridad tiende a tener más apoyo público, margen de maniobra e influencia política, en oposición a aquellos que sufren de déficits e incluso crisis de legitimidad(véase Habermas 1975; Hurrelmann, Schneider y Steffek 2007:1-2; Tallberg y Zürn 2019:593-4). A sabiendas de ello, los actores políticos se arman de múltiples estrategias de legitimación para justificar sus roles y acciones ante diversos públicos objetivos (véaseKrebs y Goddard 2015;Hurd 2008;Wajner 2019;Zürn 2018). ...
¿Cómo se legitiman los liderazgos populistas por medio del escenario internacional? Recientes investigaciones en la disciplina de Relaciones Internacionales han destacado la importancia de profundizar en las fuentes, patrones y efectos transnacionales del fenómeno populista. Sin embargo, se requiere aún un análisis más profundo de la diversidad de estrategias de legitimación empleadas por populistas en sus interacciones externas. Este estudio examina las formas en que liderazgos populistas contemporáneos en Europa han rearticulado transnacionalmente el núcleo duro de la conceptualización populista (“pueblo” y “élites”). Tal proyección del antagonismo pueblo-versus-élites al nivel internacional pretende influenciar positivamente a audiencias locales y externas para así moldear sus percepciones de legitimidad. Utilizando como vehículo analítico un modelo ideal que incorpora tres funciones de (des-)legitimación que actúan vía mecanismos normativos, políticos y emocionales (adecuación, consenso y empatía, respectivamente), se mapean ilustraciones de diversas estrategias de legitimación internacional de liderazgos populistas europeos, de izquierdas y de derechas. La identificación de patrones similares, así como particularidades locales, sugieren novedosas enseñanzas sobre las condiciones bajo las cuales los gobiernos populistas se difunden y empoderan a nivel regional y global.
... Seeking to overcome the theoretical impasse, an expanding literature has delved into the dynamics that underlie the perceived support that the global system jointly bestows upon its members, a mission that Ian Clark called "a quest for what can reasonably be accepted by the international community as a tolerable consensus on which to take action" (Clark 2005, p. 3). Among the works focusing on legitimation mechanisms at this stage we should mention studies tracing forms of empowering decisions to use force (Hurd, 2008;Voeten, 2005); reaching conflict resolution (Goddard, 2009); attaining hegemonic control (Lake, 2018;Reus-Smit, 2007); launching international and regional cooperation (Gronau & Schmidtke, 2016;Mace, 2020;Wajner & Kacowicz, 2018); and justifying institutional authority in global governance (Tallberg, Bäckstrand, & Scholte, 2018;Hurrelman, Schneider, & Steffek, 2007;Zürn, 2018). ...
This article attempts to engage the burgeoning research on the transnational dimensions of populism with recent theorization on legitimation strategies in international politics. Focusing on the performative practices of the wave of Pink Tide neo-populist leaders in Latin America (also called “Chavista” or “Bolivarian”), this work identifies three main strategies of legitimation – affective, normative, and institutional – and tracks their transnational resonance. Indications of these strategies include the extrapolation of strong emotional attachments with supporters abroad, the empowerment of identity-based solidarities, and the reconstruction of regionalist projects. Their drive to mobilize transnational support has been complemented by a normative flipside – the discursive attack on rival “anti-national” elites and the readiness to use national revenues for demonstrating solidarity with international allies. Analysis details how these strategies projected the populists’ legitimacy onto the regional and global arena. This inquiry may contribute policy-oriented hindsight on the rise of populists worldwide and their potential effects on transnational practices of cooperation and defiance, primarily on regional integration, global governance, and international conflicts.
... Despite an extensive history of the topic in the International Relations (IR) literature (Franck, 1990;Held, 1995), the legitimacy of IOs has gained traction within the IR debate only recently (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006;Hurd, 2007;Keohane, 2011). Starting with Keohane's distinction between normative and sociological -or what we call: public -legitimacy (Keohane, 2011) research, especially regarding the latter branch, has systematically increased over the last ten years (see, e.g., Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2015, 2020aBinder & Heupel, 2015;Schmidtke, 2019;Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). ...
What effects do international crises have on the public legitimacy of International Organizations (IOs)? Deviating from previous research, we argue that such crises make those international organizations more salient that are mandated to solve the respective crisis. This results in two main effects. First, the public legitimacy of those IOs becomes more dependent on citizens' crisis-induced worries, leading to a more positive view of those IOs. Second, as the higher salience also leads to higher levels of elite communication regarding IOs, elite blaming of the IOs during crises results in direct negative effects on public legitimacy beliefs on IOs. Finally, both the valence and content of the elite discourse additionally moderate the positive effects of crisis-induced worries. Implementing survey experiments on public legitimacy beliefs on the WHO during the COVID-19 crisis with about 4400 respondents in Austria, Germany and Turkey, we find preliminary evidence for the expectations derived from our salience argument. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications of these findings for future research on IO legitimacy and IO legitimation.
Supplementary information:
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11558-021-09452-y.
Violence fastened with the passion of religion predominantly continues cloaking the world at an alarming rate because violence does not only belong to everyone but it is also at the heart of the consecrated. It is no surprise therefore that violence in Kenya recurs virtually during every election resulting into polarization and tensions along religious and ethnic affiliations or both. The purpose of this paper was to examine the relationship between the Church and violence during multiparty politics in Kenya. This paper analyzed the role the church played in specific violent events during multiparty politics since 1992 up to 2017 in Kenya. In this regard the study responded to the question; what was the role of the church in the violent events during elections in multiparty politics since 1992 in Kenya? To answer this question the study investigated the role of the church in the specific violence which occurred during elections in 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2013 and 2017 election years in Kenya inferring that their roles influenced the occurrence of violence from time to time. The study was conducted through qualitative research method using historical research designs. The study established that the churches in Kenya played various roles in the violence; some of the churches kept quiet as violence flourished in their areas of jurisdiction because they conceived it as punitive and ungodly and in that way, they were in coordinated efforts; while some other churches condoned and extenuated circumstances that led to violent acts because they had a passive attitude towards the government authority having been part and parcel of it in calling for social changes; whereas some churches were not only complicit but endorsed and exhorted violence particularly by blessing youth warriors before going to fight in ethnic violence, believing that it was their religious duty to extirpate injustices and subdue evil in the sinful world using strategic acts of violence as necessary means of deterring large acts of violence and that they had the divine authority to legitimize violence so as to uproot the political evils bedeviling Kenya. In view of all these, the study concluded that the churches were metaphysically, morally, politically and criminally culpable for the violence during multiparty politics in Kenya. Consequently the study maintains that the church in Kenya, like it is with religion in general, is intrinsically violent in the version of a raging cosmic battle between “order” and “disorder” akin to the cosmic war theory as advanced by Mark Juergensmeyer. Often it is the boundary between ‘this world’ and the ‘other world’ that is blurred by church during electioneering period so that the supposedly cosmic battle becomes a real war when people shed real blood and die. The study recommends that it is important to understand the dynamics of the roles played in violence by other religious organization in multi religious nations like Kenya. The degree to which other faiths influence political views in Kenya with regard to election violence is critical. The issue of how the church can mitigate against the cyclic political violence in Kenya kept on evocating in the study. It is important to understand the remedies that the church can put in place to alleviate violence during elections in Kenya.
Constructivism is considered as a key and influential international theory and is an influential counterpart of liberalism and realism concepts. The constructivism at the early stages initiated from its developmental stages since time of the third great debates referring with pragmatism, the scholars at its initial stages brought the concepts like norms, values, rules, speech and inter-subjectivism which were referred as social construction, after this the theory emerged as one of the most important and influential one in the field of knowledge like realism and liberalism and in such a way constructivism stood among the aforementioned approaches which brought a revolution in the field of knowledge and provided another gateway for knowledge generation and thinking. Considering constructivism approach and its understanding on the basis of the literature and the facts it may be concluded that constructivism has played a remarkable role in the global politics linking kay aspects of the life with basic human values and basic aspects of life and is still playing a central role in changing the world in almost all the aspects of life including economy, environment, religion, technology, war and peace considerations which are directly linked with global political decisions and landscape which has changed the world to greater aspect and in such a way it may be considered that it has remarkable contribution in the global politics as well and the same may seem to be strengthened in the future.
Intergovernmental organisations and institutions are generally created to discuss and find collective solutions to problems that transcend national borders and individual states’ capacities. However, certain crises push for isolated, typically restrictive, actions from governments, making the role of such institutions somewhat murky. The South American Conference on Migration (SCM), the Specialized Migration Forum of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), and the Andean Committee of Migration Authorities of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) are three intergovernmental forums that were created with the aim of negotiating agreements, creating, and implementing community legislation, and achieving regional policy with regards to migration. However, from 2015, mass migration from Venezuela, which was considered a crisis by South American governments, led to restrictive policies in some countries. In this context, this paper discusses the linkages between institutions, actors, norms, and practices by examining the interactions between SCM, Mercosur and CAN and the practices of Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru regarding the Venezuelan migration crisis. Through a qualitative approach, observations of practice and discourse, and the critical analysis thereof, this paper discusses debates and decisions within institutions; the emergence and non-compliance of collective norms; and the contradictory practices employed as responses to the migration crisis.
The aim of this study was to evaluate what the function of European Criminal Law should be, if the national paradigms could be supranationally applied, and, ultimately, to determine the parameters that could confer material legitimacy to the Criminal Law norms of the European Union.
International relations (IR) scholars have traditionally viewed military alliances as vehicles, serving to ensure the states’ survival under anarchy and to maintain the balance of power essential for the systemic stability. At the same time, alliances that include a dominant state are often employed by the latter as the means of attaining its core objectives and the tools of legitimizing its extraordinary might and ambitious policies. Apparently, this situation favors ambiguity and uncertainty in terms of developing proper theoretical understanding of the nature of alliances as the core institutions, which pattern the states’ interactions, sustain international order, and ensure smooth functioning of the power relations. Seeking to elaborate more comprehensive approach to studying “asymmetric alliances” as the tools of both wielding the dominant state’s influence and legitimizing its preeminence, the paper engages the insights borrowed from the theory of structuration that helps overcome methodological limitations conditioned by dual understanding of “power” as either “attribute” or “relationship”. Specifically, the paper examines the United States’ “asymmetric alliances” in Europe and East Asia as distinct social structures, comprised of “resources” and “rules” that sustain practices of U.S. engagement in regional affairs so as to ensure reproduction of inequitable relationships between the allies and to legitimize the United States’ hegemony. This approach allows to reach more integrative understanding of the role of these alliances as the tools of Washington’s influence and the means of reproduction of the inequitable relationships between the allies, as well as to identify contradictions inherent in these hierarchical arrangements, engendered by growing tension between “resources” and “rules” involved in the process of wielding and legitimizing the “American power”.
Uluslararası sistemi ve devletlerarası ilişkileri anarşi formülasyonuyla açıklayan uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri son yıllarda ciddi bir meydan okumayla karşı karşıyadır. Bu meydan okumanın öncüsü olan hiyerarşi teorisi devletlerarası ilişkilerin ve dünya politikasının hiyerarşi ve anarşinin birlikte var olduğu melez bir yapıyla yönetildiğini belirtmektedir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı’na kadar sömürge ve imparatorluk şeklindeki resmi hiyerarşik sistemlere ev sahipliği yapan uluslararası arenaya Savaş sonrası dönem itibariyle büyük devletlerin küçük devletlerin egemenliklerini dolaylı yollarla kontrolleri altına aldıkları gayri resmi hiyerarşiler hâkim olmaya başlamıştır. Bu argümanlardan hareket eden hiyerarşi teorisi hiyerarşinin dünya siyasetindeki görünümünü, doğasını, dünya politikası ve aktörler üzerindeki etkilerini ortaya çıkarmak için ilişkisel otorite (relational authority) kavramını geliştirmiştir. Bu çalışma hiyerarşiyi, egemen devletlerarasında gerçekleştirilen pazarlıklar sonucunda inşa edilen bir ast-üst ilişkisi olarak tanımlayan ve literatürde kurumsal hiyerarşi (institutional hierarchy) teorisi olarak da isimlendirilen bu kavramın güçlü yönlerini ve sınırlarını araştırmaktadır. Bu amaçla çalışma kurumsal hiyerarşi teorisinin argümanlarına değindikten sonra bu argümanların üç güçlü yönünü ve beş temel sınırını tespit etmektedir.
The relationship between the legitimacy, effectiveness of public administration and stability of the political system is revealed. Comparative analysis of conceptual models of legitimation of power in authoritarian, democratic and transitional societies is proposed on its base. It is determined that legitimacy of authoritarian regimes is based on their functionality. Legitimacy of democratic regimes is based primarily on processes and procedures and only partially on functionality. Systematic model of legitimation of public authorities of transitional societies is proposed. It provides 10 areas of application of various technologies of legitimation of institutions and public authorities, as a certain socio-political engineering. It is concluded that nowadays new forms of legitimacy are emerged. They testify shift of the center of democracies and their complication. Movable concentration is replaced by the principle of distribution, separation, multiplication and existence of counter-democratic forms and institutions of indirect democracy.KeywordsLegitimacyAuthoritarian societyDemocratic societyTransitional societyConceptual model
The relationship between South Africa and China has not reached an apogee but has gathered great impetus and stirred controversy at the same time. There have been sustained generalisations in mainstream media discourses about engagements between China and African countries. However, despite the heightened volume of debates and media reports on China’s relations with African countries, many accounts of this tend to assume that China singlehandedly drives the engagements in this relationship. Many studies on this topic fail to account for how African countries, particularly South Africa, have been driving engagements with China. These narratives overlook the role of South Africa in this relationship and instead focus on trying to demonstrate how China is negatively impacting South Africa’s development, thus deliberately depicting South Africa as an idle participant in this relationship.
Using a qualitative approach rooted in extensive scholarly research, this study challenges such accounts with a contextual reference to South Africa-China relations in the context of BRICS. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 participants, and these were supplemented with an extensive review of the literature within the context of the relationship. The interviews were held with key participants who overtly and covertly partook or are still involved in South Africa-China relations within the context of BRICS. The study examines two important issues within this relationship which are whether the engagements between the two countries are mutually beneficial, or asymmetrically favouring China while South Africa is left high and dry with no substantial gains. The study interrogates South Africa-China relations between 2009 and 2019, an epoch in which the relationship between the two nations became convoluted as much for what it entailed as for what it excluded. Moreover, the study draws from the theoretical framework of regional integration to interrogate South Africa’s multilateral participation in BRICS and explores the integration of the formation of BRICS.
The findings of this inquiry indicate that South Africa-China relations go beyond the issues of minerals and other related natural resources. They show that the relations between the two countries encompass other serious issues such as global security, climate change, food security and more importantly issues of reforms and global governance within the broader context of BRICS. The findings show that the relations between the two countries are symbiotic and mutually beneficial to both sides. It also found that South Africa is not just a recipient of Chinese goods, but the country is actively engaging with China in the sphere of exports and others. The findings also show that South African companies are thriving in difficult Chinese markets, which again contrasts with the notion that China dominates this relationship. Moreover, the findings show that China has given South Africa an amplified voice and standing in global politics. This is against a backdrop of the Chinese population in South Africa increasing significantly since the two countries formed official ties, and that this increase in Chinese migrants in South Africa could essentially serve as the cultural and linguistic bridge between the two countries.
This study’s contribution to the body of knowledge is the documentation of scholarly evidence about the bilateral engagement between South Africa and China from a fresh non-Western-centric perspective. It also contributes by providing evidence that demonstrates that South Africa-China relations are symbiotic and based on mutual trust and strategic partnership. Lastly, the main contribution to the scholarship is to the BRICS arena where South Africa and China are key players. The study contributes to this field by suggesting a possible working framework for BRICS which may be used for policy intervention and orientation in BRICS.
The invasion of Ukraine by Russia serves as a conspicuous display showcasing the limited efficacy and incapacity of International Organizations, such as the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, in providing adequate protection to weaker states against flagrant acts of invasion and intervention, as well as
safeguarding the human rightsi of individuals residing within those societies. Whenever instances arise involving the violation of human rights and encroachments upon sovereignty, International Organizations find themselves embroiled in contentious and controversial circumstances, unable to compel member states to comply with instructions and rulings. The subsequent discourse explores innovative solutions and remedies to address the distorted jurisdictional dynamics of international organizations, with the aim of fostering a more secure environment for weaker states and promoting equity and safety among members of the international community.
Contemporary conflict studies often cite actor “legitimacy” as a key mechanism linking rebel actors to a variety of outcomes, including civilian targeting, recruitment practices, and war termination. This article advances a conceptualization of legitimacy as a dynamic process of triangulation among rebels, their potential local constituents, and the international community. Rebels derive or lose legitimacy from the local population, but also from external audiences, which have played a central role in supporting peace processes in many conflicts. We explore conceptually a myriad of ways that rebels work to create and maintain legitimacy in the context of ongoing conflict, identifying the target audiences of these tactics. These are illustrated with an in-depth study of the Moro rebellion in the Philippines.
Soft power has become a catchall phrase that suffers from analytical ambiguity. Extant literature on soft power often conflates it with other kinds of power. In this article, I suggest examining soft power from the power recipient’s perspective, emphasizing the latter’s agency. I introduce three ideal-type explanations for power recipients’ compliance with power wielders’ desires: fear, appetite, and spirit. Fear- or appetite-based compliance is in line with coercion or inducement, respectively, in Joseph Nye’s soft power formulation. As such, soft power arguments require ruling out compliance based on fear and/ or appetite. Soft power is rare in world politics, and it often builds on the material preponderance of the main custodians of the standard of civilization, that is, the central actors in the (regional) international society in question, leading to soft power’s correlation with hard power.
There have long been doubts about the viability and productivity of the International Criminal Court (ICC). At one point, African countries were actively hostile to it, owing to a perceived inequity of the African continent being overly represented in its investigations and prosecutions. Against this backdrop, it is significant that the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) launched investigations into the problems of Asian countries such as Bangladesh/Myanmar and Afghanistan. However, both of these have been met with strong opposition from Non-State Oarties, owing to of the potential for criminal charges involving same, raising the question of what impact this may have on the legitimacy of the ICC. This chapter critically examines the Bangladesh/Myanmar situation before the ICC from the perspective of the latter’s legitimacy in the course of reviewing that very legitimacy, as well as the ICC’s effectiveness and efficiency.
To large extent, research has discussed populism in the framework of theories of democracy, pointing particularly to the centrality of the category of ‘the people’ as a discursive construct articulated by a certain style of political leadership. This is understandable as populism thrives in the shadow of the shortcomings of modern democracies. As stressed by Cristóval Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) and Carlos de la Torre (2017), democratic failings and crises open the way for varied forms of ‘populist ruptures’, facilitating the construction of the category of ‘the people’ and manifestations of populist performance. Sometimes, these scenarios are democratizing, but often they produce an ‘authoritarian temptation’ by leaders who, while mobilizing supporters, impose top-down controls over society. Gino Germani, a pioneer of this research domain, considered that, due to that tendency, ‘national populism’ resembled fascism (Germani 1978, chapter 3; Anselmi 2018, 11-14; Serra 2019). Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen stressed that the authoritarian tendency turns populism into a ‘modern form of political theology.’ In this scenario, populist leaders and their supporters -one part of the population- claim to stand for the whole people and embody the general will (Arato 2015; Arato and Cohen 2019). In her analysis, Nadia Urbinati captured this process of substitution of the whole with one of its parts (Urbinati 2019).
This chapter suggests highlighting the analytical angle of citizenship in the populist equation. Populism develops within the parameters of modern constitutional democracies, at the center of which lies the concept of citizenship. Analyzing populism against the hindsight of the social and political literature on citizenship, particularly on how modern democracies balance tensions inherent in citizen models as against practices, it becomes intelligible how populist leaders gain prominence once alternative leaderships fail to address those issues in satisfactory ways. In this regard, the chapter discusses the literature on citizenship, and then identifies several domains in which populism challenges customary conceptions of citizenship, primarily liberal yet also other participatory conceptions, and what hindsight the literature on citizenship offers to studies of populism, and vice versa.
This article explores the effects of United Nations (UN) emergency Covid-19 aid on its organizational reputation in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region—the prominent aid recipient under this scheme. MENA states are traditionally critical of the UN, perceiving it as a representative of Western and colonial order. We argue that Covid-19 presented an opportunity to reinforce UN regional reputation, despite historical grievances. We perform an original online two-stage survey among 667 social media users in the three most funded MENA states—Syria, Yemen, and Sudan, where reliable data are particularly difficult to attain. The results demonstrate how long-term positive perception of the UN improved over time, enhancing UN reputation.
The focus of this chapter is UN Security Council sanctions; that is, coercive measures short of the use of military force taken under Article 41 of the UN Charter. Since the late 1990s, the Council has undergone a seismic shift in its sanctioning practice, from imposing blanket sanctions against states towards targeting individuals apparently implicated in global terrorism. As a result of this shift, this area of the Security Council’s practice has, in recent times, courted a high degree of controversy. Criticisms centre on the lack of due process guarantees provided to those targeted, which culminated in the now notorious Kadi litigation before the courts of the European Union, and other high-profile decisions of regional and domestic courts. This chapter situates these developments, first in light of the Council’s ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ and, secondly, in the context of a broader conversation on the legality and legitimacy of Security Council decision-making under Chapter VII.KeywordsSecurity CouncilArticle 41SanctionsLegal limitsLegitimisation
Kadi
United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) resolutions (UNSCRs) are adopted by a vote of the five permanent members and ten non-permanent members of the UNSC. Each UNSCR is understood to be part of the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” of the UN. The Indonesian government has been encouraged by various parties to make a legal instrument that would enforce the UNSCRs. Such an instrument would serve to bridge and reduce gaps in the rule of law regarding the enforcement of UNSCRs for nations. However, the government of Indonesia faces several challenges in implementing legal instruments for the UNSCRs. This article maintains that it is crucial to study accommodative policies regarding the national enforcement of UNSCRs by considering the example of Singapore. Singapore has special laws that respond to UNSCRs (The UN Act Chapter 339-UN Act). UN Act 339 is the legal umbrella in Singapore for the government’s implementation of UNSCRs. The UN Act is also an attempt by the Singaporean government to carry out its international obligations to the United Nations.
EKONOMİ BİLİMLERİ DERGİSİ
Cilt: 14 No: 2 Yıl: 2022 ISSN: 1309-8020 (Online) (ss. 132-157)
Günümüzde global kamusal malların pozitif etkileri ve global kamusal kötülüklerin negatif etkileri öylesine önemli boyutlara ulaşmıştır ki, hiçbir ülkenin bu iyiliklere ve/veya kötülüklere kayıtsız kalması düşünülemez. Ulus devletlerin tek başına global sorunları çözüme kavuşturmaları mümkün olmadığından sorunun çözümü uluslararası organizasyonların global anarşizmden kurtulabilmek için ortak iş birliği yapmalarına bağlı bulunmaktadır. Ancak kamu tercihi perspektifi tıpkı ulus devletler gibi uluslararası organizasyonların da başarısızlığa uğramasının kaçınılmaz olduğunu açıklamaktadır. Kamu tercihi araştırma programı uluslararası politik iktisadın iki kör bıçağının (global regülasyon ve global vergileme) sorunun çözümünü güçleştirdiğini ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Global Kamusal Mallar, Global Sorunlar, Global Regülasyon, Global Vergileme, Uluslararası Organizasyonlar, Uluslararası Politik İktisat, Kamu Tercihi
Alan Tanımı: Kamu Ekonomisi, Kamu Tercihi, Uluslararası Politik İktisat
The European arms export control system is facing a dual crisis: An ongoing crisis of effectiveness has led to a crisis of legitimacy. In many ways, that crisis is a permanent one, where collective efforts to regulate a policy field and implement agreed-upon norms and rules fail to succeed. To explain the different layers of the European arms export control crisis, we draw on global governance research of International Relations and legalisation approaches of international law. The lack of effectiveness of the European Union Common Position on arms exports has become particularly visible in the two review processes where member states failed to agree on meaningful revisions. The Europeanisation of arms production adds additional pressure to the system, as member states differ in their national arms export licensing policy practices. In sum, these developments have led non-governmental organisations and civil society to protest and file successful court cases against arms export practices violating international humanitarian law and human rights law. The article also focuses on possible means of alleviating the crisis of European arms export control.
This paper aims to contribute to the growing academic debate on the transnational drivers and patterns of contemporary populism. As populist leaderships expand both politically and geographically, the very nature of the populist phenomenon is changing, as it is increasingly being projected on the international stage. Contemporary populist leaders show a growing willingness to transfer the discursive construction of a struggle between 'the people' and 'the elites' to the regional and global levels as a way of obtaining internal and external legitimation. In so doing, they exploit the symbiotic two-level game that links national and international (de-)legitimation dynamics, seeking to gain 'abroad' the kind of legitimacy that they cannot obtain 'at home'. This paper suggests three mechanisms that explain the populist 'way out' from various legitimation traps based on the traditional distinctions between input, throughput, and output legitimacy. The paper's argument is illustrated with reference to prototypical cases of populism in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The incorporation of the literature on international legitimacy enhances our understanding of the strategic activation of populist attitudes through the transnational articulation of empty signifiers, the global diffusion of this phenomenon, and the possibilities for its contestation and mitigation.
This article aims to contribute to the growing academic debate on the transnational drivers and patterns of contemporary populism. As populist leaderships expand both politically and geographically, the very nature of the populist phenomenon is changing, as it is increasingly being projected on the international stage. Contemporary populist leaders show a growing willingness to transfer the discursive construction of a struggle between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’ to the regional and global levels as a way of obtaining internal and external legitimation. In so doing, they exploit the symbiotic two-level game that links national and international (de-)legitimation dynamics, seeking to gain ‘abroad’ the kind of legitimacy that they cannot obtain ‘at home’. This article suggests three mechanisms that explain the populist ‘way out’ from various legitimation traps based on the traditional distinctions between input, throughput, and output legitimacy. The article’s argument is illustrated with reference to prototypical cases of populism in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The incorporation of the literature on international legitimacy enhances our understanding of the strategic activation of populist attitudes through the transnational articulation of empty signifiers, the global diffusion of this phenomenon, and the possibilities for its contestation and mitigation.
Global governance has come under increasing pressure since the end of the Cold War. In some issue areas, these pressures have led to significant changes in the architecture of governance institutions. In others, institutions have resisted pressures for change. This volume explores what accounts for this divergence in architecture by identifying three modes of governance: hierarchies, networks, and markets. The authors apply these ideal types to different issue areas in order to assess how global governance has changed and why. In most issue areas, hierarchical modes of governance, established after World War II, have given way to alternative forms of organization focused on market or network-based architectures. Each chapter explores whether these changes are likely to lead to more or less effective global governance across a wide range of issue areas. This provides a novel and coherent theoretical framework for analysing change in global governance.
This article shall ask how Hamas, as a non-state actor, negotiated legitimacy with the clans in a fragmented and factionalized tribal society in the Gaza Strip from 2007–2011. An important factor that shapes the extent of power of rebels and non-state actors in limited statehood areas (LSA) pertains to the negotiation of power these rebels develop with clans in certain areas or times. Rebel governance is a complex and multidimensional concept shaped by the pre-existing particularity of the rebel, its identity, level of factionalism, the former structure of administration, and the extant political institutions. This paper will discuss Hamas as a contemporary case of rebel governance in war and post-war times, which has resulted in a special case of fragile governance. Based on ethnographic research on Hamas and insights from political theories of identity and governance, this paper suggest that tribal factionalism led to violence and played a major role in shaping the governance structure and mechanisms through political affiliation, informal judicial mechanisms, and as a part of the social network which resists government authority. This paper shall propose that Hamas used two paths of negotiations with clans: a coercive power (violent), and by mobilizing individuals of these clans and families as part of the informal judicial system (U’rf). This research aims to contribute to the understanding of rebel governance in general, and Hamas in particular, showing how struggle over legitimacy is shaped and negotiated, and why Hamas could be considered a special case in the study of rebel governance.
The embarkation of private armed guards on commercial ships in Somalia has provided a unique opportunity to test the bounds of international law. The phenomenon was new. Until that point shipowners had been reticent to carry weapons or engage the services of those carrying weapons. The legal and practical risks of such carriage or engagement outweighed the potential benefits they offered to defend vessels. Somalia, however, was genuinely peculiar. While shipowners had contended with piracy before, for example in the Straits of Malacca, Somalia represented a potent combination of a failed State with a large, difficult-to-patrol and strategically vulnerable coastline. Shipowners began to engage the services of private maritime security companies (PMSCs) and their privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) to safeguard the passage of vessels through the Gulf of Aden, adjacent to Somalia, which is also the second busiest shipping lane in the world. By 2011 it was estimated that up to 50% of vessels sailing through the Gulf of Aden were using the services of armed guards. This new phenomenon gave rise to particular concerns under public international law regarding the law of the sea (and the safety of life at sea in particular) and international human rights protection. These concerns reverberated into private domestic legal concerns as shipowners, marine underwriters and indemnifiers became alarmed at the potential vulnerability of their commercial arrangements on the grounds of illeg- ality and public policy, in addition to their potential liability stemming from the use of force. While international law did have some norms relevant to the embarkation of armed guards, targeted regulation was lacking. Applicable rules had to be distilled from a variety of legal worlds: international and domestic, public and private. Member States of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) were slow to respond to this phenomenon. Many States were reticent to cooperate on regulatory initiatives out of fear that such initiatives would be seen to condone the use of guards. Despite this, shipowners and PMSCs did not stop embarking armed guards due to the lack of regulation. Rather, some PMSCs took advantage of the lack of regulation to cut corners and contract on terms that were arguably a prima facie violation of the law of the sea (in particular the role of the shipmaster). The use of armed guards off the Somali coast has tested the ability of the law of the sea framework enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to respond to the use of force at sea. A lack of targeted governmental regulation motivated the shipping and insurance industries to develop regulatory initiatives including: the ISO 28007-1:2015 Guidelines for PMSCs Providing PCASP on Board Ships (ISO 28007:2015), the GUARDCON Contract for the Employment of Security Guards on Vessels and the 100 Series Rules as to the Use of Force (100 Series RUF). These instruments incorporate international norms concerning the law of the sea and human rights law into commercial shipping and insurance arrangements. This dissertation examines both the public international law framework and the role of private ordering in this context. The following research questions are addressed: 1. Who is responsible for the acts of PCASP at sea and why? 2. How does private ordering contribute to the governance of PCASP at sea? This dissertation argues that, despite public international law having the substantive norms necessary to address the embarkation of armed guards at sea, it is undermined by the prominent and problematic doctrine of flag State jurisdiction over vessels. The result has been gaps in the enforcement of international law giving rise to a practical impunity being enjoyed by armed guards in terms of their conduct. The industry initiatives have a unique role to play alongside public international law in helping to close these enforcement gaps. Despite this, the potential of these industry initiatives is weakened by the difficultly of measuring their effectiveness given the lack of transparency over how they are enforced in practice. Their potential is further undermined by a lack of dispute resolution options to effectively redress harm caused by armed guards. While industry contributions to regulation have great promise, they would be strengthened through stronger reporting requirements and the adoption of current proposals to allow arbitration of human rights violations committed at sea.
O presente artigo compila uma extensa revisão bibliográfica acerca da evolução do conceito de Responsabilidade de Proteger (R2P), além de explorar a contribuição brasileira no tocante ao conceito de Responsabilidade ao Proteger (RwP). O objetivo é consolidar fundamentos essenciais dispersos em inúmeras publicações num único trabalho e aprofundar questões de cunho epistemológico sobre o tema. Os resultados, após investigação em bases de dados secundárias e posterior análise de conteúdo, são assim apresentados, relativos ao Brasil: (i) o conceito de Responsabilidade ao Proteger (RwP) encontra-se inequivocamente estacionada no ponto em que o país encontrou as primeiras e naturais resistências ao tema. O trabalho é útil a acadêmicos, pesquisadores, praticantes, negociadores e outros interessados. Finalmente, discussão, implicações e recomendações para pesquisas futuras completam o presente trabalho.
After years of using terror as a strategic tool against its ostensible supporters in southern Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) claims to be moving in a democratic direction. If true, this change would stand as a case of an insurgency responding to global political and normative pressures to democratize, and would signal acceptance of greater reciprocity in social relations in the insurgency—a pattern that fits with broader propositions of state-building
scholars. Yet, as this article argues, the SPLA will not achieve its state-building objective because of the effects of international norms on the movement's intentions and pursuits of its interests.
International burden‐sharing, that is, the question how costs of common initiatives or the provision of public goods should be shared between states, raises two important questions. First, the question of motivation. How do we explain calls for burden‐sharing beyond the state? Second, the question of patterns. How can one account for the unequal distribution of burdens across countries that one observes? In order to address these questions, the first part of the paper proposes and analyses two burden‐sharing approaches—one based on a ‘cost–benefit logic’, the other on a ‘norm‐based’ logic—that offer partly competing and partly complementary hypotheses for answering these two questions. The second part analyses EU attempts to share burdens in the area of forced migration in order to test these hypotheses empirically. The results suggest that although there is still little evidence for inter‐state solidarity in the EU, norm‐based approaches can nonetheless offer a powerful account of European burden‐sharing in the area of forced migration.
The World Bank is engaged in constructing market economies in developing countries. Part of the justification for this activity is that market-based economic arrangements are, at base, 'natural' because they are the product of an economic rationality inherent in all persons. An examination of the practices of the World Bank, however, reveals that the economy is a 'constructed' space not simply in ten-ns of the need for the 'right' economic policies, or a 'good' institutional and regulatory environment, but because economic rationality itself must be constructed.
The United Nations has usurped power from its members, threatening American interests. The time has come to deliver an ultimatum: Either the United Nations reforms quickly and dramatically or the United States will end its participation.
Multilateralism is a means, not an end, and there is no more multilateral body than the UN. That may make it unwieldy at times, but the UN's inclusiveness is the key to the legitimacy only it can confer. The organization thus remains an essential force in international politics, and one the United States benefits from greatly.
Donald Green and Ian Shapiro argue that rational choice scholarship in political science is excessively theory‐driven: too few of its theoretical insights have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived. But rational choice theorizing has the potential to identify and correct logical inconsistencies and slippages. It is thus valuable even if the resulting theories are not tested empirically. When Green and Shapiro's argument concerning collective dilemmas and free riding is formalized, it turns out to be deeply flawed and in many respects outright false. Their mistake is common enough: they misclassify a variety of collective dilemmas as prisoner's dilemmas. Because they misunderstand the theory of rational choice, Green and Shapiro allege that it is refuted by empirical findings that, in fact, support it.
Using a survey of mass publics, we investigate the political legitimacy of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. To what degree does the Court have the visibility and diffuse support necessary for legitimacy? What accounts for variability in support for the Court? Are theories developed largely in the American context generalizable in Western Europe to a transnational legal institution? Do the sources of the Court's legitimacy vary across nations, and how? Our analysis indicates that relatively obscure institutions such as the Court of Justice are unlikely to build support through satisfying their constituencies' demands. Without information about the Court of Justice, ordinary citizens form their views based on its connection with the European Union and its association with broad political and legal values. As the Court moves into the limelight of European law and politics, the decisions the judges make may increasingly shape citizens' perceptions of its legitimacy.
Although rational choice theory has enjoyed only modest predictive success, it provides a powerful explanatory mechanism for social processes involving strategic interaction among individuals and it stimulates interesting empirical inquiries. Rather than present competing theories to compare against rational choice, Don Green and Ian Shapiro have merely alluded to alternative explanatory variables such as culture, institutions, and social norms, without showing either how these factors can be incorporated into a more powerful theory, or how they are inconsistent with rational choice theory. It is likely that any eventual theory of the origin and maintenance of social institutions, norms, and values will have to reserve a central place for rational action.
Re-examines the nature of violence and its role in systems of inequality. The author proposes a generic conception of violence focused unconditionally on the injuriousness of actions, divorced from their common social representation. The conflict model posits that force and violence, laced with hostility, are primary features of the dominant strategy of control in expropriative relations. The author reassesses the role of violence in the maintenance of expropriative social relations, contending that dominant groups do make routine use of violence in the management of expropriative relations, but that the violence is not practiced openly in an explicit show of force. Instead, it is organized and symbolically camouflaged so that it does not jeopardize subordinates' support for the regime. This feat of social engineering manipulates the moral legitimacy of different kinds of injurious actions and transforms the way violent acts are perceived and experienced, thus molding the common social understanding of what constitutes violence itself. By such means, dominants obscure or legitimize their use of violence while stigmatizing the violence of subordinates. Dominants thus incorporate violence into their strategies of control without increasing their own vulnerability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
In recent years political scientists have given increasing attention to the phenomenon of legitimacy, defined, following Richard Merelman, as the quality of “oughtness” perceived by members of a political system to inhere in the system's authorities and/or regime. The more the regime is regarded as morally proper and elicits generalized favorable attitudes from its constituency—i.e., is perceived to be legitimate—the more the members are predisposed to comply with directives of the authorities even when they are under no serious compulsion to do so or their own immediate self-interest does not so dictate.