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Democracy and Political Violence
Abstract
A broad overview of the phenomenon of political violence and its implications for democratic politics. Democracy and Political Violence adopts a distinct perspective: that both community and conflict are at the heart of all but the smallest of democratic societies, and that they need to be reconciled in order for democracy to be successful. John Schwarzmantel applies democratic theory to the problem of creating a liberal democracy in a situation of conflict, violence and social division. Within this framework, the book focuses on the particular issue of the challenge posed by violence, both to established democracies and to the establishment of new democracies. He combines these theoretical arguments with real-world examples and case studies to show clearly the challenges that violence poses to liberal democracies. Key Features: Takes examples from East Timor, Kenya, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq and France; Presents fresh arguments for the future conduct of liberal-democratic politics to meet new violent challenges.
... Indeed, conspiracy believers would judge peaceful and legal (normative) means as ineffective -because they rely on institutions and rules that are seen as untrustworthy or inefficient -and would therefore be more likely to use violent and illegal (nonnormative) means to achieve social change (Imhoff et al., 2020). More generally, and in line with this idea, dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy, or a perceived lack of democracy, appears to be a predictor of political violence (e.g., Urdal, 2006), and the attainment of a democratic system that is perceived as fair and efficient can be a motivation for resorting to extreme means to achieve these changes (Schwarzmantel, 2011). ...
The scientific literature on conspiracy theories indicates that (1) conspiracy believers show a greater tendency to use violent means to obtain social change, that (2) they also tend to be dissatisfied with the democratic system in which they live (even denying its democratic character), and (3) this type of dissatisfaction predisposes to the use of political violence. Bringing together these three lines of research, we hypothesized that individuals' level of satisfaction with democracy will mediate the positive association between conspiracy mentality and intentions to use political violence. The results of our first study (N = 248) corroborated this hypothesis. As expected, the associations between conspiracy mentality and both intentions to engage in nonnormative political actions and radicalism intentions were fully mediated by individuals' satisfaction with democracy. A second (pre-registered) study (N = 292) replicated this finding. Moreover, this effect seemed to be specific to nonnormative and violent political action. Our results thus indicate that conspiracy believers tend to be dissatisfied with the democratic system in which they live, which would lead them to be more prone to use violent and illegal means in order to achieve social change.
... Democratic polities can thus be assessed in terms of the level of formal recognition that they afford oppositional groups, the level of plurality among the non-state groups who participate in these processes, and the degree of involvement these processes secure among such groups as well as ordinary citizens. Where these processes are maximally inclusive, oppositional actors who feel threatened or marginalized are more likely to seek recognition and protection by exercising their political rights instead of resorting to violence (Schwarzmantel, 2011). In this respect, political elites can best constrain violence not by cowing oppositional groups but rather by recognizing their legitimate role in the political process and thereby inducing their constructive engagement (Collier and Rohner, 2008: 533). ...
This article offers a systematic, longitudinal and cross-national assessment of the constraint democratic institutions place on domestic political violence. It formulates two structural equation models which allows for the examination of the relative contribution of formal institutions and political culture as sources of constraint on political violence. Institutionalized opportunities for democratic participation significantly reduce political violence; however, these institutions only realize their full potential when embedded within a deliberative political culture. This article suggests that when oppositional groups view democratic participation as meaningful, and state elites engage with their claims, these groups are inclined to behave as radical democrats rather than violent extremists.
... The perpetrators of violence that disrupt the stability of a State also underlie their actions to reject a democratic state based on the belief that only God can govern the world and provide a basis for a regulated society (Schwarzmantel 2011), while the government system regulated by other than God must be destroyed. For fundamentalists Jihadists such as Hizb al-Tahrir and al-Qaeda, criticism of democracy is the basis of their ideology, and they argue that 'adopting Western laws and democratic rules are so evil that even if laws identical to those of the shari'a [Islamic law] were adopted in a democratic system would make them wrong and kufr [referring to unbelief or acceptance of false ideas]'. ...
Al-Sira Al-Nabawiyya is often used as a reference to violence in Islam, mainly because war narration is so dominantly displayed. The tendency of using Al-Sira Al-Nabawiyya as the basis of violence conception in Islam drives Islamic teaching practices to become violence-oriented. This article presents a re-reading of Al-Sira Al-Nabawiyya by Wakhiduddin Khan, Tariq Ramadan and Satha-Anand, with a mimetic anthropology framework. The reading on Al-Sira resulted in three conclusions. Firstly, there are many non-violence stories at all stages in the life of Prophet Muhammad, since the pre-prophetic era until his death. Secondly, the Prophet Muhammad was a teacher who based his activities on the principles of tawhîd, patience, love, forgiveness and appreciation for humanity. Thirdly, educational activities are Muhammad’s exemplary activities which are full of non-violent values. The findings of this article can be used as the basis for the reformulation of Al-Sira Al-Nabawiyya teaching materials in Islamic Education as well as the basis of teaching activities for Islamic teachers.
Contribution: This article contributes to a paradigm shift in teaching the History of the Prophet Muhammad in a peaceful Islamic education system. The peaceful paradigm in this article can also divert the tendency of Islamic extremism to become an Islam that provides peace and prosperity to the universe (rahmatan lil ‘alamin).
... According to Iftode (2015), democracy does not appear to function as a concrete political practice, but as a projected experience and a messianic form without concrete content. In contemporary societies, throughout the world, there are deep gaps between the ethical core of democracy (as an instrument of freedom) and political practice based on manipulation and violence (Schwarzmantel, 2011). ...
This paper analyses some of Marx's ideas and attitudes that have been the subject of debate, support, dispute and controversy during the 20th century. All these ideas, in the second decade of the 21st century, can be the basis for research, analysis and criticism of the same phenomena Marx spoke about 150 or 160 years ago. In this paper, we point out ten key ideas of Karl Marx that were theoretically important for the analysis of events and social changes during the XX and early XXI centuries.
New scientific and technological developments have provided a clearer insight into the functioning of the human body. Research into human genetic predispositions, genome mapping, and brain function research have all contributed to explaining human behavior. The results of studies in recent years have unequivocally shown that genetic and social factors of crime act individually but also in interaction. Biosocial criminology is considered to be a more recent paradigm in the explanation of criminal behavior, which underlines the mechanism of the cooperation of biological and social factors in the explanation of crime. The aim of the paper is to review the conceptualization and key aspects of biosocial criminology, key factors in the explanation of crime, and the most important biosocial interventions that are applied. Genetic, neuropsychological, neurophysiological and endocrinological factors are crucial in explaining criminal behavior within the biosocial approach. The results show that programs resulting from the biosocial paradigm are more effective in preventing criminal behavior than interventions implemented within traditional criminology and neglecting the influence of biological factors.
At the beginning of the last century, after several unsuccessful armed uprisings against the central government, insurgents in Ireland realized that the fight with weapons was not enough and united in the political organization Sinn Fein (Irish: Sinn Fein - "We ourselves"), respecting the security grammar (Ejdus, 2017: 30), they managed to determine what was the danger they are fighting against, what was the reference object of security (what was endangered), who was the one who protected security (subject of security) and most importantly what were the means or measures to protect security. The subsequent mobilization of forces at the political level, the expansion and deepening of the conflict led to success, especially for the population in Northern Ireland who bore the brunt during the second thirty-year escalation of the conflict (armed insurgency) in the 20th century. The activities of Catholic rebels and Protestant loyalists in the second half of the twentieth century (from 1968 to 1998) confirmed the liberal view that political and economic order reduces tensions between social groups, but also the realistic view that the entire field of security is political, as well as Galula's statement that opposing an insurgency is eighty percent a political and only twenty percent a military struggle (Galula, 1966: 63). Rebel approach, motives, interests and goals, as well as the conditions (environment) were such that the repression and engagement of the army for the implementation of police tasks such are arrest, internment, maintenance of public order and peace (Alderson, 2009: 29), instead of contributing to solving conflict, in fact contributed to decades of instability. After this, the political segment of internal conflict gained importance because the military (hard) power, as a way of achieving goals (political results), did not have a decisive influence any more. The weapons that led to success at the strategic (state) level were the processes of political reconciliation, improvement of socio-economic conditions and diplomatic relations with the Republic of Ireland. At the tactical (local) level, these were investments in education, employment, housing and local government reform. So it can be concluded that the political dimension used to have and still has the biggest significance in this and similar conflicts.
Many members of minority groups clash violently with state agents. The case of West Bank rightwing activists is particularly paradoxical. Unlike disempowered groups whose ability to bring about change is limited, these activists constitute a powerful sociopolitical force, and the security forces with which they clash also protect them in the territories to which they claim sovereignty. Based on 20 interviews with rightwing protest activists, this article explores what interpretation activists give to their part in violent clashes. The article offers two main contributions. First, it proposes the concept of perceived state legitimacy as a theoretical construct for evaluating the degree to which citizens view their state as legitimate. Unlike previous studies that define legitimacy as a unidimensional construct, perceived state legitimacy is defined here as made up of five different components: identification, trust, distributive justice, procedural justice, and legality. Second, the article shows empirically that violent clashes can indicate undermining distinct components of state legitimacy. Thus, West Bank rightwing activists who took part in violent clashes with state agents undermine the state’s legitimacy components of trust, distributive justice, procedural justice, and legality – but not identification.
Among cases of violent clashes between states and citizens, that of disempowered minorities is particularly paradoxical. The use of violence can negatively undermine the protest’s public legitimacy, and violence is likely also to extract a personal price from those using it, especially from disempowered protestors. Yet, violent clashes occur. This article, based on sixty in-depth, semi-structured interviews with protest activists, twenty of them Israelis of Ethiopian descent, focuses on ex-post explanations of disempowered protestors for their part in violent clashes with the state. Three non-mutually exclusive explanations can be offered: First, violence may be described as reactive, take place in clashes with the police during demonstrations, and therefore not a matter of strategy. Second, violent clashes can be perceived retrospectively as cost-beneficial, even if they were not a planned strategy. The potential benefit of raising problems to social discourse, despite the high cost of violence, can explain that. Finally, violent clashes can indicate undermining distinct components of state legitimacy. A combined analysis of the current case study, and of findings from other struggle arenas worldwide, provides a broad picture that could be generalized: while disempowered protestors tend to undermine state legitimacy based on the components trust, procedural justice, distributive justice, and effectiveness, they usually would not tend to undermine legitimacy based on the components identification and legality. The case of the Israelis of Ethiopian descent may be the exception that proves the rule, regarding trust and ex-post explanations for violent clashes.
This chapter builds a foundation to critically analyse the ethical and political implications of Bonhoeffer’s concept of the ‘extraordinary situation’. It does so through an investigation of a key concept, introduced by the most prominent theorist of the ‘exception’ in the twentieth century, Carl Schmitt. In Political Theology (1933), Schmitt introduces the ‘state of exception’ in connection with strong sovereignty and the event of war. This chapter considers the political and social implications of Schmitt’s account of exception, in particular the danger of dictatorship, the loss of a democratic and shared world and the introduction of a force or violence without boundaries.
Democracy has generally been understood the best remedy to prevent societal violence, as it gives different groups a channel to voice their interests and grievances. However, in this article, that focuses on the Chittagong Hills, which for many decades has formed one of the most violent spaces in Bangladesh, we argue that, in reality, democracy and violence can be two sides of the same coin. This is not to say that in Bangladesh, where full liberal democracy is not in place, ordinary citizens have no values and idea(l)s of democracy and citizenship. On the contrary, in order to make sense of the intricate connection between democratic idea(l)s, and violent imaginations and practices, we focus in particular on the process of what we call the vernacularisation of democratic politics. We connect this process to the appropriation of citizenship and nationalism, by ordinary but radically differently-positioned people, in their daily realities. We demonstrate that widely shared imaginations of Bangladeshi-ness, as Bengali-ness or Muslim-ness, and of Bengalis/Muslims as the true nation and citizens of Bangladesh, are intimately connected with popular understandings and practices of democracy, which are based on the exclusion of the not-genuine-Bengalis, with the legitimisation and continuation of violence, and the exclusion of ethnic minorities in the Chittagong Hills.
In the last few years, the fields of utopian studies and memory studies have independently developed an interest in how a concern with the past can inform the imagining of alternative futures. Both fields have interrogated the present possibility of utopian projects that look beyond the confines of the current socioeconomic order, a possibility that has been under pressure since the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s. Elliott Hall's dystopian noir thriller The Rapture (2010), which is part of his Strange trilogy, offers an acute diagnosis of the difficulties besetting the mobilization of memory for a utopian future. At the same time, the novel shows that one particular element in the discourse of memory studies, the notion of "trauma," can play a vital role in restoring the conditions under which the utopian imagination can flourish again.
Yusef Waghid argues for an African philosophy of education guided by communitarian, reasonable and culture dependent action in order to bridge the conceptual and practical divide between African ethnophilosophy and ‘scientific’ African philosophy. Unlike those who argue that African philosophy of education cannot exist because it does not invoke reason, or that reasoned African philosophy of education is just not possible, Waghid suggests an African philosophy of education constituted by reasoned, culture-dependent action.
In this article, I shall attempt to rebuff the view that there is a necessary connection between a monotheistic religion, like Islam, and violence. Rather, I shall argue that the link between Islam and violence is a contingent one, that is, it is neither necessary nor impossible, depending on the reasons offered by a particular Islamic faith community or by individuals who exist on a continuum ranging from jihadist fundamentalists to Muslim reformists (revivalists/moderates). Following such an analysis, I examine an Islamic education for non-violence, in particular what Muslim reformists ought to do to ensure the achievement of such an education.
This article empirically tests three well-known hypotheses about the political effects of workplace democracy on workers. Specifically, it asks whether membership in worker controlled agrarian collectives in southern Portugal has had any long-term effects on its participants’ political culture. The results, based upon a comparison of baseline data collected in 1980 and a sample survey of 240 residents from the same county collected in 1994, suggest that the relationship between workers’ control and political participation, radicalization, class awareness and feelings of political efficacy may be explicitly dependent upon local environmental conditions. More narrowly, our survey results indicate the presence of a substantially different rural political culture from the one described by other scholars of the Portuguese Revolution and its agrarian reform sector.
The post-Taliban democratic reforms in Afghanistan were in part a recreation of the past. Afghanistan has had six constitutions between 1923 and 1990, and most have provided for national assemblies and elections in one form or other. Yet the degree of foreign involvement in the most recent reform process was unprecedented. The heavy foreign hand contradicted the promise of national autonomy, representation, and fair process held out by the democratization agenda. By implicitly devaluing the institutions it sought to promote, the democratization process has also had potentially counterproductive effects. Moreover, while promoting democratization, Western governments simultaneously created a state so dependent on external support that it deprived the critical institution of liberal democracy – the legislature – of its meaning. The logical response of the national assembly has been to engage mostly in politics with symbolic or nuisance value. This study focuses on three areas of political reform: the structuring of the interim administration, the promulgation of a new constitution, and the establishment of the legislature.
Carl Schmitt's friend/enemy principle is exposed to in-depth philosophical analysis and historical examination with the aim of showing that the political follows hostility, violence and terror as form follows matter. The book argues that the partisan is an umbrella concept that includes the national and global terrorist.
There has been a growth in the level and variety of political activism within Muslim communities in the UK in recent years. It takes a variety of forms, from formal political organization and activism, to volunteering, civic entrepreneurialism and the assertion of politics through personal acts and behaviour. Some of this political activism has been met with fear and trepidation as observers worry it is a sign of subversive behaviour or a desire for separatism. However, in most cases this mobilization is a welcome development, not just because it enhances the democratic health of the nation, but because it is a necessary component of attempts to counter the threat from violent extremism. As the introduction to this special issue outlines, democracy should render violence unnecessary because it allows all groups and individuals to express their views and interests through a process of rational deliberation. This article explores this point through the lens of the experience of British Muslims and argues that heightened political activism is a positive sign and can, ultimately, contribute to the elimination of terrorism.
The article uses the Iraq example to show that the project of imposing democracy from outside by force is inherently contradictory and likely to fail, for reasons that go beyond the particular circumstances of the country or the Middle East. The paper then reviews a number of historical cases that have been supposed to show that democracy can result from armed invasion, and concludes that this was only so because in no case was imposing democracy the prime purpose of an invasion. Finally, it draws attention to the consequences for the quality of democracy at home in the countries most responsible for seeking to export democracy by force of arms.
Britain's ‘Contest’ counter-terrorism strategy with its ‘4 Ps’ codification is often held up as a paradigm of an effective liberal democratic counter-terror strategy. However, while the strategy has had some success and been widely emulated internationally, questions remain about the ‘generational’ aspect frequently referred to by government and what kind of an impact such a wide-ranging approach might be having in the long-term upon the United Kingdom. This article seeks to explore the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of the British counter-terrorism strategy while probing some of the areas which may offer themselves as problematic in the longer term. In particular the author explores the ‘Prevent’ part of the strategy which seeks to prevent radicalization leading to terrorism from ever taking place, asking questions about how defined the strategy appears to be and how much the UK might in fact be setting itself up to counter a war without end.
This article seeks to propose and defend the necessity of political community as a prerequisite for an effective democratic polity. It defends a republican model of political community, involving ideas of active citizenship and interaction across the particular identity groups which proliferate in contemporary liberal-democratic societies. It is argued that ideas of community as communication, derived from the work of the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, and his distinction between ‘being- in-common’ and ‘common being’, can be applied in a more political sense than in his original usage to justify a revised notion of republican solidarity. This more open form of community is used as the basis for expounding a strong concept of civic identity, which is defended against three rival conceptions. The article takes issue with some liberal theorists who assert that political community is neither desirable nor possible under contemporary conditions. It offers reasons to be sceptical of both a ‘civic nationalist’ perspective as well as of ‘post-nationalist’ arguments. The significance of the issue of community is illustrated by examples drawn from the recent riots in France and some analyses of the significance of those events.
Much has been written about the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and their ramifications for international politics. This article contends that, nearly five years on, the type of terrorism which emerged that day has not only altered the way liberal democracies define and execute their foreign and defence policies, but that it has also affected their ability to attend to policy objectives domestically. Global terrorism, and the governmental policy responses to it, are not subjected to the same reciprocal balance checks that tend to limit the ferocity and lethality of domestic terrorist conflicts. Consequently, as policy-makers attempt to find responses appropriate to contain the new global threat, four values that democratic societies have come to uphold over the past two centuries are increasingly challenged: security, liberty, equality and efficiency have become fundamental principles that guide the formation of domestic public policy and constitute the criteria by which policy success is judged. Yet, our account of the political developments in the United Kingdom and the United States reveals that aspiring to those values is meeting unprecedented constraints.